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Full text of "The Department of State bulletin"

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FEB 9 1978 

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Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2010 / January 1978 



Cover Photos: 

Marshall D. Shulman 
President Carter 
Anthony Lake 
Andrew Young 
Secretary Vance 



The Department of State Bul- 
letin, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to 
provide the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign rela- 
tions and the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 



For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index- 
Si 8.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy- 
Si. 40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Afl 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 






/ 



CONTENTS 



U.S.S.R. 

1 An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Marshall D. Shulman) 

3 U.S.S.R.— A Profile 

5 U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (Biographic Data) 

8 Summit Meetings 



DEPOSITORS 

FEB 9 1978 



THE PRESIDENT 

9 Television Interview, December 28 

12 News Conference, December 15 

15 Carter Administration's First-Year Accomplishments, (White House Summary) 



THE SECRETARY 

17 News Conference, December 6 






ARMS CONTROL 

20 SALT and the Test Ban— Cause for Optimism (Paul C. Warnke) 



ECONOMICS 

24 The United States and the Third World (Anthony Lake) 

27 Corrupt Practices, Investment Disclosure (Statement by President Carter) 

27 U.S. Balance of Trade and Payments (Statement by President Carter) 



EUROPE 

28 Secretary Vance Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels 

30 Letters of Credence (Finland, France) 

31 Crown of St. Stephen (Matthew Nimetz, Joint Communique) 

32 U.S., Bulgaria Lift Travel Restrictions on Diplomats (Department Statement) 



FOOD 

33 Fulfilling A Basic Human Right (Andrew Young) 

36 Food Aid (Foreign Relations Outline) 




HUMAN RIGHTS 

37 U.S. Observes Human Rights Day at Belgrade (Arthur J. Goldberg) 

38 Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and Week (Proclamation) 

39 Release of Political Prisoners 



MIDDLE EAST 

40 Visit of Secretary Vance 

46 Assistant Secretary Atherton Interviewed on the "Today" Show 

47 Cairo Preparatory Meeting Opens (Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.) 

48 Prime Minister Begin Visits United States, December 14-19 

49 Middle East Peace Efforts (Department Statement) 
49 Chronology of Recent Events 



UNITED NATIONS 

50 New U.S. Approaches and Initiatives (Charles William Maynes) 

53 International Civil Aviation Safety (John Clifford Kennedy, Lester L. Wolff) 

55 Operational Activities (Charles W. Whalen) 

56 Outer Space Programs (Marjorie Craig Benton) 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

58 Jamaican Prime Minister Visits United States 

TREATIES 

59 U.S., U.K. Aviation Agreement {Julius L. Katz) 

60 Current Actions 



62 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



try 1978 



3D r ),0S 



1 



U.S.S.R.: An Overview of UJS+Soviet Relations 



irshall D. Shulman 1 

)lic opinion in the United States 
ended to fluctuate widely in its 
s about the Soviet Union, based 

has been upon simplified and 
ized stereotypes about the nature 
jurposes of the Soviet system. 
Administration has both the op- 
nity and the obligation to build a 
ier and steadier base in public 
on for a realistic and consistent 
:>ach to our relations with the 
;t Union, without any illusions 

the seriousness of the problems 
ved in this relationship and with- 
ndue expectations about the time 
ffort that will be required to move 
by-step toward a less dangerous 
nore constructive relationship. To 
op this kind of public support, we 
a more widespread understanding 
th the changes and the continuities 
jviet political life, as well as a 

perception of our own interests in 
/ay we would like to see our rela- 
hip with the Soviet Union develop 
the coming years, 
ther than attempting to clarify the 
guities of the word "detente," it 
d be more productive to make it 

that we start from a frank recogni- 
that the Soviet-American relation- 
al this period in history is a com- 
ive one, based upon quite different 
s of the world and conflicting 
•term aims; at the same time, it is 
true that these two countries, as 
bitants of the same planet, have 
/ overlapping interests. 
)mmon sense dictates that we 
Id, while advancing our own inter- 
and purposes energetically, seek to 
late the competitive aspects of the 
ionship to reduce the danger of war 
at the same time to enlarge the area 
Doperation where our interests are 
in conflict. Over the coming dec- 
, to the extent that future genera- 
; of Soviet leaders may see their 
interest in a more constructive rela- 
;hip, we should make it clear that 
■vould be receptive and responsive 
movement in this direction. 
Ithough Soviet-American relations 
jut one element of our foreign pol- 



icy, there is scarcely an aspect of inter- 
national life that is not affected by this 
relationship and that would not be 
made more difficult and more danger- 
ous by a high level of Soviet-American 
tension and unregulated competition. 

While these considerations suggest 
that we should welcome and seek to 
strengthen the prospect of an improve- 
ment in Soviet-American relations, 
they also suggest that substantial prog- 
ress over the long run will be better 
served by specific actions on concrete 
problems based upon mutual self- 
interest than by symbolic gestures or 
abstract declarations about detente. 
Further, they suggest that, although the 
balance between competitive and co- 
operative interest may — and we hope 
will — shift increasingly in favor of the 
latter, both elements are an integral 
part of the relationship, and there is 
nothing inconsistent in dealing with 



both competitive and cooperative aspects 
of the relationship at the same time. 

Although it lacks the headline appeal 
of simplistic slogans, this measured, 
balanced, and realistic approach can 
help to avoid the swings of public sen- 
timent between too high expectations 
and disillusioned hostility. With public 
support and understanding of this ap- 
proach, we can sustain a steadier and 
more consistent policy toward the 
Soviet Union through the inevitable ups 
and downs caused by changes in the 
Soviet Union, in the United States, and 
in the international scene. 

Current Issues 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT). The most urgent foreign pol- 
icy issue arising out of the Soviet- 
American relationship stems from the 
fact that, as a result of modern military 



Marshall D. Shulman was born April 8, 
1916, in Jersey City, New Jersey. He 
graduated from the University of Michigan 
in 1937. After pursuing graduate studies at 
the University of Chicago and Harvard, he 
received an MA. degree in 1948 from Col- 
umbia University and a Ph.D. degree in 
1959, also from Columbia. 

In January 1977 Mr. Shulman was ap- 
pointed Special Consultant to the Secretary 
on Soviet Affairs; the following September 
he was sworn in as Special Adviser to the 
Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs with the 
rank of Ambassador. He is also chairman of 
the Interagency Coordinating Committee for 
U.S. -Soviet Affairs. Mr. Shulman is on 
leave from his position as Adlai E. Stever- 
son Professor of International Relations at 
Columbia University where he was also Di- 
rector of the Russian Institute. He is the au- 
thor of a number of books and articles on 
international politics, Soviet foreign policy, 
and the limitation of armaments. 

Among his other activities, Mr. Shulman 
has served as Special Assistant to the Secre- 
tary of State (1950-53), consultant to the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, and was on the Advisory Commit- 
tee on East-West Trade of the Department 




of Commerce. He has been on the faculties 
of Harvard (1954-62) and the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Uni- ■ 
versity (1961-68). Mr. Shulman also has 
been a director of the Council on Foreign 
Relations and a member of the Council of 
the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies (London). □ 






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1978 



ology, each country has the abil- 
destroy the other as a functioning 
:y. How we should react to this 
)me fact has been the subject of a 
luing debate in this country and is 
et clearly resolved in the public 

r fundamental premise is that we 
provide adequately for the secu- 
f our country and of our allies and 
e preservation of the values of our 
ty. Some argue that we can best 
:t the security of our country by 
ng for as much military superior- 
» "possible over the Soviet Union 
ather possible adversaries. The 
iquence of this course, however, 
encourage the other side to do the 
, with the net effect of a continu- 
novement toward larger, more 
lex, and less stable weapons sys- 



tems on both sides; a steady decrease in 
our security; and a mounting strain 
upon our society. 

Between this approach and the other 
extreme of inadequate concern for the 
importance of a military equilibrium, 
there is a third course which has been 
the declared policy of this government 
in recent years and whose purpose has 
been to seek to stabilize the strategic 
military competition at moderate levels 
by negotiations with the Soviet Union 
in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

We are committed to the proposition 
that this country must be strong so that 
no adversary could ever be in a posi- 
tion to believe that it could attack 
either this country or our allies without 
disastrous consequences for itself. Al- 
though the United States can, if neces- 
sary, keep pace with whatever level of 



PROFILE * 

ography 

;a: 8,649,490 sq. mi. (about 2Vi times 

the size of U.S.). 

pital: Moscow (pop. 7.8 million). 

her Cities: Leningrad (4.4 million), Kiev 

(2.1 million), Tashkent (1.7 million). 



ople 

pulation: 258.9 million (July 1977). 
inual Growth Rate: Less than 1% (1975). 
:nsity: 84 per sq. mi. (European part), 4 
per sq. mi. (Eastern Siberia and Soviet 
Far East). 

hnic Groups: 53% Russian, 17% Ukrain- 
ian, 4% Uzbek, 4% Byelorussian (1970). 
:ligions: 70% atheist; 18% Russian Or- 
thodox; 9% Moslem; 3% Jewish, Protes- 
tant, Georgian Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic, Armenian Gregorian, 
inguages: Russian (official), 76% Slavic, 
11% Altaic, 8% other Indo-European, 
3% Uralian, 2% Caucasian, 
teracy: 98.5% (between 9-49 yrs. of age), 
fe Expectancy: 70 yrs. (1974). 



overnment 

fficial Name: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 

>-pe: Federal Union (est. Dec. 30, 1922). 

ate of Constitution: 1977. 

ranches: Executive — U.S.S.R. Council of 
Ministers. Legislative — bicameral 
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet (767-member 
Council of the Union, 750-member 
Council of Nationalities). Judicial — 
Supreme Court of U.S.S.R. 

Dlitical Party: Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU). 

uffrage: Universal over 18; direct, equal. 



Administrative Subdivisions: 15 Union Re- 
publics, 20 autonomous republics, 6 
krays, 120 oblasts, 8 autonomous ob- 
lasts. 

Economy 

GNP: $937 billion (1976 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate: 3.7% (average 
1971-75). 

Per Capita Income: $3,591 (1976 est.). 

Per Capita Growth Rate: 2.8% (1976). 

Agriculture: Land — 27%; labor — 23%; 
products — wheat, rye, corn, oats, 
potatoes, sugar beets, linseed, sunflower 
seed, cotton and flax, cattle, pigs, sheep. 

Industry: Labor— 38% (1976); products- 
mining, ferrous and nonferrous metal- 
lurgy, fuels and power, building mate- 
rials, chemicals, machine building. 

Natural Resources: Fossil fuels, water- 
power, timber, manganese, lead, zinc, 
nickel, mercury, potash, phosphate. 

Trade: Exports— $37.2 billion (1976): fossil 
fuels, raw materials, machinery and 
equipment, semifinished products. 
Imports— $38. 1 billion (1976): machin- 
ery and equipment, foodstuffs, raw mate- 
rials. Partners — G.D.R., Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
F.R.G., Cuba, U.S., Japan, Finland, 
Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Romania. 

Official Exchange Rate: 1 ruble = 
US $1.38026 (August 1977). 



*Taken from the Department of State's 
January 1978 edition of the Background 
Notes on the U.S.S.R. Copies of the com- 
plete Note may be purchased for 500 from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed 
when ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to 
the same address). 



military competition is required, it 
clearly is in our security interest that 
the military competition be as stable 
and reduced to as low a level as can be 
achieved through negotiations. This is 
what we have been trying to do in 
SALT since it began in November 
1969. 

The Treaty on Limiting Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Systems and the 
Interim Agreement on the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms of May 1972 
have clearly been useful, but both sides 
have, nevertheless, continued to build 
up their strategic weapons arsenals— 
qualitatively and quantitatively — in 
ways that were not limited by the treaty 
or the Interim Agreement." 

One reason why SALT has not been 
more effective so far is that the differ- 
ences in the weapons systems and the 
geographical situations of the United 
States and the Soviet Union have made 
it difficult to measure with any preci- 
sion what strategic equality means. 
Each side is stronger in some aspects of 
the military competition, and each side 
has been driven by concern that the ad- 
vantages of the other might be, or 
might appear to be, more effective than 
its own. We have also been experienc- 
ing a period of extraordinary techno- 
logical innovation in weapons which 
has made the calculations involved 
in SALT negotiations incredibly com- 
plex. 

And yet, despite the complexity of 
the technical aspects of SALT, the 
basic policy questions involved come 
down to a matter of common sense and 
judgment on which the President, the 
Congress, and an informed public can 
base their decisions. 

In the present negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, an effort is being made 
to stabilize the military competition, to 
begin a downward turn to more sensi- 
ble levels, and to slow down the intro- 
duction of new and less stable military 
technologies. If these negotiations suc- 
ceed, both countries will be more se- 
cure, and the world will be safer. 

During the visit of Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko to Washington in 
September, considerable progress was 
made in breaking through issues that 
had been deadlocked for a long time. 

Although the Interim Agreement 
formally expired on October 3, each 
side has stated that it 'will not take any 
actions which would be inconsistent 
with that agreement while the present 
negotiations are proceeding. 3 In these 
negotiations, the basic agreed elements 
would be incorporated in a new treaty 
which would run until 1985. Other 
elements which are of concern to one 
side or the other but on which full 
agreement has not yet been reached 






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would be held in place by a protocol to 
the treaty, whose function would be to 
give us 3 years in which to continue ef- 
forts to find mutually satisfactory solu- 
tions to these problems. At the same 
time, it is anticipated that agreement 
will be reached on the principles to 
govern the next round of negotiations, 
the main thrust of which will be to 
work for more substantial reductions 
than are immediately possible while 
preserving the strategic equilibrium be- 
tween the two countries. 

Progress in SALT would represent 
not only a significant improvement in 
the most important single aspect of 
Soviet-American relations but an ad- 
vance in the most fundamental issue af- 
fecting international peace and secu- 
rity. Although SALT must stand on its 
own, based upon the enlightened self- 
interest of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, it can enhance the pros- 
pects for other arms control problems 
and for an improvement in other as- 
pects of Soviet- American relations. 

Other Arms Limitation Aspects. A 

brief summary of the present status of a 
number of other arms limitation negoti- 
ations in process is in order, since they 
are more extensive than may be gener- 
ally appreciated. 

• Indian Ocean — the second round 
of bilateral U.S. -Soviet talks on this 
subject, held in Washington in late 
September, was encouraging. We are 
seeking Soviet agreement to stabilize 
the military situation in that region as a 
first step and to prevent an arms com- 
petition from developing between the 
two countries. The third round con- 
vened in December in Bern. 

• Comprehensive test ban — in these 
negotiations, which also include the 
United Kingdom, there has been some 
progress in moving from the present 
partial test ban toward one that would 
include all underground nuclear explo- 
sions. Although an agreement seems to 
be emerging that a ban on nuclear 
weapons tests would be desirable 
now — whether or not other nuclear na- 
tions are prepared to join in the 
agreement—differences remain on sev- 
eral questions, including whether 
peaceful nuclear explosions should also 
be banned. We feel that such a total 
ban is necessary and are continuing to 
negotiate on this question at Geneva. 

• Mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions (MBFR) in central Europe — at 
Vienna arduous negotiations involving 
the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and some of their respective allies have 
been seeking an equitable solution to 
this source of danger and tension. 
There has not yet emerged any com- 
mon ground between the Western in- 



sistence that reductions should move 
toward equal levels and the Soviet in- 
sistence that the present balance of 
forces should be preserved by equal 
percentage reductions. We are continu- 
ing these negotiations in the conviction 
that a solution to this problem could 
contribute substantially to European 
security and a climate of justified con- 
fidence. 

• Chemical weapons — these negotia- 
tions are moving forward reasonably 
well. The Soviet and American delega- 
tions are working on technical details 
and problems of definition in the hope 
that it may be possible by spring to 
make a joint submission of guidelines 
to the Committee of the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva. 

• Antisatellite arms control — since 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union rely heavily upon satellite re- 
connaissance to monitor compliance 
with SALT and other agreements, as 
well as for early-warning systems, it is 
obviously a matter of concern that 
agreement should be reached to prevent 
either side from developing the capabil- 
ity of destroying satellites. There have 
been reports that the Soviet Union has 
been experimenting with such 
capabilities, and, if these were to con- 
tinue, the United States would clearly 
draw on its strong technological base to 
develop capabilities at least as strong 
as those of the Soviet Union. We are 
continuing our own research and de- 
velopment work in this area should it 
be necessary swiftly to develop such 
capabilities; at the same time, we are 
preparing proposals which we hope 
will head off this potentially destabiliz- 
ing development. 

• Radiological weapons — negotia- 
tions are proceeding on this subject at 
Geneva with some prospect of reaching 
agreement in a few months. 

• Advance notification of missile 
launches — this subject has been in- 
cluded in the strategic arms limitation 
negotiations and is now under negotia- 
tion at Geneva. The Soviet position has 
been that necessary safeguards are al- 
ready provided in two previous 
agreements— one on the Prevention of 
Incidents on and Over the High Seas of 
May 1972 and the other on Measures 
To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nu- 
clear War of September 1971 — which 
oblige either side to notify the other if 
a test or accidental launch might be 
subject to misinterpretation. 4 We be- 
lieve that a more far-reaching obliga- 
tion on both parties is required if a 
genuine contribution to mutual confi- 
dence is to be achieved. 

• Limitations on conventional arms 
transfers — only a beginning has been 
made in dealing with this dangerous 



Department of State Bullet 

problem, which is made more diffici 
because it involves conflicting politic 
interests in specific areas and touch 
on important interests of our allie 
Since the United States is the princir. 
source of conventional arms sales a 
transfers, it has felt the obligation 
initiate proposals on this subject, t 
substantial negotiations have not ) 
resulted. 

• Nonproliferation of nucle 
weapons — this is a subject on whi 
the United States and the Soviet Uni 
should have, and do have, strong par 
lei interests and on which a fair degi 
of cooperation has been achieved. 
June the two sides agreed to subsui 
their joint efforts on nonproliferati 
under the aegis of the Lond 
Suppliers Group since the cooperati 
of other nuclear suppliers is obviou 
essential. 

The key to any effort to halt prolif 
ation is to increase our knowledge 
the relationship between the fuel cy 
in peaceful applications and the p 
duction of nuclear materials 9 
which weapons can be produced, 
must not only know this subject wi 
we must insure that other nations 
also aware of these risks and bene 
of nuclear energy. The Internatio 
Atomic Energy Agency, in which 
United States and the Soviet Un 
have generally worked, well togetl 
has played a valuable role in this 
fort. Constructive participation by 
Soviet Union in the International I 
clear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Organiz 
Conference, held October 19-21 
Washington, has been a further indi 
tion of the high level of cooperation 
tween our two governments 
nonproliferation. 

• Theater nuclear weapons — So 
weapons which are targeted on Eur 
are at present largely unconstrained 
any international agreement. So' 
development of increasingly mod 
systems, such as the SS-20 — a mob 
intermediate range ballistic mis 
with multiple independently targets 
warheads — and the Backfire boml 
are causing our allies increasing c 
cern. We are at this point uns 
whether negotiations on these syste 
which fall into the "gray areas" 
tween SALT and MBFR, are feasi 
The problem is an increasingly im] 
tant one, however, and one to wl 
we will be giving much thought. 

A summary judgment of these va 
arms limitation efforts would sug 
that a wide number of significant p 
lems are being addressed, some 
reasonable prospects of effective 
suits, some less so. In our judgm 
these efforts are more likely to be 



iry 1978 



i the extent that they seek specific 
:oncrete steps rather than general 
rations. In our view, propagandis- 
clarations of intent, although they 
have a specious public appeal, do 
antribute substantially to the solu- 
af concrete problems in reducing 
anger of either conventional or 
ar war. 

eas of Political Competition. 
the Quadripartite Agreement of 
on Berlin, the most crucial area 
tential confrontation between the 
d States and the Soviet Union — 
al Europe — has been relatively 
e. By comparison with earlier 
is, it is an important step forward 
Europe is now in the category of 
aphical areas where the risk of 
ontation has been substantially re- 
i. Although Europe — East and 
— continues to be a vital area of 
cal competition because of its sig- 
nt industrial resources, the con- 
of that competition can be made 
dangerous to the peace of the 
I if more substantial progress is 
ved in the negotiations at Vienna 
e reduction of military forces in 
•ea. 

contrast the Middle East still 
a substantial risk of hostilities 
1 could involve the Soviet Union 
he United States. For 30 years, 
gh four Arab-Israeli conflicts, 
t and American interests have in- 
:ted in the Middle East. While 
t influence in the area has had its 
md downs, it is obvious that the 
is of considerable importance to 



the Soviet Union and that a construc- 
tive rather than an obstructive role by 
the Soviet Union would be an impor- 
tant element in any effort to reduce the 
danger of another Middle Eastern war. 

In the current situation, we have 
been able to work both with Israel and 
the Arab parties in starting the process 
toward a settlement, but to achieve a 
comprehensive and durable solution 
requires direct negotiations between 
the parties. This can best be achieved, 
we believe, under the auspices of a 
Geneva conference, with the coopera- 
tion and support of its two co- 
chairmen — the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

It should be made clear beyond any 
doubt that it was this objective that was 
the sole motivation in our joining with 
the Soviets in issuing a statement on 
the Middle East on October 1 during 
the presence of Foreign Minister 
Gromyko in New York. 5 It would be an 
error to believe that the statement was 
inspired by any desire to use the Mid- 
dle East as a vehicle for improving 
U.S. -Soviet relations. 

In Africa it must be said that Soviet 
actions over the past 2 years have 
shown a lack of restraint. In Angola 
and also in the war between Ethiopia 
and Somalia, we feel that Soviet 
policies — especially arms supply — 
contributed to local conflicts in a way 
that seriously destabilized the region. 

In other African areas of potential 
conflict — Rhodesia and Namibia — 
there have been set in motion initia- 
tives which could lead to a settlement 



enjoying wide African support. It has 
been our purpose to encourage the 
Soviet Union to adopt a constructive at- 
titude toward these initiatives and to 
avoid any further East-West polariza- 
tion of Africa. We hope and expect that 
the Soviet Union will support the es- 
sential role of the United Nations in 
working toward settlement in these 
areas. 

In a summary assessment of this 
brief review of the global aspect of 
Soviet-American relations, it can be 
said that although realism compels us 
to accept the political competition be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the United 
States in various areas of the world as a 
fact of international life, there has been 
some modest progress in moving to- 
ward a codification of the restraint that 
can be expected in greater or lesser de- 
gree in the different areas. This is 
motivated not by altruism but by self- 
interest on both sides, since it is pain- 
fully evident that an unregulated com- 
petition can dangerously exacerbate the 
many local sources of conflict which 
have arisen and will arise, and the pos- 
sibility of local conflicts spiraling out 
of control is always present. 

Economic Relations. The develop- 
ment of economic relations is clearly 
an important component of the total re- 
lationship between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In recent years, 
the Soviet Union has indicated an ac- 
tive interest in expanding its importa- 
tion of agricultural products, consumer 
goods, manufactured goods, and ad- 
vanced technology. It would also like 



9 



S. AMBASSADOR 
) THE U.S.S.R. 

lalcolm Toon, a career Foreign Service 
icer, was born in Troy, New York, on 
y 4, 1916. He holds an A.B. degree from 
r ts College (1937) and an M. A. from the 
tcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
38). Upon graduating from the Fletcher 
lool, he became a research assistant for 
National Planning Board. He served in 
U.S. Navy (1942-46) as a PT-boat 
nmander, principally in the South 
:ific, attaining the rank of Lt. Com- 
nder. He was awarded the Bronze Star. 
Embassador Toon joined the Foreign 
vice in 1946 and was assigned to War- 
i where he served as an administrative 
icer (1946-49); he then served as Politi- 
Officer in Budapest (1949-50). During 
academic year 1950-51, he attended 
idlebury College and Harvard University 
:re he took Russian area and language 
ning. He was then assigned to Moscow 
ere he served as a consular and political 




officer (1951-52). After spending a year in 
Rome, he became Political Officer and 
Chief of Consular Affairs in Berlin. 

In 1956 he was assigned to the Depart- 
ment of State and during that tour was a 



delegate to various international confer- 
ences, including the U.S. -U.S.S.R. cultural 
exchange negotiations, the 1958 nuclear test 
ban conference in Geneva, the 1959 Geneva 
foreign ministers' conference on Berlin, and 
the 10-nation Committee on Disarmament in 
1959. He served in the Department as Dep- 
uty Director of the East-West Exchanges 
Staff (1956-60) and then as First Secretary 
at the Embassy in London until 1963. He 
was then assigned to Moscow where he was 
Counselor for Political Affairs. 

From 1965 to 1968 Ambassador Toon 
was Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs 
in the Department and in 1968-69 was Act- 
ing Deputy Assistant Secretary for Euro- 
pean Affairs. 

He was appointed Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia in 1969, Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia in 1971, and Ambassador to Is- 
rael in 1975; he was sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to the U.S.S.R. in December 1976. 

Ambassador Toon received the Depart- 
ment's Superior Honor Award in 1965 and 
was appointed a Career Minister in 1973.D 



a 



3 




to expand its export of manufactured 
goods as well as raw materials to West- 
ern markets. The development of this 
trade with the United States and other 
advanced industrial nations can be a 
stabilizing factor in Soviet policy to- 
ward the world. 

There are also areas in which Soviet 
and U.S. economic policies are af- 
fected by and have a critical impact on 
the rest of the world. Foremost among 
these are international grain trade and 
energy problems. The cooperation of 
the Soviet Union in the orderly alloca- 
tion and handling of food reserves, as 
well as the supply and availability of 
oil, will be increasingly important. 

Questions have been raised about the 
balance of political risks and benefits 
to the United States that need to be 
weighed in determining a national pol- 
icy on the expansion of economic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. Clearly a 
period of national discussion and con- 
sultations with the Congress lie before 
us as we seek to clarify such issues as 
the extension of most-favored-nation 
status to the Soviet Union, what 
criteria should govern the extension of 
credits through the Export-Import 
Bank, what criteria should govern the 
transfer of technology, to what extent 
we should participate in energy and 
other resource development projects, 
etc. We shall also have to address the 
question of how the necessary degree 
of coordination can be achieved be- 
tween the government and the private 
sector and between the United States 
and its allies. 

It has been the declared policy of 
this government that it looks toward an 
improvement in economic relations be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the United 
States as conditions make this possible, 
and it would be desirable to move in 
this direction by prompt and measured 
steps. The concrete measures by which 
this policy can be implemented will be 
determined on the basis of consulta- 
tions with the Congress. 

Scientific, Academic, and Cultural 
Exchanges. Between 1972 and 1974, 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
signed a series of 1 1 bilateral agree- 
ments to foster cooperation in a variety 
of technical fields: health, environmen- 
tal protection, artificial heart research, 
energy, atomic energy, agriculture, 
housing, transportation, oceanography, 
space, and science and technology. 
Prior to 1972, our cooperative relations 
with the Soviet Union in these fields 
had been largely restricted to one-time 
exchanges. The bilateral agreements 
added an element of continuity to our 
cooperative ventures and have stressed 
joint research efforts. 

We have pursued a variety of objec- 



tives in implementing the agreements: 
achieving scientific or technical ben- 
efit, promoting commercial relations, 
broadening and deepening our overall 
relations with the Soviet Union, and 
expanding our access to their closed 
society. Participating U.S. agencies re- 
port satisfactory or better progress to- 
ward these goals. As evidence of our 
determination that continued participa- 
tion remains in our interest, during 
1977 we agreed to the extension of five 



Department of State Bullel 

agreements — artificial heart researc 
health, environmental protectio 
space, and science and technology — f 
a further 5 years. Under the 
agreements, 876 Soviet participar 
traveled to the United States and 9 
U.S. participants traveled to the Sov 
Union in 1976. 

Other programs, notably that of t 
National Academy of Sciences, bri 
Soviet and American scientists t 
gether, in some cases for collaborati 



U.S. TRADE WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 



2,305.9 



EXPORTS TO 
U.S.S.R. 

GRAIN AND 
FEEDSTUFFS 



1 ,832.7 



IMPORTS FROM 
2 U.S.S.R. 



1,187.1 




1,105.0 


' 



1 ,487.0 



1,278.8 



753.0 



187.1 



SOURCE: COMPILED FROM DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE FIGURES 



uary 1978 

;arch of up to a year's duration, 
jwledge and understanding of one 
ther has grown as a result of a 20- 
r-old official exchanges agreement, 
ier which approximately 350 schol- 

students, and lecturers now travel 
ually between the two countries. 
Jnder the same agreement, six 
iet performing arts groups visited 

United States in 1977 and two 
erican groups have gone to the 
'iet Union. Soviet and American 
ibitions are to tour nine cities in 
h country in the next 3 years. In 
6 a Soviet exhibit on science toured 

United States, and a U.S. exhibit 
photography completed a Soviet 
r in 1977. In addition, we had a 
entennial exhibition in Moscow and 
Soviets in turn held a 60th anniver- 
y exhibition in Los Angeles in 
/ember 1977. 

n addition to the scientific and 
alarly advances that flow from these 
hange arrangements, we attach im- 
tance to the opportunities for per- 
al contacts and increased insight 
i each other's society. While there 

asymmetries between the two 
ieties that complicate the problem 
managing these exchanges so that 
r benefits are equally distributed, 
ry effort is being made to insure 

this is the case, and significant im- 
vements have been registered since 
exchanges began. 

luman Rights. Although the human 
its issue has been a source of con- 
ion in U.S. -Soviet relations, it is 

hope that over the longer run, it 
[ be seen to have had constructive 
:cts. 

a the philosophical level, we be- 
e that there can be a useful dialogue 
ween societies that start from the 
ds of the society and emphasize the 
illment of material needs and those 
ch start from the dignity and worth 
he individual and emphasize the ful- 
nent of political rights, 
t is obvious, however, that the 
nan rights issue also raises political 
I bureaucratic problems — that it 
ches on fundamental questions of 
itical control and, therefore, often 
nulates neuralgic responses. We 
e sought to make it clear in our 
iteral discussion on human rights is- 
s and at the Belgrade Review Con- 
:nce on the Helsinki Final Act, that 
commitment of this Administration 
he advancement of human rights is 
integral element of our foreign pol- 
generally and is not directed against 

Soviet Union in particular. There 

not been and there will not be any 
ckening in this commitment. We 
e sought the most effective means 
which to realize our purpose, which 



U.S. TRADE WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1977 



EXPORTS 

$1,278.8 MILLION 



IMPORTS 

$187.1 MILLION 



RICE 

1.5% / OTHER 

18.0% 





ALUMINUM 

WASTE & SCRAP 

9.0% 



SOURCE: COMPILED FROM DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE FIGURES 



is to seek constructive results in im- 
proving the lot of individuals con- 
cerned and to encourage long-term 
trends in the world toward a wider re- 
spect for the dignity and worth of 
human beings. 

We do not see this objective as in- 
consistent with the desire to work to- 
ward reduced international tension and 
improved Soviet-American relations; 
on the contrary, we believe that in the 
long run the reduction of international 
tension can contribute to an easing of 
the internal pressures which restrict the 
fullest realization of the creative poten- 
tial of men and women everywhere. 

Internal Developments 

Our thinking about the relations be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union clearly rests upon the assump- 
tions we make about domestic trends 
within each, although in practice these 
assumptions often remain unagreed to 
or unarticulated in our discussions of 
the subject. 

Some students of the Soviet Union 
tend to emphasize the historical con- 
tinuities in the Russian experience; 
others, the changes in the complex re- 
sponses of Soviet society to advancing 
industrialization. There are obviously 
important truths in both perspectives, 
and both have to be taken into account 
in our thinking. The Soviet system re- 
flects the centuries of centralization, 
autocracy, bureaucratism, and isolation 
from the Western traditions which has 
marked the Russian experience and 
been carried over into the Soviet 
period. At the same time, it is also true 
that the Soviet Union is constantly in a 
process of change in significant re- 



spects, reflecting the tugs and hauls of 
competing pressures and interests 
characteristic of developing societies 
elsewhere. 

Notwithstanding the extreme cen- 
tralization which marks Soviet institu- 
tions, the central drama of Soviet polit- 
ical life is between tendencies toward 
orthodoxy and toward modernization, 
contending in every aspect of domestic 
and foreign policy, sometimes perhaps 
within the minds of individual Soviet 
leaders. 

Although in the limited public im- 
pressions we have of the Soviet Union 
through Western press accounts the 
main divisions appear to be between 
the dissidents and the Soviet "Estab- 
lishment," the fact is that even within 
these groups there are significant dif- 
ferences, and there are many other gra- 
dations of opinion that need to be taken 
into account in Soviet society and 
Soviet political life. Although the 
population as a whole appears to be ex- 
tremely resistant to change and largely 
apolitical, there can be observed at 
both ends of the political spectrum — 
among the dissidents as well as among 
the party elite — the modern equivalent 
of the dual strains in Russian history of 
the Slavophils and the Westerners. 

Nationalism is reflected in the Soviet 
Union not only among the various 
minority nationality groups but also 
among the Great Russians; similarly, 
the impulse toward modernizing the 
country along Western lines also cuts 
across other divisions in the political 
spectrum. These divisions have their 
effects on two of the most interesting 
questions affecting the present and fu- 
ture development of the Soviet Union. 

The first of these stems from the fact 




S 



:i 




Department of State Bulletir 



that the Soviet Union is on the 
threshold of a wholesale generational 
turnover at the upper levels of its 
power structure. Not necessarily in the 
next succession but within the foresee- 
able future, it is clear that an ascendant 
generation will be holding the levers of 
power, and one of the most intriguing 
questions before us concerns the 
character of that generation — men now 
in their forties and early fifties. We 
know that by and large they tend to be 
better educated than the present ruling 
group and more familiar with the out- 
side world, but beyond that, they do 
not appear to be a homogenous group. 
Whether they will tend to move toward 
nationalism and orthodoxy or toward 
Western-style modernization, we can- 
not now predict. All that we can say, 
perhaps, is that to the extent they see 
their interest in a responsible involve- 
ment of their country in the world 
economy and the world community, 
they should not feel from what we do 
or say that this option is closed to 
them. 

This is related to the second ques- 
tion: how the Soviet leadership will 
deal with some fundamental structural 
problems in the Soviet economy. Be- 
hind the problems of low productivity 
and lags in the advanced technological 
sector are organizational problems that 
inevitably involve anomalies in the 
highly centralized political control sys- 
tem. Conflicting approaches to the so- 
lution of these problems reflect the di- 
visions between the impulses toward 
orthodoxy versus modernization men- 
tioned earlier and also appear to have 
some correlation with the differences 
between the generations. While we 
should not underestimate the capaility 
of the Soviet system to manage its 
problems on a day-to-day basis without 
any clear-cut solutions to these 
choices, it may have some relevance 
for our own policy choices that the de- 
velopment of economic relations with 
the advanced industrial societies of the 
West is bound to have some influence 
on the directions that will emerge. 

External Factors 

At least brief mention should be 
made of a few of the most important of 
the factors external to the Soviet Union 
likely to influence the course of 
Soviet-American relations. 

The Sino-Soviet relationship ob- 
viously deeply influences the Soviet 
outlook, involving both rational calcu- 
lations and visceral fears. Some of the 
effects of this Soviet preoccupation 
may be salutory, and some may be dis- 
advantageous to our interests. As a 
general principle, our efforts to move 



toward normalization of our relations 
with the People's Republic of China 
rest upon the desirability for our own 
interests and those of the international 
community of that outcome. It should 
not be interpreted as an effort to ma- 
nipulate the geopolitical triangle in 
order to achieve short-term benefits. 
The stabilization of the strategic mili- 
tary competition cannot be fully 
realized without the participation of the 
People's Republic of China, and until 
that is possible, there will remain sig- 
nificant limits on how far the Soviet 
Union and the United States can go on 
a purely bilateral basis. 

Among other external factors, 
perhaps the most important for its in- 
fluence on the Soviet-American rela- 
tionship is the capability of the interna- 
tional community to absorb the thrust 
of the Soviet Union toward expanding 
its political influence and establishing 
itself as a global power. It is a charac- 
teristic mark of this period in history 
that the rise of the Soviet Union as a 
world power coincides with many other 
profound transformations in the inter- 
national order. The Soviet Union seems 
not to have fully perceived how much 
the revolutionary transformations of 
this age have moved from the patterns 
of traditional Marxist-Leninist thought, 
and it is not clear how Soviet aspira- 
tions will adjust to the new patterns. 

In this connection, a significant prac- 
tical aspect of the question is the capa- 
bility of the international community to 
deal with the tensions and potential 
conflicts between the developing na- 
tions and the industrialized nations. 
The intersection of the East- West and 
the North-South divisions in interna- 
tional politics requires a broadening of 
our perspectives over those to which 



we have been accustomed in the past 
Here the balance between competitive 
and cooperative elements in th< 
Soviet-American relationship has to b< 
tested and assessed freshly in each par 
ticular circumstance. And here the bal 
ance between our national rivalry an< 
our common stake in the solution o 
such global problems as resources; 
food, energy, and the environment re 
quire a constant interplay betweei 
short-term advantages and longer tern 
imperatives. 

We can only claim to have ap 
proached the threshold of this problem 
but events move with such rapidity tha 
we may not be granted the luxury of ; 
leisurely adjustment in our habitua, 
modes of thought. To the codificatioi 
of the restraints we seek in thi 
Soviet-American competition as i 
bears on local conflict situations, wii 
seek to add the more positive dimei* 
sion of active cooperation between thi 
Soviet Union and the United States i| 
supporting international institution 
that are emerging to deal with thes; 
global problems. CJ 



'Based on a statement before the Subcommi 
tee on Europe and the Middle East of the Hous 
Committee on International Relations on 0( 
tober 26, 1977. The complete transcript of t$ 
hearings will be published by the committee an 
will be available from the Superintendent ( t 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic« 
Washington. D.C. 20402. 

2 For texts of the treaty and the Interii 
Agreement, see Bulletin of June 26, 197: 
p. 918 and 920, respectively. 

3 For Secretary Vance's statement, see Bui 
letin of Nov. 7, 1977, p. 642. 

4 For texts, see Bulletins of June 26, 1971 
p. 926, and Oct. 18, 1971, p. 400, respectively 

5 For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 7, 197" 
p. 639. 



Tehran 

Yalta 

Potsdam 

Geneva 

Washington 

Camp David 

Vienna 

Glassboro 

Moscow 

Washington 

Moscow 

Valdivostok 



SUMMIT MEETINGS 

Nov. 28 -Dec. 1, 1943 



Feb. 4-11, 1945 

July 17-Aug. 2, 1945 

July 18-23, 1955 

Sept. 15, 1959 
Sept. 25-27, 1959 
June 3-4, 1961 
June 23, 25, 1967 
May 22-30, 1972 
June 18-26, 1973 
June 27-July 3, 1974 
Nov. 23-24, 1974 



Roosevelt-Stalin 

(Churchill) 
Roosevelt-Stalin 

(Churchill) 
Truman-Stalin 

(Churchill-Atlee) 
Eisenhower-Khrushchev 

(Eden-Faure) 
Eisenhower-Khrushchev 
Eisenhower- Khrushchev 
Kennedy-Khrushchev 
Johnson-Kosygin 
Nixon-Brezhnev 
Nixon-Brezhnev 
Nixon-Brezhnev 
Ford-Brezhnev 



Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. 



jary 1978 



THE PRESIDEIVT: Telemtott Interview 



'resident Carter was interviewed on television by news correspondents of the 
r major television networks — Tom Brokaw (NBC), Robert Mac Neil (PBS), 
7 Schieffer (CBS), and Barbara Walters (ABC)— on December 28, 1977. Fol- 
ing are excerpts relating to foreign policx. ' 



}. There are a number of sub- 
ts that we want to cover tonight, 
luding some news developments 
t are going on even as we speak. 

ant to begin, however, with a 
.•stion about the trip that you 
ve on tomorrow. It was origi- 
ly postponed because you did not 

have the energy bill passed. It 
I has not been passed, 
ly question is this: Aren't you 
y ing into the twin themes of your 
tics who complain that your 
rgy bill has not been passed; 
t you have failed on the major 
nestic priority of your Adminis- 
tion; and that your foreign pol- 

has no real definition because 
» trip seems to have no urgent 
me to it? 
i. The only major legislation that 

not pass the Congress this year 

which I was expecting to pass, 

energy. Speaker of the House Tip 
sTeill [Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., of 
ssachusetts] said that it was the 
;t productive session since the first 
n of Franklin Roosevelt. I'll let 

be the judge of that, 
he energy legislation, I think, will 
the first item on the agenda when 

Congress reconvenes in January. 
1 there's no doubt that wherever I 
Dn this trip — to Eastern Europe, to 
stern Europe, to the Mideast, to 
ia — what our nation does about 
rgy will be a prime question. 
/e are the leader of the world. We 

one of the major oil producers. 

are the greatest consumer, and 
1 Congress does take action on the 
rgy proposal that I put forward 

April, and which the House of 
>resentatives passed in August, 

cloud will hang over the determi- 
on and leadership qualities of our 
ntry. So I am disappointed about 

s far as the trip is concerned, it's 
fully planned. We began working 
this trip last March, and the na- 
s that we will visit are important 
is both domestically and in our 
:ign relations. 

oland in Eastern Europe — a Com- 
list government with close ties to 



the Soviet Union but also friendships 
with us, heavy trade with the Western 
nations — is relatively willing to give 
people their religious freedom and 
other freedoms. We will have a good 
meeting, I think, in Poland. 

We go from there to Iran, very 
close military ally of ours, a strong 
trade partner of ours with whom we 
share many political responsibilities. 
And then we go to India, the biggest 
democracy in the world, one that in 
recent years has turned perhaps ex- 
cessively toward the Soviet Union, 
but under the new leadership of Prime 
Minister Desai is moving back toward 
us and assuming a good role of, I 
would say, neutrality. And we have a 
strong friendship with India. It's a 
strong country. They are almost self- 
sufficient now. They have food 
surpluses. 

We come back from there to Saudi 
Arabia, our major supplier of im- 
ported oil, a nation that's worked 
closely with us in foreign affairs in 
many parts of the world; from there 
back to France, our historic ally, 
keystone in Europe. I'll have long 
discussions with President Giscard 
there, and then go back to Brussels to 
strengthen our relationships with the 
European Community and with 
NATO. 

So every stop will be productive 
for us. I'll be taking the word and the 
good will and the sense of importance 
of the American people toward them 
in learning about those countries in 
the process. 

But energy will be the tie that will 
bind us together on this trip, and I 
hope that this will demonstrate to the 
American people and to the Congress 
the necessity for rapid action on one 
of the most controversial and divisive 
issues that the Congress has ever 
faced, and that is to give our country 
for the first time a comprehensive 
energy policy. 

Q. I know we'll all want to get 
back to just how you plan to go 
about getting that energy policy. 
But while we are on foreign policy, 
I'd like to ask you about the Middle 
East. President Sadat, I think 
everyone agrees, made a spectacu- 



lar gesture that opened up a whole 
new era here. Do you feel that the 
Israelis have as yet made a com- 
parable gesture? Have they been flex- 
ible enough in your view? 

A. Both President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin have been bold and 
courageous. We've been dealing with 
the Mideast question as a nation for 
decades — in a leadership role at least 
within the last two Administrations. 
And we see the complexity of the 
questions and the obstacles to prog- 
ress. When I first became President, 
we spelled out the basic issues — 
withdrawal from occupied territories, 
secure borders, the establishment of 
real peace, the recognition of Israel's 
right to be there, and dealing with the 
Palestinian question. 

We are now in a role of supporter. 
We encourage them to continue with 
their fruitful negotiations. We try to 
resolve difficulties, to give advice 
and counsel when we are requested to 
do it. This is a better role for us. In 
the past, we've been in the unenvi- 
able position and sometimes unpleas- 
ant position, sometimes nonproduc- 
tive position as mediator among par- 
ties who wouldn't even speak to each 
other. So I think that the progress that 
has been made in the last month and a 
half has been remarkable and has 
been much greater than I had antici- 
pated. And I know Sadat and Begin 
well and personally and favorably. 

If any two leaders on Earth have 
the strength and the determination and 
the courage to make progress toward 
peace in the most difficult region that 
I've ever known, it is Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat. There is 
no reason for us to be discouraged 
about it. We will help in every way 
we can to let their progress be fruit- 
ful. I think that President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin could have 
reached a fairly quick solution of just 
the Egyptian-Israeli problem in the 
Sinai region. But this is not what they 
want. 

They both want to try to resolve the 
other questions — what is real peace; 
will Israel be recognized as a perma- 
nent neighbor to the countries that 
surround them; can the Palestinian 
question, the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip be addressed successfully? And 
knowing how difficult these questions 
are, I have nothing but admiration, 
further nothing but congratulations for 



4 

M 



\ 

21 
X 
3 







10 



Department of State Bulle 



them on what they have achieved so 
far. 

Q. You are going to see King 
Hussein of Jordan in Tehran. Pres- 
ident Sadat said in an interview 
that was broadcast on public televi- 
sion last night that King Hussein 
had told him that he was fully be- 
hind his efforts in public; until 
now, King Hussein's opinion has 
been relatively mysterious. Do you 
have any information that would 
make you agree with Mr. Sadat and 
are you going to discuss that with 
King Hussein and urge him to sup- 
port the Sadat initiative when you 
see him? 

A. I don't intend to put any pres- 
sure on King Hussein — I couldn't if I 
wanted to — to immediately begin to 
negotiate with Israel and Egypt as a 
partner. If he wants to do it, we 
would certainly welcome that. What I 
will try to learn, however, is what 
role Jordan is willing to play in the 
resolution of the Palestinian-West 
Bank problem, at what point he 
thinks it would be advisable for him 
to enter the negotiations personally as 
a government leader, and what we 
can do to get him to give his open 
support and encouragement to both 
Begin and Sadat as they struggle to 
resolve the differences between them. 
I think King Hussein has — indeed 
in his private discussions with Secre- 
tary Vance and his personal com- 
munications to me — shown a very 
positive attitude. And in his travels 
around the Middle East to visit with 
other leaders — some who don't en- 
courage the talks like [Syrian] Presi- 
dent Asad, those who are very hope- 
ful for progress, like those in Saudi 
Arabia — I think he's shown a con- 
structive attitude already. But it helps 
me to understand on a current basis 
the remaining problems and in what 
way they can be brought in to achieve 
a comprehensive peace. 

I think they all trust our country; 
our motives are good. We've never 
misled them. We've been honest and 
as a person, as a country that carried 
messages from one to another, and I 
think that this puts us in a position to 
exert legitimate influence. But what 
we've always hoped for is direct 
negotiations or discussions — 
communications among the leaders 
involved with our offering good of- 
fices when we are requested to do it. 

Q. The chief stumbling block 
right now does seem to be what we 
might call the right of return of the 
Palestinians to the West Bank and 
the Gaza. You have in the past 
come out against an independent 
nation per se on the West Bank, but 



you have also talked of the legiti- 
mate rights of the Palestinians and 
you have been in favor of some kind 
of an entity — although people are 
still a little obscure about what that 
means — an entity perhaps linked to 
Jordan. 

Would you, in the light of the de- 
velopments, now clarify your views 
for us today; tell us if they have 
changed; and if they have not, is it 
because the United States has de- 
cided to be neutral on this subject? 

A. You've described my position 
very well. We do favor a homeland or 
an entity wherein the Palestinians can 
live in peace. I think Prime Minister 
Begin has taken a long step forward 
in offering to President Sadat, and in- 
directly to the Palestinians, self-rule. 

President Sadat so far is insisting 
that the so-called Palestinian entity be 
an independent nation. My own pref- 
erence is that they not be an inde- 
pendent nation but be tied in some 
way with the surrounding countries, 
making a choice, for instance, be- 
tween Israel and Jordan. 

President Sadat has not yet agreed 
to that position of ours. Prime Minis- 
ter Begin has offered that the citizens 
who live in the West Bank area or the 
Gaza Strip be given an option to be 
either Israeli citizens or Jordanian 
citizens, to actually run for the Knes- 
set as candidates, and to vote in 
elections — both national Israeli and 
Jordanian or local elections in the oc- 
cupied territories once they are re- 
leased. 

But we don't have any real choice. 
I've expressed an opinion, but if Is- 
rael should negotiate with the sur- 
rounding countries a different solu- 
tion, we would certainly support it. 
But my own personal opinion is that 
permanent peace can best be main- 
tained if there's not a fairly radical, 
new independent nation in the heart 
of the Middle Eastern area. 

Q. In view of the deadlock now, 
however, have you tried to convince 
either side of your opinion? You've 
had conversations with both. 

A. I've expressed this opinion to 
President Asad, to King Hussein, to 
President Sadat, to Crown Prince 
Fahd [of Saudi Arabia], and also to 
Prime Minister Begin, and 
privately — and of course they have 
heard my statements publicly. Our 
preference is not to have an inde- 
pendent nation there, but we are per- 
fectly willing to accept any reason- 
able solution that the parties them- 
selves might evolve. 

Q. If I could just get back to the 
question I asked you, do I take it 
that you would not pass judgment 



in public, at least at this point, < 
whether the Israelis have been fie 1 
ible enough in the negotiating 
far. Do you think that the positk 
that they put forward — Mr. Beg 
said today that there would alwa 
be Israeli troops on the West Bai' 
and that all who wanted peace I 
have to know that. Is that a reali 
tic negotiating position? 

A. Yes, it's certainly a realist 
negotiating position. 

Q. But would Mr. Sadat ever a 
cept that? 

A. I don't know. There is a gre 
deal of flexibility there: the numb 
of military outposts; the length 
time when this interim solution mig 
be in effect — I think Prime Minist 
Begin said it would be reassessed 
the end of 5 years — the degree of pa 1 
ticipation of the governments of Isra 
and Jordan in a possible adminisu; 
tive arrangement. All these questioj 
could add a tone of progress or a po 
sibility for resolution of what sees 
to be insurmountable obstacles. 

So I think that Prime Ministf 
Begin already has shown a great dq 
of flexibility. Obviously Preside 
Sadat and King Hussein and othe< 
would have to accept (or rejec 
whatever proposal is put forwarj 

But the length of time when tl 
interim agreement would be in effe' 
would be negotiable and the exact i 
lationship between the new self-ru 
government as far as its autonomy 
concerned — its dependence upon 
subservience to the Jordanians or tl 
Israelis — all of these things are still 
be negotiated. So I think there 
enough flexibility at this point. 

Q. Has either Egypt or Israel, < 
both, asked the United States fo 
mally yet to provide guarantees ft 
any agreement that is made? 

A. In my private conversatior 
with some of them, they have e: 
pressed to me that if a guarantee i 
rangement between ourselves and i 
rael should be worked out, that 
would be acceptable to the Arab lea 
ers. But we've never discussed tl 
between ourselves and Israel in a! 
definitive form. 

My preference would be that o 
involvement would be minimiz' 
after an agreement has been reache 
But if it became a matter of havi 
the negotiations break down coi 
pletely, our having some limited re 
as mutually accepted among tho 
parties involved, then we would co 
sider that very, very favorably. 

Q. There now seems to be son 
signals coming out of Geneva — ai 
even from friends of th 
Administration — that we will n 1 



ary 1978 



11 



; a SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- 
Talks] agreement in 1978, or at 
t one will not get before the 
ite. That's the word from Sena- 
Alan Cranston [of California], 
is known as a very good vote 
iter in the Senate. Is that your 
king as well, that we are not 
ig to have a SALT agreement 
i the Russians during this next 

, I would be disappointed if we 

t have a SALT agreement this 

. We've made good progress on 

T. We started out with SALT I, 

Soviets having a very heavy 

ntage — about a three to two ratio 

tieir favor. President Ford and 

etary Kissinger made great prog- 

I think, at Vladivostok and in 

subsequent negotiations to pro- 

the first indication of equality. 

we will maintain that posture of 

lal advantage between ourselves 

the Soviets. 

e have added a new dimension — 
ive tight constraints on future de- 
ment of weapons, both quantita- 
ly and also the quality of the 
)ons, and to reduce actually the 
ber of destructive weapons per- 
:d. We still have some negotiat- 
to do. But we have made good 
ress on SALT. We have also 
i pleased with the results of 
tiations with the Soviet Union on 
omprehensive test ban to prohibit 
esting of nuclear weapons at all. 
id we have made progress, also, 
ying to stop a military buildup in 
Indian Ocean. My guess is that 
dent Brezhnev would be likely to 
to come here to visit after those 
: negotiations have made some 
antial progress and when there is 
>spect of immediate resolution of 
emaining differences, 
would never approve a SALT 
ement nor present one to the 
»ress that didn't have an adequate 
tt of verification of compliance 
which didn't protect the right of 
awn country to defend itself and 
irry out our domestic and foreign 
y. Whatever I put forward to the 
»ress will be good for our nation, 
e've had a maximum degree of 
Ivement by the Congress. We've 
had Senators in Europe at the 
•tiating table. And we've kept 
i informed as the progress is 
;. So my guess is that 1978 will 
us successful, and my guess is 
when we present it to the Con- 
>, the SALT agreement will be 
3ved. 

It is reported that Vice Presi- 
Mondale with you, of course, 



is working on a list of your top 
priorities for next year with the 
feeling perhaps that you had too 
many top priorities this year to give 
to Congress. Can you tell us what 
the top two or three priorities 
would be and can you tell us if it 
would include a national health in- 
surance program which organized 
labor feels you promised to intro- 
duce this year? 

A. Yes, I intend to introduce a na- 
tional health program to the Congress 
this year, late in this session. They 
can't pass it this year, but it will be 
introduced. Dealing with the 
economy — which we've just 
discussed — would be a top priority. 
Completing work on the energy pack- 
age would be the first specific thing ' 
that we'll do. One of the most impor- 
tant is to resolve the Panama Canal 
treaty question. 2 

About 75 years ago in the middle 
of the night the American Secretary 
of State signed the Panama Canal 
treaty that presently is in existence. 
No Panamanian has ever signed it; no 
Panamanian ever saw it before it was 
signed. It was signed by a Frenchman 
who be'nefited financially from the 
terms of the treaty on behalf of the 
Panamanians. That treaty gave us a 
chance to do a tremendous job in build- 
ing the Panama Canal, keeping it open 
for international shipping. It's helped 
our country a lot. It's something of 
which we can be proud. 

Presidents Eisenhower and Ken- 
nedy recognized that the present 
treaty was inadequate. President 
Johnson started negotiations to 
change it. Presidents Nixon and Ford 
continued, and we concluded it this 
year. 

It's one of the most difficult politi- 
cal questions that we'll have to deal 
with. It's going to take a lot of time 
in the Congress to pass it. What we 
wanted was one that treated us and 
Panama fairly, and we got it. We 
wanted a treaty that did not put a fi- 
nancial burden on the American tax- 
payer, and we got it. We wanted 
treaties that would guarantee proper 
operation of the Panama Canal 
itself — for us and for foreign 
shipping — and we got it. We wanted 
treaties that would also guarantee us 
permanently the right to take what ac- 
tion we think necessary to keep the 
canal safe, to defend it, and to keep it 
open for us to use, and we got it. 

We wanted a treaty — two treaties 
there are [Panama Canal Treaty and 
Treaty Concerning the Permanent 
Neutrality and Operation of the 
Panama Canal] — that would give us 
the right for expeditious passage in 



time of need or emergency, for our 
ships to go to the head of the line and 
go through the canal without delay, 
and we got it. We wanted treaties 
also that would be acceptable in the 
eyes of the international community, 
particularly in Latin America, and we 
got them. 

So this is what we have tried to do 
under four Presidents, and we have 
finally succeeded. And I would say 
that would be one of the most dif- 
ficult challenges that we have politi- 
cally this year. It is absolutely 
crucial that the Senate ratify these 
treaties, and I think the terms are 
very favorable to us and to Panama. 

Q. You've got all that in the 
treaty. Do you have the votes in the 
Senate? 

A. I think we will get the votes in 
the Senate. 

Q. Do you not now have them? 

A. I can't say for sure that we do 
because many Senators still haven't 
expressed their commitment to me or 
their opinion. But I was talking to 
President Ford this past week who's 
strongly supportive of the treaties, 
along with Secretary Kissinger and 
others, and he said that in his 
speeches to college groups and others 
around the nation that he is getting an 
increasingly favorable response from 
the audience. I think public opinion is 
building up for the treaties as they 
know the terms of them. 

Q. Could we interpret this as the 
beginning of a new campaign on 
your part to get out and sell the 
treaty? You've been criticized for 
having left the ground to the oppo- 
sition somewhat. Are you going to 
make a major effort personally to 
try and sell it? 

A. Yes, I consider it one of my 
most important responsibilities. 

Q. And can you meet the dead- 
line? President [Chief of Govern- 
ment General Omar] Torrijos has 
set April — which he says is 
urgent — and that Panama's pa- 
tience could be exhausted. 

A. No, I don't feel any constraint 
to operate under a deadline, but both 
Senator Byrd [Robert C. Byrd of 
West Virginia] and I and the leaders 
of the Senate all hope that we can re- 
solve that issue early in the year, 
certainly I think by April. 

Q. On that — since, by the way, 
just to get back to my original 
questions — it seems that your 
priorities next year are very similar 
to your priorities this year, energy 
and the economy. But in October, 
you and President Torrijos issued a 
joint statement to remove the 
doubts about the rights of the 



9 














s'j'jMtt 



i 
M 


^iisli 


C! 


■ - ■ * 


"i 





12 



Department of State Bullet 



United States to defend the neu- 
trality of the canal and also the 
right of ships to pass promptly 
through it. 3 A number of Senators 
have felt that they might be more 
comfortable with this if it were ac- 
tually written into the treaty. 
Would you be willing to see the 
treaty amended so that it would re- 
flect this understanding, this state- 
ment between you and General 
Torrijos? 

A. No, I think it would be good to 
have a signed agreement between me 
and President Torrijos, and he has in- 
dicated he would be glad to sign that 
statement that was made and, of 
course, I would too. I think the Sen- 
ate could express an understanding 
that the treaty was being approved by 
them with the understanding that this 
was a proper interpretation. But to ac- 
tually amend the treaty would require 
Panama to have another referendum 
on the subject and they've already 
had one. 

Many people in Panama think that 
the treaties are too favorable to the 
United States. And I don't think it 
would be fair to them after they 
negotiated in good faith to cause them 
to have a completely new referendum. 
I would certainly hate to have two 
ratification votes in the Senate, sepa- 
rated by several months. So I think 
that the Senate can very well express 
its understanding of what the treaties 
mean. We can exchange documents 
with the Panamanian leader. To 
amend the treaties, though, I think, 
would be inadvisable. 

Q. Abraham Lincoln said just 
toward the end of his Presidency — 
he said, I must confess that events 
have controlled me rather than the 
other way around. I wonder, look- 
ing back over your first year, how 
do you feel about this first year? 

A. I feel good about it. It's been 
exciting and stimulating and challeng- 
ing and sometimes frustrating experi- 
ence for me. 

Q. Were you controlled by 
events? 

A. I think — yes, I think so. I've 
tried to represent what the American 
people want me to be and what they 
are. I noticed one of the news com- 
mentators the other night said that 
when I said during the campaign that 
I wanted a government as good as the 
American people are, that it was dem- 
agoguery. I don't think that's accu- 
rate. You know the American people 
are good and decent and idealistic. 
And I think they want their govern- 
ment to be good and decent and 
idealistic. 



One of the most popular things that 
I've tried to do is to express to the 
world our own peoples' commitment 
to basic human rights — to freedom 
and independence and autonomy, the 
worth of a human being — whether 
they live here or in Russia or in South 
America or in Uganda or China. And 
I doubt that there's a national leader 
in the world now who doesn't think 
about human rights every day and 
how his or her actions are measured 
against a standard that the world is 
beginning to demand. 

So I think what I've tried to do is 
to see what is good in our nation, in 
our people, in our past, and try to 
preserve it and to deal with changing 
events to the best of my ability. I've 
got a good Cabinet. I've had good 
cooperation and support from the 
Congress who recognized my newness 
in Washington. And overall, although 
I see great problems ahead of us, I 
feel confident. 

I got my staff — the National Secu- 
rity Council — today to give me an 
analysis of the world situation as it 
was a year ago and the comparison 
doesn't look bad. I think we are 
trusted now where we weren't 
before — say in Africa, primarily 
because of the influence of [U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations] 
Andrew Young. I believe that our in- 
tentions are recognized as being good. 
So in all I think it's been a good year 
for us. 

Q. Can you tell us what you 
think has been your greatest single 
achievement this past year and 
also — even though we hear that you 
don't have sleepless nights, 
everyone makes mistakes — what do 
you think your biggest mistake has 
been? 

A. I think my biggest mistake has 
been in inadvertently building up ex- 
pectations too high. I underestimated 
the difficulty and the time required 



for Congress to take action on co 
troversial measures. It's much easi 
for me to study and evolve and pn 
ent legislation to the Congress than 
is for them to pass it in its final fori 
And I've dashed some hopes and d 
appointed people that thought 
might act quicker. 

I think that the achievements a 
not measured in how many bills w{ 
passed and how many bills 1 
signed or even my harmony with t 
Congress. If I have achieved an 
thing, it's been to restore a tone 
our nation's life and attitude th 
most accurately exemplifies what 
stand for. I use the human rig! 
issue as one example. It gratifies 1 
to know that the nations in Afri 
now look to us with friendship a 
with trust whereas, just a short til 
ago, they wouldn't permit our Seci 
tary of State to come in their countr 

It gratifies me to see a burgeonr 
friendship with Latin American r. 
tions and to see our NATO allies nt 
recommitting themselves to stro 
military commitments, and it gratif 
me to see some progress being ma 
in relieving tensions between ot 
selves and the Soviet Union. We 
making slow, steady progress. We i 
attempting many things simultai; 
ously. Sometimes they get confusi 
because they are so voluminous I 
so many of them. 

But I think having our nation a 
its government represent more ace 
rately the hopes and dreams of t 
American people is a general acco 
plishment of which I am most proud 



1 For complete text, see Weekly Comp 
tion of Presidential Documents of Jan. 
1978, p. 1941. 

2 For texts of treaties and related materi; 
see Bulletins of Oct. 17, 1977, p. 481 
Nov. 7, 1977, p. 615. 

3 For text of statement of understanding 
Oct. 14, 1977, see Bulletin of Nov. 
p. 631. 



News Conference 
of December 15 (Excerpts) 1 



I have a statement to make first 
about a subject of great importance to 
us. This is Human Rights Week 
around the world. I have worked day 
and night to make sure that a concern 
for human rights is woven through 
everything our government does, both 
at home and abroad. 

This policy has produced some con- 



troversy but is very much in keep 
with the character and the history 
our own country. We became an 
dependent nation in a struggle 
human rights. There have been m< 
such struggles since then — for ' 
abolition of slavery, for universal s 
frage, for racial equality, for i 
rights of workers, for women's rig! 



muary 1978 



13 



Not all of these struggles have yet 
;en won. But the freedom and the 
gor of our own national public life 
evidence of the rights and the liber- 
js that we have achieved. I believe 
at public life everywhere, in all na- 
ans, should have that same freedom 
id vigor. 

We have no wish to tell other na- 
?ns what political or social systems 
ey should have, but we want our 
vn worldwide influence to reduce 
iman suffering and not to increase 
. This is equally true whether the 
luse of suffering be hunger on the 
le hand or tyranny on the other. We 
e, therefore, working to advance a 
11 range of human rights — economic 
id social as well as civil and 
>litical. 

The Universal Declaration and 
her international human rights cov- 
lants mean that one nation may 
iticize another's treatment of its 
tizens without regarding each other 
enemies. We will continue to do 
is, just as we welcome the scrutiny 
d criticism of ourselves as part of 
e normal dealings between nations, 
e have strengthened our foreign 
'licy on human rights, and we are 
tting it be known clearly that the 
lited States stands for the victims of 
pression. We stand with the tortured 
d the unjustly imprisoned and with 
3se who have been silenced. 
Other governments and the dissi- 
nts in Eastern Europe and the polit- 
il prisoners in Latin America and 
;ia know where we stand. We have 
oken out against the gross viola- 
>ns of human rights in countries like 
imbodia and South Africa and 
|anda. We have received exiles 
Dm many other countries — exiles 
io represent those who are unable 
speak freely in their own lands. 
We have encouraged several coun- 
es to permit inspection of human 
;hts situations by the International 
>mmittee of the Red Cross. We 
ve reduced military relationships 
lich in some countries in the past 
ve seemed to support repressive 
?imes. 

Our foreign assistance programs 
11 now reflect more clearly our 
ncern about human rights. We will 
ntinue to lead the fight in the 
lited Nations sponsored by Costa 
pa to establish an Office of the 
gh Commissioner on Human 
ghts. We support the private and 
i: independent human rights organi- 
jions which gather information and 
j>port activities in the human rights 
Id. 

[In the past year, human rights has 
ome an issue that no government 



on Earth can now afford to ignore. 
There have been numerous instances 
of improvement. Some represent 
genuine change, some are only 
cosmetic in nature. But we welcome 
them all because they reflect a relief 
of suffering people and persecuted 
people. 

The results of our human rights 
policy will seldom be dramatic. There 
will be tensions along the way, and 
we will often be perceived as either 
being too rash or too timid. But this 
is a small risk compared to the risk 
assumed by brave men and women 
who live where repression has not yet 
yielded to liberty. 

My personal commitment to human 
rights is very strong. The American 
people feel as I do. Our government 
will continue to express that commit- 
ment and not ever hide it. And we 
will always encourage other nations 
to join us. 

Q. There are reports that Prime 
Minister Begin is bringing along 
some of his peace proposals to dis- 
cuss with you. My question is, if the 
United States underwrites peace, 
will we have a say in terms of what 
real peace is; if it gives economic 
aid, psychological aid, security, and 
so forth? 

A. Our hope and our goal has been 
that the nations directly involved in 
the Middle Eastern crisis — the Middle 
Eastern disputes — would meet directly 
with one another and reach agree- 
ments that would encompass three 
basic questions. One is the definition 
of real peace, genuine peace, predict- 
able peace, relationships among 
human beings that might transcend 
the incumbency of any particular 
leader. I think President Sadat has 
made a major stride already in the 
achievement of what is real peace. 

The second one is the withdrawal 
of the Israelis from territory and, at 
the same time, the assurance that they 
would have secure borders. 

And the third one, of course, is to 
resolve the Palestinian question. As I 
have said before, the direct negotia- 
tions between Egypt and Israel is a 
major step forward. 

We are attending the Cairo confer- 
ence and will offer our good services 
when it is needed. But the basic re- 
sponsibility will be on the shoulders 
of the two nations directly involved. 

As you know, U.N. observers are 
also there. Other countries were in- 
vited by President Sadat to attend — 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the 
Soviet Union. They have not yet ac- 
cepted that invitation. We are not try- 
ing to define the terms of peace. Any- 
thing that is acceptable to Israel and 



her neighbors will certainly be ac- 
ceptable to us. 

But we are always available, I 
hope, as a trusted intermediary on oc- 
casion to break a deadlock or add a 
supportive word or in a way to intro- 
duce one of those leaders to another 
and convince the opposite party that 
each leader is acting in good faith. 

I have no idea what proposals, if 
any, Prime Minister Begin will bring 
to me tomorrow morning. But he and 
I will meet privately — just the two of 
us — for a while at his request, and I 
will listen to what his report might 
be, and we will be as constructive as 
we have been in the past. 

Q. Do you have any idea of what 
the outcome of the Cairo conference 
will be in terms of goals? 

A. I have hopes, but obviously I 
can't predict what will occur. We 
have always hoped that even when 
some of the nations choose not to par- 
ticipate that the nations who do 
negotiate could move a major step 
forward toward an ultimate com- 
prehensive peace settlement. 

Both Prime Minister Begin and 
President Sadat have stated publicly 
and repeatedly that they are not seek- 
ing strictly a bilateral or two-nation 
agreement. They recognize that an 
agreement in the Sinai without involv- 
ing the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, 
the Golan Heights, could not be a per- 
manent resolution of territorial differ- 
ences. And if they ignore the Palestin- 
ian question this would still not result 
in permanent peace, and if the Palestin- 
ian question is not addressed, again, it 
would not be an adequate step toward 
permanent peace. 

So I think, obviously, this is a 
good first step. I would hope that in 
Cairo itself, even if the other nations 
don't choose to attend, that Egypt and 
Israel can make a major stride toward 
a comprehensive peace that would at 
least address in definitive terms the 
questions that also involve Palestin- 
ians, Jordanians, Syrians, and 
Lebanese. 

Q. I take it from your description 
of the U.S. role in the Mideast that 
it is not your intention to endorse 
specific proposals; that is to say, if 
Mr. Begin or anyone else presents 
to you what they hope to do, that 
they would not be able to go back 
to a peace conference and say, 
"Jimmy Carter says that this is 
what he likes." 

A. That is a fairly good assess- 
ment. I stay in close touch with most 
of the Middle Eastern leaders, cer- 
tainly President Sadat. We exchange 
communications several times a 



3 
i, 



'J 

■ill 
3! 
.3 



U. 



«! 

HI 

3 



14 

week. Cy Vance is returning from the 
Middle East tonight, and he will give 
me a very definitive analysis of the 
attitude of all the Middle Eastern 
leaders involved, plus Saudi Arabia, 
one step removed geographically. 

I think I know at least in general 
terms what would be acceptable to 
President Sadat, maybe not as a final 
conclusive agreement but as an 
interim step or major step, toward a 
final agreement. And if Prime Minis- 
ter Begin's proposal, in my own per- 
sonal judgment, is conducive to a 
step in the right direction and would 
be acceptable to President Sadat, then 
I would certainly privately tell him, 
"This is a very good step." 

If it should be far short of what I 
think President Sadat could accept 
without very serious political conse- 
quences and serious disappointment in 
Egypt and the rest of the world, I 
would have no reticence about telling 
Prime Minister Begin privately, "I 
just don't think this goes far 
enough." But I would not be the ul- 
timate judge of whether it would be 
acceptable to the Egyptians or not. 
That would be up to President Sadat. 

Q. Do you feel that the Soviet 
Union in recent months has been in 
any way helpful in trying to bring 
peace to the Middle East, and how 
do you regard U.S. -Soviet relations 
as we come to the end of this year? 

A. I think our relations with- them 
are much better than they were 
shortly after I became President. I 
think they have gotten to know me 
and my attitudes; I think I have got- 
ten to know them and their attitudes 
much better than before, on the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a 
comprehensive test ban, the Indian 
Ocean, and many other items. We 
have had a very constructive relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union which I 
think is constantly improving. I think 
the Soviets have been much more 
constructive in the Middle East than 
they formerly had. 

Obviously, they have not been as 
constructive as I would like to have 
seen. The Soviets, for instance, were 
invited to attend the Cairo confer- 
ence, along with other nations. They 
were invited by President Sadat. They 
chose to decline the invitation. I 
wished that they had accepted. The 
Syrians have chosen to decline. I 
have no evidence that the Soviets 
have had to use their influence on the 
Syrians to prevent their attendance. I 
think this was a decision made by 
President Asad in Syria. 

So I would say the Soviets have not 
been very constructive yet. They have 



not been nearly as much of an obsta- 
cle as they apparently were in the 
past. 

Our general relationships with the 
Soviets are very good, and my hope 
is that they will continue to cooperate 
in the future when we go past Cairo 
toward an ultimate Geneva confer- 
ence. I was well pleased with the 
joint Soviet and American statement. 2 
Although it is not a definitive solu- 
tion, obviously, it has no obstacles in 
it which would prevent an ultimate 
resolution of the Middle East differ- 
ences. 

So I would say it is a mixed as- 
sessment. In general, though, they 
could have been much worse. 

Q. Your preference for a general 
or comprehensive settlement in the 
Middle East is quite understanda- 
ble, one that could be endorsed by 
all the interested parties. But I 
wonder if you think, in light of 
what has happened since President 
Sadat's visit, since many people feel 
that Israel has no real worries 
about a one-time war, that if an 
agreement — formal or informal — 
even a real warming takes place be- 
tween Israel and Egypt, that you 
could have de facto peace in the 
Middle East, perhaps not as neat 
and wrapped up as a treaty, that 
would be a major accomplishment 
in itself? And do you think that it 
may have to come to that as a result 
of President Asad's opposition to 
the talks and the Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization (PLO)? 

A. Our immediate hope and goal is 
that any peace move made by Israel 
and Egypt would be acceptable to the 
moderate Arab leaders in the Middle 
East, certainly King Hussein in Jor- 
dan, certainly the Saudi Arabians. We 
have had good indications in my per- 
sonal visits with President Asad that 
he wants to resolve the differences. 
Lebanon is heavily influenced, as you 
know, by Syrian presence there. The 
PLO have been completely negative. 
They have not been cooperative at 
all. 

In spite of my own indirect invita- 
tion to them and the direct invitations 
by Sadat and by Asad, by King Hus- 
sein, by King Khalid in Saudi Arabia, 
the PLO have refused to make any 
move toward a peaceful attitude. 
They have completely rejected U.N. 
Resolutions 242 and 338. They have 
refused to make a public acknowl- 
edgement that Israel has a right to 
exist, to exist in peace. So I think 
they have, themselves, removed the 
PLO from any immediate prospect of 
participation in a peace discussion. 
But I certainly would not ascribe 



Department of State Bulletii 

that sort of intransigence or negativi 
attitude toward any of the other par 
ties who have been mentioned as pos 
sible participants. We want to be sun 
that at least moderate Palestinians an 
included in the discussions. And thi 
is an attitude that is mirrored not onl; 
by myself but also by Prime Ministe 
Begin, President Sadat, and others 
So I think they are all major steps, al 
ready having been taken, to delineat 
those who are immediately eager ti 
conclude a step toward peace — thos 
like President Asad who will wai 
awhile to see what does occur, see i 
the Golan Heights question can be re 
solved and so forth, and those wh 
have, in effect, removed themselve 
from serious consideration like th 
PLO. 

Q. Your foreign trip is takin 
you to a disparate range of cour 
tries, and the schedule offers fair! 
limited time for exchange wi^ 
other heads of state. 3 Can you te 
us what overall objective you hat 
in mind for this trip and if there 
any foreign policy theme that yc 
want to accomplish? I would like | 
add to that, do you intend to pre 
this issue of human rights that yc 
mentioned earlier in your stops j 
Poland and Iran? 

A. Yes, I do intend to press tl 
subject of human rights. My time s 
aside for negotiations with forei; 
leaders where I will visit is equivale 
to the time that I set aside for discu 
sions with foreign leaders who cor 
here and visit me. There are literal 
weeks of preparation that go into t 
visit to any country, days of prepai 
tion on my own part. 

I will spend a lot of my time ov 
the Christmas holidays reading thi 
notebooks on the nations to be v: 
ited. Each nation is different. I w 
start off my trip with Poland. I thi 
it is very important that an Americ 
President indicate our interest 
Eastern European countries. Poland 
one that has very close ties to us. \ 
have strong trade relationships w 
Poland. 

And my presence there is just 
important as is the presence of Pre 
dent Brezhnev when he visits a nati 
like France or Germany. We will 
discussing a broad range of questic 
with Poland. We are just making 
brief stop in Saudi Arabia and Iran 
and from India. But we will ha 
time for several hours of intens 
discussions with the leaders in th< 
two Middle Eastern countries. 

They are major suppliers of oil 
ourselves and to the rest of the wor, 
They have a major political and m 



wary 1978 



15 



y influence in the Middle East. It 
very important that I let their 
ople and those leaders know that I 
re about our friendship with them 
d vice versa. India, as you know, is 
: world's largest democracy, with 
ndreds of millions of people. 
In the past under Mrs. Ghandi, 
:ir primary orientation shifted to- 
ird friendship with the Soviet 
lion. I would like very much for the 
ople of India, for Prime Minister 
sai, with whom I have a continuing 
rrespondence, to know how much 
value a restoration of those strong 
s of friendship, trade, commerce, 
th India. I think this is a very im- 
rtant consideration for me. 
[ have already visited England, 
rly next summer or late spring, I 
I! be visiting West Germany and I 
•ticularly wanted to visit France, as 
11. When I was in London last 
ly, President Giscard particularly 
;ed me if I could come to France 
er this year — late this year. I re- 
ed that I would if I could schedule 
So, I am very eager to negotiate 
jor problems with France. They 
/e a much greater historical pres- 
:e, for instance, in Africa, than do 
. I think many of the African na- 
ns, particularly those who speak 
jnch, look toward France as a 
iree of advice and counsel, eco- 



nomic aid to them. It will help me to 
have a better avenue or understanding 
of Africa to meet with Giscard. 

France is not a member of NATO. 4 
But they are very supportive of the 
European defense effort. They retain 
very rigidly their autonomy and inde- 
pendence from the influence of other 
countries, which is good. But I want 
to discuss with Giscard our negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union, our in- 
fluence in the Middle East, our grow- 
ing influence in Africa. 

Of course, to visit NATO headquar- 
ters is important, as well, because we 
are trying to increase our contribution 
and our influence in NATO. 

Those trips are not tied harmoni- 
ously or homogenously together be- 
cause each country is unique, each 
visit will be unique, and I will pre- 
pare each one to get maximum benefit 
from it. 

. □ 



1 For the full text, see Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1977, 
p. 1867. 

2 For text of the statement issued on Oct. 1, 
1977, see Bulletin of Nov. 7, p. 639. 

3 President Carter visited Poland, Iran, In- 
dia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, and Bel- 
gium Dec. 29, 1977-Jan. 6, 1978. 

4 France does not participate in the military 
activities of NATO but it is a member of that 
Organization. 



Carter Administration's 
Firsts ear Accomplishments 



lite House Summary ' 



n his commencement address at the 
iversity of Notre Dame on May 22, 

President outlined the objectives of 
i foreign policy and described 

. . the strands that connect our ac- 
ns overseas with our essential 
iracter as a nation." 
He declared his belief that 

• • we can have a foreign policy that 
democratic, that is based on funda- 
ntal values, and that uses power and 
luence ... for humane purposes. 
: can also have a foreign policy that 

American people both support . . . 
1 understand. ..." 
'Our policy must be open; it must 
candid; it must be one of construe - 
p global involvement, resting on 
t cardinal principles." 
'First, we have reaffirmed Ameri- 
s commitment to human rights as a 
damental tenet of our foreign pol- 



"Second, we have moved deliber- 
ately to reinforce the bonds among 
. . . democracies." 

"Third, we have moved to engage 
the Soviet Union in a joint effort to 
halt the strategic arms race." 

"Fourth, we are taking deliberate 
steps to improve the chances of last- 
ing peace in the Middle East." 

"Fifth, we are attempting ... to 
reduce the danger of nuclear prolifer- 
ation and the worldwide spread of 
conventional weapons." 2 

The Administration, by its work in 
international affairs this year, has 
sought to carry out the objectives 
which the President set forth at Notre 
Dame. Among the principal accom- 
plishments in the realm of foreign 
policy and national security are these. 



Human Rights 

The President has strengthened our 
human rights policy, and we are let- 



ting it be known clearly that the 
United States stands with the victims 
of repression. We are also working to 
advance the full range of human 
rights — economic and social as well 
as civil and political. He has signed 
the American Convention on Human 
Rights [June 1], the International Cov- 
enant on Economic, Social and Cul- 
tural Rights [October 5]. Our foreign 
assistance programs will reflect more 
clearly our human rights concerns. 

We have encouraged several coun- 
tries to permit inspection visits from 
the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. We are strongly support- 
ing international organizations con- 
cerned with human rights, particularly 
the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, whose budget was tri- 
pled this year. 

Nuclear Proliferation 

The Administration has developed a 
comprehensive policy covering 
domestic and export activities and has 
initiated an international, technical 
evaluation of the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle. The President signed [on May 
26] Protocol I of the treaty of 
Tlatelolco, which creates a nuclear 
weapons-free zone in Latin America. 

Arms Transfers 

For the first time, the United States 
has adopted a policy of restraining 
both the number and the kinds of 
American arms sold abroad. We have 
also begun to discuss restraint with 
other major arms suppliers. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

At the end of the last Administra- 
tion, the SALT negotiations were at a 
stalemate. The efforts of this Admin- 
istration, beginning with the March 
proposal set forth by Secretary Vance 
in Moscow, have resulted in major 
progress in the SALT negotiations. 
We are now working on a comprehen- 
sive settlement consisting of a treaty 
to last through 1985, a 3-year pro- 
tocol, and a statement of principles to 
guide the SALT III negotiations. Al- 
most all the major issues are now re- 
solved, and we anticipate completion 
of a SALT II treaty in the early part 
of next year. 

Panama Canal Treaties 

After 14 years of negotiations 
under four U.S. Presidents, the 
United States and Panama adjusted 
their relationship as it applies to the 
Panama Canal. President Carter and 
Gen. Omar Torrijos signed two canal 
treaties on September 7, 1977, which 



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16 

would gradually transfer responsibil- 
it\ for the operation and defense of a 
neutral canal to Panama. The treaties 
give the United States the permanent 
right to defend the canal's neutrality. 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

Negotiations are underway on a 
treaty banning all nuclear explosions. 

North-South Relations 

The U.S. image in the less de- 
veloped world and the United Nations 
has changed dramatically from that of 
an adversary to that of a potential 
partner. In the Security Council de- 
bate on Africa, we played a mediating 
role. Our arms control policies have 
made a favorable impression on the 
U.N.'s annual review of disarmament 
issues. We played a constructive role 
in the Maputo and Lagos conferences. 
And we participated, for the first 
time, in an Association of South East 
Asian Nations ministerial meeting. 
The appointment of Ambassador An- 
drew Young [as U.S. Permanent Rep- 
resentative to the United Nations] 
highlighted our concern for the Third 
World. 

Western Europe 

The Administration has: partici- 
pated in a successful Belgrade Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, including a review of 
human rights; prepared another 
mutual and balanced force reductions 
proposal to advance talks; inaugurated 
four NATO efforts (the long-term de- 
fense program, the short-term im- 
provements, the "two-way street" in 
defense purchases, the East-West 
study); agreed to provide a $300 mil- 
lion loan and forged a multinational 
consortium to help democracy in Por- 
tugal; and secured a major Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund loan for Italy. 

Soviet Union-Eastern Europe 

The Administration has put the 
U.S. -Soviet relationship on a more 
reciprocal, realistic, and what we 
hope will be an ultimately more pro- 
ductive basis for both nations. The 
Administration has improved relations 
with various Eastern European coun- 
tries, including Yugoslavia, as a re- 
sult of the Vice President's visit, and 
Poland, as a result of Secretary [of 
Commerce] Kreps' visit and the Pres- 
ident's scheduled state visit. 

Arab-Israeli Conflict 

The Administration stressed the 
need for a comprehensive settlement 



which has three core elements: defini- 
tion of the nature of the peace, estab- 
lishment of recognized borders and 
security, and resolution of the Pales- 
tinian question. We have urged, with 
considerable success, the Arabs and 
the Israelis to be forthcoming on 
peace commitments, direct negotia- 
tions, and peace treaties. We have 
supported the Sadat-Begin dialogue. 

People's Republic of China 

The Administration has followed 
the Shanghai communique in efforts 
toward normalization of relations, 
while emphasizing the mutuality of 
efforts necessary to complete the 
process. Recognizing their strategic 
importance, we have also continued 
to develop a consultative relationship 
with the Chinese on global affairs. 

Korea 

The details of the Korean ground 
troop withdrawal plan have been de- 
signed to alleviate major Asian ap- 
prehensions that the United States is 
in the process of disengaging from 
the region. 

Vietnam 

The Administration has started the 
process of normalizing relations 
through talks in Paris and has estab- 
lished a mechanism to continue to try 
to account for our servicemen still 
missing in action. 

Africa 

Vice President Mondale informed 
Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna that 
U.S. -South Africa relations depended 



President 
Carter's Trip 



As the Bulletin goes to press, Pres- 
ident Carter is completing his trip to 
seven countries in Europe, the Middle 
East, and South Asia: 



Dec. 29 


Poland 


Dec. 31 


Iran 


Jan. 1 


India 


Jan. 3 


Saudi Arabia 


Jan. 4 


Egypt, France 


Jan. 6 


Belgium 



The February issue will carry com- 
plete documentation on this trip, in- 
cluding the President's news confer- 
ence in Warsaw and addresses in New 
Delhi and Paris. □ 



Department of State Bullet 

upon South Africa moving away fro 
apartheid. With the British, we o 
fered a plan for Rhodesian indepen 
ence. We initiated a five power groi 
to negotiate toward an independe 
Namibia. We have restored good rel 
tions, based on mutual respect, wij 
black African states of all politic 
leanings. 

Latin America 

The Administration has developed 
new global approach to Latin Amerii 
and the Caribbean, one which recc 
nizes the diversity of the region rati- 
than one which pretends a single pi 
icy identified by a simple sloga 
(This approach has been well-receivl 
in the region.) The President sign] 
the Panama Canal treaties. Throui 
direct negotiations with Cuba, J 
have concluded a fisheries agreemd 
and established an interest section; 
each country. We have ratified an d 
change of prisoners treaty wij 
Mexico and negotiated one wi| 
Bolivia. We have adopted a co| 
prehensive policy for the Caribbe 
and have been joined by 28 natio 
and 16 international institutions to ; 
tablish a Caribbean Group for Coj 
eration in Economic Developme 
We have dramatically improved < 
relations with a number of countri 
including Venezuela, Jamaica, Pt 
and Mexico. 

London Summit 

With the leaders of major industn 
democracies, the President reach 
agreement at the London summit o 
common program for internatio 
economic cooperation. 

Multilateral Trade Negotiations 

The Administration has reach 
agreement with the European Ei 
nomic Community on a timetable 
negotiations, breaking a long stf: 
mate. 

Defense and Security 

The Administration has formuk: 
a comprehensive, national defei 
strategy which includes an ove 
American posture toward the Soi 
Union. The President reached a d l 
sion not to produce the B-l bom 
but to proceed with cruise missiles 

Intelligence 

The Administration has reorgani' 
the intelligence agencies and f 
taken comprehensive steps to pro 1 
telecommunications . 



uary 1978 

ernational Communications 

'he Administration has established 
ew International Communication 
:ncy to replace the U.S. Informa- 
i Agency and the Bureau of Educa- 
al and Cultural Affairs in the De- 
ment of State. 

ense Budget Reduction 

he President met his campaign 
lge to cut military spending by 



$5-7 billion. The Ford budget for fis- 
cal year 1978 was $123 billion. The 
Carter budget is $117 billion, as ap- 
proved by Congress. □ 



1 Issued as a press release by the White 
House on Dec. 17, 1977, which also included 
domestic accomplishments (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Dec. 26). 

2 For the full text 
13, 1977, p. 621. 



see Bulletin of June 



THE SECRETARY: 

tews Conference of December S 1 



efore I take your questions, I'd like 
(take a few opening remarks about 
important developments that have 
l occurring in the Middle East. 
tie President has already stated the 
iration and respect of our govern- 
t for the leadership of President 
it and Prime Minister Begin. They 
: broken through psychological bar- 
i which have impeded progress to- 
i peace in the Middle East for three 
ides. As a result, an irreversible 
ess has begun. The leader of the 
:st Arab state has been received in 
el before the eyes of the whole 
d. This single act has done more 
any number of words could to 
'P away doubts about the sincerity 
oth governments in seeking an end 
loodshed and strife, 
om the first days of this Adminis- 
on, we — like our predecessors — 
sought to get the parties talking 
ctly with each other in serious 
)tiations. Now these two strong 
ers have done just that, leaping 
inhibitions of the past and pro- 
ral quarrels of the present, 
langes so fundamental inevitably 
ulate a variety of reactions. There 
rly are now crosscurrents at 
: — some bringing the parties closer 
ther, some moving them apart. We 
;ve our proper role at this point is 
upport and reinforce the former 
e using our relationships across the 
trum to moderate the latter. I will 
Peking to do both on my trip to the 
[December 9-15]. 
ie President wants to be sure that 
ie Middle East leaders fully under- 
1 that the present Egyptian-Israeli 
itives have our full support and 
they know our support is fully con- 
nt with our continuing dedication 
ie objective of a comprehensive 
He East peace settlement. We be- 
that all the parties to the Geneva 



conference remain committed to that 
goal. 

President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin have made a breakthrough, and 
we intend to help them wherever possi- 
ble to enlarge that opening. They and 
the other leaders concerned in peace ef- 
forts have told us they want us to con- 
tinue our role. In the past, when there 
was no movement, our proper role was 
to take the initiative in stimulating new 
ways of acting and thinking. Today, 
when leaders in the area are boldly 
moving forward, our proper role is to 
support their progress and help broaden 
it to all fronts in the continuing search 
for a final settlement. All the leaders 
have welcomed my visit, and I look 
forward to receiving their counsel and 
their views. 

Q. When you say in your state- 
ment that all the parties remain 
committed, do you include the Soviet 
Union? And Mr. Habib's trip to 
Moscow; is that designed, at least in 
part, to tell the Soviets they haven't 
been as constructive as we would like 
them to have been with the Syrians 
and the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]? 2 

A. Insofar as the Soviet Union is 
concerned, they consider to have their 
responsibilities as one of the two 
cochairmen of the Geneva conference. 
Some of the statements which they 
have made in recent days have not been 
helpful; they raise questions. 

I look forward to meeting with Mr. 
Habib when I get to Brussels 
[December 7-9], where he will report 
to me on his discussions with the 
Soviets during the last 2 days. 

Q. The enthusiasm that you show 
for the Sadat-Begin talks seems to be 
somewhat tardy. There was a long 
pause in this capital when they 
started. Has this, in fact, represented 
a reassessment of American policy? 



17 

A. Let me first address your question 
of being tardy. As soon as the state- 
ment of the Cairo conference was made 
[by President Sadat on November 26], 
we indicated that we believed that it 
could play a helpful role but that we 
wished to consult with all of the par- 
ties. We did that consultation over the 
weekend and made a statement — which 
I think was clearly a very positive 
statement — on Monday following our 
consultations. 

We do, as I have indicated, support 
very strongly this initiative. We believe 
that it can be a steppingstone toward 
peace, and we shall do all that we can 
within our power to help support that 
effort as it moves forward. 

Q. Is it now conceivable, in the 
light of American policy, that there 
could be a settlement without a 
Geneva conference? 

A. It is possible, but all of the par- 
ties have said that it is their intention to 
move toward a Geneva conference. 
That has been stated by Prime Minister 
Begin, by President Sadat, and the 
others have indicated also their desire 
to go to a Geneva conference. So that 
as of the moment all of the parties ap- 
pear to wish ultimately to go to a 
Geneva conference. 

However, we have first the Cairo 
conference [December 14], and we 
have to see how much can be accom- 
plished during the Cairo conference. I 
hope that much can be accomplished 
during the Cairo conference. 

Q. When you say "all the leaders 
have welcomed my visit," are you 
saying that Syria has accepted receiv- 
ing you? 

A. Yes, they have, and they have 
said they welcome the visit. 

Q. Is there any reason to think 
that Syria would see the Cairo con- 
ference as a step on the way to a 
Geneva conference? Any communi- 
cations or any actions by Syria that 
would — 

A. No. I have nothing at this point 
that would indicate that. Indeed, the 
indications as a result of the statement 
which was made at Tripoli yesterday 
would indicate the contrary. However, 
the Syrians have indicated they wel- 
comed my visit to discuss the issues. 
They have never said that they close 
the door to a Geneva conference and an 
ultimate settlement, and I look forward 
to my discussions with President Asad 
to find his views as to how he believes 
one should proceed from here. 

Q. Breaking the psychological bar- 
rier would be a guarantee to bring 
peace to the Middle East? 

A. I think the breaking of the 
psychological barrier is an historic 
event. I think, as I said I believe at my 



I 



2! 

y 
<( 

si 

3 



last press conference, that the principal 
obstacle to peace was the psychological 
barrier that existed as the parties 
moved forward and came closer and 
closer to serious face-to-face negotia- 
tions: and I think by the steps which 
were taken in President Sadat's trip to 
Jerusalem [November 19-21] and by 
his reception there by Prime Minister 
Begin and the Israeli people that a bar- 
rier really was broken and that a sea 
change was effected that will have 
events following upon them in a fash- 
ion which is irreversible. 

Q. Have the recent developments 
in the Middle East shaken, chal- 
lenged, or changed any of the basic 
assumptions and directions of Ad- 
ministration policy? 

A. We have always, as I 
indicated — as did our predecessors — 
strived for the objective of bringing the 
parties face-to-face in negotiations. We 
have said — as did our predecessors — 
that the only way there could be a solu- 
tion was for the parties to negotiate that 
solution themselves. Therefore, I be- 
lieve that the steps which we are seeing 
now in terms of face-to-face negotia- 
tions are of fundamental importance, 
and I hope that that circle of face-to- 
face negotiations will be widened and 
that others will join. 

Q. Does that not change the origi- 
nal nature of the Geneva conference 
as a meeting place to stimulate face- 
to-face negotiations where, in fact, 
you have them started now; and does 
that not change the process in terms 
of the necessity for the immediacy of 
a Geneva conference to be a launch- 
ing pad for talks, whereas you have 
the talks going on now? Can you ex- 
pound on that? 

A. I'll be glad to expound on that. 
The process of serious discussions 
could have started at Geneva had the 
parties been willing to do so. It can 
also start in the Cairo discussions in the 
circumstances that now exist. 

I think that we should seize any op- 
portunity, and we should not concern 
ourselves about the forum in which the 
peace process starts to enter upon seri- 
ous discussions and that, therefore, 
with this new initiative having been ta- 
ken, we should support it; and we 
would hope that others would join in 
the process, as I've indicated, as it 
moves forward. 

Q. Does this raise a possibility of a 
sequence of conferences like Cairo, 
or extensions of Cairo, which could 
take place before there would be a 
Geneva conference for the purposes 
of formalizing an agreement? 

A. I think it is too early to say 
exactly what the length and form of the 
Cairo conference will be. That will be 



up to the parties once the discussions 
get under way. They have put no time 
limits on that particular conference, but 
they have stated that this was prepara- 
tory toward a Geneva conference. 

Q. One, with the principle of di- 
rect talks now established between 
Israel and an Arab country, what do 
you see as the future role for the 
United States, if any? And secondly, 
in that connection, on this trip, why 
do you feel that you have to go out 
personally? I mean, do you doubt 
that the Middle East leaders fully 
understand that you strongly support 
the present Egyptian-Israeli initia- 
tives and that they know your sup- 
port is fully consistent with continu- 
ing dedication to— 

A. Your first question is which? 
Q. With the principle of direct 
talks now established, what do you 
see as the future role for the United 
States? 

A. The role for the United States at 
this point, as I indicated in my opening 
statement, I believe is to be supportive 
and facilitate the direct talks which are 
getting under way in the Cairo confer- 
ence and to work with the parties to 
help them move forward in their direct 
talks. 

As we go along, they may wish us to 
play a greater role, and if they do, we 
are prepared, of course, to help in any 
way to move the peace process for- 
ward. 

In respect to the second half of your 
question, why do I feel it necessary to 
go out to the Middle East at this time, 
both the President and I feel that there 
is no substitute for face-to-face conver- 
sations, direct talks with the leaders of 
the various nations involved; and we 
think this is particularly important at 
this time when there is a blockage of 
communications between the various 
leaders and that perhaps we can play a 
facilitating role by keeping all of those 
channels of communication open. 

Q. On your last trip — in fact, I 
think on your two previous trips— 
you asked for and received drafts, in 
effect, of peace treaties, at least from 
the Israelis and to a lesser extent in 
outline form from the Egyptians. Do 
you feel that that process contributed 
to the breakthrough, and will you on 
this trip be asking the Jordanians, 
Syrians, or any of the other parties 
to put together in any kind of draft 
form what they feel an ultimate 
peace treaty should look like. 

A. During my last trip, I asked all of 
the parties to provide us with drafts of 
peace treaties or with memoranda re- 
flecting the essential elements of a 
peace treaty as they saw it. We did re- 
ceive from each of the countries either 



Department of State Bulli 

a draft peace treaty or their views \l 
respect to the essential elements ci 
peace treaty or treaties. I think 1 
they have been helpful, and at I 
point I don't think that there is i 
need for us to ask for further worln 
their part, but we will undoubted!); 
discussing their current views withi 
spect to the elements of peace treat; 
Q. Is it your intention when i 
meet with President Asad to tnt 
convince him or one of his reprei 
tatives to participate in the Cii 
conference, and if not, what fori 
do you see the Syrians becoming i 
volved in in the future? 

A. We have made clear to all oil 
parties that we would hope that l] 
might find it possible to participat 
the Cairo conference. As you kno^ 
number of the countries have deel ; 
to do that. We hope that they will )i 
an open mind. I think it will be he! 
to discuss with each of the leaders | 
views with respect to how one shl 
proceed in light of the current Sj 
tion, and I would hope, in my cor?! 
sation with President Asad, to red' 
his views as to how he thinks one; 
best proceed to keep the proces' 
peace moving forward. 

Q. Do you have any notion of | 
own, any particular framewor 
your own, that you would lik 
suggest if, in fact, he is adari 
about not going to Cairo? 

A. First, I think we ought to 
what the parties themselves can: 
velop on this. If they run 
roadblocks on this, then, as I've) 
and the President has said, new ir 
tives might be helpful; then we w. 
be willing, should the parties desii 
to come up with some suggestior 
our own. 

Q. Have recent developmenl 
South Africa, particularly the 
verdict, had any effect on our 
tinuing review of policy tov 
South Africa, any change in our 
tions expected now? 3 

A. You're talking about South A 
itself? 
Q. South Africa, the country, i 
A. Insofar as South Africa its* 
concerned, during the election 
paign which was recently finis: 
there were statements by the go 
ment that they intended to take a 
actions in the postelection period g 
dealt with the problem of apart: 
We shall be watching to see what 
pens under these circumstances, al 
course, it's too early to say yet wht 
anything, may come out of this * 
ess. But I think it would be prerrt 
for me at this point to speculate* 
may eventuate from the South Ah 
Government. 



jary 1978 



19 



». Can you tell us the current 
us of our thinking on economic 
itions with South Africa? 

. Our current thinking is that this 
ter is under review in the U.S. 
ernment, as I believe I indicated to 

earlier, and there have been no 
1 conclusions reached. 
i. Just to follow up your earlier 
ement about the Soviet state- 
its, you said that their recent 
iments have raised questions. Is it 

to surmise that their comments 
e raised questions about their Iiv- 
up, if not to the letter, to the 
it of the Soviet-American state- 
it of October 1st? 4 
. They have raised questions about 
t their ultimate objectives are. We 
believe their ultimate objective is 
ee a comprehensive settlement of 
Middle East problem and to work 
ochairman to that end. That is one 
le reasons that, as I say, I will be 
ing forward to the reports of Mr. 
ib's discussions in Moscow to get 
latest thinking which he will have 
ived as a result of those talks. 
. Could you please give us your 
ssment of the Saudi role right 

and their attitude toward the 
'o conference as you understand 

. It would be inappropriate for me 
peak specifically for the Saudis. 
: is clearly up to them to do. In the 
, they have played a very construe - 
role in connection with the Middle 
problem and in seeking to facili- 
a solution to this problem, and I 
Id hope that in the future, they 
Id continue to play such a role. 
. Do you believe that the appro- 
tion for the State Department is 
mple that you can overlook Mrs. 
ug's commission's [Bella S. Ab- 
Chairperson, National Commis- 
on the Observance of Interna- 
al Women's Year] defiance of a 
e Department directive that they 
using your franking privilege 
thousands of dollars a month? 
. With respect to that, Mr. Read 
ijamin H. Read, Deputy Under 
etary for Management] talked to 
Commission and indicated to them 
they should use their own franking 
lege. It is taking a while for them 
a that. They will do it — I have no 
ition about it. It simply has not 
lied the point where they can do it. 
. About a month ago, it was an- 
nced the United States would re- 
i the Crown of St. Stephen to 
igary. Since then there has been 
e opposition to that and appar- 
y some delay. Even one Con- 
swoman said that she had been 
at the White House that certain 



conditions would be put on this, and 
I wanted to know if it is definitely 
going to be returned, and if there are 
any conditions, what they are. 

A. The decision to return the crown 
is a firm decision. We have been hold- 
ing the crown in safekeeping. We be- 
lieve that the time has come when the 
crown should be returned. There have 
been a number of improvements in the 
relationships between our country and 
Hungary. They are seen in the area of 
the reunification problems; they are 
seen in the complete repayment of the 
debts which arose out of World War I; 
they have been seen in cultural, scien- 
tific, and technical agreements which 
have been negotiated with them; and 
we believe that it is appropriate under 
the circumstances to return it. 

Q. Is there any chance that we will 
negotiate a trade agreement with 
Hungary if it should be returned? 

A. That is a question which is not 
yet ripe for discussion. 

Q. The new American enthusiasm 
for direct talks between Israel and 
the Arab states put the United States 
in diametric opposition to Syria, 
which has stated that it wants talks 
only in the context of Geneva and 
does not want direct talks. 

A. First, let me take issue with your 
statement "the new enthusiasm." We 
have been urging direct talks from the 
outset, and there should be no question 
about that. That is not a new policy 
with us; that has been a consistent pol- 
icy of the United States. 

You ask, has that put the United 
States and the other parties in conflict 
with Syria? Syria has not indicated 
whether or not they would enter into 
direct conversations. What they have 
been raising questions about up to this 
point is the question of the forum in 
which any such talks would take place. 

Q. Are you hopeful the Congress 
would approve an increase in mili- 
tary aid, including compensation aid 
to South Korea, in light of the Park 
regime's lack of cooperation with the 
United States in the congressional 
bribery scandal and repeated human 
rights violations in South Korea? 

A. When the question of assistance 
goes to the Congress, I hope that it will 
be acted upon affirmatively. I would 
have to be very clear, however, in say- 
ing that such things as the Tongsun 
Park affair and some of the recent ac- 
tions in the civil rights area — the 
human rights area — cannot help but 
have an eroding or negative effect upon 
the attitudes within the Congress and, I 
think, generally within the United 
States. 

Q. You are going to be talking to 



[British] Foreign Secretary Owen the 
day after tomorrow — 

A. Yes. 

Q. — on the Rhodesian situation? 
From all appearances the Anglo- 
American plan is as dead as a door- 
nail, and the play has been taken in 
Rhodesia by Ian Smith in his propos- 
als for an internal settlement. I won- 
der if you could share with us some 
of your thoughts about where we go 
next. 

A. Yes. I would be glad to. I will be 
meeting with Secretary Owen at the 
Brussels meetings on Thursday and 
Friday, and we will be discussing the 
question of southern Africa, including 
the Rhodesian situation. Mr. Moose, 
the Assistant Secretary for African Af- 
fairs, will be with me during those 
discussions. 

I think in talking about this problem 
it is important in dealing with such a 
complex situation to keep some basic 
points in mind. 

The only way, we believe, to resolve 
the problem peacefully and rapidly is 
through agreement on free elections 
open to all of the parties; secondly, by 
the transfer of power to a government 
freely chosen by the people of Zim- 
babwe; and third, a constitution that 
protects the rights of all of the people 
of that country, whether they be black 
or white. This will require that the 
transition agreements be fair and that 
they not favor any one group. 

These are the goals that lie at the 
heart of the Anglo-American plan, and 
that plan we are continuing to pursue. 

Coming to Mr. Smith's initiative, 
the Smith plan may be a step in the 
right direction, but it doesn't appar- 
ently provide for the kind of open elec- 
tions that all parties will find fair. It is 
not yet clear whether it really provides 
for universal suffrage for all adults 
within the country. So that there are a 
number of questions that one has to 
find the answer to in order to determine 
how this fits into these essential areas 
which are so important. 

A number of the nationalist leaders 
have already indicated that they are 
taking a look at the Smith proposals in 
the light of and in the framework of the 
Anglo-American proposal. That re- 
mains on the table and remains active 
and supported by both ourselves and 
the British. 

Q. How great a setback has been 
dealt to the prospects in the longer 
term of an overall settlement and a 
broader peace conference by the fact 
that Egypt has broken relations with 
Syria — another one of the major 
parties — and may be on the verge of 
breaking relations with the Soviet 
Union? 



■ w& 

'■■■-:■■ 
nr 



■■.■■-■.'■•■ 



#» 



10 



A. I think it was too bad that Presi- 
dent Sadat was forced to break rela- 
tions with the five Arab nations. 5 It is 
our hope that in time those differences 
may be healed, particularly insofar as 
Syria is concerned, and we would hope 
that all of the parties in the Middle East 
conference — or the Middle East situa- 
tion in terms of the confrontation 
states — would keep an open mind and 
that the channels of communications 
may again be open so that there can be 
movement by all toward a final 
settlement. 

Q. The time has come for Israel to 
make some move on the substance 
and for someone to say what will be 
supported? 

A. Yes. I think that the time has 
come, and I think that the parties agree 
that the time has come, to really begin 
to come to grips with the question of 
substance and not merely with the 
question of procedures alone. 

I think everybody knows what the 
questions of substance are that have to 
be dealt with. They are the nature of 
peace; they are the question of with- 
drawals from occupied lands; and they 
are, of course, the Palestinian question. 
These issues are going to have to be 
dealt with in connection with any dis- 
cussions which could lead to a com- 
prehensive peace, and I think the par- 
ties are saying — both Israel and 
Egypt — that they recognize that these 
issues have to be dealt with. 

Q. There have been political 
executions in China. I wonder if the 
United States is still concerned about 
the situation — human rights 
situation — in mainland China. 

A. Yes, the United States is con- 
cerned about the human rights situation 
in any part of the world where there are 
executions. The information which we 
have with respect to that particular 
situation is limited, and that is all I can 
say at this point on it. 

Q. If the PLO were also invited to 
the Cairo meeting, are you intending 
to meet with them and, if not, how 
are you going to get them to the 
Cairo meeting? 

A. No, I am not intending to meet 
with the PLO. As I have said to you 
many many times, as a result of the 
commitments which we made in the 
Sinai II agreement [September 1975], 
we cannot speak with the PLO unless 
certain conditions are met. Those con- 
ditions have not been met. There is no 
indication that there is any intention to 
meet those conditions. So, I do not ex- 
pect to meet with the PLO. 

Q. Can you now give us any kind 
of a framework for when you expect 
to get a Geneva conference going? I 
take it the first of the year is out. 



A. No, I can't give you any specula- 
tion or guess on that, and I don't think 
it is that important. I think the impor- 
tant thing now is to see how much 
progress we can make at the Cairo con- 
ference. That is what is on the table 
now. Let's see what we can do and see 
how we can move ahead there. 

Q. Would you say that the events 
of the past days, what with the sharp 
disagreements amongst the Arabs, 
have led us closer or further away 
from Geneva? 

A. I think for the moment they have 
probably led us further away. On the 
other hand, I would hope that as time 
passes that changes will be effected and 
that the circle of those discussing the 
peace process will be enlarged again. 

Q. I think it is safe to say now that 
there won't be a Geneva conference 
before the end of the year, and I 
think we would appreciate your re- 
flecting backward and telling us what 
in your mind prevented a Geneva 
conference. As you look back, what 
one thing or several things. 

A. As I indicated, I think that one of 
the main stumbling blocks was the 
psychological stumbling block, and 
that, I think, has been removed. 

Secondly, there were still two pro- 
cedural problems that were holding up 
a Geneva conference, and it was not 
possible up to the present time to work 
out those different views with respect 
to those procedural points, and those 
were the basic factors that made it im- 
possible at this time to go to a Geneva 
conference. 

Q. Has the political importance of 
the PLO been reduced by President 
Sadat's various actions? 

A. It seems to me, insofar as the 
PLO is concerned, that the actions 
which they have taken recently indicate 
less of a willingness to consider, in a 



Department of State Bullel 

way which might make it possible f 
some sort of participation, for that 
happen, and so I don't think it seer'l 
likely now that that is a — 

Q. Can the Palestinian issue be st 
tied without the PLO's involvemem 

A. I think that the Palestinian issi 
must be solved. As to exactly how th 
will be solved, I think we would wa 
to look and see what the parties thei 
selves suggest on this. I don't want 
prejudge what is going to be put fc 
ward by any of the parties with respe 
to this issue. 

Q. You said progress should 
made, you should work toward pre 
ress at the Cairo conference. Sin 
the only parties there other than t 
U.N. observer are Israel, Egypt, a 
the United States, what is the natu 
of progress that you would like 
see? 

A. I would hope that out of the Ca;i 
conference it might be possible to coj: 
up with a framework of the substanti: 
matters that have to be dealt with<i 
order to achieve a comprehensive 1 
tlement; and in addition to that, the; 
maining procedural questions mijl 
be cleared away. I think if that ffl 
accomplished, then there would h^: 
been real progress. 



1 Text from press release 544 of Dec. 6, IS 

2 Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ph 
C.Habib met with U.S.S.R. officials in Mos.i 
Dec. 5-6. 1977. 

3 Mr. Biko was a black South African critid 
the apartheid policies of the South African G 
ernment who died in Sept. 1977 in detention 
Dec. 1977 a Pretoria magistrate, presiding ar 
inquest, found no one criminally responsible 
Mr. Biko's death. 

4 For text see Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1977 
639. 

5 President Sadat broke diplomatic relatij 
with Algeria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, 
Syria on Dec. 5, 1977. 



ARMS CONTROL: SALT and th 
Test Ban — Cause for Optimism 



by Paul C. Warnke ' 

I have been assigned today a topic 
which I think speaks eloquently of the 
emphasis that the Carter Administra- 
tion has put on the subject of arms con- 
trol. As you know, since January, the 
Carter Administration has undertaken 
at least 10 separate initiatives in this 
particular area. 

They involve perhaps most promi- 
nently the negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on strategic arms limitations. In 



addition to that, we have the cq 
prehensive test ban negotiations, whj 
have been going on in Geneva in ao 
tion to the Strategic Arms Limitati 
Talks (SALT). Also in Geneva we hj 
been discussing the questions of b 
ning chemical weapons and radiold 
cal weapons. We have, in addition, 
Indian Ocean arms limitation talks 
which we are engaged with the Soi 
Union. 

Pending on the horizon are si] 
things as discussions with respect to: 



luary 1978 



21 



ctions on conventional arms trans- 
i and the elimination of antisatellite 
apons in space that could, of course, 
iously jeopardize U.S. -Soviet rela- 
lships and arms control objectives. 
Ve are also involved in preparations 

the Special Session on Disarma- 
nt of the United Nations, which will 
e place next spring. 
Embassador Gerard Smith and Mr. 
lip Farley are engaged on a continu- 

basis with the overarching problem 
avoiding the proliferation of nuclear 
ipons. 2 

)n November 5 I returned from 5 
jks in Geneva, where I participated 
the discussions with delegations 
m the Soviet Union on strategic 
is limitations and a comprehensive 

ban treaty. 

think that most Americans and the 
^rnational community generally 
or these initiatives. They recognize 
t this is the most effective way of 
linishing the chances of a confronta- 
l between the Soviet Union and the 
ited States leading to a war that 
Id devastate human society. I would 
e to say, however, that the initia- 
ls are not free from criticism. From 
e to time, even in Geneva, I get a 
it echo of the fact that there are 
se who are less than totally satisfied 
h our efforts. 

furiously, there are two basic com- 
ints and, it seems to me, they repre- 
t a striking contrast. One of them is: 
y is it that we keep caving in to the 
>sians and how can you trust them 
way? And the other one is: Why 
s it take you so long and why do 
i get so little done? 
t may come as no surprise to you to 
i that I don't think that either one of 
se criticisms has any validity. I'd 
: to deal with them, however, or at- 
ipt to deal with them. 

gotiating Process 

nrst, with respect to the criticism 
t we are giving in to the Russians, 
t we are making too many conces- 
ns, and how can we trust them: I 
nk that particular school of criti- 
n suffers from the fact that its ad- 
ents haven't really stopped to con- 
sr what is the nature of arms control 
;otiations. 
3y their very nature they are differ- 

than other types of negotiations, 
sn in the international field. Arms 
ltrol is not the kind of a zero-sum 
ne that sometimes it's portrayed to 

It has few of the attributes of a 
nmercial negotiation. What it has to 
with, in terms of substance, is the 
lie security of the nations that are 
jaged in the conversations. And that 



basic security is going to be protected. 
What that means is that either side, in 
the long run can be out-traded. Ob- 
viously, each side would like to end up 
with an agreement in which it had all 
the advantages and in which the other 
side was restricted where it was not. 
But that can't happen because, even if 
one side should be out-traded, you 
would not have a viable, durable arms 
control agreement. There is no way in 
which either side could get specific en- 
forcement. There is no court of law to 
which you could take your contract and 
say I won this particular trade and I am 
entitled to the fruits of my victory. In- 
stead, you would find that the side that 
had been out-traded would promptly 
repudiate the deal in the exercise of its 
sovereign rights. 

So you start with the fact that you 
have to end up with an arms control 
agreement which is fair, which is bal- 
anced, which has equal restrictions on 
both sides, and provides for equal secu- 
rity. Now that necessarily means a 
process of hard bargaining, hard trad- 
ing, but also a process of analysis in 
which you have to consider what the 
basic interests are of the other side. It 
makes for, obviously, a prolonged and 
complex sort of process. 

With regard to the entire question of 
arms control, moreover, there is no 
way of avoiding dealing with the 
Soviet Union. There are only two mili- 
tary superpowers, so that we have to 
proceed on the basis that we can work 
out, in the final analysis, some sort of 
useful agreements with the Soviet 
Union that will stabilize the competi- 
tion that will unquestionably continue 
to exist between us. I don't think we 
can proceed on the basis that arms con- 
trol limitations are going to eliminate 
this spirit of competition and the exist- 
ence of friction between the two coun- 
tries. But we don't have to be friends 
in order to reach agreements which are 
in the interests of both sides. 

I feel very strongly that arms control 
is in the interests of both sides. I think 
that is the case because, even if you as- 
sume a continuing competition for 
world influence, that competition can 
express itself in one of two ways. 
Either the military competition will 
proceed without restraint, or we will 
find some way in which a measure of 
greater sanity and greater safety can be 
introduced into the relationship. That, 
as I say, is in the common interest. It is 
in the interests of both sides. 

At the present point, despite some 
comments that you read in the press, 
there is a military balance between the 
two countries. There is no military 
superiority on the part of the Soviet 
Union. I don't know of any reasonable 



person, in or out of the government, 
who feels otherwise. In most respects, 
we maintain a qualitative edge, but it is 
not a qualitative edge that gives us the 
type of political domination that we 
would like to have but which, ba- 
sically, is unattainable given the re- 
sources that exist on the side of the 
Soviet Union. 

So that we have the choice: We can 
either continue with the military com- 
petition without restraints or we can 
find some way of bringing that compe- 
tition under control by effective arms 
control measures. 

I don't think that any one of us 
would be prepared to see the Soviet 
Union achieve a degree of military 
superiority. That might not end up with 
a war, but it would certainly end up 
with the kind of world in which our 
interests would be subordinated. 

So, essentially, I see arms control 
negotiations as being a measure by 
which we can best advance the security 
of the United States. And I think that 
we can deal with the Soviet Union be- 
cause their perception has to be the 
same. You don't have to trust the mo- 
tives of the Soviet Union to feel that 
they would negotiate in good faith on 
arms control issues. You can trust any- 
body to protect his own interests. And 
you can trust any nation to take those 
steps that will protect its national 
security. 

Strategic Balance 

We are in a position at the present 
time in which, as Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown said on "Issues and An- 
swers" on November 6, we have a sta- 
ble strategic balance. Now by that we 
mean that neither side at the present 
point — no matter what the circum- 
stances of international friction, no 
matter what the tensions, no matter 
what the provocations — would have 
any incentive to initiate a first strike. 
Neither side could adopt the option of 
going to nuclear war. 

At the present point, we have some- 
thing in excess — well in excess — of 
9,000 individual nuclear warheads 
targeted at the Soviet Union. They 
don't have anywhere near that number. 
They have only something around 
4,500. In each instance, it's more than 
there are lucrative targets available to 
strike. In each instance, it means that 
the side that was attacked would be in a 
position to respond with a devastating 
retaliatory strike and eliminate the 
other country as an industrialized 
society. 

That's a grim sort of picture, but it is 
the best we can hope for in the way of 
stability in the nuclear weapon age. 




s 

1. 

t 






22 



Department of State Bulletii 



And the anomaly is that both countries 
continue, without restraint, to accumu- 
late more and more in the way of nu- 
clear arms, to spend tens of hundreds 
of billions of dollars. While this con- 
tinues, the very best that we can hope 
for is that the situation won't become 
worse, that there won't be some sort of 
development which would make the 
strategic balance less stable. 

That's a very powerful incentive for 
the United States to negotiate. It's a 
very powerful incentive for the Soviet 
Union to negotiate. There are other 
reasons that, as far as I'm concerned, 
tend toward good-faith negotiations in 
the arms control field. For the Soviet 
Union there are political reasons as 
well. It obviously is to them of impor- 
tance to be seen dealing responsibly 
with the United States on measures that 
have to do with the safety of the world. 
There are, finally, I think, real military 
reasons why the Soviet Union would be 
prepared to negotiate in good faith on 
arms control. They recognize that in no 
event would we be willing to concede 
them military superiority. So the alter- 
native is that they would be faced by 
actions on the part of the United States 
in response to their military buildup. 
Moreover, they have to recognize that 
we do have a technological lead. And 
then also, from the military standpoint, 
there is the entire question of prolifera- 
tion. And the Soviet Union, just as we, 
has to be responsive to the danger that 
nuclear weapons will fall into the hands 
of more and more countries or subna- 
tional terrorist groups. And I have no 
doubt that the fact that if nuclear 
weapons do become that widely dis- 
tributed, this would exponentially in- 
crease the risk that a nuclear weapon 
will someday be used in anger. 

At the present point, our relationship 
with the Soviet Union and our common 
possession of nuclear weapons have 
reached the stage of maturity in which 
only insanity would motivate their use. 
We can't count on less stable govern- 
ments with less experience in the field. 
And we can't certainly count on ter- 
rorist groups to exercise a comparable 
degree of sane restraint. 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

In that regard, I think that the com- 
prehensive test ban negotiations that 
have been conducted in Geneva for the 
past 5 weeks can have very important 
consequences for the proliferation 
problem. As I'm sure you know, these 
negotiations are on a trilateral basis. 
The United Kingdom is working with 
the Soviet Union and the United States 
to try to put an end to nuclear tests. We 



have had some quite severe obstacles 
that explain the fact that, for the past 
20 years, we have been striving for a 
comprehensive test ban but haven't 
achieved it; that explains the fact that it 
has been 14 years since we achieved 
the limited test ban which put an end to 
atmospheric testing. One of the major 
problems has been the dispute between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
as to the coverage of a comprehensive 
test ban treaty. It's been our view that 
to be truly comprehensive, to be effec- 
tive, and to have the maximum inhibit- 
ing effect on proliferation, the treaty 
should ban all nuclear explosions, not 
just the weapons tests. 

The Soviet Union has appeared to 
place a great premium on the conduct 
of so-called peaceful nuclear explo- 
sions (PNE) — the use of nuclear explo- 
sive devices for a variety of purposes, 
such as the enhancement of yields from 
gas and oil wells, mining operations, 
river diversions. 

We, on the other hand, have at least 
for the past several years contended 
that, whatever the possible economic 
benefits might be, they are far more 
than offset by the advantages to both 
countries and to mankind of putting an 
end to nuclear explosions completely. 
Now we can't really blame the Soviet 
Union exclusively for adopting this po- 
sition. It's not so many years back that 
in the United States we harbored really 
quite ambitious objectives for the use 
of PNE. At one point, for example, we 
considered that this might be a means 
of creating a new Panama Canal. How- 
ever, the prospect began to seem more 
and more illusory. It was predicted by 
some that the resulting landslides might 
not only blot out the new canal but 
might put an end to the old one too. In 
any event, we have moved on from that 
view of PNE utility. But the Soviets 
have continued to maintain that any 
comprehensive test ban had to have an 
exclusion for peaceful nuclear explo- 
sions. Our position has been that not 
only would this leave the possibility of 
the accrual of military benefits, but it 
also would not have the desired effect 
of preventing other countries from de- 
veloping their own nuclear explosive 
devices. You will recall that, back a 
few years ago, the Indian Government 
exploded a nuclear device which they 
promptly labeled as a peaceful nuclear 
explosive. The results, of course, are 
almost indistinguishable from those of 
a nuclear bomb because, in fact, it is a 
nuclear bomb. 

We believe, that, from the prolifera- 
tion standpoint, if the United Kingdom, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States 
all totally gave up any nuclear explo- 



sions, it would be very, very difficul 
for any other country to face the conse 
quences, in terms of international con 
demnation, if it were to become a nev 
member of the nuclear club. 

I am delighted to report that thi 
speech that President Brezhnev mad 
last week did, in fact, represent a ver; 
major move on the part of the Sovie 
Union. The Soviet negotiators ii' 
Geneva promptly confirmed the fac 
that he meant what he had said and tha 
they were prepared to have 
moratorium on peaceful nuclear explo 
sions which would accompany a ban o: 
nuclear weapons tests. There remain ti 
be worked out a number of very sever 
problems, but I am much, much mor 
optimistic than I was 10 days ago. 
think that it is a very constructive mov 
on their part. I believe that it will even 
tually solve this major problem. 

"As I indicated, there are problem 
that remain, particularly the question Q 
whether other nuclear weapons state 
will join in a comprehensive test ban 
We obviously would like to see th£ 
happen, but our feeling is that the mo% 
important prospect for ending nuclea; 
weapons tests and nuclear explosion; 
generally is for the countries that ar 
the major nuclear powers, that conduc; 
the great bulk of the tests, to enter int/ 
an agreement which would put an en< 
to them. And, of course, the particip? 
tion of the United Kingdom in this re 
gard is of immense importance in term 
both of international support and als> 
of showing that this is not just a dea 
between the two superpowers. 

So with regard to this issue of non 
proliferation, this is certainly one o 
which we and the Soviet leadership ca 
find common ground. We have there a 
identity of interests which leads to 
distinct stimulation for our arms con 
trol initiatives. 

SALT Negotiations 

With respect to the SALT talk 
themselves, this is where the complaii 
is most often voiced that we are cavin 
in to the Russians, that we are makin 
concessions, that it's all one-sided, th; 
we are being out-traded. The defense 1 
those charges is that they are incorrec 
We are not being out-traded. We ha\ 
to recognize that any agreement wi 
involve matching restrictions on bot 
sides. There has been movement. Thei 
is no question about that. The mov< 
ment has not been one-sided. 

I'd like to take you back to the earl 
days of the Carter Administration ar 
our first efforts with regard to initi; 
tives in the field of strategic arms coi 
trol. You will remember that Secretai 



iuary 1978 

nee led a delegation to Moscow last 
iron, and we brought with us alterna- 
: proposals. 

}ne of them was a so-called com- 
hensive package that would have 
ant a very dramatic step forward in 
;ctive strategic nuclear arms control, 
had a number of provisions which 
uld have meant that the qualitative 
e would have been slowed down, in- 
ad of merely putting new limits 
nerically on the numbers of strategic 
lear weapons that each side could 
e. The agreement would have in- 
ved significant reductions in the 
rail total of so-called strategic nu- 
ir delivery vehicles. It would have 
ant a reduction in the number of 
se vehicles which have MIRVs, 
ich is an acronym for multiple 
ependently-targetable reentry 
icles — the capability of a single 
sile to launch a number of warheads 

launch them accurately at a number 
argets. It would have meant also a 
action in the introduction of new 
:s of nuclear missiles, 
he Soviet Union leadership, as far 
ve could tell, felt that this went too 
and too fast. They appeared to feel 
> that it went beyond what had been 
jed upon in Vladivostok between 
sident Ford and General Secretary 
zhnev in 1974. Recognizing that 

was a possibility, we had an alter- 
ve proposal to present in Moscow 
vlarch. And that was the so-called 
;rral package. What it would have 
int is the acceptance in a treaty of 

Vladivostok ceilings, which were 
DO in total numbers of strategic nu- 
ir delivery vehicles, of which 1,320 
Id be launchers of MIRVed mis- 
s. Other issues would have been 
erred for a subsequent SALT 
otiation. Now the Soviet Union also 
cted that as not going far enough, 
o where are we today and how have 
gotten there? 

iradually in the months since 
rch, we have begun to evolve a 
-T II treaty which I would say is in 
veen the two proposals that we pre- 
ted in March. It does not in one step 
as far as our March comprehensive 
kage. It is, however, from the 
idpoint of arms control, from the 
idpoint of protecting the invulnera- 
ity of our deterrent, from the 
idpoint of our national security, a 
lificant step forward and much bet- 
than our deferral package of March. 

rather than there having been a 
idy retreat since Moscow, I would 

there has been a steady advance, 

we now can see in the making a 
LT II agreement which will move us 
vard toward effective arms control. 



What it will mean is a significant re- 
duction in both the overall aggregate of 
nuclear delivery vehicles and in the 
number of those vehicles that have 
multiple independently-targetable reen- 
try vehicles. From that standpoint, it 
diminishes the threat to our own land- 
based intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBM). It diminishes the counterforce 
potential. It will mean a reduction in 
the number of the intercontinental bal- 
listic missiles that the Soviet Union has 
with multiple warheads. And we hope 
it will mean at least the beginning of 
stopping the qualitative improvements 
of nuclear weapons which are poten- 
tially destabilizing. I think that there is 
no question that the agreement is a sub- 
stantial improvement over the deferral 
package of last March. I believe also 
that it points the way toward an even 
more effective arms control agreement. 

Essentially, what we are working out 
is a three-piece framework. The first 
piece would be a basic treaty lasting 
through 1985, which would set these nu- 
merical limits, which would constrain 
some of the weapons programs that 
threaten to be destabilizing. There 
would be a 3-year protocol which 
would handle, on a temporary basis, 
some of the weapons systems which are 
being considered and as to which our 
thinking has not progressed to the point 
at which we know where our best inter- 
ests would lie in a long-range solution. 
The protocol would leave us in a posi- 
tion to continue with all of the de- 
velopments that we feel are essential to 
protect our security in the event that 
arms control turns out to be a failure. 

One of the problems that exists at the 
present time is that we are endeavoring 
to defend against criticism a treaty 
which remains to be completely 
negotiated. And we are trying to de- 
fend it against an ideal that doesn't 
exist. The issue at the present point ap- 
pears to be whether this treaty is as 
good as some other hypothetical, 
theoretical treaty, and the answer is, of 
course, that it is not. I can dream up a 
treaty which would be better. But I 
don't think I can negotiate that dream 
treaty and I don't think anybody else 
can, at this point. The real issue has to 
be whether the treaty, as it is finally 
developed, advances or diminishes the 
security of the United States. And I can 
say to you without the least doubt that 
the treaty which is being negotiated 
will represent a very significant im- 
provement in the security of the United 
States. 

Now, essentially, that's where we 
are at the present point. My account 
leads, of course, to brief discussion of 
the second basic complaint that I men- 



23 

tioned at the beginning of my remarks, 
which is: Why does arms control take 
us so long? 

Differences in Military Situations 

I think the answer is really pretty 
clear. It takes so long because it's very 
complicated, because it deals with the 
essence of the security of the countries 
involved in arms control negotiations. 
We're also dealing with a situation in 
which there is a considerable asym- 
metry between the situations of the two 
major military powers. There are dif- 
ferences in the way in which their 
forces have developed and the stresses 
that they have placed on particular 
weapons systems as against others, 
differences certainly as far as their rela- 
tions with other countries are con- 
cerned, and obvious geographic differ- 
ences. These are asymmetries which 
require consideration and resolution in 
the course of arms control negotiations. 
I will discuss a couple of these asym- 
metries briefly. 

We have placed our primary em- 
phasis on the maintenance of the so- 
called strategic nuclear triad. We have 
our strategic nuclear forces divided in 
three parts. We have the intercontinen- 
tal ballistic missiles. We have the sub- 
marine launched ballistic missiles. We 
have our strategic bombers. It's a rela- 
tively even division among those three 
components. 

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
has placed its primary emphasis on the 
land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. So, therefore, constraints that 
affect primarily the ICBM's bear more 
heavily on the Soviet Union than they 
do on us. 

Other asymmetries that exist are, for- 
tunately, very much in our favor. We 
have only one military threat of signifi- 
cance and that's the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union, on the other hand, has to 
face a long and troubled Eastern border 
with the People's Republic of China. 
They have on the West the Eastern 
Europeans, who frequently become sul- 
len if not rebellious. We, fortunately, 
don't have that sort of a troubled bor- 
der situation. On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union is closer than we are to 
Western Europe and, therefore, the 
rapid deployment of forces is more 
readily available to them than it is to 
us. 

With respect to the future, it is cer- 
tainly my hope that we will be able, 
within a relatively short period of time, 
to bring to a completion a SALT II 
treaty. It will be, I think, along the 
general lines that I have discussed. It 
will, as I have said, mean a significant 






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24 

forward step. I hope, also, that with the 
new position of the Soviet Union with 
regard to peaceful nuclear explosions 
that we will be able to achieve a com- 
prehensive test ban. The two very much 
complement one another. If, for exam- 
ple, we succeed in a SALT agreement 
in getting a ban on new types of nu- 
clear weapons, then the existence of a 
comprehensive test ban will give us a 
further degree of assurance that there is 
compliance with that provision, be- 
cause it would make the development of 
new types of warheads considerably 
more difficult. 

As far as the other arms control 
measures are concerned — the other 
negotiations on chemical weapons, 
radiological weapons, conventional 
arms transfers, eliminating the threat of 
antisatellite systems — they, I think, 
will profit from the success of these 
two major negotiations. The time re- 
quired is certainly something that I 



can't predict. They should not be very 
prolonged negotiations now that we 
have succeeded in bridging the major 
gaps. We can only hope that the Soviet 
Union will continue to feel as we feel 
that the completion of these agreements 
is basic to the security of both coun- 
tries, is essential to world peace, and 
will create the kind of climate in 
which, hopefully, we can resolve many 
of the other differences that exist be- 
tween us and that add to the troubles of 
the world. □ 



1 Address before the Woman's National 
Democratic Club in Washington, D.C., on 
Nov. 10, 1977; Ambassador Warnke is Director of 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) and chairman of the U.S. delegation to 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

2 Ambassador Smith is U.S. Special Repre- 
sentative for Nonproliferation Matters and U.S. 
Representative to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency; Mr. Farley is Deputy U.S. Spe- 
cial Representative for Nonproliferation Matters. 



ECONOMICS: The United States 
and the Third World 



by Anthony Lake ' 

I will speak for a while first on the 
approach of a new Administration to 
the crucial economic issues we are ad- 
dressing with the developing nations. 
The phrase "new Administration" may 
no longer be accurate after 10 months. 
But I think we do have an approach to 
these issues that is new in some of its 
directions and priorities. Before getting 
to the specific issues themselves, let 
me say a few words about context. 

For many years during the period 
after World War II, American relations 
with Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
were looked at primarily through the 
prism of the cold war. And especially 
with regard to Africa and Asia, our 
concerns for close relations with our 
traditional allies cut across our inclina- 
tion to support the movement toward 
independence by Europe's colonies. 

In recent years, we have come to 
look at the problems of the Third 
World more in their own right, in terms 
of realities of the Third World itself. 
We can do so because we have come to 
appreciate better the limits to the influ- 
ence of both the Soviet Union and the 
United States in the Third World. We 
must do so because of the growing im- 
portance of the Third World to us, 
politically as well as economically, and 
because only bad policy ensues when 
we allow either our global fears or our 



global hopes to skew our vision of the 
facts. 

This is not to say we should be indif- 
ferent to the influence of the Soviet 
Union in the Third World or elsewhere. 
We and the Soviets have different 
views of history and of the future; our 
relationship continues to have competi- 
tive, as well as cooperative, elements. 

But in terms of our own self-interest, 
we must begin to deal with the develop- 
ing nations on a basis which takes full 
account of their growing importance to 
us. And we should understand that the 
determination of Third World nations 
to decide their own policies, their wish 
to determine their own fates, is a basic 
protection for the world of diversity we 
want to see preserved. 

So it is no longer possible to say that 
East- West relations or ties among the 
industrial democracies are more impor- 
tant to us than North-South policies. 
For different reasons, they are all vital 
to U.S. interests and to the kind of 
world we want for our children. Ad- 
vancement of our objectives in one area 
cannot be divorced from progress in 
another. Worldwide energy security, 
for example, affects the economic wel- 
fare of the industrial democracies, the 
developing world, and the eastern 
Communist states. Economic coopera- 
tion among the United States, Europe, 
and Japan affects growth in the Third 
World; by the same token, their eco- 



Department of State Bullei, 

nomic health is important to our own 
Another way of looking at the impc 
tance of the U.S. -Third World relatio 
ship is to enumerate some of tho 
problems which cannot be solved wit 
out their cooperation. 

• Controlling the proliferation of n 1 
clear weapons requires the assistan 
of India, Iran, Brazil, and Argentin 
among others. 

• Restraining the dangerous grow 
of conventional arms races must be a 
dressed on every continent. 

• Human rights, including the ec 
nomic dimension of those rights, arei 
concern to us wherever they are 
jeopardy. 

• Managing an economically int< 
dependent world to assure globl 
growth and promote economic equ 
requires close cooperation between t: 
governments of the industrial democi 
cies and those of the developii 
nations. 

Managing the Relationship 

For many of these first months in 
fice, the Administration has be: 
reviewing — and arguing about — h<, 
this complex, interconnected relatk 
ship with the developing nations can:: 
managed. Let me summarize sc: 
general conclusions we have come 
with in six points. 

First, we must adopt a positive 4 
constructive attitude in addressing 
ternational problems encompassing I 
developing countries. We will se 1 
common ground with these countri 
for progress will only be possible wr 
solutions are mutually beneficial to 
parties. 

Second, we will recognize in our ; 
tions that interdependence is more tli 
a slogan. It requires us, as we fashi 
our domestic economic policies, to in 
into account their impact on the rest 
the world, including the Third Wor 
Traditionally, the economies of the < 
veloping countries have relied upon i 
economic dynamism of the major 
dustrial economies. We must contir 
to be reliable on that score. But it 
increasingly true that we have a ma> 
stake in the health and vitality of 
Third World, as well. No less tl 
35% of our exports went to develop, 
countries, while almost half of our I 
ports came from them. 

Third, the structure of the interi 
tional system is changing, gradua; 
evolving from a "North" an( 
"South" into a global community 
which all countries have resp< 
sibilities as well as rights. Much of 
North-South rhetoric has, unfon 
nately, implied that only the indust* 
nations have obligations. This canC 



lary 1978 



25 



rue. If fully accepted, it fosters 
paternalism and resentment. Even 
phrase "North-South," and the 
otomy it sets up, obscures the gra- 
ins that exist among nations. This 
ysis does not mean we can — or 
Id try to — split the Group of 77. 2 
as the economies of developing 
ltries advance from one level to 
her, it is important that they show 
:asing concern for the global wel- 
They will have a growing stake in 
:ommon good. 

ey oil-producing nations, for 
iple, now ponder the damaging ef- 
of rising oil prices on the health of 
dobal economic system and, there - 
, on their own long-term economic 
lopment. Even small oil price rises 
easily wipe out the gains which the 
d World could reap from aid, in- 
nent, and loans from the industrial 
>ns. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal 
dated the other day that each per- 
ige point of increase in oil prices 
$400 million to the U.S. energy 
it has an even more devastating 
tct on other countries, 
ich nation must also face its re- 
sibilities to its own citizens, who 
nost in need — and our own country 
no exception. However well- 
tioning the international economic 
:m, development is fundamentally 
allenge for each government and 
:ty to address in its own terms. 
>urth, while our policies must be 
al in their concept, their implemen- 
n must be specific to each situa- 
Policies must be tailored to take 
account the great diversities that 
among the developing countries. 
>r the economically stronger coun- 
i, the most appropriate areas of 
leration are trade and access to pri- 
capital and technology. Most of 
i America is now in this position, 
le aid still plays an important role 
le region, its prosperity depends 
larily upon the continuing evolu- 
of an open international financial 
trading system in which developing 
Uries can participate ever more 

)r the poorer nations, including 
t African countries, official de- 
pment assistance — foreign aid — 
lins the vital source of external 
tal. Africa will benefit from the in- 
on of the World Bank— and of our 
i Agency for International 
elopment — to focus concessional 
stance on the nations most in need. 
fth, we accept the diverse models 
:onomic and political development 
the less developed countries 
C's) have chosen to benefit their 
)les. But we also believe that cer- 
human rights have universal appli- 



cation. Human rights include not just 
the basic rights of due process, to- 
gether with political freedoms, but also 
the right of each human being to a just 
share of the fruits of one's country's 
production. 

Sixth, we recognize that the eco- 
nomic and social issues we all face — 
such as protecting the environment and 
the oceans — are global problems from 
which Communist countries are not 
immune and to which they can and 
should make a positive contribution. 
Consequently, it will be our policy to 
encourage a constructive role by the 
centrally planned economies — to in- 
crease their development assistance 
generally and to join us and developing 
countries in a global development ef- 
fort. 

Basic North-South Issues 

These six principles only have mean- 
ing, of course, in terms of the specific 
issues we face: liberalizing trade, insur- 
ing adequate balance-of-payments 
financing, improving our foreign as- 
sistance performance and reorienting 
its focus in the direction of poor 
people, stabilizing commodity price 
fluctuations, and facilitating the flow 
of investment and technology on terms 
fair to companies and governments. 
Underlying many of these issues, how- 
ever, are at least three basic tensions. 

1. We frequently face difficult 
choices between our short-term and our 
longer term interests. 

2. We sometimes confront a tension 
between what we consider to be sound 
economic policy and, at the same time, 
our desire to maintain a positive 
momentum in our political relation- 
ships with the developing nations. 

3. On almost every issue, we must 
find ways to enhance the participation 
of LDC's in international decisionmak- 
ing in a way that is acceptable to them 
and to us. 

Let me say a word about each. 

First, trade-offs between short-term 
and longer term interests. 

We are, as you know, in a period of 
economic difficulties, both in the 
United States and abroad. Governments 
everywhere are under pressure to re- 
spond to the immediate plight of their 
citizens, particularly the need to protect 
jobs. This results in at least two policy 
dilemmas for the United States. 

•It is axiomatic that a liberal trade 
regime is in the interest of both the de- 
veloped and the developing nations. 
Freer trade can promote the long-term 
development of the resources the world 
needs, provide lower prices and greater 



choice for consumers, and increase op- 
portunities for producers in all coun- 
tries. Trade can be an engine for eco- 
nomic development and a means for 
developing nations to participate in the 
international economic system. All this 
is accepted in principle, as the stated 
goal of all countries participating in the 
current multilateral trade negotiations 
in Geneva. But the harsh political real- 
ity is that these longer term benefits are 
threatened by short-term protectionism. 

The United States has been in the 
forefront in encouraging the negotia- 
tions to move forward. We must con- 
tinue to do so, while seeking to cushion 
the impact of immediate dislocations. 
In the months ahead the United States 
will be vigorously pushing for trade 
liberalizing measures in the current 
trade negotiations in Geneva. We will 
be giving special attention to products 
of interest to LDC's. And we will do 
our best to work with other countries to 
devise trading rules which promote 
trade between the developed and de- 
veloping world. 

•Another example of the need — and 
the difficulty — in protecting the future 
against shorter term pressures is the 
issue of foreign assistance. Our foreign 
aid program has undergone many 
changes over the past decade, from the 
large, capital-intensive programs of the 
1960's to the small programs we now 
increasingly support — much of which 
is focused on rural development. 

This Administration intends to give 
more priority to development assist- 
ance than it received throughout the 
1970's. We see these development pro- 
grams as an integral part of our overall 
strategy of promoting flows of de- 
velopment finance, as the most effi- 
cient and direct method of transferring 
resources to countries which do not 
have full access to private capital mar- 
kets, and as the most direct way to at- 
tack poverty. 

We believe that larger and more ef- 
fective foreign assistance programs — 
bilateral and multilateral — are in the 
U.S. national interest and in the inter- 
est of global development. So year by 
year, it is increasingly important to 
convince the Congress and the public 
that devoting resources to the fight 
against poverty abroad is tied to the ul- 
timate health of our economy here at 
home. 

The Administration consequently 
faces the challenge of demonstrating to 
American citizens that foreign assist- 
ance works — that it can, together with 
other policies, make a difference in the 
global food, energy, or population bal- 
ance and that it can, by mobilizing the 
assistance of other donors and en- 
couraging sound domestic policies on 




: 



26 



Department of State Bulla 



the part of recipients, stimulate growth 
and equity. 

Let me say another word about our 
approach to foreign assistance. Our 
focus on meeting basic human needs, 
which is an integral part of our overall 
human rights policy, is not as simple as 
it may appear. We face at least two 
basic challenges here. 

• In some cases, we face a dilemma 
when we consider foreign assistance 
for countries where political and eco- 
nomic human rights are denied. Our as- 
sistance is targeted on improving the 
economic conditions of poor people. 
Since aid is generally government-to- 
government, the regime concerned in- 
evitably derives some political boost 
from our assistance. But we do not 
want to deprive poor people because of 
the nature of their government. In such 
cases, our decisions must be made on a 
pragmatic, case-by-case basis and very 
human terms. 

•In addition, meeting basic human 
needs is not, in our view, a welfare 
program but a way for a country and a 
society to develop. Accordingly, we 
will encourage host governments to 
make an increasing commitment of 
their own to the needs of their poor, at 
the same time as we increase our aid to 
them. Many developing countries faced 
with balance-of-payments problems, 
high energy prices, and the need for 
massive domestic investment, may re- 
sist placing a priority emphasis on the 
well-being of their poor. Because the 
poor are often excluded from the politi- 
cal process, their concerns are given 
less weight by governing elites. If we 
place conditions on our aid, these elites 
could charge us with attempting to 
intervene in their internal affairs. Our 
challenge is to be sensitive to their 
concerns, while promoting our views 
and our commitment to the poor. 

A second dilemma which underlies 
our North-South efforts is the need 
both to maintain a cooperative mul- 
tilateral political environment for dis- 
cussing economic issues while expres- 
sing our differences over what are the 
soundest and most effective economic 
policies that can serve our common 
long-term interests. 

I can think of two cases where this 
issue has arisen. In the area of com- 
modity policy, the developing nations 
have proposed the negotiation of an in- 
tegrated commodity program for 18 
different raw materials. The idea is to 
relate international efforts to address 
the problem of each commodity market 
through a common financing 
mechanism — a common fund. This 
proposal has assumed a strong political 



significance in the North-South 
dialogue. 

The United States and other indus- 
trial nations agree with Third World 
leaders that commodity issues are of 
central importance to the world econ- 
omy and to the economic development 
of many countries. But we are con- 
vinced that effective measures can be 
devised only if each market is ad- 
dressed as an individual case and that 
these individual arrangements form the 
best basis for a common commodity 
policy and funding arrangement. 
Negotiations on this question begin 
November 7 . We will enter them in the 
hope that we can advance a positive 
and realistic position. We face the 
challenge of supporting what we con- 
sider sound economic policies, while 
working to maintain a constructive 
negotiating atmosphere. 

Another such area is debt. Develop- 
ing countries have been seeking 
generalized forgiveness of past official 
debt, which many of them see as a 
structural impediment to future 
development. 

We seek to respond to such financial 
needs by arranging additional resource 
transfers, through bilateral and mul- 
tilateral foreign assistance. But our 
analysis shows that every debtor is in a 
different situation. Some have little 
problem managing their debts. Others 
face only a temporary difficulty in serv- 
icing their loans. Still others may face 
long-term structural problems charac- 
terized by an inadequate net flow of fi- 
nancial resources. 

In cases of extreme and urgent need, 
obviously we stand prepared to discuss 
debt rescheduling. But in the divergent 
circumstances we face, we believe any 
generalized debt forgiveness would be 
inadvisable. First, the benefits to 
debtors would bear little relationship to 
their development needs, since some 
nations with the largest debts are grow- 
ing fast and can more easily service 
them. Second, by treating all countries 
alike, we would, in effect, be dis- 
criminating against those countries 
which have struggled to pursue policies 
to reduce their indebtedness over time. 
And third, a general debt moratorium 
would be seized upon by those who 
have traditionally cried "giveaway" at 
any effort to transfer resources to the 
Third World. 

A third basic issue underlying 
North-South economic relations is the 
need to expand LDC participation in 
the management of the world economy. 
One of the major drives behind the 
new international economic order is 
Third World desire for greater political 
participation in the global economy. 



The developing nations want not onh 
larger slice of the global pie, they w< 
to be at the table when the pie is slic 
and have a voice in its apportionmen 
We are convinced that it is essent 
to widen the circle of international c 
cisionmaking. We believe that the ec 
nomic system must be fair, and equa 
important, it must be seen as fair. I 
going from principle to practice p 
sents us with difficult issues. 

•First, there is the question of h| 
broadbased global economic manaj 
ment can be. While we live in a wo 
of sovereign nations, it is also a wol 
of states which are unequal in tlr 
ability to influence the system, 
good or bad. Thus it is exceedingly ( 
ficult for the international communi, 
including developing countries the 
selves, to select which develop; 
countries should play the largest role 

•There is also the practical quest 1 ! 
of which management arrangeme.s 
and institutions should be expand. 
Should the most advanced develop! 
countries be invited to join the Org. 
zation for Economic Cooperation il 
Development? Would they want ' 
Should their voice and vote be enlari 
in international financial institutit' 
and if so, are they willing to underfi 
commensurate obligations? Should) 
make a special effort to incorpoi 
LDCs into institutions which have : 
to be created — such as for energy 
the oceans? These are some of the. 
sues we are addressing now. 

To summarize, I think it is fair to; 
that despite the increasing complexi: 
of North-South relations and the ci 
ceptual as well as practical probli 
we face, the Administration has rri 
considerable progress in formulatir 
set of positive development policies 

•We are intent on making substau 
increases in our foreign assistai: 
while emphasizing the focus on mi 
ing basic human needs. 

•On commodities, we reversed' 
policy of previous years and have: 
cepted the principle of a common ii 
to facilitate buffer stocks. 

•We have agreed to an expansio: 
World Bank activities, also a revel 
of previous policy. 

•The Administration has agreed 
the expansion of International M< 
tary Fund lending and is now see| 
congressional agreement. 

•In the trade negotiations, wei 
willing to reduce trade barrier^ 
products of special interest to LDC 

•We will vigorously negotiate f 
system of internationally coordinf 
national food reserves. 



lary 1978 

^nd for once, we are taking the 
ed Nations very seriously on eco- 
ic and social issues. 

tie general principles I have 
ested tonight are only a shorthand 
eality. This is especially true when 
speaks in the abstractions of eco- 
ics. Our statistics and our analyses 
ern the lives of billions of people 
le coming generation — people here 
.merica and people abroad. If we 
inward, toward protectionism and 
ference, the human cost would be 
erably high. That is the essential 
lem we will be addressing on al- 
: every foreign policy issue we now 

jntributions of scholars such as 
selves can be threefold. 

four objective analyses of events 
atin America and Africa are valu- 
as scholarship. They are also valu- 
for policymakers trying to under- 
i the facts with which we must 

iqually valuable would be your 
ghts on some of the policy dilem- 
I have discussed. I am quite sin- 
in hoping each of you will con- 
writing me with your views and 
estions. Asking you to do so is one 
e reasons I came here, 
^nd finally, whatever your views, 
le urge you to press them on de- 



cisionmakers in both the executive 
branch and the Congress and to con- 
tribute to the public debate on these 
issues. 

Such involvement may seem, to 
many of you, inconsistent with the ob- 
jectivity of a scholar. I have no quarrel 
with such an individual conclusion. But 
before reaching it, I hope you will con- 
sider one point. 

We are emerging now from the most 
contentious period in the last 100 years 
of our nation's history. The war in 
Vietnam so engaged the passions of us 
all — as it should have done — that we 
began to think too easily about all pol- 
icy issues in terms of simple 
categories: right or wrong, interven- 
tionism or noninterventionism, real 
politik or idealism. 

As I have tried to suggest tonight, 
the time has passed when we can think 
in the simple terms of any doctrine, 
whether derived from Munich or Viet- 
nam. The complexities of our chal- 
lenges, the necessary breadth of our 
priorities, and the depth of our dilem- 
mas elude such simple formulas. 

If we are to have a decent public de- 
bate on our policies — which we 
want — and if we are to show how pro- 
gressive policies abroad are in our 
long-term national interest — as we 
must — then there can be no substitute 
for the participation in those debates of 



Corrupt Practices 9 
Investment Disclosure 



ment by President Carter 



im pleased to sign into law S. 305, 

"oreign Corrupt Practices Act of 

and the Domestic and Foreign In- 

nent Improved Disclosure Act of 

iring my campaign for the Presi- 
y, I repeatedly stressed the need 
ough legislation to prohibit corpo- 

bribery. S. 305 provides that 
ssary sanction. 

ihare Congress' belief that bribery 
thically repugnant and competi- 
y unnecessary. Corrupt practices 
een corporations and public offi- 

overseas undermine the integrity 
stability of governments and harm 
elations with other countries. Re- 
revelations of widespread overseas 
;ry have eroded public confidence 
ir basic institutions, 
is law makes corrupt payments to 
gn officials illegal under U.S. law. 



It requires publicly held corporations to 
keep accurate books and records and 
establish accounting controls to prevent 
the use of "off-the-books" devices, 
which have been used to disguise cor- 
porate bribes in the past. The law also 
requires more extensive disclosure of 
ownership of stocks registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 

These efforts, however, can only be 
fully successful in combating bribery 
and extortion if other countries and 
business itself take comparable action. 
Therefore, I hope progress will con- 
tinue in the United Nations toward the 
negotiation of a treaty on illicit pay- 
ments. I am also encouraged by the In- 
ternational Chamber of Commerce's 
new Code of Ethical Business 
Practices. □ 



1 Made on signing S.305 into law on Dec. 20, 
1977 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 26). As enacted 
S.305 is Public Law 95-213, approved Dec. 19. 



27 

scholars such as yourselves. For one 
essence of scholarship is to help us 
comprehend more clearly the com- 
plexities we must address, without re- 
treat to a world of comforting 
simplicity. D 



1 Address before the annual meeting of the 
African Studies Association and Latin American 
Studies Association in Houston on Nov. 5, 1977 
(introductory paragraph omitted); Mr. Lake is 
Director of the Policy Planning Staff. 

2 The Group of 77 is a caucus of developing 
countries formed in 1964 at the first U.N. Con- 
ference on Trade and Development to present a 
unified bargaining position in their negotiations 
with industrialized countries. It is now com- 
posed of 115 developing countries. 



MJJS. Balance 

of Trade 
and Payments 

Statement by President Carter 1 

The U.S. balance of trade and pay- 
ments has shifted this year to a large 
deficit position. The two main causes 
appear to be large oil imports by the 
United States and relatively slow eco- 
nomic growth in Japan, Germany, and 
other nations. 

These deficits have contributed to 
some disorder in the exchange markets 
and rapid movements in exchange 
rates. Heightened uncertainty and in- 
creased exchange market pressure in 
recent weeks have coincided with the 
delay in congressional action on our 
energy legislation. A mistaken belief 
that the United States is not prepared to 
adopt an effective energy program has 
been partly responsible for recent un- 
settled conditions in the exchange mar- 
kets. We have a responsibility to pro- 
tect the integrity of the dollar. Pfompt 
action is needed in energy and other 
fields to reduce our deficits. 

Last April, I submitted to the Con- 
gress a comprehensive conservation 
and conversion program to reduce our 
dependence on foreign oil. I am confi- 
dent that the Congress will not allow 
this situation to continue to deteriorate 
through inaction. I am equally confi- 
dent that the American people will 
fully support this critically important 
program. When enacted, the measures 
now under consideration will have in- 
creasingly beneficial effect in coming 
years and exert their main impact by 
1985. 

The United States is currently im- 



i. 

f 

''I 

\ 



B 






28 

porting petroleum at a cost of about 
$45 billion a year. In 1978, taking ac- 
count of planned production of Alaskan 
oil, our oil imports will be stable, de- 
spite substantial purchases for our 
strategic petroleum reserve. Neverthe- 
less, it is essential that we take further 
steps to curtail these imports in order to 
reduce both our excessive dependence 
on imported oil and the burden on our 
balance of payments. The energy 
measures I am now proposing are de- 
signed to serve these ends. 

I have instructed the Department of 
Energy to pursue efforts to: 

• Expand production of oil at the Elk 
Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve; 

• Encourage an expansion of produc- 
tion at Prudhoe Bay above the 1.2 mil- 
lion barrels a day planned for early 
1978; 

• Maintain production of California 
crude at a high level; and 

• Work with appropriate governmen- 
tal and private interests in expediting 
provision of adequate pipeline capacity 
for transport of Alaskan and Califor- 
nian oil east of the Rocky Mountains. 

Combined with conservation meas- 
ures, these efforts offer good promise. 

The new measures will take effect in 
the period immediately ahead and serve 
as a bridge until the implementation of 
the more comprehensive legislative 
program begins to exert fundamental 
changes in our energy balance in the 
years ahead. 

I have also instituted measures to 
expand U.S. exports. 



• We have doubled Commodity 
Credit Corporation credits to support 
agricultural exports. 

• In 1978, we will increase sharply 
lending activity by the Export-Import 
Bank, to support exports generally. 

We will not engage in unfair compe- 
tition for export markets; we will fully 
respect our understandings with other 
governments regarding export credit 
terms. But within these understand- 
ings, there is room for a more active 
effort to expand our exports. Through 
such an effort, I believe we can achieve 
substantial increases in exports in 
1978, as well as in subsequent years. 

With these measures, the prospects 
for an improvement in our trade posi- 
tion will be good. Some of these meas- 
ures will begin to take effect in 1978. 
When fully implemented, these meas- 
ures, energy and nonenergy, should 
produce an annual improvement in our 
trade position of several billion dollars 
and will improve the U.S. balance of 
payments. 

There has been a great deal of public 
discussion in recent weeks about the 
large U.S. trade and payments deficits 
and the movement of rates in the ex- 
change markets, mainly between the 
dollar and the German mark and 
Japanese yen. The American economy 
and the dollar are fundamentally sound; 
U.S. products on the whole are com- 
petitive. While some exchange rate ad- 
justment has been understandable in 
light of economic developments in 
Germany, Japan, and the United 



Department of State Bulle 

States, recent exchange market dis< 
ders are not justified. 

The new energy measures strike i 
rectly at a key part of the balance-t 
trade problem. The export measui 
will enable us to respond effectively 
expanding export opportunities. I 
gether, the energy and export measui 
represent action to strengthen our b 
ance of payments and deal with c 
trade deficit in a substantive way 
improving the underlying conditk 
upon which the value of the dollar fi 
damentally depends. 

Furthermore, next month I shall 
presenting to the Congress a co 
prehensive economic program desigrl 
to insure a healthy and growing ec< 
omy, to increase business capital ■ 
vestment, to expand industrial capac 
and productivity, and to maintain p 
dent budgetary policies while coi 
teracting inflationary pressures. Thj: 
and related measures will promote en 
nomic progress and underscore c 
commitment to a strong and soul 
U.S. economy. 

In the discharge of our respc 
sibilities, we will, in close consultatji 
with our friends abroad, intervene] 
the extent necessary to counter disi 
derly conditions in the exchange rn 
kets. The measures I have enumeral 
will deal with the root causes of thf: 
market disturbances in a more diri 
and fundamental way. 



1 Made on Dec. 21, 1977 (text from We; 
Compilation of Presidential Document! 
Dec. 26). 



EUROPE: Secretory Vance 
Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels 



Secretary Vance headed the U.S. 
delegation to the regular ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Brussels on December 8-9. ' 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
DEC. 9 2 

The ministerial meeting which we 
have just finished has left me with re- 
newed confidence in the alliance as 
the keystone of our relations with 
Europe and of U.S. foreign policy. 
This meeting, although it produced no 
dramatic events, in my judgment was 
productive and very useful. We had a 
detailed review of the state of East- 
West relations and ongoing negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union in the 



Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and 
in the mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions talks which are going on in 
Vienna. In addition, we have re- 
viewed the not yet completed discus- 
sions which are taking place in 
Belgrade. 

We also reviewed the progress 
which has been made to date in fulfil- 
ling the work program which we had 
set out for ourselves at the summit 
meeting which was held last May, 
and I think all of us concluded that 
the progress which is being made on 
the various studies which are under 
way is encouraging. While the issues 
which we face are complex, and not 
susceptible to easy solution, our dis- 
cussions were marked by harmony 
among the 15 sovereign nations. 



It is clear that the determinatioi: 
the allies to do what is necessar: 
maintain NATO's effectiveness 
shared by all. And I will leave B: 
sels with the conviction that the I 
liance has the will, the determinat: 
and resourcefulness to meet any d 
lenge to its purpose, its strength, oj 
cohesion. 

Q. [Inaudible] Israeli hard-lH 
what will be the position of yi 
country if an armed conflict I 
lows? A declaration from you I 
may help. 

A. I don't want to talk about su< 
hypothetical question. I don't waiil 
talk about failure. We have before 
the Cairo conference which is con 
up on the 14th of December. Wei 
going to do all that we can to H 



uary 1978 



29 



Ice progress in this conference. One 
he purposes of my trip to the Mid- 
East is to do all that I can in help- 
to assure that this is a step forward 
the peace process, which I believe 
o be, and to see that the channels 
:ommunication are kept open with 
of the parties to the Middle East 
flict. 

}. Do you feel that the Western 
es have done all that they can to 
that there's progress at the 
iro conference? 

l. This is a matter which has been 
:ussed with the Western allies, and 
h of them will be making their in- 
idual decisions with respect to 
it they believe they can do and 
uld do with respect to the Cairo 
ference. 

}. Did you get any feeling 
sther the alliance would like the 
ited States to go ahead with de- 
opment and deployment of the 
itron bomb? 

l. In our ministerial meetings the 
uced blast bomb, the so-called 
tron bomb, was only mentioned 
:e and very briefly. [Secretary of 
snse] Harold Brown covered this at 
it length in his press conference, 
I endorse what Harold had to say 
he discussion that he had with all 
ou just 2 days ago. I would merely 
! that no decision has yet been 
:hed by the President of the United 
es with respect to either production 
eployment. 

he President has made it clear that 
vish to have the views of all of our 
:s with respect to both the question 
roduction and deployment; we have 
yet received the views of all of our 
es; and we are awaiting their 
ights and suggestions with respect 
lis matter. 

K In Washington at your last 
ss conference you said Soviet 
ements on the Middle East had 
led questions, but before you 
Id make a judgment you wanted 
get a report from Mr. Habib 
der Secretary for Political Af- 
s Philip C. Habib]. You've got- 
this report. What's your judg- 

. My judgment is that the Soviet 
>n wishes to see a comprehensive 
ement reached in the Middle East, 

their objective remains a Geneva 
ference. Those objectives are 
ed, I believe, by all the parties. 

is what the leaders of all of the 
'tries involved have stated. 
ie Soviet Union and ourselves do 
agree with respect to the question 

Cairo conference. Our position is 

well known with respect to that, 
believe this is an important step 



forward, and we are going to do all we 
can to help make progress through the 
Cairo conference. 

Q. What is your reaction to the 
public Soviet statement that our 
actions — American actions — now 
are in direct contradiction to the 
U.S. -Soviet joint declaration which 
was issued? 3 

A. I'll refer you back to what I just 
said a couple of days ago in a press 
conference which I held just before I 
left the United States. I stated at that 
time that our objective was a com- 
prehensive settlement ultimately to be 
consummated at a Geneva conference. 
That remains our ultimate objective. 
The Soviets state that that is their ob- 
jective as well. I see nothing in con- 
flict between what we said in the joint 
U.S. -Soviet statement, which was ba- 
sically that. We did refer to the de- 
sirability of convening a Geneva con- 
ference by the end of the year in the 
joint statement. 

New circumstances have occurred 
since that time. I think that we ought 
to take advantage of those new circum- 
stances and proceed with the Cairo 
conference. That does not rule out an 
ultimate Geneva conference, and, 
therefore, I do not see the inconsis- 
tency which seems to have been 
suggested in the Tass article to which 
you're referring. 

Q. Dr. Luns, the Secretary Gen- 
eral of NATO, has told the Greek 
press that he expects a new Ameri- 
can initiative to help with the 
Greek-Turkish differences. Could 
you comment on that? 

A. No, all I would say on the 
Greek-Turkish problem is that the 
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Tur- 
key, as I understand it, will be meet- 
ing this afternoon under the auspices 
of the Secretary General. He will not 
be present but the two will be having a 
bilateral discussion. I think all of us 
welcome such a discussion. No one 
knows what will come out of that dis- 
cussion. We hope that progress may 
result from it, but we'll have to wait 
and see what transpires at that 
meeting. 

Insofar as the United States is con- 
cerned, we have always said that the 
matter of Cyprus, which is one of the 
issues between them, is a matter 
which is being handled under the aus- 
pices of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. We have, from the 
very first, said that we welcome that 
and that we would do whatever we 
could to support that effort, and that 
remains our position. If at any time 
Greece and Turkey ask our help with 
respect to their problems and the res- 
olution of their problems, as with any 



other allies, we would of course be 
happy to do what we could to help. 

Q. Would you give — taking into 
account the Arab world reactions, 
would you give any blessing to the 
idea of a separate peace between 
Israel and Egypt? 

A. Both the President of Egypt and 
the Prime Minister of Israel have said 
that they are seeking a comprehensive 
settlement, not a bilateral settlement, 
and I believe and accept what they 
have stated. 

Q. We have heard a good deal 
about the allies wanting more par- 
ticipation in the SALT discussions 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
in view of SALT III, and the fact 
that the guidelines for SALT III 
are to be part of SALT II. I won- 
der if you would comment on that 
desire, and what you think the U.S. 
Government can do about it? 

A. Yes, this is a subject which I 
addressed at some length during my 
remarks to the ministerial meeting yes- 
terday. I gave assurance to our col- 
leagues with respect to two or three 
matters on which concerns had been 
expressed. I believe all of them accept 
the reassurances which I have given to 
them. We believe very strongly that 
there should be full and complete con- 
sultation in SALT II and, when we get 
to SALT III, in SALT III with our 
NATO allies. 

This is of great importance, and we 
have been consulting with our NATO 
allies as we have moved along in SALT 
II. I think if you will talk to the minis- 
ters of the various countries they will 
tell you that they believe that these 
consultations have been full and have 
been helpful to them. 

I think it is important, as we move 
on into SALT III in the future, that 
we even intensify these consultations 
because we, ever increasingly, move 
into more and more complex matters. 
And, therefore, it is important to have 
even greater consultation than was the 
case in earlier times when there were 
not so many complex issues to be 
dealt with. 

Q. Would the United States dis- 
courage the separate agreement in 
principle between Egypt and Is- 
rael, as distinct from a separate 
peace agreement? 

A. At this stage the parties say they 
want to reach a comprehensive agree- 
ment. I take what they say at face 
value; and we are going to do every- 
thing to support what they say they be- 
lieve is in their interest and in the 
interest of regional peace. 

Q. I understand that, but on the 
way toward that comprehensive 
agreement, evidently there's con- 












30 

sideration of an agreement in prin- 
ciple; not a separate peace treaty 
but a separate agreement in prin- 
ciple. 

A. But an agreement in principle 
covering a comprehensive settlement. 

Q. I take it from what you said 
about the Russians that we do not 
now expect them to cooperate with 
the United States in Middle East 
diplomacy until you start redirect- 
ing your efforts toward reconven- 
ing a Geneva conference. 

A. No, I did not say that. What I 
said was that I did not believe that 
they would support, in any way, the 
Cairo conference and that we have 
differing views with respect to that 
matter. 

Q. We've been told by several 
countries that there's now a pros- 
pect of some movement forward in 
the mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions in Vienna. Is that the 
American impression also? And if 
so how would that progress, what 
form would it take? 

A. We discussed at some length the 
mutual and balanced force reduction 
discussions and various possible steps 
which need to be taken if progress is 
going to be made in those talks. I 
think it was the unanimous opinion of 
all of the ministers that it would be in 
the interest of both sides if progress 
could be made. The first issue which 
has to be cleared away is the issue of 
data exchange, which is fundamental 
to all other steps, and this is the area 
in which I would hope and expect that 
we might see the first real steps of 
progress. 

Q. The hopes were expressed 
that the Cairo conference might be 
open-ended. In such a case, would 
you expect Jordan to join at a 
later stage, and at what stage? 

A. I have no idea what the parties 
who have declined to attend the Cairo 
conference will or will not do. That is 
a sovereign decision that each one of 
them will have to make in the future, 
and we're all going to have to watch 
and see what happens as the Cairo 
conference moves forward. 

Q. You referred twice in an ear- 
lier statement to the ultimate need 
for a Geneva conference. Is it the 
American view that there should be 
as much direct negotiation as pos- 
sible following the Cairo confer- 
ence, not only between Israel and 
Egypt but between Israel and each 
of the other parties? 

A. We have said for years that we 
believe that the only way you are going 
to get a settlement is through direct 
discussion among the parties, and we 
have encouraged direct discussions 



among the parties. Any steps which 
lead to that are positive steps in our 
judgment, and, as in the past, we will 
continue to encourage direct discus- 
sions among all the parties. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE 4 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministe- 
rial session in Brussels on the 8th and 9th of 
December, 1977. 

Ministers examined developments since the 
Council's meeting in London last May. They 
reaffirmed their resolve to fulfill the common 
purposes and enhance the effectiveness of the 
Alliance and agreed that the work in this direc- 
tion was proceeding satisfactorily. 

Ministers emphasized that the strength, vital- 
ity and cohesion of the Alliance are drawn not 
only from its defense preparedness but also 
from the shared commitment of its peoples to 
the principles of democracy, respect for human 
rights, the rule of law and social progress and 
from their common desire to safeguard their 
freedom and independence. Ministers reaf- 
firmed their commitment to the pursuit of de- 
tente and to the achievement of a better under- 
standing with the countries of Eastern Europe. 
In these efforts they are guided by their dedica- 
tion to peace and their concern for the worth of 
the individual. Ministers stressed that, to be 
significant, efforts to remove barriers within 
Europe should benefit the lives of individual 
citizens as well as relations between states. 
Ministers noted that although recent progress in 
East-West relations had been uneven, there had 
been some favorable trends. They resolved to 
develop these and to seek a broader pattern of 
cooperation with the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact across a wide range of international is- 
sues. For these efforts to succeed, reciprocity 
and restraint are required on the part of all 
governments concerned. A policy of detente 
cannot be pursued selectively. 

Ministers considered the meeting now being 
held in Belgrade as a follow-up to the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. They noted that a thorough presenta- 
tion of views was taking place on the degree of 



Letters 
of Credence 



On November 22, 1977, the follow- 
ing newly appointed Ambassadors pre- 
sented their credentials to President 
Carter: ' 

Finland — Jaakko Olavi Iloniemi 
France — Francois de Laboulaye □ 



1 For texts of the Ambassadors' remarks and 
the President's replies, see Department of State 
press releases dated Nov. 22, 1977. 



Department of State Bulle i 

progress made in implementing the Final A, 
but regretted that a number of specific cr: 
cisms of inadequacies in implementation H 
not yet received satisfactory answers. The ■ 
change of views in Belgrade so far has c«- 
firmed that while some progress has bei 
achieved in certain fields, much remains to: 
done in improving relations between states I 
in ensuring the rights and well-being of inj- 
viduals. Ministers, recalling the importancel 
the commitment of all signatory governments: 
respect fundamental freedoms and huir: 
rights, including that of the individual to ki 
and act upon his rights and duties in this fie 
affirmed their determination to pursue 
dialogue on these matters. In addition to me 
ures to improve implementation in other fiel 
Ministers considered that the scope 
confidence-building measures should i 
broadened in accordance with the provision:: 
the Final Act. Recognising the long-term na: 
of the CSCE process, the allies will conti 
their efforts both during the Belgrade mee, 
and afterwards to ensure that a stronger impji 
is given to full implementation of all provis;i 
of the Final Act by all participating states. 

Ministers expressed satisfaction at the | 
stantial amount of work already done by.i 
Council in permanent session on the fresh sil 
of long-term trends in East-West relations ;i 
their implications for the Alliance requester 
allied leaders at their meeting in Londoii 
May. 

Ministers noted with concern that the st?l 
growth in the military strength of the Wa«i 
Pact inevitably casts a shadow over the F; 
West relationship. Emphasizing the defers 
character of the Alliance, Ministers recogn: 
that the foundation of its security was: 
maintenance by the Alliance of forces suffk 
in quantity and quality to deter aggressi 
withstand pressure or, if necessary, defendl 
territorial integrity of the member states. r i 
asserted their determination to take the ne: 
sary steps to achieve this objective. In this 
text, Ministers reaffirmed their view thatl 
early coming into operation of the defense: 
operation agreements between allied coun 
will strengthen the defences of the entirei 
liance in particular in the Mediterranean. 

The Ministers of countries participatin 
the integrated defense structure of the Allii 
welcomed the progress being made by thosi 
lies concerned in developing the long-term i 
gram in selected areas to enable NATO fc 
to meet the changing defense needs of. 
1980s and the successes achieved in the i 
gram of short-term measures designed td 
prove the capabilities of NATO forces by 
end of 1978. 

Ministers took note with appreciation oi 
ports on efforts to make more effective u' 
available resources for defense througli 
creased standardization and interoperab 
They welcomed initiatives to encouragd 
trans-Atlantic dialogue on equipment ma: 
to remove obstacles to the establishment jj 
operative projects and to create a more' 
anced relationship among European and i 



itiary 1978 



31 



■'/'.< 



lencan members of the Alliance in connec- 
n with the procurement of defense equip- 
nt. 

Ministers reaffirmed their determination to 
ve for genuine measures of disarmament and 
is control. They noted the increased activity 
this field in recent months and the prospects 
progress on important matters. They af- 
ned their intention to play a constructive 
i in the forthcoming United Nations special 
sion on disarmament. They expressed the 
>e that 1978 would see more rapid progress 
ichieving concrete measures in this area, 
linisters of the participating countries re- 
ived the state of negotiations in Vienna on 
[ual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). 
:y expressed once more their conviction that 
se negotiations would achieve their agreed 
i of contributing to a more stable relation- 
p and to the strengthening of peace and se- 
ity in Europe only if they were to result in 
ninating the existing ground force manpower 
parity in Central Europe and ensuring undi- 
lished security for all allies. These Ministers 
ffirmed their position that these objectives 
ild be achieved by their proposal to estab- 
, in the area of reductions, approximate par- 
in ground forces in the form of a common 
ective ceiling for ground force manpower on 
h side and to reduce the disparity in main 
[le tanks. They called for a positive response 
he additional offer they made to the Warsaw 
t countries in December 1975. They indi- 
:d the importance they attach to the inclu- 
n of associated measures in an MBFR 
sement. These Ministers stressed the need 
a genuine data discussion as a basis for fur- 
r progress in these negotiations, 
linisters discussed the recent developments 
the US-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation 
ks and noted with satisfaction the progress 
ie. They expressed support for the efforts for 
United States to conclude a SALT agree- 
lt which maintains and enhances strategic 
)ility and is responsive to the security inter- 
i and concerns of the Alliance, 
linisters reviewed the developments con- 
ning Berlin and Germany as a whole since 
ir last meeting in May 1977. They noted 



with satisfaction the positive effects which the 
Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971 
continues to have in and around Berlin. The 
Ministers emphasized the importance of strict 
observation and full implementation of all the 
provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement, in- 
cluding those regarding the ties between the 
western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Re- 
public of Germany and those regarding the rep- 
resentation abroad of the interests of the west- 
ern sector of Berlin. Ministers underlined the 
essential connection between the situation re- 
lating to Berlin and detente, security and coop- 
eration throughout Europe. 

Ministers expressed the hope that recent de- 
velopments in the Middle East, which they wel- 
come, will lead to a just and lasting peace in 
the region endorsed by all directly interested 
parties. Ministers took note of the report on the 
situation in the Mediterranean prepared on 
their instructions. They once more emphasized 
the importance they attach to maintaining the 
balance of forces throughout the Mediterranean 
area. They requested the Council to continue its 
consultations on this subject and to report to 
them at their next meeting. 

Ministers noted with appreciation the work of 
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern So- 
ciety (CCMS) and the actions taken by nations 
to implement the CCMS recommendations and 
resolutions on air, inland water and marine pol- 
lution. Ministers noted that the Alliance mem- 
bers had resolved to deal effectively with 
hazardous wastes to minimize environmental 
damage. 

The next Ministerial session on the North At- 
lantic Council will be held with the participa- 
tion of heads of states and governments in 
Washington on 30th and 31st May, 1978. □ 



' Another press release relating to Secretary 
Vance's trip to Brussels is No. 550 of Dec. 8, 
1977. 

2 Text from press release 551 of Dec. 10, 
1977. 

3 For text of the joint statement issued on 
Oct. 1, 1977, see Bulletin of Nov. 7, 
p. 639. 

4 Text from press release 552 of Dec. 10, 
1977. 



Crown of St. Stephen 



ATEMENT BY MR. NIMETZ 1 

t is a great pleasure for me to testify 
s morning before this subcommittee 
)ut a most important milestone in our 
ationship with the people of Hun- 
y- As you know, President Carter 
i decided that, in light of substantial 
Jrovement in U.S. -Hungarian rela- 
is, we will return to the Hungarian 
>ple the crown of St. Stephen which 



has been in our custody since the close 
of World War II. 

There has never been any doubt that 
the crown of St. Stephen belongs to the 
Hungarian people. This has been our 
stated policy since we received the 
crown in 1945. We have recognized al- 
ways that our role was merely one of 
safekeeping this unique historic relic 
and we have fulfilled our responsibility 
with propriety and dignity. The time 



has come to return the crown to Hun- 
gary where it has served as a symbol of 
Hungarian nationhood for nearly 1 ,000 
years. We believe the decision to re- 
turn the crown of St. Stephen to the 
Hungarian people at the present time is 
both the right action to take and an ac- 
tion that is in our national interest. 

The President made his decision in 
light of the history of the crown and its 
unique place in the Hungarian national 
existence. Tradition holds that Pope 
Sylvester II gave the crown of St. 
Stephen to Hungary's first Christian 
king in the year 1000. It came to sym- 
bolize the essence of the Hungarian 
people and as such played a central 
role in the course of Hungarian history. 
At the end of World War II, the custo- 
dial guard gave over the treasure with- 
out condition to elements of the U.S. 
Army. I am submitting to the subcom- 
mittee a narrative of this event based 
on the archives of the executive 
branch. 

Throughout the postwar period, the 
U.S. Government at many times con- 
sidered the possibility of the return of 
the crown. However, a series of histori- 
cal events, as well as difficulties in 
U.S. -Hungarian relations, led to post- 
ponement of a positive decision until 
our most recent review which was un- 
dertaken from late spring through early 
fall. 

The return of the crown to the people 
of Hungary is correct and needs no fur- 
ther justification. A historical treasure 
that played a major role in a nation's 
history for nearly 1,000 years should be 
in that country for its people, and for 
people everywhere, to view and 
cherish — rather than in a U.S. Gov- 
ernment vault. 

Aside from the essential Tightness of 
the decision to return the crown, we be- 
lieve this decision will advance U.S.- 
Hungarian relations. The return of the 
symbol of Hungary's nationhood will re- 
spond to the national aspirations of the 
Hungarian people and will encourage 
understanding and better relations be- 
tween our peoples and our two govern- 
ments. It will foster the spirit of the 
Helsinki Final Act 2 to which we as a 
people and, we believe, the Hungarian 
people are dedicated. 

Relations between the United States 
and Hungary have improved signifi- 
cantly in recent years. 

• Hungary has been exemplary 
within the Warsaw Pact in its im- 
plementation of the provisions of the 
Helsinki Final Act. 

• Our two nations have signed a con- 
sular convention that affords protection 
to U.S. citizens in Hungary. 

• We have settled the outstanding 












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32 

nationalization claims of U.S. citizens 
and resolved all U.S. Government fi- 
nancial claims, including payment in 
full of the arrearages on a World War I 
era debt. 

• We have signed our first inter- 
governmental agreement on exchanges 
and cooperation in culture, education, 
science, and technology. 

The decision to return the crown in 
no way alters our view that Hungary, as 
a Communist state, lacks many of the 
essential elements of a democracy. 

In considering the return of the 
crown, the Administration was con- 
scious of the specific concerns of 
Hungarian-American organizations and 
individuals. President Carter, as a can- 
didate, told the Coordinating Commit- 
tee of Hungarian Organizations in North 
America in the fall of 1976 that he 
would take their points of view into 
consideration because, as he put it, 
"the involvement of ethnic and reli- 
gious groups in our political system 
should be viewed as a national 
strength." During the past year, State 
Department officers have met or spoken 
with nearly 100 representatives of 



Hungarian-American organizations. The 
views of these organizations, as well as 
those of concerned Members of Con- 
gress and other interested individuals, 
were fully taken into consideration in 
making this decision. 

We will return the crown to the Hun- 
garian nation and people in a manner 
most fitting to its significant national, 
cultural, and religious character. A 
personal representative of the President 
will return the crown in Budapest on 
behalf of the American people to a per- 
sonal representative of the Hungarian 
President and a delegation of govern- 
ment officials; parliamentarians; lead- 
ers of a wide range of popular organiza- 
tions; and prominent religious leaders 
of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish 
faiths. The Hungarian Government has 
assured us that the crown will be 
promptly and permanently displayed in 
Budapest in a manner appropriate to 
the crown's historic and national sig- 
nificance. Everyone — Hungarians, 
Americans of Hungarian and other 
ethnic backgrounds, and all others — 
will be welcome to view it. 

To conclude, I would like to reiterate 
that President Carter in making this 



U. S. , Bulgaria Lift Travel 
Restrictions on Diplomats 



Department Statement 1 

The Government of the United States 
of America and of the People's Repub- 
lic of Bulgaria on November 9 recipro- 
cally lifted travel restrictions on the 
movement of each others' accredited 
diplomats and their staffs within their 
respective countries by an exchange of 
diplomatic notes at the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia. 
The notes were exchanged by U.S. 
Ambassador to Bulgaria Raymond L. 
Garthoff and Bulgarian Director of State 
Protocol Dr. Boris Dzhibroz. 

The Government of Bulgaria declared 
certain border zones off limits to dip- 
lomatic personnel from all foreign coun- 
tries in 1964. These restrictions still 
apply. The Government of Bulgaria im- 
posed additional restrictions applicable 
only to accredited U.S. diplomats in 
1968 in response to restrictions placed 
on accredited Bulgarian diplomats by 
the U.S. Government in 1967. It is 
these bilateral restrictions which the 
exchange of notes yesterday lifted. 
Henceforth, the only travel restrictions 
applicable to U.S. diplomats in Bul- 
garia are those which apply to all other 



diplomats, including those of other 
Communist countries. 

By virtue of this exchange of notes, 
diplomats of all Eastern European coun- 
tries with which the United States has 
diplomatic relations are free of travel 
restrictions within the United States ex- 
cept for visits to installations of national 
security significance. Reciprocal travel 
restrictions on the movement of Soviet 
diplomats remain in effect. 

The Department of State views this 
reciprocal elimination of travel restric- 
tions as a positive step by the Govern- 
ments of the People's Republic of 
Bulgaria and the United States to im- 
plement the provisions of the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, especially those 
of basket III , to " . . . ease the regula- 
tions concerning movement of citizens 
from the other participating States in 
their territory, with due regard to secu- 
rity requirements." 2 CD 



Department of State Bullei 

decision has fully taken into accou 
the particular history and status of t 
crown, the expressed concerns 
Hungarian-Americans, the impact' 
the crown's return on the developing 
of U.S. -Hungarian relations, and V. 
expected benefits to the foreign poli 
interests of the United States. We | 
lieve that the American people wl 
take pride in the fact that we accepll 
the responsibility of safeguarding | 
crown during the dark days of 19', 
that we fulfilled our custodianship w 
dignity, and that we are now return; 
this single most treasured symbol of J 
Hungarian people to its proper a: 
rightful home. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE 3 

The President of the United State;: 
America has determined that it is I 
propriate and fitting that the Crowr: 
St. Stephen and other Hungarian B 
nation regalia, which had b- 
safeguarded in the United States sin 
the close of World War II, be retur: 
to the people of Hungary. 

The return of the Crown will I: 
place in Budapest on January 6 art 
in ceremonies in which delegations 1 
resenting the American and Hunga'i 
peoples will participate. 

The Government of the Hungai 
People's Republic will place the Cr. 
and the coronation regalia on pen 
nent public display in an appropr 
historical location in Budapest for 
population of the country, Hungan 
living abroad and foreigners alik< 
see. 



■Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman John Trattner on 
Nov. 10, 1977. 

J For complete text, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 
1975, p. 323. 



EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, 
DEC. 13 3 

United States 

His Excellency 

Frigyes Puja 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Hungarian People's Republic 

Your Excellency: 

As you know. President Carter has Q 
mined that it is appropriate and fitting th; 
Crown of St. Stephen and other Hung: 
coronation regalia, which have been H 
safekeeping of the United States since the « 
of World War II, be returned to the peof 
Hungary. We are now prepared to retur; 
Crown and other coronation regalia in a: 
mony in Budapest. 

As a result of my discussions with yoi 
with other senior officials of the Minis! 
Foreign Affairs concerning the return c 
Crown, it is my understanding, and that ■ 



nuary 1978 



33 






jvernment, that the following arrangements 
ive been decided upon by our two 
jvernments: 

• The Crown and other coronation regalia 
II be returned to the Hungarian nation and 
ople in-a solemn public ceremony at a venue 

Budapest which will underscore the histori- 
1. cultural, religious, and national tradition 

these objects as well as the "people-to- 
ople" nature of their return. 

• President Carter, as Chief of State, will 
point a senior United States Government of- 
lal. or other prominent American, as his per- 
nal representative to lead the American dele- 
tion which will return the Crown and other 
>alia. The American delegation will include 
;mbers of the United States Congress and 
ler representatives of the American people. It 
our intention that the American delegation 
II include Americans of Hungarian descent 
jsen to exemplify the contributions of Hun- 
ry to the development of the American nation . 
nil inform you as soon as possible of the pre- 
e composition of the American delegation. 

• The Crown and other regalia, as property 
the Hungarian nation and people, will be re- 
ived by the head or designated representative 
the Hungarian state. We understand that rep- 
sentatives of the Hungarian National Assem- 
y. Presidential Council and Government, 
iders of the Hungarian Churches — including 
: Hungarian Cardinal-Primate and leaders of 
ingarian Protestant denominations and of the 
itional Representation of Hungarian Jews — as 
:11 as representatives of Hungarian public or- 
nizations and outstanding personalities of 
ientific and cultural life will be among those 
vited to participate in the ceremony. 

• Remarks at the ceremony will be confined 
statements which will emphasize traditional 

lited States-Hungarian ties, friendship be- 



tween our two peoples, and our mutual desire 
to continue the development of better bilateral 
relations. 

• In keeping with the fact that the ceremony 
of return of the Crown will be an event of inter- 
national interest, representatives of American, 
Hungarian, and international media, including 
press, radio, and television, will be permitted 
to film, record, and report the ceremony. Such 
media coverage will also be possible for the ar- 
rival in Budapest of the American delegation 
and for other similar events in connection with 
the return of the Crown. 

• The Hungarian and United States Govern- 
ments will, upon transfer of the Crown and 
other regalia, exchange notes or letters 
acknowledging the safe receipt of these objects 
and waiving any claims by each Government 
against the other Government arising from the 

United States Government safekeeping of 
them. 

• A Joint Communique officially announcing 
that the Crown and other coronation regalia will 
be returned is to be made simultaneously in the 
near future by appropriate United States and 
Hungarian authorities. 

• The Crown and other coronation regalia 
will be placed on permanent public display in 
an appropriate historical location in Budapest 
for the population of the country, Hungarians 
living abroad, and foreigners alike to see. 

Your Excellency, I would appreciate receiv- 
ing confirmation that you and your Government 
share the same understanding of the arrange- 



'Made before the Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East of the House Committee on In- 
ternational Relations on Nov. 9, 1977. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 



ments, as specified above, pertaining to the re- 
turn of the Crown of St. Stephen and other 
coronation regalia. 

Sincerely yours, 

Philip M. Kaiser 
American Ambassador 

Hungary 

His Excellency 
Philip M. Kaiser 
American Ambassador 
Budapest, Hungary 

Dear Mr. Ambassador: 

I wish to thank you for your letter of De- 
cember 13, 1977, in which you have reaffirmed 
the decision of the President of the United 
States to return the Crown of St. Stephen and 
other Hungarian coronation regalia to the Hun- 
garian people and have described your under- 
standing of the arrangements pertaining to the 
return of the Crown. 

I am pleased to inform you that the points 
outlined in your letter of December 13, 1977, 
clearly reflect my understanding, and that of 
my Government, of the arrangements which 
have been decided upon by our two govern- 
ments concerning the return of the Crown. 

Sincerely yours, 

Frigyes Puja 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Hungarian People's Republic □ 



Printing Office, Washington, DC. 20402. 
Matthew Nimetz is Counselor of the Department. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, 
p. 323. 

3 Press release 570 of Dec. 15, 1977. 



FOOD: Fulfilling A Basic Human Right 



'Andrew Young 1 

It is an honor for me to be invited to 
k'e this 10th lecture commemorating 
ank L. McDougall of Australia who 
d so much to create this wonderful ag- 
:ultural arm of the U.N. system, 
hile I was not privileged to know him, 
am told that inspiration, imagination, 
id determination best characterize 
ank McDougall . 

We are often told that this planet is 
>efully short of persons of the 
cDougall mold, but this view is not 
ceptable to me. Many others, in all 
rts of the world, have the visions and 
pirations of this noble Australian, and 
tope and pray they also have his de- 



termination. You Ministers, the Sec- 
retariat, representatives of other agen- 
cies, can best remember Frank 
McDougall by stimulating thought 
on new approaches among your 
colleagues. 

By refusing to accept anything but 
the very best and by assuring that 
whatever we do or propose in this criti- 
cal field of agriculture has, as its very 
base, the fullest consideration of the 
dignity of man and the rights given him 
by our Creator. 

America has its roots deep in agricul- 
ture. Our greatness, our failures, our 
joys, and our agonies derive in large 
part from these roots. Thomas Jefferson 
was a democrat, a humanist, and a 



farmer. His role in the birth of our coun- 
try and in the declaration of human 
rights derives from his agrarian back- 
ground and philosophy. 

American farmers played a vital role 
in expanding our frontiers westward. 
Their determination, their courage, and 
their individualism rose from their 
closeness to and love for the land. 
America's commitment to human rights 
and individual liberty owes much to 
these agricultural pioneers. Our eco- 
nomic development in the past and our 
prosperity today are based in large part 
on our agricultural abundance. While 
only a tiny fraction of our labor force 
remains in agriculture, much of our in- 
dustrial production capability and our 



■.■/.*.•;.•••■. 




34 

export potential would not exist without 
agriculture. 

President Carter is a farmer. His farm 
was not run by a corporation; it was fam- 
ily run. His hands and his feet know 
well the red dirt of Georgia. Bob Berg- 
land, our Secretary of Agriculture, is 
also a fanner — not an agronomist or a 
bureaucrat or an agricultural business 
executive, but a farmer — elected by 
other fanners to Congress and then ap- 
pointed by the President. 

Our background and our philosophy, 
our leaders and our people make the 
United States a strong supporter of ag- 
ricultural development. We believe that 
international cooperation is necessary if 
the world's problems in food, nutrition, 
and agriculture are ever to be resolved. 
But we know full well also that great 
mistakes can be made in agriculture. 
Coming from the southern part of the 
United States, I am painfully aware that 
the organization of agriculture can be an 
instrument of repression and human 
bondage. The colonial system of agricul- 
ture in our South was based on cheap 
slave labor. Even after the Civil War 
many elements of this system remained. 
Hatred of land contributes to continued 
enslavement. 

Industrialization transformed the 
South — its labor, its economic struc- 
ture, and its social organization. Indus- 
trialization attracted the poor 
farmers — black and white — off the land 
where they could barely scratch a liv- 
ing. Industrialization generated a de- 
mand for skilled and educated labor. 
The blacks of our South could no longer 
be held down to fuel the profits of ab- 
sentee landlords. They had to become 
educated, trained, and proud in order to 
participate in the industrialization proc- 
ess. 

The experience of the southern 
United States has taught us a lesson. 
Agricultural development can only suc- 
ceed in the long run if the rights to land 
and the social organization that support 
agriculture production and distribution 
are fair and just. 

We must reorient our thinking to- 
ward the land and to the needs of those 
who labor on the land. Farmers need 
motivation to do their job. The work 
must pay. The life must be bearable. If 
people are to find living in the rural 
areas attractive, then leaders need to 
adopt policies that make those areas in- 
viting and see to it that the total rural 
environment satisfies. The public can 
push for this. Many Americans believe 
now that they can best influence na- 
tional policy by controlling their 
neighborhood community. Others are 
returning to the land in search of a bet- 
ter way to live. 

Our experience has taught us also 



that many of our urban problems have 
rural origins; for example, where ag- 
riculture is neglected by public officials 
to the point that people abandon the 
land and go to the cities to seek a better 
life. Yet in the cities, life is not neces- 
sarily better. 

Food is and always has been top-level 
politics in my country and, I suspect, it 
has been and is in yours. How many 
times political leaders would have done 
better to choose a full granary than a 
full arsenal to prevent violence and dis- 
ruption. 

Food and hunger are now very much a 
part of the international debate between 
what we call the North and the South. In 
the past, monarchs, presidents, prime 
ministers and generals have risen or fal- 
len with the fluctuations of staple food 
prices. Hunger knows no homeland; it 
violates borders, impels migrations, 
alienates otherwise loyal citizens. 
Hunger is said to be a problem of the 
poor, but the hungry poor, in their anger 
and frustration, can pull down the rich 
and powerful. Food is a right. 

Food is a political right. Our own po- 
sitions as leaders depend on guaran- 
teeing this right. Many of us began our 
careers with slim waistlines and good in- 
tentions. Now we are part of a privileged 
group, circling the groaning tables of in- 
ternational diplomacy. It is, therefore, 
incumbent on us to stay aware: There is 
hunger and malnutrition, in my own 
country and in other lands; it can come 
upon us swiftly. 

I grew up in the tradition of civil 
rights struggles to affirm popular rights. 
In the U.S. civil rights movement, we 
used to ask, "What good is it to have the 
right to eat at an integrated lunch 
counter if you can't pay the bill?" We 
knew we had to desegregate public ac- 
commodations; we also knew we had to 
confront the economic barriers to uni- 
versal human rights. 

What more basic right could there be 
than the right to food? It underpins all 
other human rights, for without food 
there is no humanity, either of body or 
spirit. Hunger not only saps vitality, it 
violates human dignity. Though many of 
us live with abundance, we are all aware 
how pervasive hunger is. 

In the African Sahel even now rainfall 
and crops are uncertain, and the situa- 
tion grows more ominous daily. In the 
United States too, there have been seri- 
ous droughts in the West and South. 
Elsewhere, in the midst of natural or 
political upheavals, farmers do not 
plant. Although most of the world's 
granaries are overflowing today, they 
may not be tomorrow. Even in the midst 
of plenty, drought and famine are still 
with us. Experts tell us that a reason- 
able estimate of the number who are un- 



Department of State Bulled 

dernourished in our world is 500 mil 
lion. We know that many government: 
are hard-pressed to raise the money fe 
pay for badly needed food imports. 

Today, in a period of relative plenty 
it is essential to work toward guarantee 
of the right to food for the world's popu 
lation. It is time to take stock and plai 
against future famines. 

Billions have gone into food relief ii 
recent years. But relief ends only to 
day's hunger; it does nothing for thi 
long term. The ultimate goal is tota 
food security. We have the obligatioi 
now to plan preventive measures in botl 
marketing and production that may ob 
viate the emergency sacks of grain am 
help people devise ways to feed them 
selves. 

Hunger and Poverty 

Hunger is primarily a problem of th 
poor and the powerless. The rich some 
how manage to get enough to eat. Fool 
is not the only problem of the nomads ii 
the Sahel, the miseries of those sleeping 
in the overcrowded streets of Calcutta 
or the hungry in Haiti. Poverty is 
complex of deprivations, only one c 
which is hunger. But of all the misfor 
tunes that afflict this planet, surely re 
lief of hunger is the most essential. 

Our ancestors were far more aj 
the mercy of natural threats H| 
food production — drought, pestilence 
floods, and disease — than we need be 
We possess many techniques for solvin 
the problems of world hunger and mal 
nutrition. Today hunger need not be in 
evitable. The world can produce enoug 
food for all — within our lifetime- 
thanks to the advances throughout th 
ages, including the plow. Production 
however, is only one side of the coir 
The other is distribution. Who will pre 
duce more and for whose benefit? Wh 
is food distributed so unevenly? 

In attacking problems of hunger an 
poverty, we need pay special attentio 
to the rural poor. One way to help th 
rural poor is to increase their sell 
sufficiency. There are many rural pa 
who canot pay for imported food an 
who live on marginal lands in fragile er 
vironments. For a variety of reasor 
they are unable to grow enough foo( 
draw enough water, and plant enoug 
ground cover to subsist. My Chines 
friends say, "It is good to give a fish to 
hungry man. It is better still to help nil 
fish for himself." 

Self-reliance, however, is only a pa 
of the answer. In food, the world 
interdependent. Our common task- 
organize this interdependence fairly — 
unfinished. Many people feel helple: 
and angry before the fluctuations 1 
world food prices, the insufficiencies ) 



luary 1978 



35 



present grain reserve pattern, the 
;aries of marketing, the difficulties in 
ablishing grain reserves, the scarcity 
capital for investment. Even minimal 
bal emergency food reserves fall 
irt of what many consider sufficient. 
5 poor nations expect a genuine rein- 
ed effort from the richer nations. 
Ve must renew domestic efforts to im- 
uent the agrarian reforms necessary to 
i the poor. Hard political choices have 
>e made. Let us terminate: 

i Land tenure policies which result 
infair distribution of the fruits of the 
d and inefficient production; 
• Credit facilities that benefit the 
l farmers and ignore the small- and 
iium-sized entrepreneurs; 
» Pricing policies which deny low- 
ame farmers a fair return on their 
duction or place a disproportionate 
burden on them; 

» Distribution policies which impede 
free flow of vital foodstuffs from 
as of abundance to areas of need, 
n in the midst of famine; and 
1 Population policies that fail to in- 
i couples the right to determine the 
iber and spacing of births. 

)bviously each nation should insure 
t it is conscientiously following 
icies designed to help the poor to 
ieve their right to food. However, the 
imunity of nations collectively has a 
ponsibility to cooperate to improve 
international climate for efficient 
duction and distribution and elimina- 
i of hunger and poverty: 

' By a substantial and effective in- 
ise in resources transfer devoted to the 
blems of hunger and malnutrition; 
1 By an accelerated transfer of tech- 
3gy and know-how with careful adap- 
on to local circumstances; and 
' By an improvement in the interna- 
lal market for food, reducing the 
le of scarcity and plenty, of high 
ces that take food from hungry 
Jths, and low prices that ruin farms 
incially and destroy their access to 
dit. 

"he richer nations have done far less 
n they might to help their poorer 
ghbors through resource transfers 
1 technological assistance. Govern- 
its are supported by constituencies 
hin their own borders who often 
ther know of nor care about problems 
)ther countries. Taxes are always too 
ti, and there is little sentiment for 
tig them on projects whose benefits 
at best far away and indirect. Con- 
ation is fine for others but not if it 
lands a change in one's own style 
I patterns of life. 

'rotectionism, subsidization of ineffi- 
nt production, and unfair commercial 



practices still abound. And yet if pov- 
erty in general and the maldistribution 
of the world's wealth is to be corrected, 
we need the courage and wisdom to ac- 
cept changes, not because they are easy 
to accomplish but because we recognize 
their innate justice. The food producing 
and exporting countries have a special 
obligation — to help organize a more ef- 
fective and stable market for food, to 
use their food abundance wisely for the 
international good, to contribute to an 
effective international system of food re- 
serves, and to disseminate their produc- 
tion knowledge to enhance food security 
for all. 

Rural Development 

But in spite of all that is done by the 
agricultural exporting nations , there will 
be no true independence and freedom 
without a well-developed program of 
rural development. Our task is not just 
to feed hungry people but to involve 
them in productive capabilities. 

The problems of urban migration, un- 
employment, and income distribution 
that plague all of the nations of the 
world in some form are only exaggerated 
by food dependence. Rural development 
can be a key to both food production and 
the stabilization of our nations in new 
development patterns. 

In this decade, the development plans 
of many countries received a rude set- 
back from rising oil prices. Many na- 
tions experienced hunger. We have 
given much thought to oil and not 
enough to agriculture. Treated well, the 
land is an inexhaustible resource, not a 
depletable one like oil. Renewing itself 
every growing season, the land can pro- 
tect us from the worst terrors of want. It 
is up to us — the international commu- 
nity of nations — to behave responsibly, 
using our resources well and effectively 
for the good of all. Rome is called the 
Eternal City. It is also the city of our 
sustenance. 

The Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion (FAO) here in Rome has been a 
vital force for international cooperation 
in agriculture since 1945. It is deserv- 
ing of our support and close attention. It 
is our organization, and we have the re- 
sponsibility to make it an increasingly 
effective force in world agriculture. 

The FAO's World Food Program is an 
increasingly important channel for food 
aid. The concept of food for work, 
pioneered by the program, can be ex- 
panded into one increasingly develop- 
mental tool. 

But if food, production is to be a de- 
velopment machine, contributing to an 
agriculture-based rural development 
strategy, the entire community of inter- 
national development agencies must be 



involved. The patterns of roads and 
infrastructure in most of the developing 
world are part of the colonial pattern of 
exploitation. They were not designed to 
help the nationals develop. They are 
still contributing to the enslavement of 
the people. 

If this pattern is to be reversed, then 
freedom roads developed by the U.N. 
Development Program; credit availabil- 
ity structured through the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development and 
the World Bank; fertilizer, irrigation, 
and rural industrial development must 
somehow be done in concert. 

But bureaucratic coordination can 
also be the death of development. We 
can get so concerned about protecting 
our bureaucratic-vested interests that we 
never get to the people with the re- 
sources they so desperately need. 

There is a delicate balance between 
coordination and creative competition 
that must be found. Every country in the 
world is fighting and losing the battle of 
bureaucracy/ Whether East, West, 
North, or South, we find that we are our 
own worst enemies. 

Food Corps 

One of the mechanisms which has 
emerged as a creative challenge to the 
problems of bureaucracy is the utiliza- 
tion of the volunteer. As a concept to 
help the agriculturally less developed 
nations of the world, I like the idea of 
national, regional, and perhaps even in- 
ternational volunteers for food produc- 
tion. The idea would be to integrate the 
best of the volunteer service concept 
with the best ideas for promoting effi- 
cient, low-cost agricultural productivity 
and technical cooperation among de- 
veloping countries. Technical efficiency 
is as important as voluntary service and 
might best be built in by emphasis on 
both human and technical progress. 

Volunteers have many strengths. 
They are dedicated; they are not a new 
bureaucracy for they are temporary. But 
to be effective, they must be well- 
trained. 

For technical services, we have 
within the U.N. system itself consider- 
able available backup. Moreover, since 
self-reliance, not exports, is the goal, 
village improvement needs to be kept 
low-cost. 

Such a corps of volunteers could 
serve where the mechanized techniques 
of expensive farms are ruled out. Even if 
funds were available, mechanized tech- 
niques have their limits, particularly in 
the fragile environments where many of 
the people most vulnerable to famine 
live. There, even small shifts in weather 
or land use can bring disaster. Massive 
mechanized intervention can even result 



% 



■ ■■'■■. 

iii 




36 

in great waste, like the infamous peanut 
(groundnut) scheme in Tanzania before 
independence. 

Such a national, regional, and inter- 
national food corps would promote small 
improvements that reduce problems of 
excessive or wasteful land use, poor 
crops or stock varieties, erosion, grass 
burning, inadequate water supply, and 
deforestation. One part might specialize 
in the needs of rural women, who ac- 
count for at least half of the subsistence 
food production of the developing world. 
Volunteers must have knowledge not 
only of different agricultural processes 
but also of different societies. Village 
agricultural development requires great 
sensitivity to local social relations. 

Farming takes time and persistence. 
As outside volunteers withdraw, and the 
nationals take over, it is important to 
maintain technical backup services for 
some years. Too many village develop- 
ments have faded away for lack of tech- 
nical support during a reasonable transi- 
tion period. Food volunteers would take 
on tasks in the context of national plans, 
through a process which might include 
dialogue with capital donors. At the out- 
set if the international, regional, and na- 
tional volunteers train together, this 
could reinforce the national agricul- 
tural, educational, research, and exten- 
sion services. As many of the outside 
volunteers as possible should come from 
the developing countries. 

Volunteers would be expected to put 
their hand to the plow, the pump, the 
wheel. However, their main charge 
would be to stimulate villagers to greater 
production and self-sufficiency to be 
part of a self-perpetuating chain of prac- 
tical agricultural education. 

This idea of food volunteers is con- 
ceived as a complement to the existing 
international development structures. 
Since any organizational planning must 
be done collectively, I suggest the con- 
cept only in broad outline; it must, of 
course, fit into the existing international 
system and benefit from existing na- 
tional services. 

In our struggle against hunger and 
malnutrition, a food corps concept is 
only a step. Who would not volunteer in 
such a cause? Of course, this cannot an- 
swer all our problems; there is no simple 
single answer. Working to develop this 
concept can refresh our dialogue, give 
us strength to solve conflicts among our- 
selves, and renew our dedication to al- 
leviating global hunger. 

This year I had the good fortune to 
travel to several African and Caribbean 
countries. In Jamaica, I met people who 
said, "Why should a poor country, with 
good land, import food?' In Guyana I 
was impressed by the cooperative vil- 
lages I visited and by the towns where 



authorities gave people land and en- 
couraged farming. 

But perhaps the most impressive les- 
sons were those from Costa Rica and 
Ivory Coast. Both are countries with ex- 
tremely limited mineral resources; their 
development of the land has been the 
key to all of their industrial develop- 
ment and social progress. 

There are still many problems, but 
the food self-sufficiency by these coun- 
tries is the basis not only for an export 
potential and earnings of foreign ex- 
change but the basis of a new social de- 
velopment and political freedom. Thus, 
even in bad times, townsmen who have 
no jobs can still subsist from their own 
harvests. 

The poor nations are right to expect a 
genuine reinforced effort from the richer 
nations , but they must work toward their 
own balanced agricultural development. 
No country has developed a powerful 
economy without strong agriculture. 
This does not mean each country is 
self-sufficient, but it has to develop its 
agrarian economy to insure a firm foun- 
dation for its development. 

Our backgrounds differ in many ways 
and we have many different viewpoints. 
As Julius Nyerere [President of Tan- 
zania] has said, "The nations must have 
the courage to talk about their differ- 
ence and must hold fast to the principles 
of our common humanity." 

The basic human need is for a filled 
breadbasket; a bowl of rice or millet; 
and for the balancing nutrients of 
greens, protein, fruit, and milk. Our 
larger objective is to create a global food 
system integrated enough to meet 
everyone's needs for adequate nutrition, 
flexible enough to respond to the rapidly 
changing conditions in agriculture, and 
yet producing an absolute increase in 
the total amount of food so that there is 
enough to go around. 

Never before in history have these 
goals been so attainable and so neces- 
sary for the survival of us all. Food se- 
curity is not just bread for the hungry; it 
is spme guarantee of peace for the 
world. 

The patterns of agricultural and eco- 
nomic cooperation which can produce a 
sugar agreement or evolve a common 
fund can also contribute to an interde- 
pendence and mutual understanding 
which limits the potential for starvation, 
military destruction, and civil strife. 

There is no task which requires more 
urgency than "the beating of swords into 
plowshares and spears into pruning 
hooks." Cruise missiles and backfire 
bombers don't offer nearly the national 
security that comes from a full harvest 
and well-fed, well-educated, and pro- 
ductive farmers. All of our cities are 
exploding with anxiety and discontent 



Department of State Bulletii 

while a rural opportunity for peace am 
prosperity beckons. 

We can fulfill these goals in our time 
American students have begun to focu 
on an end to world hunger by 1985. 1 
was the creative power of our yout 
which successfully challenged racisr 
and discrimination in the 1960's an 
ended our involvement in Vietnam i 
the 1970's. Surely the youth of the worl 
with our help can end world hunger i 
the 198ffs. 

If that dream can be realized, it is nc 
too visionary to believe that true foo 
security for the peoples and nations ( 
this planet be a reality by the end of thi 
century. I 



■Statement at the Food and Agriculture Orgat 
zation in Rome as part of the McDougall Lectu 
on Nov. 14, 1977; Ambassador Young is U; 
Permanent Representative to the United Natio 
(text from USUN press release 1 16 of Nov. 15)"* 



Food Aid 



Foreign Relations Outline 1 

J 

Since World War II the United Stan 
has supplied extensive food aid to ma: 
nations. Although joined by Canac, 
Australia, and several Western Eui 
pean nations, we remain by far U 
most important food donor. The ma: 
vehicle for U.S. assistance is the 191 
Agricultural Trade Development a.l 
Assistance Act (Public Law 480). 
the past PL 480 served as a method! 
market support for the United Stas 
and as a means to meet a deficit coi- 
try's immediate needs for food. Its mJ 
purposes today are twofold: 

• Meet the nutritional needs of j 
poorest people. This aim is served ) 
PL 480 Title II grant aid, whii 
supplies free food to those unable: 
buy it and 

• Encourage agricultural deveh- 
ment in the less developed countri 
This objective is met by PL 480 TitH 
concessional sales of commodities t 
the local market; funds realized fit 
these sales finance developmi 1 
measures. 

The World Food Program and 11 
voluntary agencies normally admini::' 
Title II programs and oversee food I 
tribution in the recipient nations. I 
FY 1977, PL 480 food shipment - 
more than 6 million tons — will td 






nary 1978 



37 



ut $800 million in sales and over 

million in grants. FY 1978 levels 
expected to be similar, but grant 

will be increased. 

i. World Food Conference 

bnvened in Rome in 1974 to focus 
ntion on global food problems, the 
: erence adopted several resolutions, 
uding a target for distributing as aid 
inimum of 10 million metric tons of 
n per year. We agreed to contribute 
fair share of this amount. The con- 
nce also concluded that food pro- 
tion in the poorer nations must be 
eased rapidly if hunger and malnu- 
Dn are to be eliminated. We are at- 
pting to encourage this necessary 
ease in production through food and 
r aid. 

he conference further recommended 
an international system of nation- 
held grain reserves be established 
revent recurrence of the food short- 
! and highly volatile price situation 
he early 1970's. We support this 
»osal and favor negotiating a new in- 
ational wheat agreement that would 
tain an international security re- 
e feature. Finally, the conference 
>osed that barriers to international 
trade be liberalized to stimulate 
luction and help stabilize prices. 
United States is actively pushing 
objective at the multilateral trade 
ttiations in Geneva. 

480 Legislation 

) August 1977 Congress made sev- 
major changes in PL 480, includ- 
an increase in the minimum ship- 
ts required under Title II. 
ood for Development. The most 
jrtant change was the establishment 
"itle III (Food for Development), 
:h permits signing agreements with 
pient countries for a specified an- 

1 value of agricultural commodi- 
— to be delivered over a 1-5 year 
od. If planners can be assured a 
lin level of assistance over a longer 
od than the present 1 year, they 
better integrate that aid into their 
)nal development programs. 

) qualify for Title III concessional 
s assistance, a country must meet 
International Development Associa- 
s poverty criterion— now $550 per 
ta GNP — and demonstrate a need 
food aid. The recipient must also 
e to improve agricultural productiv- 
is well as the situation of its rural 
-• Funds generated from PL 480 
modity sales are to be placed in a 
ial account to finance these proj- 
; the amount disbursed will consti- 
repayment of the amount owed the 
ed States for the imports. 



Human Rights. Another change in 
PL 480 prohibits Title I and III assist- 
ance to countries grossly violating 
human rights, unless it would directly 
benefit the needy people of those 
countries. 

Improved Administration. In re- 
sponse to criticism of food aid adminis- 
tration, Congress required the executive 
branch to determine, before PL 480 as- 
sistance is supplied, that adequate 
storage facilities are available and dis- 
tribution of the commodities will not 
create a substantial disincentive to food 
production in the recipient country. 

Title II. This grant program is to be 
increased from a minimum distribution 
of 1.3 million to 1.6 million tons in FY 
1978 through FY 1980, to 1.65 million 
in 1981, and to 1.7 million thereafter. 
The amount of this assitance to be dis- 
tributed through voluntary agencies and 
the World Food Program is also 
increased. 



Benefits 

PL 480 food aid has been a vital part 
of America's foreign assistance effort 
for over 20 years. It has not only bene- 
fited other nations but has also assisted 
American farmers and created U.S. 
jobs. With the recently adopted im- 
provements, PL 480 should be an even 
better tool for helping to improve food 
production and distribution in devel- 
oping countries. Almost all nations 
now realize that such an improvement, 
concomitant with a limitation of 
population growth, is the only way to 
solve their food and malnutrition 
problems. □ 



'Based on a Department of State publication 
in the GIST series, released in October 1977. 
This outline is designed to be a quick reference 
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended 
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy 
statement. 



HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. Observes 

Human Rights Day 

at Belgrade Conference 



by Arthur J. Goldberg 1 

It is altogether fitting that this Bel- 
grade meeting take proper recognition 
that tomorrow is Human Rights Day. 
My government and most other mem- 
bers of the United Nations, as well as 
many groups and individuals, will be 
observing the 29th anniversary of the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 2 which as I noted in a 
prior intervention, is incorporated by 
reference in the Final Act. 3 Today I 
would like to suggest that the par- 
ticipating states of the Helsinki accord 
have a special opportunity to do more 
than "observe" this event of transcend- 
ent importance. Separately and to- 
gether, we can — if we have the political 
will — translate the rhetoric of celebra- 
tion into the concluding document and 
into actions that will benefit our citi- 
zens as individuals and our nations as 
members of a stable worldwide commu- 
nity. 

At the heart of the Universal Decla- 
ration is its recognition that "the inher- 
ent dignity and ... the equal and inal- 
ienable rights of all members of the 
human family" lie at "the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the 
world." That same concept animates 



the Final Act. It is paraphrased in the 
preamble, detailed in principle 7, and 
specified in the act's humanitarian pro- 
visions. 

As a concept, the line between the 
dignity of the individual and the just 
ordering of the society in which he 
lives is an old precept for many of our 
societies. As a foundation of interna- 
tional order, it is a relatively innovative 
idea, a vision born of two World Wars, 
and the determination to promote jus- 
tice, liberty, and economic security. 
The Universal Declaration speaks of 
"barbarous acts which have outraged 
the conscience of mankind" and ties 
their prevention to the promotion of 
"friendly relations between nations." 

Our conference in Belgrade has been 
exploring ways in which to deepen 
those relations, not the least through 
the promotion of the human rights the 
Universal Declaration proclaimed. We 
are approaching the time for action — 
the drafting of our final document 
based on this review of our shortcom- 
ings as well as the advances we have 
made and the proposals tabled. It is 
appropriate to summarize the pos- 
sibilities and challenges before us. 

The U.S. delegation has consistently 
adhered to the view that this meeting 



1 







38 

has been and is required frankly and 
honestly to review the record of the im- 
plementation by all of the signatory 
states, as well as to consider new pro- 
posals to further implementation. We 
also are of the view that we are obli- 
gated individually and collectively to 
reaffirm our determination to fulfill our 
solemn undertakings in the Final Act. 
Further, we firmly believe that we must 
give adequate consideration to the 
Final Act's innovative commitment on 
respect for human rights and fundamen- 
tal freedoms, including the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion, or belief, 
and we must comply with these provi- 



sions. To this end my delegation, 
joined by others, has sponsored pro- 
posal BM/60 reaffirming principle 7 
and seven other resolutions emphasiz- 
ing and endorsing other specific hu- 
manitarian measures of the Final Act. 

We should, in the opinion of my 
delegation, and in fidelity to the Final 
Act, also give special and collective 
acknowledgement to the valuable and 
privileged — and what should be the 
protected — role of individuals and or- 
ganizations in furthering the process of 
implementation through their public 
scrutiny of developments and practices 
in their own and in other signatory 



Bill of Rights Day, 
Human Rights Day and Week 



A Proclamation^ 



This month marks the anniversaries 
of two great events in the long struggle 
for the rights of human beings: the 
ratification of the American Bill of 
Rights on December 15, 1791, and the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights by the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 10, 
1948. 

The Bill of Rights culminated the 
Founders' efforts to create for their new 
country a national life grounded in lib- 
erty and respect for individual rights. 
The Declaration of Independence pro- 
claimed the inalienable rights of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
The Constitution formed a "more per- 
fect Union" in which those rights could 
be fulfilled. And the first ten amend- 
ments to the new Constitution placed 
the keystone on this new edifice of 
human rights. The immediate applica- 
tion of those rights extended only to 
one country, and only to some of the 
people in it. But because those rights 
were proclaimed as the natural birth- 
right of all human beings, the docu- 
ments that embodied them were rightly 
seen to have a profound and universal 
significance. 

It is a lesson of history that no 
enumeration of rights, however 
eloquent, can alone ensure their protec- 
tion in practice. We Americans strug- 
gled, sometimes bloodily, to make the 
rights promised in our founding docu- 
ments a reality for all our people. That 
experience of successful struggle for 
human rights in our own country was 
both painful and ennobling, and it 
propelled us into a leading role in the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of 



Human Rights by the United Nations. 
As a people, we believe what that Dec- 
laration says: that the promotion of re- 
spect for human rights is the shared re- 
sponsibility of the world community. 
We call on the governments of other na- 
tions to join us in discharging this re- 
sponsibility. 

Everywhere on earth, men and 
women have made great personal sac- 
rifices, even to the laying down of their 
lives, in the long struggle for justice 
and human dignity. By their sacrifices, 
they have already hallowed the human 
rights anniversaries I proclaim today. 

Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, 
President of the United States of 
America, do hereby proclaim December 
10, 1977, as Human Rights Day and 
December 15, 1977, as Bill of Rights 
Day, and call on all Americans to ob- 
serve Human Rights Week beginning 
December 10, 1977. Let us reflect on 
the significance of the Bill of Rights, 
which has given purpose to our national 
life, and of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which holds the prom- 
ise of greater liberty in the lives of all 
the inhabitants of our planet. Let us re- 
commit ourselves, as individuals and as 
a Nation, to the realization of these 
rights, the guarantee of which we hold 
to be the essential purpose of the civil 
order. 

In Witness Whereof, I have 
hereunto set my hand this ninth day of 
December, in the year of our Lord nine- 
teen hundred seventy-seven, and of the 
Independence of the United States of 
America the two hundred and second. 
Jimmy CarterD 



■No. 4542, 42 Fed. Reg. 62467. 



Department of State Bulleti 

countries. This too is the subject of 
proposal which we and others hav 
tabled. 

And we should also jointly pledg 
our energetic efforts both to protect th 
rights of religious believers among ot 
citizens and to facilitate internation; 
contact among them, as the Final A< 
stipulates. 

Our giving of such commitments wi 
be understood around the world as 
fresh contribution to the process begi 
in the Universal declaration of Huma 
Rights and the Final Act. We all re« 
ognize that much of the Final Act d 
pends for its realization on the unila 
eral actions of each of our states. In tl 
area of human rights and fundament 
freedoms, the initiative and responsibi 
ity for action lies very much at horn 
subject, however, to the type of inte 
national accounting we have been see 
ing in the importarit review we are co. 
ducting at this meeting. 

In the United States, the agenda 
unfinished human rights business is ri 
fully realized, although we are proud 
our overall record. It includes action c 
ratification of certain internation 
agreements in the field of human rigb 
which President Carter signed at tl 
United Nations on October 5. 4 It )> 
eludes programs — none of them ji; 
perfected, but all of them already so: 
governmental policy commitments- 
advance the equal rights of minorin 
and the economic security of all ci ; 
zens. And, finally, it includes tl 
search for better ways to implement t 
policy, enshrined in such legislation 
our Foreign Assistance Act, of promc 
ing "the increased observance of intt 
nationally recognized human rights.' 
The effort the United States is ma 
ing is a sincere one. We would ho 
that other nations would, in the sar 
spirit, examine their conduct to see, 
way of illustration, whether the right 
religious education is truly fostere 
whether believers can freely profe 
and practice their faith, whether opp( 
tunities for free association of believt 
to worship and celebrate their religi 
are honored in fact as well as words. 
is a fact of life that in some nations 
Eastern Europe those conditions do r 
obtain. This is a matter of grave cc 
cern to the United States. One hundi 
and forty million Americans are ide 
tified with Protestant, Catholi 
Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, and otl 
religious groups of their own choosir 
This is safeguarded by the fij 
amendment to our Constitution whi> 
guarantees the free exercise of religu 
Our people share the belief of the p« ; 
Tennyson, who once wrote th;. 
"More things are wrought by pra; 
than this world dreams of." We reg: 



>w 



iry 1978 

act that grave violations of basic 
in rights and fundamental free- 
: — including freedom of thought, 
:ience, religion, and belief — exist 
ne of the countries of the East, 
ndamental to the pursuit of human 
s is the unfettered expression of 
gent and peaceful views. Tomor- 
observing an anniversary of great 
tance to the promotion of human 
;, let us not foreg those who have 
unjustly punished simply for ex- 
ing what is characterized as dis- 
A number of the signatories of 
meeting have such prisoners of 
ience. 

morrow's anniversary is an fmpor- 
>ccasion to recommit our confer- 
to advance toward the human 
goals of the Final Act. As the 
tary General of the United Na- 
said in his statement on the occa- 
)f Human Rights Day, "... the 
ction and promotion of human 
is now among our most urgent 
ties. Much has been accomplished 
the years, but regrettably much 
emains to be done. Disturbing 
ions in various parts of the world 
idict the goals and ideals we have 
imed not only in the Declaration, 
i the Charter of the United Na- 
and they stand as serious barriers 
way of international peace and 

ty" 

have cited specific cases, 
ries, and countries during the re- 
if implementation at this meeting 
g with significant and regrettable 
s of human rights' violations, and 
ent Carter on December 5, in re- 
l to our CSCE Commission, has 
in great detail both the progress 
is the Secretary General of the 
1 Nations has pointed out, the 
?ing violations of human rights 

occurred and are still all too 
snt in various parts of the world, 
^legation will make President 
's report, citing chapter and 
available to all delegations. 5 
ould be fitting— in the spirit of 
/ and of the obligation the Final 
its on each participant — for ap- 
ite authorities to examine again 
Dmpliance in light of the Univer- 
claration and the Final Act and 
i appropriate remedial action, 
e have a special obligation in 
nnection in light of the specific 

rights and humanitarian provi- 
[ the Final Act. 

should respond to Secretary Gen- 
aldheim's call for "... all Gov- 
'ts, non-governmental organiza- 
nd peoples in every nation to 
Tiorate the historic occasion we 
xlay by rededicating themselves 
'ring the fundamental freedoms 



set forth in the Declaration." The Final 
Act mandates us to do so. 

I have suggested some actions our 
states can take here in Belgrade and 
elsewhere to give fitting tribute to to- 
morrow's anniversary. I can only add 
that lipservice is not real observance of 
human rights; actions and practices are 
the true test of a society's commitment 
to its ideals. As His Excellency, the 
Honorable Lazar Mojsov, President of 
the 32d session of the General Assem- 
bly, said in his remarks commemorat- 
ing this occasion: "The oppression of 
man and non-respect for human rights 
have always been negative omens of so- 
cial unrest and even international con- 
flict. In the interest of peaceful and 
progressive advancement to a better, 
more secure and more just world, the 
human community as a whole must, 
once and for all, do away with such 
manifestations which jeopardize funda- 
mental human rights." 

In light of the comments made by 
delegates representing some of the 
countries of the East questioning the 
relationship between human rights and 
security, the comments by the Presi- 
dent of the Assembly and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations provide a 
definitive answer. 



39 

As the remarks by Secretary General 
Waldheim and General Assembly Pres- 
ident Mojsov so eloquently point out, 
peace, security, and human rights are 
indeed indivisible, and all those who 
seek detente must recognize that the 
detente we seek must have a human 
face if it is to be effective and en- 
during. □ 



1 Address at the plenary session of the Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in Belgrade on Dec. 9, 1977; Ambassador 
Goldberg is Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to 
the CSCE. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Dec 19 1948 
p. 752. 

3 For text of the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulle- 
tin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. 

4 For remarks of President Carter upon signing 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the International Coven- 
ant on Civil and Political Rights, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 31, 1977, p. 586; for texts of covenants, 
see Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1967, p. 107. 

5 Copies of the report may be obtained from the 
Correspondence Management Division, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington 
D.C. 20520. 



Release of Political Prisoners 



The State Department welcomes the 
release on December 31 by the Korean 
Government of all but one of the so- 
called Myongdong prisoners as the 
latest in a recent series of positive ac- 
tions which mean that a large number 
of persons will start the new year in 
freedom. 

Acting Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher said that the Department 
takes encouragement from this and re- 
lated developments and hopes they pre- 
sage a year of progress in 1978 in the 
enhancement of human rights. 

The Myongdong prisoners who were 
released today in Korea were opposi- 
tion political and religious figures ar- 
rested in connection with promulgation 
of an antigovernment manifesto at 
Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul in 
March 1976. Former presidential can- 
didate Kim Dae-jung, the one 
Myongdong prisoner not released, has 
been moved to Seoul University hospi- 
tal for medical treatment. 

Among the other recent actions was 
the release by the Government of 
Indonesia of some 10,000 political 



prisoners, as part of that government's 
announced 3-year plan to release the 
remaining political prisoners currently 
being held. The releases were notewor- 
thy in that prisoners were permitted to 
return to their homes and were not as- 
signed to transmigration centers as 
originally anticipated. 

In addition, the Government of Paki- 
stan also announced recently the re- 
lease of some 1 1 ,000 political prison- 
ers who had been detained — according 
to the Government of Pakistan — under 
the previous Administration. 

Earlier this month the Government of 
Bangladesh announced the release of 
935 political prisoners. 

While welcoming these most recent 
prisoner releases, the Department rec- 
ognizes that the human rights situation 
worldwide, including the problems of 
political prisoners, remains a matter of 
deep and continuing concern. The 
United States will continue to urge, and 
to work for, improvement in all aspects 
of human rights. □ 

1 Press release 586 of Dec. 31, 1977. 



■ 



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40 



Department of State Bullei 



MIDDLE EAST: Visit of Secretary Vance 



Following his Trip to Brussels to attend the North Atlantic Council ministerial 
meeting Secretary Vance visited the Middle East December 9-15 and met with gov- 
ernment' officials in Egypt (December 9-10), Israel ( D ^^ er l 1 /f °- 12 ^ Jo ^ an A (D h e : 
cember 12-13), Lebanon (December 13), Syria (December 13-14), and Saudi Arabia 
(December 14-15). Following are news conferences by Secretary Vance and foreign 
leaders on various occasions during the trip, as well as Secretary Vance's statement 
upon his return to the United States. 1 



NEWS CONFERENCE, CAIRO, 
DEC. 10 2 

Secretary Vance: I have had the 
pleasure this morning of meeting with 
President Sadat and exchanging views 
with respect to the forthcoming Cairo 
meetings and our joint search for a 
peaceful solution to the problems of the 
Middle East. I told President Sadat of 
the great admiration and respect which 
all of us have for the historic events 
which he set in motion with his courage- 
ous trip to Jerusalem. A new momentum 
has been given to the peace process by 
this bold initiative, and we in the 
United States shall do everything within 
our power to help maintain that momen- 
tum. 

Our objective remains a comprehen- 
sive settlement. There are many things 
which have to be done to pave the way 
to an ultimate meeting at which a com- 
prehensive settlement can be reached. 
The Geneva meetings will be the ulti- 
mate meeting at which that could be ar- 
rived at. The Cairo meetings will be a 
step on the way and will pave the ground 
here at these meetings toward the ulti- 
mate comprehensive proposal. 

Q. Do you have an indication that 
the Soviet Union is going to main- 
tain its role as cosponsor of the 
peace talks? 

Secretary Vance: The Soviet Union 
has indicated that it will remain as a 
cochairman of the Geneva conference. It 
has indicated that it will not participate 
in the Cairo meetings. We had hoped 
that they would participate in these 
meetings because we believe that the 
Cairo meetings can and will perform a 
very constructive role in paving the way 
toward an ultimate Geneva conference. 

Q. What is the American role in 
the coming future steps, either in 
Cairo or in Geneva or in the final 
settlement? What are the American 
commitments? 

Secretary Vance: We will be play- 
ing a supportive role to the initiative 
which has been taken — the bold initia- 



tive by President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin. 

Q. Are you hopeful that the Cairo 
conference will produce a set of 
principles for a comprehensive set- 
tlement that will commend them- 
selves to some of the other Arab 
leaders in this area? 

President Sadat: We are working. I 
have already proposed this Cairo meet- 
ing to work toward this end. Instead of 
starting discussing procedural arrange- 
ments in Geneva, we should agree upon 
all these points and prepare the whole 
approach and the land, like the Secre- 
tary said, for Geneva to succeed. 

Q. What do you expect of the 
American role? 

President Sadat: Someone said that 
after my initiative and after I visited 
Jerusalem that the American role is of 
less importance; I say no. The American 
role after my visit is much more con- 
firmed, like I said it before. And no one 
can imagine that in 30 hours' visit to 
Jerusalem and having discussions with 
the Israelis responsible have solved al- 
ready the 30 years' — the last 30 
years ' — difficulties that we had among 
us. So the American role, as I said, is 
confirmed rather than minimized. 

Q. How long do you think the 
Cairo meeting will go on for? When 
do you think a Geneva conference 
could now be convened? 

President Sadat: Let us hope that 
they reach the end that we are agreed 
upon; that is, preparation for Geneva. 
The time is open. The discussion also is 
open. That is what I have agreed already 
today with Secretary Vance. Really, you 
should always skip any fixing of dates or 
so, as much as the Cairo conference is 
working and preparing and paving the 
way toward Geneva. The peace process 
is in momentum, and that is what we are 
after, all of us. 

Q. Do you need the United States 
help to negotiate with Israel, or will 
you take care of all the negotiations 
yourself? 

President Sadat: The United States 



is, number one, cochairman. Numli 
two, the United States enjoys the cor 
dence of me and the Israelis. And thi;i 
of great importance, because as I t| 
you, whenever we need to bring our i 
cussions to, I mean, a proper way, 
whenever there is a gulf between us, 
United States for sure can bring us 
gether. 

Q. Could you please tell 
whether or not you are pleased v\ 
the Israeli response to your inii 
tive that has resulted — the Isrs! 
response over the past 2 weeks? 

President Sadat: Not yet. Tfi 
haven't answered. 

Q. What specifically do you w; 
the Israelis to do at this stage? 

President Sadat: I shouldn't si* 

before the microphones and so forth 

Q. At what point do you exp 

Syria and Jordan to come back j 

this process? 

President Sadat: In the meeting 
have arranged their places for ther 
come, and whenever they choos: 
come we shall be very happy to | 
them with us. I told King Hussei^i 
Jordan] yesterday and I told him to 
his time. I'm not urging him. 

Q. Are you at all upset or 

mayed at the continuing criticisi 

your initiative by some Arab | 

ernments and by the Soviet Uni( 

President Sadat: Not at all It 

happened before, even much more 

hement than this time you remer 

after the second disengagement aj 

ment; for one year and a half they 

tinued, but it doesn't worry me at 

And, unfortunately, this is our habi 

Q. There is a great deal of sp 

lation that if the other Arab lea 

do not approve a set of princ 

for a comprehensive settlement 

you will then seek a separate p 

with Israel. Is that accurate or i 

President Sadat: Not at all, n 

all. I would have fulfilled it eithe: 

fore Jerusalem or during my vis 

after that. Really, our aim will aj 

be a comprehensive settlement. 

Q. You spoke twice of Gene 1 
the ultimate meeting at the er 
this process that is being launi 
now. Does that mean that youi 
see Geneva as a place to rati! 
confirm agreements reached 
viously and no longer the g 
where the agreements have 1 
worked out? 

Secretary Vance: What I mea 



uary 1978 

t was that, as both President Sadat 
I have said, there's a great deal of 
k to be done to pave the way to 
leva so that Geneva can be fruitful 
productive. That does not mean that 
e would be no substantive negotia- 
s at Geneva. 

}. Is it contemplated that this 
iference will expand to the 
eign minister level in the next 
nth or so? 

•resident Sadat: Let us hope so. 
this will depend upon the develop- 
it after the meetings take place here, 
it is a possiblity, yes. 
>. Have you agreed with King 
»sein on the Palestinian question? 
'resident Sadat: King Hussein and 
»ree to the strategy that has been 
3ted by the Arab summit in Rabat, 
s strategy contains two points: 
iber one, the withdrawal from the 
I occupied after 1967; number two, 
ing the Palestinian question, all the 
:cts of the Palestinian question. It is 
a humanitarian question anymore, 
of it is humanitarian — I mean the 
gee problem — but still the solving of 
problem in itself. So King Hussein 
I, when we have our discussions, we 
: discussed all these issues accord- 
to this strategy. 

i. At what point do you expect to 
lg the Palestinians into the dis- 
sions? 

resident Sadat: Let me say this, 
are ready to have them with us; their 
e will be prepared for them when- 
they choose to come. 
. Back in 1973 the whole idea 
laving cochairmen at the Geneva 
ference was that the United 
es was the closest friend of your 
my Israel and the Soviet Union 
thought to be the closest friend 
Egypt. Have events moved so 
, has your relationship with Mos- 
' changed so much that this 
cutre is no longer useful? 
resident Sadat: I fear that you are 
following what is happening really, 
difficulties with the Soviet Union 
long before the October war. And 
lis same issue they wanted to be my 
esman or my guardian. And I re- 
1 And I still refuse this. This has 
>ened long before the October war 
continued after the October war. 
. [Inaudible] Rabat summit deci- 
i about the Palestinians, that 
at decision to which you refer, 
the Palestine Liberation Or- 
zation (PLO) is the sole repre- 
ative of the Palestinians. Is it 
, still now, for you? 
resident Sadat: That the PLO is 
epresentative? Yes. Yes, in spite of 
fact that the Tripoli conference 



in its decisions has canceled this. 

Q. Did you ask Mr. Vance this 
morning for specific help on prepar- 
ing the agenda for the Cairo confer- 
ence? 

President Sadat: I must tell you 
this. We are in constant contact ex- 
changing points of view all the time. But 
there is nothing specific that I asked the 
Secretary today. We have discussed the 
whole thing and all the alternatives. 

Q. You said that the Tripoli con- 
ference had canceled the under- 
standings of the Rabat conference. 
In what way? 

President Sadat: In the field of the 
PLO and in the field of working toward a 
peaceful settlement because we have 
agreed in Rabat to push the peace proc- 
ess to achieve those goals. 

Q. Do you mean that after 
Tripoli, that the PLO is no longer 
the sole representative of the Pales- 
tinian people? 

President Sadat: No, I didn't say 
this at all. I said that in spite of the fact 
that they have canceled this in Tripoli, 
King Hussein and I are sticking to the 
Rabat decisions. 

Q. How has the direct negotia- 
tions between Israel and Egypt 
changed the American role? In what 
ways, as you see the American role, 
has it changed and how has it 
changed? 

Secretary Vance: From the very 
first and for many years the United 
States has said that we believe that a 
settlement of the Middle East problem 
must be reached by negotiation between 
the parties themselves. We have always 
said that the United States wanted to do 



41 



all in its power to facilitate such discus- 
sions. That remains our position. 

We welcome direct discussions be- 
tween the parties such as those that will 
be taking place between Egypt and Is- 
rael, and we will continue to do what we 
can to facilitate that process. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JERUSALEM, DEC. II 3 

Prime Minister Begin: There is rea- 
son to be optimistic. Now, on behalf of 
the Government of Israel and the people 
of Israel, may I welcome our honored 
guest and dear friend, Secretary of State 
Mr. Vance, to Jerusalem and to our 
country and his friends and colleagues 
who accompany him on this very impor- 
tant journey to the Middle East. 

Before President Sadat arrived in 
Jerusalem, I sent a cable to the Presi- 
dent of the United States in which I 
said, inter alia: "People in our country 
and abroad contend that this is an his- 
toric moment. You have created it, Mr. 
President." 

Tonight I think it's a propitious mo- 
ment to repeat that appreciation we, the 
Israelis, have for the President, for the 
Secretary of State, for the Government 
of the United States, and the Congress 
in both Houses in connection with these 
momentous developments in the Middle 
East — the unprecedented visit of Presi- 
dent Sadat to Israel and, to the same ex- 
tent, the unprecedented reception ac- 
corded to him in this country by our Par- 
liament, our government, and our 
people. 

We are now in the midst of the 



Egyptian President Sadat and Secretary Vance meet at the President's rest house outside Cairo. 




h 

■I 










* 



42 

peacemaking process. We are now mak- 
ing a serious real effort to achieve and 
to establish peace in the Middle East. I 
would like to stress that it is the ac- 
cepted policy of the Governments of the 
United States, of Israel, and of Egypt 
that the efforts are for a comprehensive 
peace settlement, that there is no inten- 
tion to have two countries reaching 
peace and signing a peace treaty and 
leaving the other countries out of this ef- 
fort. To the contrary, we intend to do 
our utmost and best to bring about the 
establishment of peace the signing of 
peace treaties between Israel and all her 
neighbors — to the south, to the east, 
and to the north. And in this effort, we 
are helped to a very great extent by the 
Government of the United Nations [sic], 
by the Government of the United States, 
by the President, and the Secretary of 
State. 

It is in this spirit, Mr. Secretary, that 
we welcome you again in Jerusalem. 
You are not a novice to this city, you are 
almost one of the family, and we have 
met many times in this hotel. May I say 
that the Secretary of State actually trav- 
eled the same road President Sadat did 
3 weeks ago, and the Secretary came 
from Cairo to Jerusalem and then went 
to the King David Hotel and then we 
had a private talk. It's all almost a 
repetition of what happened 3 weeks 
ago and again all has been done in 
friendship, in understanding, in pur- 
suit of peace. 

Secretary Vance: Thank you very 
much, Mr. Prime Minister, for your 
very kind words. 

I bring with me the appreciation, 
the gratitude, and the admiration of 
President Carter and of all Americans. 
The leadership which you and Presi- 
dent Sadat have given to the movement 
for peace is something which history 
will record for generations to come. I 
am terribly pleased that I am able to 
be here at this point to meet with you 
and to discuss what we can do to help 
follow the leadership which you and 
President Sadat have given to the 
search for peace. I feel that our dis- 
cussions today which have been, as 
always, friendly and fruitful have 
helped very much in guiding our steps 
in a supportive role in the days ahead. 
So I thank you again on behalf of my- 
self, my colleagues, and the President, 
and I share your hope. I think that 
there is a chance of moving forward 
now toward real peace, a true and last- 
ing peace. 

Q. You've been to Egypt and Is- 
rael; can you tell us how things will 
go beginning Wednesday in Cairo, 
what you see happening at least as 
far as you can into the future? 



Secretary Vance: On Wednesday 
the meeting of Cairo will commence. 
The meeting, as President Sadat has 
indicated, is an open meeting. It has 
no fixed date within which to accom- 
plish its task. I anticipate that there 
will be discussed at the meeting mat- 
ters of substance as well as matters of 
procedure. I believe that it is possible 
in those meetings to chart the course, 
to pave the way toward an ultimate 
comprehensive settlement as the Prime 
Minister has said. Our objective — the 
objective which we all share — is that 
we may achieve a comprehensive set- 
tlement of all of the issues which have 
troubled the Middle East for so long 
and that this step will be a very impor- 
tant step along that road. 

Q. Based on what the Secretary 
has told you, do you see at the 
moment any realistic possibility 
that Syria and Jordan or either one 
of them will take part in the Cairo 
conference toward this com- 
prehensive peace that you both say 
you see? 

Secretary Vance: At this moment 
both Syria and Jordan have indicated 
that they do not intend to participate 
in the Cairo conference. This is a de- 
cision which each must take as an in- 
dependent sovereign nation. What the 
future will hold, I do not think any of 
us can predict. We hope that they will 
keep an open mind and, as the peace 
process moves forward, that they will 
decide to join the peace process. But 
we must look to them to make that 
decision. 

Prime Minister Begin: I can only 
express hope that both Syria and Jor- 
dan will join in the effort. You re- 
member in the Knesset I invited them 
already for the third time, either to 
come to Jerusalem as President Sadat 
did, or if they would prefer me to go to 
see them, I will go any place and meet 
them. But I understand that this is a 
part of the American effort now, and, 
therefore, the Secretary of State is 
here and will visit both Amman and 
Damascus to try indeed to convince 
the leaders of the two countries that 
they can join. Of course, it is up to 
them. We want them to participate in 
the effort together with us. 

Q. Is it possible that you can get 
these other parties that Mr. Begin 
just mentioned to participate after 
an interval, perhaps after the first 
of the year when the Cairo confer- 
ence might possibly take another 
level or another dimension? 

Secretary Vance: I think that it is 
possible that these other countries may 
decide at some point to join the peace 
process as the Prime Minister said. All 
of us hope that this would be the case, 



Department of State Bulleti 

and we will continue to urge that thi 
keep an open mind and join the peai 
process and try and help in achievii 
the common goal which all of us sharj 
because I do believe that they, to 
want peace. 

Q. [Inaudible] one of the thin 
that might make it easier to chan 
either the form or the venue of t 
Cairo conference? 

Secretary Vance: I think that \ 
must proceed with the Cairo confci 
ence and see what happens as we ji 
along that road. The peace process 
a continuing process and hopefully, 
some point, the others will join. 

Q. You opened by saying then 
reason to be optimistic. Wh 
cause do you have for optimism? 

Prime Minister Begin: What 
would like to say, and the Secrets 
will also confirm it, is that this is | 
first time for 29 years that Israel H 
the largest Arab state, the strong) 
Arab state, embarked on direct, fac 1 
to-face negotiations with a purpose; 
the declared goal by both of them— . 
sign peace treaties. Let us not forj 
this very important fact. It is a turni" 
point in the history of both these coif: 
tries. Now, there is a negati; 
phenomenon, the Tripolitanians. El 
we believe it is passing, because uj 
are interested and should be interesrl 
in joining these efforts. Now, 
meet, we talk. We shall go on mt 
ing. We clarify matters. We make 
effort, an intellectual effort, all of 
And therefore, there is reason to; 
optimistic. 

Q. The Israeli Office of Inforii 
tion put out an extract of an edi 
rial from the New York Tin 
today which said, and I quote: 
durable peace means Israeli cone 
sions that will go beyond Sinai, | 
will include security arrangeme 
with Syria and Jordan, too. 1 
price for security: abandonment) 
the demand for sovereignty over 
West Bank." I wonder if you h 
a comment on that. 

Prime Minister Begin: Whate 
detail will be proposed by any of fl 
I will give the following answer. It jj 
very serious answer, may I say. ' 
are now in the midst of the most d 
icate negotiation to establish pe= 
after so long, protracted years of vi 
fare between the countries. Giv 
chance to that negotiation. And eve 
thing is, as I said time and agai 
negotiable; of course, except the 
struction of Israel. And everything 
be negotiated. But the negotiatii 
will take place in Cairo, in Gen^ 
in Jerusalem, with all due respd 
not before the camera of 



raw 



uary 1978 

»hty friend, the television. 
\. With all deference to your 
ire not to conduct negotiations 
e, can you, without going into 
ail, tell us whether since the 
lat visit there has been new 
iking concerning Israel's posi- 
ns with regard to the West 
lk? 
•rime Minister Begin: New or 

thinking; this is the issue. And 
ire thinking. 

►. I'd like to know whether you 
lk that unanimity in the Arab 
rid is a prerequisite for the 
tievement of progress in 
leva, in Cairo, in Jerusalem. 
1 the contrary, whether prog- 
s in those places is contingent 
m unanimity in the Arab world. 
I I would like to ask the Secre- 
te particularly this question: Is 
United States concerned about 

deep split in the Arab world 
ause of recent events? If so, 
Id he please tell us why? 
ecretary Vance: We would all 
; to see unanimity because the 
tier unanimity is achieved, the 
e rapid the progress would be to- 
i peace. That does not mean, how- 
r, that progress cannot be made 
1 though one has less than unanim- 

es, it's obvious that there has been 
•lit in the Arab world. However, as 
: moves forward, I think all of us 
; and believe that there is a possi- 
ty that that split can be healed, 
disappear, and that one can find a 
ter degree of unanimity than there 
t the present time. But I think 
e is a chance for real peace, and 
nust get started on that course, 
i. Is there a complete under- 
iding, an agreement between Is- 
I and America regarding Israel's 
iding and attitude in the Cairo 
ference? 

ecretary Vance: We have no dif- 
nces of view with respect to the 

conference. We have been meet- 
during the last 2 days to talk about 
i the substance and the details of 
Cairo conference, and I look for- 
d tt) a fruitful conference. 

rime Minister Begin: I concur. 
I. Is it desirable from your 
™t of view and do you think it 
ild be possible for the Cairo 
ference to produce a set of 
nciples for a comprehensive 
lement? 

rime Minister Begin: Yes, I 
k this is really the purpose of the 
ro conference. Now the delega- 
s, both of Egypt and of Israel, will 

1 with the basic principles of the 
ce treaties to be negotiated, con- 



43 



w 




4*2 



U.S. and Israeli officials hold a working dinner in Jerusalem during the Secretary's visit. From 
left to right: Secretary Vance, Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, Director of the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Harold H. Saunders, Political Adviser to the 
Prime Minister Yehuda Avner, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip C. 
Habib, Prime Minister Begin, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. 



eluded, and ultimately signed. And, as 
you know, under international law, 
there are many chapters and articles, 
sections and subsections of a peace 
treaty of very great value to the future 
of any nation which signs such a very 
important document of international 
standing and value. And this is going 
to be discussed in Cairo, and again I 
want to stress, it will be a sample for 
the peace treaties to be signed with all 
our neighbors to the peacemaking 
process which starts now in Cairo. 
Under no circumstances will it be the 
end; it will be the beginning of that 
process which ultimately must bring 
about the establishment of permanent 
peace in the Middle East. 

Q. The whole set of principles — 
should they also include the Pales- 
tinian issue? 

Prime Minister Begin: The prob- 
lem of the Palestinian Arabs will be 
discussed, debated; we think of it, and 
I'm sure we shall find a solution for 
this problem. 

Q. In the absence of other Arab 
governments at Cairo, would you 
be inclined to regard President 
Sadat as a person who can reflect 
their views and, indeed, discuss is- 
sues which apply not only to Egypt 
but to the other governments with 
which you wish to make peace at 
some later stage? 

Prime Minister Begin: While in 
Jerusalem, President Sadat said that 
when we start talking directly about 
peace, he would like to represent, if I 
may say so, the Arab cause, and we 
agree. So I have no doubt whatsoever 



that in Cairo our delegations will talk 
not only about the bilateral relations 
between Egypt and Israel but also 
about the problems concerning other 
countries in the Middle East neighbor- 
ing with Israel. 

I can only imagine that President 
Sadat will not claim that he can speak, 
for instance now, on behalf of Presi- 
dent Asad [of Syria], because Presi- 
dent Asad doesn't agree to talk with 
us. So this is a problem, indeed, of 
the peacemaking process. Let us have 
some patience. 

If for the time being there are those 
who take a negative attitude, we 
should be optimistic. It will change — I 
believe it will change — and they will 
join in that effort. It's a problem of 
time; let us give ourselves some time. 

Q. We've seen Secretaries of 
State coming through the Middle 
East now fairly often on sometimes 
successful, sometimes unsuccessful 
missions but always in a role of 
mediator. Now that there are di- 
rect face-to-face negotiations, how 
do you gentlemen, especially after 
the talks in Cairo and here, envis- 
age the role of the United States in 
the future in these discussions? 

Secretary Vance: The United 
States is delighted that we have face- 
to-face discussions going on between 
Israel and Egypt. It has been our hope 
for years that the time would come 
when the parties could sit down to- 
gether face-to-face and discuss the 
serious issues that had to be resolved 
in order to get peace. We have said 
time and again that that's the only way 






■ 

■ *Jy.*. 

mi 



■'■■■<■■■■' 
-:•:••,•:■ ■ 





■•■■■■•■ - 
•'•..■■•• 

111!! 



a 



>2 



WW 



■ 



44 

you're going to achieve a real peace. 

Our role continues that of a 
mediator, a facilitator; that is the role 
we intend to play. We want to be sup- 
portive of the discussions face-to-face 
among the parties. 

Prime Minister Begin: You said 
that the Secretary of State is visiting 
the Middle East often. As a citizen of 
one of the host countries, I will add: 
Not often enough! 

Secretary Vance: Thank you Mr. 
Prime Minister. [Laughter] 

Q. President Sadat was asked 
yesterday in Cairo whether he was 
pleased with the Israeli response to 
this initiative. He said, no, not yet. 
They haven't answered. My ques- 
tion is, one, do you intend to an- 
swer, and, two, when do you intend 
to answer? Would that be after 
Cairo or before Cairo? 

Prime Minister Begin: You might 
have seen that we do not go into pub- 
lic polemics about any statements 
whatsoever. I think it's a healthy at- 
titude. The real response is negotia- 
tions, and negotiations will start on 
Wednesday in Cairo. 

Q. As Israel's chief ally and 
friend, what is the United States 
advising Israel to do at this historic 
moment? 

Secretary Vance: America, as Is- 
rael's historic friend, is counseling 
with Israel to find out what we can do 
to be most helpful in the direct negoti- 
ations which are going on face-to-face 
between Israel and Egypt. 

Prime Minister Begin: May I pay 
tribute to the efforts made by the Pres- 
ident of the United States and the 
Government of the United States 
throughout the years, and mainly dur- 
ing this year, to bring about these 
momentous developments. And let me 
also add, even the visit itself by Pres- 
ident Sadat to Jerusalem was made 
possible by the help of the United 
States Government. So I would like to 
pay tribute to this effort. 

Q. President Sadat said in an 
interview yesterday the Israeli po- 
sition on the Palestinian question 
would have to change if peace is to 
be achieved in the Middle East. 
Have you worked out a new posi- 
tion on the Palestinian question, 
and is Mr. Vance carrying any 
message on this subject to the 
other Arab countries, or is he car- 
rying any message from you to the 
other Arab countries? 

Prime Minister Begin: There is a 
problem of the Palestinian Arabs. I 
said so in the presence of President 
Sadat in the 1 nesset, and we will find 
a solution for this problem. 




Jordanian King Hussein and Secretary Vance 
at the Royal Palace in Amman, wide World Photo 

Q. The second part of my ques- 
tion, is Mr. Vance carrying any 
message from you to the Arab 
countries on this question of — 

Prime Minister Begin: Do you ex- 
pect me to reply to you? [Laughter] 

Q. You made a strong statement 
in support of Arab unity. Do you 
plan on this trip and in subsequent 
weeks to try to facilitate the Egyp- 
tians and the other Arabs coming 
together? Have you discussed this 
with Mr. Sadat to find some way of 
bringing the Arabs together? 

Secretary Vance: I have discussed 
with President Sadat the questions of 
the divisions that exist within the Arab 
world. He, like all of us, would like to 
see those divisions healed and disap- 
pear. I will, in my talks with the other 
Arab leaders, urge them, as we have 
from the outset, to participate in the 
peace process. We have said this to 
them from the moment that the Cairo 
conference was proposed. They have 
indicated that they, too, seek the same 
end objective; namely, a comprehen- 
sive peace which will settle the ques- 
tions of the Middle East. And, there- 
fore, I will continue to pursue our po- 
sitions with respect to this and discuss 
that matter with them. 

Q. Do you think Arab unity 
helps the peace process, or some 
Israelis in the past have suggested 
a divided Arab world actually helps 
Israel? 

Prime Minister Begin: I do not 
agree with the theory that a divided 
Arab world will help Israel. To the 
contrary, we believe that we should 
have peace on all the borders of Is- 
rael, sign peace treaties with all our 
four neighbors — Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
and Lebanon. All the four neighbors 
should live in peace with Israel, and 



Department of State Bullet 

Israel wants to live in peace wit 
them. We do not drive wedges, we c 
not believe in that famous precej 
known in Latin: Divide et empera. W 
don't want to divide, and we don 
want to rule. We want peace. This 
what we believe in. 

Q. At the Tripoli conference, tl 
Palestinians took — according I 
President Sadat — a more extren 
position that they would not pa 
ticipate in negotiations at all. Hi 
this made you more optimist 
that, as you look down the road 
negotiations, the Palestinians ha' 
in fact taken themselves out of tl 
picture? 

Prime Minister Begin: Tripo 
cannot make anybody optimisti 
When I spoke about optimism, I mea 
the trend, the development, the ho 
to overcome the negation of tl 
Tripolitanians, and of course, it is, 
most negative phenomenon for the tii 
being. What did they say in Tripoi 
No recognition of the State of Israt 
no negotiations with Israel, no pea 
with Israel. Actually, another pronu 
ciamento was made there that Isra 
should be destroyed. This is negati 
of course. 

The Soviet Union is behind th 
negative attitude, which is very 
grettable because the Soviet Union i; 
great power and is a cochairman of (J 
Geneva conference. But this h^ 
pehed, let me say, 2 weeks ago, a 
that does not decide the issue. M< 
kind will march forward. War is evi 
ble; peace is inevitable. So we shl 
overcome with a common effort tl 
hurdle, too, and Syria and Leban: 
and Jordan will join in the peace 
fort, and ultimately we shall ha 
peace throughout the region. This 
our belief. 

Q. You said that it is your undi 
standing that the Cairo conferen 
will discuss substance and pro> 
dures. The Palestinian issue 
volves both matters. In your ta 
in Egypt and here in Israel, hii 
you heard any thoughts, ideas, i 
proposals which will indicate thi 
is already movement toward bri< 
ing the gap— the very wide gai 
between the Arab and the Isra 
positions on the Palestinians? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say th; 
believe that the Palestinian questi 
will be among the issues which will 
discussed in the Cairo conference. , 
Q. Do you agree with Pri ' 
Minister Begin that the Sov! 
Union is behind the most Arab i 
tremists positions? 

Secretary Vance: With refere : 
to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Ur' 
is the cochairman of the Geneva 



nary 1978 



45 



nee. They have a serious responsi- 
ty, as we do, as cochairman. They 
2 said that they intend to discharge 
responsibility. I do not want to 
ment on their motives and, there - 
, will not do so. 



WS CONFERENCE, BEIRUT, 

C. 13 4 

ve just had a very good conversa- 
with President Sarkis, with the 
tie Minister, and with the Foreign 
ister. We had a chance to discuss 
ly issues relating to the Middle 
t problem and to the situation in 
anon itself. On the basis of my 
^ersation with President Sarkis, I 
confident that Lebanon will be able 
urmount its problems and resume 
traditional role which it has played 
tie area. 

/e have noted the progress which 
been made with respect to re- 
ding the institutions within the 
ntry and particularly the progress 
is being made with respect to the 
lilding of the army. We will con- 
e to help in connection with this 
ect and with other steps that may 
lelpful in the reconstruction of the 
ntry. 

wish to reaffirm our very strong 
x>rt for President Sarkis in the ef- 
s which he is making to achieve 
e goals for your country. 
>. Do you think that the Israeli 
'eminent is willing to give some 
cessions to the Arab countries? 
. I think that the Israelis are pro- 
iing with seriousness; they are en- 
ig into discussions starting tomor- 
and direct face-to-face talks with 
pt. They have stated that they are 
pared to and wish to attend a 
eva conference at which there can 
reached a comprehensive settle- 
it. They have affirmed that their 
:ctive, as is the objective of the 
b states, is a comprehensive set- 
lent of the Middle East problem, 
I believe that there is hope that 
objective can be obtained. 
>. Will Lebanon be going to a 
leva conference? 

• That is a judgment which Leba- 
will have to take itself and, I 

k, will be made at the time that 

•e would be a call for a Geneva 

'erence. 

\. Can we know why the United 

tes did not try to solve the 

blems of south Lebanon? 

• The problems in the south of 
anon are very difficult problems. 

have, throughout the months in 
ch I have been involved with the 



problems of the Middle East, tried to 
play, and I believe we have played, a 
helpful role in acting as an inter- 
mediary between the various parties 
that are involved in that very complex 
and difficult set of issues. And we will 
continue to play a constructive role. 

Q. We know that there was a 
proposal to station U.N. forces on 
the borders of Lebanon. What 
happened to this proposal? 

A. The last time I was here there 
was some general discussion with re- 
spect to the possibility of U.N. forces 
in the southern area. That question 
was discussed among the various par- 
ties. For various reasons a decision 
was taken by the parties not to pro- 
ceed with that. 

The principal action which needs to 
be taken at this point is to implement 
the third stage of the Chtaura agree- 
ment. I would hope that it might be 
possible that there could be agreement 
reached to put the third stage into ef- 
fect, because that could have a very 
important and beneficial effect should 
that be done. 5 

Q. Are you hopeful after your 
last 2 days of talks in Jordan and 
in Lebanon that the circle of par- 
ticipants in the Cairo talks might 
be enlarged at some stage? 

A. I have said that with respect to 
the Cairo talks that I did not believe 
that it was realistic to expect that 
there were going to be changes with 
respect to the participation in the 
Cairo meetings which start tomorrow. 
I still believe that that is the case. I 
am, however, encouraged by the fact 
that everyone that I have talked to 
says that an ultimate comprehensive 
settlement in Geneva is the objective 
of each of them. And if we can con- 
tinue to work toward that, I think that 
the Cairo meetings can be very help- 
ful in paving the way to that objective 
at the end of the road. 



STATEMENT, RIYAHD, 
DEC. 15 fi 

Secretary Vance: The United 
States and Saudi Arabia are partners 
in the pursuit of peace and economic 
stability. There is a long history of 
friendship and close cooperation be- 
tween our countries. President Carter 
and I are particularly grateful for the 
opportunity to be able to consult with 
and receive the wise advice of His 
Majesty King Khalid, His Highness 
Crown Prince Fahd, His Highness 
Prince Sa'ud, and their colleagues. I 
particularly have appreciated the op- 
portunity again to meet with them dur- 
ing this all too short visit. I shall be 



returning to the United States directly 
today and will be reporting to the Pres- 
ident on my trip through the Middle 
East. We are committed to the search 
for a just, permanent, and comprehen- 
sive settlement in the Middle East, 
and we will remain diligent in our ef- 
forts to achieve that goal. 

Q. Were you able to bridge the 
differences among the Arab coun- 
tries you have visited? 

Secretary Vance: The various 
countries which I have visited, of 
course, are all sovereign and inde- 
pendent nations. They must make their 
own determinations with respect to 
their future courses of action. I believe 
that all of them are committed to the 
achievement of a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East, but each of 
them will have to speak for itself with 
respect to its course of action. 

Q. In your recent trip to the 
area you have visited Jerusalem. 
Does that mean any change in the 
American attitude toward 
Jerusalem? Because it is known 
that the U.S. Government did not 
recognize Jerusalem as the capital 
of Israel. 

Secretary Vance: The United 
States does not recognize Jerusalem as 
the capital of Israel. The fact that I vi- 
sited Jerusalem in no way changes our 
position with respect to that issue. 

Q. Could you give us an idea of 
the current view of the Saudi Gov- 
ernment about the initiatives un- 
dertaken by President Sadat of 
Egypt, the Cairo conference, and 
his trip to Jerusalem? 

Prince Sa'ud: If I may comment on 
these issues which you have stated, I 
think that Saudi Arabia believes that 
any judgement has to follow the results 
of any action undertaken. Until now 
the results from the action that has 
been undertaken is not present, and, 
therefore, we hold judgement on that 
until some result is viewed. 

Q. Were you encouraged by Mr. 
Vance's report on his talks in Is- 
rael, and do you believe that there 
is additional flexibility in Israel 
from what you've heard from Mr. 
Vance? 

Prince Sa'ud: I might say that I 
was cautiously optimistic after the dis- 
cussions I've had with the Secretary. I 
would link, however, this optimism 
completely with the solidarity that 
could be achieved between the Arab 
countries in the pursuit of peace. 

Q. During your traveling among 
the capitals of the area, what kind 
of result do you expect, and do 
you think that you are optimistic? 



§ 



Mi 

J' 



•a,' 






46 

Secretary Vance: I, like His Royal 
Highness, am cautiously optimistic. 
The purpose of my trip was to see what 
the United States could do to support 
the momentum toward peace which has 
been created and, furthermore, to ex- 
change views with the leaders in the 
area and to learn from them their 
views with respect to the ways in 
which the United States can contribute 
to the achievement of a just and last- 
ing peace, and it was also to maintain 
the channels of communication with all 
of the countries in this area. I believe 
that the results of the trip achieved 
those purposes. 



STATEMENT, ANDREWS AIR 
FORCE BASE, DEC. 15 7 

Vice President Mondale: On be- 
half of the President of the United 
States, we want to welcome our Secre- 
tary of State, Cyrus Vance, back home 
again and thank him for, what we have 
come to expect, an extraordinarily 
gifted job representing our country 
with skill and with dignity. 

Secretary Vance: Thank you very 
much, Mr. Vice President. 

Good evening, ladies and gentle- 
men. It has been a very good and use- 
ful trip. I will be going directly from 
here to the White House to report in 
detail to the President. 

The President asked me to go to the 
Middle East to do three things: to dis- 
cuss with the leaders of the area how 
we can help to maintain the momentum 
toward peace generated by President 
Sadat's visit to Israel and Israel's re- 
sponse to that initiative; to learn their 
views on the steps necessary to ad- 
vance the peace negotiations; and to 
keep open the lines of communication 
with all of the governments that must 
be involved in a negotiated peace. 

My talks began with President Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin. I found 
both men ready to deal directly and 
promptly with the key issues. They are 
both committed to achieving peace, 
and both encourage us to remain in 
our active role. 

President Sadat believes his trip to 
Israel demonstrated his sincere com- 
mitment to peace. He believes that the 
way has now been opened to the 
achievement of a just and lasting 
peace, that what has taken place has 
dramatically shown the possibilities 
that lie in a peaceful relationship be- 
tween Israel and its neighbors. 

Prime Minister Begin believes that 
President Sadat has taken a courage- 
ous step which Israel has welcomed 
warmly. He has said that he intends to 



sustain the momentum toward peace. I 
expect this matter will be discussed 
when he meets with the President to- 
morrow . 

President Sadat's visit to Israel has 
unquestionably had a deep impact on 
the people in both Egypt and Israel. I 
believe all of them, from senior gov- 
ernment officials to the man and 
woman in the street, are convinced 
that an historic opportunity lies before 
them in the quest for a just and dura- 
ble peace. In my talks with President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, I 
stressed the United States' firm com- 
mitment to a comprehensive peace. I 
found both in complete agreement and 
ready to move forward on that basis. 

In my meetings with the leaders of 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia, I found intense interest in 
momentous events of recent weeks. 
Even where there is sharp disagree- 
ment over the course taken by Presi- 
dent Sadat, I found a commitment to 
a comprehensive peace and a strong 
desire to maintain close contact with 
the United States. These leaders do 
not see the future of their countries in 
war. I hope that each will find ways 
to contribute to a peaceful settlement 
in the most appropriate manner for 
his country. 

The opening of the Cairo conference 
coincided with the final leg of my trip, 
a trip which helped crystalize thinking 
on how to improve the prospect for 
positive results from this historic meet- 
ing. We regard the Cairo conference 
as a constructive and an important 
step forward. We have pledged to do 



Department of State Bull 

everything we can at Cairo to help 
parties reach agreement. Once 
proper agreements have been reac< 
on general principles and on matter:] 
procedure, we would expect the tn 
to shift to a broader framework. 

In each of the countries that I , 
ited, I affirmed the continued cili 
mitment of the United States to 
search for peace. I made clear that 
will give our fullest support to the I 
forts now underway and to those i 
will follow. 

Despite the difficult decisions 11 
must still be made and the h| 
negotiations ahead, we have before) 
a unique opportunity to achieve pe: 
in the Middle East. It would be tr; 
to lose this opportunity. This vievi 
shared by the people of the region, 
must pray for the statesmanship 
the vision that will gain for the ped 
of the Middle East and for the m 
the peace that has so long b; 
sought. 



1 Other press releases relating to Secri 
Vance's trip are Nos. 553 of Dec. 9; 555,; 
557, and 558 of Dec. 12; 563, 564, 565, ; i 
567 of Dec. 13; and 568 and 569 of Dec. 1' 

2 Text from press release 554 of Dec' 
1977. / 

3 Text from press release 559 of Dec! 
1977. 

4 Text from press release 566 of Dec 
1977. 

■ 5 The Chtaura agreement regulates the P; 
tinian presence in Lebanon. The United S 
is not a party to it. 

6 Text from press release 574 of Dec. 
1977. 

7 Text from press release 577 of Dec 
1977. 



Assistant Secretary Atherte 
interviewed on the "Today" Shot 



Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. 
Atherton, Jr., was interviewed on the 
"Today" Show on December 7, 1977, 
by Bob Abernathy, "Today" corre- 
spondent in Washington. 

Q. Things have been moving so 
quickly lately in the Middle East — 
President Sadat's trip to Israel, the 
denunciation of that by many Arab 
countries and the Soviet Union, the 
coming meeting in Cairo. Any way to 
tell whose move it is now? 

A. I think clearly that the focus now 
is on the conference in Cairo where 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 



Begin have said that they want t 
delegations to try to do some prep 
tory work for the Geneva Middle i 
Peace Conference. 

Q. A lot of people would say 
after Mr. Sadat took all the chai 
that he did — going to Jerusalem- 
now the turn of the Israelis to 
something equally significant. V 
do you think? Is it time for the 
raelis to make some very signifi* 
gesture or concession in return? 

A. I think both sides are goin; 
have to be flexible to make concessJ 
to try to accommodate their positioi 
the positions of the other in the C 
talks. I would think, what's more, i 



ry 1978 



47 



lides recognize this and are going 
Cairo conference with this frame 
id. 

But each side equally, in your 
lent? Or is it now the turn of 
raelis? 

There is something that each side 

from the other. Egypt clearly 

Israeli commitments on the re- 

3f occupied territories and on 

kind of a solution for the Palesti- 

)roblem. The Israelis want from 

abs, and from Egypt in particular 

s case, commitments to peace, 

.1 relations. And I think there are 

to have to be accommodations in 

these areas on the part of both 

President Sadat told the New 

Times yesterday that in the 
g negotiations he would carry 
»h to the end with Israel alone 
essary if the other Arab coun- 

efuse to go along with his ap- 
li. Prime Minister Begin indi- 
he would do the same. Would 
nited States have any objection 
jparate deal between Israel and 

by themselves? 

I think it's premature really to 
)out that. It's true that there has 

lot of speculation about separate 
settlements, but let's go back and 
t what both the Egyptians and the 
s are saying. They're saying that 
rpose of the Cairo conference is 
pare for a Geneva conference to 
: basis for a comprehensive peace 
lent on all fronts. Clearly, this is 
Terence. We think it would lead 
luch stabler Middle East to have 
on all fronts. 

lut if you can't get that — 
I wouldn't want to cross that 

yet. I really think it's premature 
n talk in those terms. Obviously 
get to a point where some of the 
i are not interested in a peace 
lent — as the President said in his 
conference last week — then you 
to consider alternatives. But 
not there at this point. 
The Cairo meeting between 
i and Israel begins Decem- 
1. You'll be there representing 
nited States. I'm interested in 
y what you imagine you'll be 

upon to do. How do you see 
>untry helping? 

.et's first go back and understand 
lie Cairo conference is now. The 
inference has been called by the 
;nt of Egypt. Egypt is the host. 
)f the principal parties to the 
sraeli conflict and to the Geneva 
conference are going to be there, 
ipression is that they are coming 
iager to begin to negotiate with 



each other. And we do not see our role 
as a lead role in this conference but cer- 
tainly as a supportive role. We are 
there as friends of both sides to help 
both sides in any way that they think 
we can help to make progress. 

Q. Suppose in trying to put to- 
gether the interests of both that you 
talked about before, suppose you are 
asked as the representative of the 
United States, are we prepared to 
help guarantee Israel's security? 
How do you answer that? 

A. We've always said that we would 
be prepared to participate in any system 
of guarantees of a peace settlement. In 
that context, we have an open mind and 
would consider any system of guaran- 
tees that the parties themselves thought 
would give them a sense of security 
and would help make the agreement 
more viable. 

Q. Involving U.S. troops? 

A. We haven't come to that point, of 
course, in our considerations, but I be- 
lieve that the Secretary of State said re- 
cently that we would not rule out the 
concept of a defense treaty if that were 
necessary to help make the peace set- 
tlements secure. But obviously it is 
something that would have to be done 
in accordance with our constitutional 
processes and consultation with Con- 
gress. 

Q. Suppose you're asked exactly 
what the United States would do in 
the way of a homeland for the Pales- 
tine Arabs. Would we support not 



just an entity or a homeland as Pres- 
ident Carter has said, but would we 
also support the idea of a full-fledged 
independent state? 

A. We have said that we would not 
prefer an independent Palestinian state, 
that we think a Palestinian homeland in 
some kind of association or linkage 
with Jordan would be a better solution. 
But in the final analysis this is a ques- 
tion that is going to have to be resolved 
in the negotiations by the parties to the 
conflict. And we have not taken a U.S. 
position on what the precise solution of 
the Palestinian question should be. 
We've set out a concept. 

Q. What is the Soviet Union up to? 
Are they very critical of what Sadat 
has done? We've had the Under Sec- 
retary of State [for Political Affairs 
Philip C. Habib ] in Moscow talking to 
them. What are they doing? 

A. The Soviets are a cochairman of 
the Geneva conference, and we talk to 
them as the other cochairman. We have 
assumed that they have an interest in a 
Geneva conference ultimately and in a 
peace settlement. We have not found 
their recent comments helpful, their 
criticism of Sadat's move — which we 
think is an important breakthrough — 
their support for the position of the crit- 
ics of Sadat — quite frankly, we have 
not found this helpful. And our own 
view is that they should play a respon- 
sible role, and we are going to wait and 
see if they do come to play a responsi- 
ble role. □ 



Cairo Preparatory Meeting Opens 



by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. ' 

It is an honor to represent the United 
States on this historic occasion. 

I would like first to extend congratu- 
lations to the Governments of both 
Egypt and Israel whose commitment to 
peace has made it possible for this 
meeting to convene. It is a particular 
pleasure to be sitting at this table today 
with friends from Egypt and Israel and 
with Gen. Siilasvuo [of Finland], who is 
present to represent Secretary General 
Waldheim. 

In sending me here, President Carter 
made it clear that the U.S. Government 
sees the convening of this meeting in 
Cairo as a constructive step on the road 
to peace. We are ready to do whatever 
we can to facilitate, support, and en- 
courage the negotiations here to pre- 
pare the way for the Geneva Middle 



East Peace Conference and the 
achievement of a comprehensive, just, 
and durable peace in the Middle East. 

For nearly 30 years the Middle East 
conflict has reaped a terrible harvest of 
lives, resources, and energies of Arabs 
and Israelis alike. It is true that during 
this period there have been some steps 
forward: Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338, the convening of the 
Middle East Peace Conference in 
Geneva in 1973, and the conclusion of 
three limited agreements under the aus- 
pices of that conference, all testified to 
the increasing commitment by the par- 
ties to the search for a peaceful settle- 
ment. 

Yet, in spite of this progress, the 
remaining psychological obstacles have 
imposed formidable barriers, as the at- 
tempt has been made this year to take 
the logical next step of opening negoti- 







3 






48 

ations for a final peace settlement at 
Geneva. 

The momentous events of recent 
weeks have fundamentally altered that 
situation and have provided new hope 
that the objective of an overall settle- 
ment embodied in peace treaties can, in 
fact, be achieved. With one bold stroke 
President Sadat has broken through the 
barrier and imparted new momentum 
toward peace. With farsightedness and 
statesmanship, Prime Minister Begin 
has responded in a manner that makes 
it clear that Israel, for its part, does not 
intend to allow this unique opportunity 
to be lost. These two strong and crea- 
tive leaders have brought about a sea 
change in attitudes both in Israel and in 
the Arab countries, and today 
solutions — a month ago considered 
unattainable — have been suddenly 
brought within the realm of possibility. 
Today few nations in the world 
would challenge the proposition that 
these developments have created a 
unique opportunity for successful 
negotiations leading to peace in the 
Middle East. The idea of peace has 
captured the imagination and ignited 
the hopes of a war-weary region. The 
government leaders who are charged 
with the responsibility, as well as the 
challenge, of negotiating can do so 
with the confidence that there is today 
an overwhelming public constituency 
in the region for peace. 

All of us in this room would agree 
that we must not allow the momentum 
of these events to be lost. President 
Sadat has called this meeting to prepare 
for a reconvening of the Geneva confer- 
ence, the objective of which remains 
the negotiation, among all the parties 
to the conflict, of a final peace settle- 
ment on the basis of Resolutions 242 
and 338. 

I must record my government's re- 
gret that others invited to this meeting 
have felt unable to accept the invitation 
to attend. Ultimately, I believe those 
absent will see that the process begun 
here is in their benefit. We are all 
agreed the door remains open for others 
to join at any time. 

My government — indeed each of the 
governments represented here— has 
emphasized on numerous occasions 
that our objective is the negotiation of 
a comprehensive peace settlement. 
Central to my government's policy 
over the years is the concept that this 
peace can only be achieved through 
negotiations between the parties. Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 242 established 
the principles for those negotiations. 
Resolution 338, which made a conven- 
ing of the conference in Geneva possi- 
ble, established the process. We have 



always held the view that wherever and 
whenever the parties can start talking 
with one another, it is in the spirit of 
that mandate. 

We see the discussions getting 
underway today in Cairo as an integral 
and contributory step toward a recon- 
vening of the Geneva conference and 
the negotiation of a comprehensive 
peace. We do not agree that these pro- 
ceedings are contradictory to the 
Geneva conference. As President Car- 
ter said [November 30]: "The road to- 
ward peace has already led through 
Jerusalem, will now go to Cairo, and 
ultimately, we believe, to a com- 
prehensive consultation at Geneva." 

In calling for this preparatory meet- 
ing, President Sadat has indicated two 
basic objectives: Making progress to- 
ward resolving the substantive prob- 
lems and overcoming the remaining un- 
resolved procedural obstacles to a 
Geneva conference. We believe these 
are realistic and obtainable goals and 
that valuable work can be done here. 
We will do everything we can to help 
the two negotiating parties make prog- 
ress. It is for them to define in the first 
instance the subject matter of these dis- 
cussions, but we will remain available 
to offer counsel, suggestions, or any 
other assistance the parties may feel 
they need. 

We are opening these talks at a 
unique moment. All of us here must 
not only hope we have reached a turn- 
ing point in history but also must make 
our contribution to insure that it will 
indeed prove to be a lasting turning 
point. The leaders of our respective 
governments — and our peoples — are 



Department of State Bull 

expecting us to achieve solid results 
this meeting, and we should not II 
them. As President Carter recently s| 
[November 2]: "We may be fac; 
now the best opportunity for a pen 
nent Middle East peace settlement] 
our lifetime. We must not let it A 

bv " .1 

In closing I hope you will permit 
to indulge in a brief personal refl 
tion. For many years I have labored,? 
behalf of my government and w; 
countless colleagues — some of wh, 
have given their lives in the effort- 1 
help our Arab and Israeli friends fir 
breakthrough to peace. I have shai 
and, I think, have acquired some 
derstanding of the agonies both si 
experience as they face decisions f 
ful for the future of their peoples— a! 
indeed, for the world. It is a great ] 
sonal satisfaction to be part of tfci 
talks which hold but so much hope ii 
the long-sought breakthrough has h 
achieved. The negotiation of dee 
rooted differences involving vital ;i 
tional interests is never a smoot^ 
easy task, and we can expect momeni: 
discouragement. These must and ca) 
overcome, however, if the gov«i 
ments we serve, and we persona 
keep before us the vision we all s> ! 
today of a peaceful and prosper 
Middle East. My government is 
dedicated to that vision. 



1 Remarks made at the opening session o 
preparatory meeting for the Geneva peace 
ference in Cairo on Dec. 14, 1977; Mr. Ath 
is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
South Asian Affairs (text from press releasf 
of Dec. 15). 



Prime minister Begin 
Visits 1/.S. December 14-19 



White House Statements 

December 16 ' 

The President was happy to have 
the opportunity to welcome Prime 
Minister Begin again to the United 
States. 

The Prime Minister and the Presi- 
dent met privately for an hour and 
subsequently others joined. The entire 
discussions lasted 2 hours. The Presi- 
dent was able to hear firsthand from 
Prime Minister Begin his impressions 
and evaluations of the momentous 
events in the Middle East set in train 
by President Sadat's historic visit to 



Jerusalem and his reception by 1 
people, parliament, and Governi 
of Israel. 

All aspects of the current Mi 
East situation were discussed in! 
context of the search for a c 
prehensive peace. 

Obviously, a particular focus 
on the direct talks which have i 
menced between Egypt and Isi; 
The Prime Minister and the Pres: 
discussed the most effective wa; 
continue the momentum and to tu 
the broader goal of negotiati. 
comprehensive peace. 

In this respect, the Prime Mir] 
and the President discussed undl 



ary 1978 



49 



principles which could guide fu- 
negotiations. The Prime Minister 
ined proposals concerning the fu- 
relations between Egypt and Is- 
and a process for resolving the 
; of Palestinian Arabs, 
le President thanked the Prime 
ister for his thoughts in both of 
i areas and promised to give them 
>us consideration. 

le President told Prime Minister 
n that the United States is con- 
:ed that the course of direct 
itiations on which Prime Minister 
n and President Sadat have em- 
ed offers a unique opportunity for 
e. We, of course, recognize that 
ese new circumstances the test of 
ptability of the provisions of a 
itiated settlement will lie in the 
ments of those who will ulti- 
:ly sign the peace treaties. The 
ed States will continue to remain 
le closest possible consultation 
both sides in the effort to help 
find common ground. 
le President and the Prime Minis- 
/ill meet again tomorrow evening 
p.m. 

smber 17 2 

le President and Prime Minister 
n and their advisers tonight con- 
id the round of discussions begun 
erday morning. They explored 
er Prime Minister Begin's latest 
osals for progress toward com- 
ensive peace in the Middle East 
the next steps to be taken to ad- 
e the peace negotiations. The 
ident expressed his appreciation 
he Prime Minister's constructive 
oach and his conviction that 
e Minister Begin and President 
t, together, are taking important 
5 down the road to a just and 
srehensive peace. 

esident Carter welcomed the di- 
talks which will soon be held be- 
n Prime Minister Begin and Pres- 
: Sadat. President Carter told the 
e Minister that he believes the 
:nt discussions between Israel and 
)t, based on the good will and 
:ation to peace both have man- 
;d, now more than ever hold out 
iise of real progress. The United 
is considers that the understand- 
and statesmanship which the 
e Minister is demonstrating make 
table contribution. 
ie President pledged the continu- 
:ooperation of the United States 
hatever ways the parties find use- 
The President undertook to re- 
i in close touch with Prime Minis- 
Begin and President Sadat and 



will look forward to learning of their 
further progress in the mutual search 
for a comprehensive peace. The Pres- 
ident shares with them their dedica- 
tion to fulfilling this historic opportu- 
nity to bring peace to a region too 
long burdened with misunderstanding 
and war. □ 



Chronology of 
Recent Events 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 19, 1977. 

2 Read to news correspondents by Secretary 
Vance at the White House following the meet- 
ing. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 26, 1977. 



Middle East 
Peace Efforts 

Department Statement 1 

We are still in the process of re- 
ceiving and accessing the reports on 
the meetings December 25 and 26 be- 
tween Prime Minister Begin and Pres- 
ident Sadat. U.S. Ambassador to Is- 
rael Samuel W. Lewis and U.S. Am- 
bassador to Egypt Hermann F. Eilts 
did see Prime Minister Begin and 
President Sadat respectively earlier 
today. 

It seems to us important at this 
point to maintain perspective on the 
meetings which have taken place. It 
has been our objective, working with 
the Middle Eastern parties, to estab- 
lish a process of negotiation which 
could lead to a comprehensive peace. 
As 1977 ends, there are now direct 
negotiations dealing with the princi- 
ples that would cover a comprehen- 
sive settlement and other substantive 
and procedural matters that would be 
parts of an overall settlement. 

We are pleased that progress has 
been made at the recent meeting and 
that concrete steps have been agreed 
on for continuation of substantive 
discussions. We have always recog- 
nized that the beginning of negotia- 
tion, while a crucial step, would not 
by itself resolve all of the difficult 
problems. That is now the work 
which lies ahead. 

We continue to support the objec- 
tive of a comprehensive settlement. 
That is also the objective of Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat. 
Establishing a negotiating framework 
for a comprehensive settlement will 
be one of the important items on the 
agenda in the weeks ahead. □ 



Dec. 1 



Dec. 2 



Dec. 4 



Dec. 5 



Dec. 6 



Dec. 7 



'Read to news correspondents on Dec. 27, 1977, 
by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. 



Jordan accepts U.N. Secretary 
General Waldheim's proposal 
to hold preparatory talks at the 
U.N. Syria and Egypt also 
favorably receive the proposal. 

Two-day conference begins in 
Tripoli, Libya, attended by 
Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, 
South Yemen, and the Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization 
(including the "rejectionist" 
organizations led by the Popu- 
lar Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine). 

Prime Minister Begin visits the 
United Kingdom (Dec. 2-7) 
for talks with government 
leaders. 

Egypt calls home its ambassadors 
to Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen, 
Syria, and the U.S.S.R. 

Under Secretary for Political Af- 
fairs Philip C. Habib arrives in 
the U.S.S.R. to discuss recent 
events in the Middle East with 
Soviet officials (Dec. 5-6). 

Tripoli conference concludes. 
Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, 
Syria, and the PLO sign a joint 
communique and form new 
Arab "front for resistance and 
confrontation" and "freeze" 
all political and diplomatic re- 
lations with Egypt. Iraq rejects 
communique and walks out of 
meeting. 

Egypt breaks diplomatic relations 
with Algeria, Iraq, Libya, 
South Yemen, and Syria. 

Secretary Vance announces a 
6-day trip (Dec. 9-15) to 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Leba- 
non, Saudi Arabia, and possi- 
bly Syria (noon press brief- 
ing). 

Diplomats of Algeria, Iraq, 
Libya, South Yemen, and 
Syria leave Egypt. 

Egypt announces closing of cul- 
tural centers operated in Cairo 
by the U.S.S.R., East Ger- 
many, Hungary, and Czecho- 
slovakia and closing of Soviet, 
East German, Czechoslovak, 
and Polish consulates in 
Alexandria; Soviet and Polish 
consulates in Port Said; and 
the Soviet consulate in Aswan. 
Consulates in Cairo remain 
open as well as Egypt's consu- 
lates in Soviet bloc countries. 



S 

j 
3 



'■■■'■■ 



50 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 9 



Dec. 10 



Dec. 12 



Dec. 13 



Dec. 14 



Dec. 15 



King Hussein meets with Presi- 
dent Asad of Syria in Damas- 
cus. 
President Gaafar Muhammed 
Nimeiri of Sudan publicly sup- 
ports President Sadat's visit to 
Israel. 
Prime Minister Begin returns to 

Israel. 
King Hussein meets with Presi- 
dent Sadat in Egypt. 
President Asad visits Saudi 
Arabia on first stop of a 4-day 
trip to Arabian peninsula 
states. 
Secretary Vance arrives in Cairo 
for meetings with President 
Sadat and other government of- 
ficials. 
Secretary Vance arrives in Israel 
for meetings with Prime Minis- 
ter Begin and other govern- 
ment officials. 
Secretary Vance meets with King 
Hussein who states in a press 
conference that Jordan will not 
attend the Cairo conference but 
may join negotiations for an 
overall settlement at a later 
date. 
Israeli delegation arrives in 

Egypt. 
Prime Minister Begin announces 
that he will arrive in New York 
on December 14 and meet with 
President Carter in Washing- 
ton, D.C., on December 16. 
Secretary Vance meets with Pres- 
ident Sarkis and other govern- 
ment officials in Lebanon. 
Secretary Vance meets with Pres- 
ident Asad and other govern- 
ment officials in Syria. Presi- 
dent Asad reaffirms his opposi- 
tion to the Cairo meeting. 
First session of Cairo peace con- 
ference begins. The delegation 
heads are: Ahmed Esmat Abdel 
Meguid, Permanent Represen- 
tative to the United Nations, of 
Egypt; Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, 
Director General of the Prime 
Minister's Office, of Israel; 
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., As- 
sistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs, of the United States. The 
U.N. observer is Gen. Ensio 
Siilasvuo, Chief Coordinator 
for U.N. Peacekeeping Ac- 
tivities in the Middle East. 
Secretary Vance meets with King 
Khalid and other government 
officials in Saudi Arabia. 
Prime Minister Begin arrives in 

New York. 
Secretary Vance returns to the 

United States. 
President Carter holds a news 



conference largely concerned 
with the Middle East. Dec. 26 

Dec. 16 Prime Minister Begin meets with 

President Carter to discuss Is- 
raeli peace proposals. 
President Carter phones President 
Sadat. 
Dec. 17 Prime Minister Begin meets 

again with President Carter. 
Dec. 18 Prime Minister Begin announces 

that he will meet with Presi- 
dent Sadat in Egypt late this 
week or early next week. 
Prime Minister Begin states 
that he came to Washington, 
D.C., to obtain "good will and 
understanding" toward his 
peace proposals and that is 
what he received from Presi- 
dent Carter (interview on CBS 
"Face the Nation"). Dec. 27 

King Hussein flies to Saudi 
Arabia and plans to visit other 
Arab states to discuss Middle 
East peace developments. 
Dec. 19 Prime Minister Begin announces 

that he will meet with Presi- 
dent Sadat on December 25 in 
Ismailia, Egypt. Dec. 28 

Prime Minister Begin ends his 
5-day visit to the United 
States. 
The PLO issues a statement re- 
jecting Prime Minister Begin's 
peace proposals. 
Dec. 20 Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer 

Weizman meets in Egypt with 
Egyptian President Sadat and 
Minister of War and War Pro- 
duction Mohamed Abdel Ghani 
el-Gamassi. 
Dec. 21 Israeli Defense Minister Weiz- 

man meets again with Presi- 
dent Sadat. Dec. 31 
Dec. 22 Israeli Cabinet unanimously en- 
dorses Prime Minister Begin's 
peace proposals. 
Dec. 24 Prime Minister Begin flies to 
Egypt for talks with President 
Sadat at Ismailia. 
Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel is ap- 
pointed Foreign Minister of 

Egypt. 
Dec. 25 Prime Minister Begin meets 



Department of State Bulleti 

with President Sadat. 
Prime Minister Begin and Pres 
dent Sadat end their 2-da 
meeting with a joint news cofi 
ference in which they pledge I 
continue their efforts towai 
peace. 
Military Committees and Polit 
cal Committees are createc 
The Military Committees wi 
be headed by Defense Mini 
ters Ezer Weizman of Israi 
and Mohamed Abdel Ghai 
el-Gamassi of Egypt and wi 
meet in Cairo. The Politic 
Committees will be headed 1 
Foreign Ministers Most 
Dayan of Israel and Mohann 
Ibrahim Kamel of Egypt ar 
will meet in Jerusalem. 
The Cairo conference goes in, 1 

recess. 
U.S. Ambassador to Egypt He 
mann F. Eilts meets with Pre 
ident Sadat in Egypt. 
U.S. Ambassador to Isra 
Samuel W. Lewis meets wi 
Prime Minister Begin in Israe 
The Israeli Parliament votes 
support Prime Minister Begirt 
peace proposals (60 for, 
against, and 40 abstentions).' 
Prime Minister Begin makes pi' 
lie the text of the Israeli pea? 
plan. 
President Carter endorses "b<| 
and courageous" moves 
President Sadat and Prin 
Minister Begin toward a coi 
prehensive peace in the Midd 
East and restates the Americ 
position on the Palestini; 
question (television interview 
President Carter, on one stop 
his six-nation trip, arrives 
Iran for talks with the Shah 
Iran and King Hussein of J< 
dan. 
President Carter announces tl 
after his visit to Saudi Arab 
he will meet with Preside 
Sadat in Egypt on January 
and then continue as schedul 
to France. 



UNITED NATIONS: 

l/JS. Approaches and Initiatives 



by Charles William May ties 1 

We meet today in an active and fas- 
cinating period for the United Nations. 
After years of neglect, or indifference, 
toward the United Nations, our gov- 
ernment has shown new interest and 



concern. In the last few months, t 
Administration has paid unprecedent 
attention to that organization. No otf 
President has spent 2 full days at t 
United Nations. Secretary of SU 
Vance went to New York and cc 
ducted bilateral discussions with soi 



uary 1978 



51 



foreign ministers. Secretary of Ag- 
ulture Bergland recently led our 
egation to the conference of the 
>d and Agriculture Organization. 
:retary of Transportation Adams 
sented a major set of proposals 
icerning hijacking to the general 
iference of the International Civil 
lation Organization. The President 

asked the Secretaries of other 
nestic agencies to play an equally 
ve role in the work of the United 
ions. 

Vithin the General Assembly and 
Security Council, there has been a 
st of activity on such issues as air- 
: hijacking; a mandatory arms em- 
go on South Africa; proposals to 
olve the conflicts in Rhodesia, 
nibia, and the Middle East; and 
:hinery to extend the economic 
logue between the rich countries 

the poor countries. In addition, 
■e have been debates and significant 
)lutions on human rights, disarma- 
lt, outer space, law of the sea, re- 
cturing of the United Nations sys- 
, and even unidentified flying ob- 
s. 

:'s against this background that I 
ild like to talk to you today about 
role of the United Nations in the 
duct of U.S. foreign policy and ini- 
ives that this Administration has 
:n to strengthen that role. 
fe all know that America was the 
f proponent of the United Nations 
years ago. The foresight and 
tlism that American statesmen dis- 
'ed at the time were a source of 
it pride for our country. Indeed, it 

be argued that the only new idea 
nternational affairs in this century 

been the creation of first the 
gue of Nations and then the United 
ions. Both were uniquely American 
tructure and inspiration. No won- 

that Americans were proud the 
ted Nations was in the United 
es. 
ftat then happened? We all know 

this view of the United Nations is 
d. Americans in the last few years 
: not been proud of the United Na- 
s. A few have even been disgusted 
i it. What caused the change? 
could offer many explanations, all 
sible, but I would like to suggest 

one: the foreign policy conse- 
lces of neglect. That factor, more 

any other in my opinion, explains 
difficulties in the United Nations. 

easy excuse for America's prob- 
3 in the United Nations has been 
rise in Third World influence and 
disadvantages to us of a policy of 
nation, one vote in a world body, 
the truth is that such an explana- 
is really just an excuse. 



Why? Because there is no signifi- 
cant longrun conflict of interest be- 
tween the United States and the de- 
veloping countries on many issues be- 
fore the United Nations. On the 
contrary — provided the United States 
adopts a policy that is both responsible 
and responsive — America finds, as we 
have learned in recent months, an un- 
accustomed degree of support in the 
Third World. But for the last 10 
years — and this is a fact we must all 
understand — our U.N. policy has been 
less a policy than an afterthought. 

One can say this without making 
judgments. During most of this period, 
we were at war; and whenever there is 
war, everything else is an afterthought 
and necessarily subordinate. My pur- 
pose in pointing out this obvious yet 
overlooked fact is not to persuade you 
to criticize earlier Administrations but 
to induce us all to remember the set- 
ting in which the substantial falling 
out between the United States and the 
United Nations took place. Our 
foreign policy priorities have now 
changed, and I think that is a key rea- 
son that we are making more progress 
in the United Nations now than we 
have in some time. 

It is on the basis of this 10-year 
period of neglect, however, that we 
have to judge three of the most dis- 
cussed appointments in the postwar 
years — that of Daniel Patrick Moyni- 
han, that of William Scranton, and 
that of Andrew Young, Jr. — all major 
national figures, all men who, it was 
suggested, "could have had something 
better," all U.N. Ambassadors. At 
first blush, they have little in com- 
mon. They have different styles, dif- 
ferent foreign policy priorities, yet 
they all did share one central insight 
that virtually everyone else in this 
period had forgotten: that in addition 
to military power and trade balances, a 
nation must be concerned about the 
way others see it. And they all recog- 
nized in that connection that the 
United Nations was of vital concern to 
U.S. foreign policy. All three men 
recognized that it must be taken seri- 
ously and argued this point with their 
colleagues in Washington. 

Coping With Change 

Against what factors did these three 
Ambassadors have to work? It is 
sometimes helpful to understand where 
one has been so he can understand 
where he wants to go. 

One ingredient in our policy of ne- 
glect, certainly, has been the turnover 
in American representation. In a 
period of 9 years, the United States 
had eight different Ambassadors at the 



United Nations, in part reflecting the 
relative disinterest in the United Na- 
tions of our Presidents in that period. 

Another special factor, certainly, 
was the issue of the Middle East, aris- 
ing in countless forms, in countless 
forums, very much deterring progress 
in other fields. The injection of this 
bitter political issue into almost every 
U.N. arena has caused growing disillu- 
sionment about the United Nations in 
this country, particularly among the 
more politically attentive, and to a 
large extent it still does. In a very real 
sense, it may be said that the way the 
Middle East issue has been fought out 
in international forums is poisoning the 
entire international system and by defi- 
nition the United Nations system.. But 
that argues not for getting out of the 
U.N. system or for ignoring the Middle 
East issue but rather for getting on with 
the settlement of that question. The 
sooner it is resolved, the earlier we will 
be able to make significant strides in 
other areas. 

Another highly significant turn of 
events has been the evolution of the 
Third World alliance. A striking 
phenomenon in recent years has been 
the growing power of key Third World 
countries — nations like Algeria, 
Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tan- 
zania, and Yugoslavia. Gifted with 
talented officials and their own views 
of global issues, they have acquired 
policy impact well beyond their own 
regions. 

The coalition of less developed 
countries began to gain strength in the 
1960's. This was inevitable. Not only 
were there more nations in the United 
Nations but there were also important 
shifts in the international balance of 
power. Thus, in 1950 the United 
States accounted for 60% of the indus- 
trial production of the world, 50% of 
its military spending, and 50% of its 
monetary reserves. By 1976 these fig- 
ures were 30%, 25%, and 7%. Much 
of this new power gathered in the 
hands of our traditional allies in West- 
ern Europe and Japan. But the de- 
veloping countries also gained. India 
and Brazil now rank as the 10th and 
11th industrial powers in the world, 
and Iran and Saudi Arabia are major 
resource powers. 

Yet even though the Third World 
coalition began to gain strength in the 
early 1960's, its power did not burst 
upon the world scene with full force 
until 1973-75. Several vital 
psychological factors provided the im- 
petus: a new war in the Middle East, 
restored pride to the Arabs, the grant- 
ing of overdue independence to the 



1*1 

I 
it; 

'J 









52 

Portuguese colonies, and the 
worldwide dislocations caused by just 
a few Third World nations through an 
embargo on oil. 

These same years, 1973-1975, by 
some form of historical mischief, were 
also the years that marked the nadir of 
U.S. commitment and self-confidence. 
It was in these years that Saigon fell, 
Watergate began, and America tem- 
porarily lost its way. 

One can scarcely imagine a worse 
environment for international accom- 
modation and compromise. The Third 
World increased its demands. The 
United States dug in its heels. Con- 
frontation rose to unprecedented 
heights. Politically oriented resolutions 
multiplied in specialized agencies. 
Highly charged issues were debated in 
the General Assembly. The paralyzing 
effects of the resolutions linking 
Zionism and racism astonished 
everyone — even those who originally 
sponsored them. 

Many believe that what happened at 
the United Nations in this period was 
not so much a change in international 
circumstances but simply a case of 
Third World rhetoric outstripping real- 
ity. But I believe there is a more fun- 
damental factor at work. In ray opin- 
ion, it is without dispute that the role 
of the developing nations in the United 
Nations and in world affairs has in- 
creased dramatically. The Third World 
now represents 74% of the world's 
people. It has 58% of the world's 
armed forces. It is a veritable 
storehouse of the world's resources. 
As the number of global issues in- 
creases, the diplomatic leverage of the 
developing nations also grows. 

Even so, I would be among the first 
to urge that we place matters in 
perspective. Collectively, the West 
continues to represent 60% of the 
world's gross national product. It pro- 
vides 80% of the official development 
assistance and accounts for 85% of the 
total financial flow to developing na- 
tions and the multilateral agencies. 
Just as we must take into account their 
growing importance, they must take 
account of our continuing significance. 
What has this Administration done in 
the face of these developments? 

Administration Policy 

The Carter Administration's ap- 
proach to the United Nations has been 
characterized by changes in three 
major areas. 

The style has been changed primar- 
ily through the presence of Andy 
Young and his energetic efforts to cul- 
tivate leaders in the Third World and 
to broaden our comprehension of 



shared interests. But there are other 
steps, including the President's deci- 
sions to give two major addresses here 
at the United Nations, to invite Secre- 
tary General Waldheim to Washington 
at a very early stage in his Administra- 
tion, and to spend 2 full days here at 
the United Nations in October. 

The substance of our relations with 
the United Nations has changed 
through our recognition that the United 
Nations is a vital ingredient in the 
conduct of the world's business and by 
our determination to make greater use 
of all of its machinery. 

The funding aspect of our policy has 
shifted as we have tried to reverse 10 
years of decline in American contribu- 
tions to components of the U.N. sys- 
tem to the point where many of our 
voluntary contributions, percentage- 
wise, are now below our assessed con- 
tributions. 

Our contribution to the U.N. De- 
velopment Program, for example, was 
38% of the total in 1965; it is less than 
20% today. We have succeeded in 
stimulating many other governments to 
carry a larger share of the burden. We 
would still like to encourage more 
contributions from the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries and 
from a few developed nations, but ba- 
sically it is now time for us to carry 
our fair share in order to solidify this 
common approach. 

On many issues — such as the Mid- 
dle East, southern Africa, and North- 
South relations — let us acknowledge, 
even as we use the United Nations, 
that the process is difficult. The 
United Nations cannot "solve" these 
issues. That is not to say, however, 
that United Nations involvement is ir- 
relevant. Work at the United Nations 
can facilitate negotiations, clarify 
problems, hasten dialogue, and 
legitimize solutions. It shouldn't need 
repeating, but it is clear that all 
parties — both the great powers and the 
smaller nations — have much to gain 
from using the United Nations for 
these purposes. And if we all recog- 
nize our common interest in using the 
United Nations, it will function better. 
The United Nations is particularly 
vital to most of the smaller nations. It 
is the collective source of much of 
their diplomatic influence, the basic 
outlet for their foreign relations initia- 
tives. They want to be included in the 
councils of power, where they clearly 
have a right to be. The United Nations 
provides them the policy voice they 
seek. 

The stronger powers also have a 
vital interest in the United Nations be- 
cause they have the most to gain from 
a stable international order. The Mid- 



Department of State Bulle 

die East and southern Africa aij 
flashpoints that could trigger major 
ternational conflicts. The North-Soi 
dialogue is not a matter of charii 
The developing countries are t| 
source of many of the raw materi, 
needed by us. They provide over oi- 
third of our trade, and the volume, 
growing both absolutely and in re* 
tion to our trade with Western Eurc 
and Japan. This is not a zero-sn 
game. Indeed, the economy of the J 
tire world is not likely to get mov : 
again unless we cooperate to stimuli 
the economic development of ll 
Third World. 

That we are, in fact, economica 
and politically interdependent wi 
these nations is a hard lesson H 
Americans to learn. Economically, 
tend to think we are self-sufficie 
even though we all stood in i 
gasoline lines in 1973 after the A: 
oil embargo, and we all suffered pi 
increases on heat, light, and | 
thousands of products in our soci 
that depend on petroleum. Political 
we like to think we can act alo; 
even though we face an array of glo! 
issues where the most skillful or ; 
termined national policy can be r. 
dered ineffectual if others do ; 
cooperate. 



Preparing for the Future 

The new attitude of the Carter 
ministration toward the United Nati 
on these issues — at least so far- 
proving to be productive. I believe 
fair review of the last 10 months 
confirm that. 

We are working with the African 
the settlement of issues in the soutl 
part of their continent. While we 1 
had disagreements, we believe we 
developing a new and positive worl 
relationship with a continent that 
eludes one-third of the United Nat 
membership. Certainly a large par 
the credit for this belongs to Al 
Young, whose energetic and o 
style of diplomacy is building a 
basis for understanding betw 
Americans and the Africans. 

As we move forward on Africai 
sues, we are working with Israel 
the Arabs in bringing more perma 
peace to the Middle East. We an 
nally moving toward a treaty 
Panama and thereby resolving an d 
that has been a sore point in our 
tions with the entire Third Work 
decades. On economic questions,! 
ficulties remain but we hope I 
sides are learning to listen better i 
to be more open in their dialogue, 
having done all this, where are' 
headed? 



ry 1978 

iddition to pursuing the efforts 
)ned, we remain concerned about 
nts of counterproductive politici- 

that continue to creep into U.N. 
; in all its forums. We need to be 
:. Every nation has been guilty 

practice, ourselves included. I 
it may be fairly said that both we 
le Soviet Union were excessive 
' introduction of cold war at- 
> into virtually every aspect of 
work in the past. 

an advantage of detente is that 
i the Soviets are trying harder to 
se the number of bilateral rela- 
ips from which political consid- 
ns can be excluded. This has 
lealthy for the United Nations, 
iperpower confrontation often 
:ed paralysis just as Arab-Israeli 
ntation is doing today. We need 

every effort to keep the U.N. 
es focused on the substantive is- 
that are their chief respon- 
es. 

getary concerns will also be on 
enda for the future. We need to 

efficient management of the 
system while at the same time 
:k to insure sufficient funds and 
dgetary flexibility necessary to 
the unexpected problems that 
ntly arise in the U.N. context, 
g with congressional concerns 
the effectiveness of the United 
s will be part of our effort, 
there is one problem of overrid- 
portance for the future, and that 
_eal with the continuing inclina- 
: many in this country to think 
tnerica can go it alone. We see 
sw in suggestions that we do not 
iternational institutions or in the 
ded belief that all other nations 
utomatically pay heed to us 
t our attempting to take their 
ts into account as well. We talk 
interdependence but, like the 
sr, nobody does very much 
t. 

fact is that in a growing number 
as, international relations are 
;yond the effective policy reach 

nation-state. All countries, in- 
', the superpowers, must rely to 
xtent on other nations for essen- 
redients in their economies, liv- 
andards, or security. As an 

Institute study recently noted, 
: is a complex interconnection 
;n the issues of population, 

, resources, pollution, food, 

supply, economic growth, and 
Jment. A problem in one sphere 
ates problems in others. Popula- 
>r instance, affects all the other 
• So does availability or scarcity 

gy" 

he personal level, as noted by 



Steve Bailey of the American Council 
on Education, we live in "a world in 
which rebellion in Chile can cause an 
assassination in Vienna, in which Tur- 
kish poppies can produce muggings in 
Montreal, in which industrial effluents 
in Detroit can cause cancer in 
Windsor, Ontario, in which crimes on 
Hawaii Five-O can stimulate re- 
cidivism in Boston." 

We all need to find new ways to 
cope with interdependence of this sort. 
The U.N. system is but one of the 
many devices in which people around 
the world are talking to each other, 
searching for common solutions. There 
are 149 nation-states, a hundred major 
transnational corporations, and dozens 
of nonprofit multinational organiza- 
tions, and their representatives get to- 
gether in some 800 intergovernmental 
conferences and more than 3,000 in- 
ternational association meetings every 
year. 

The agenda of problems that faces 
us on a global scale is monumental. 
We should have no illusions that we 
can deal with these issues ourselves. 
One of my predecessors, Ambassador 
Harlan Cleveland, recently sum- 
marized the challenge in this way: 

Somehow the community of nations — or at 
least of those most concerned — will need to 
create a food reserve, assure energy supplies, 
depress fertility rates, stabilize commodity 
markets, protect the global environment, man- 
age the ocean and its deep seabed, control the 
modification of weather at human command, 
rewrite the rules of trade and investment, re- 
form the monetary system, mediate disputes, 
reduce the cost of military stalemate, control 
conflict in a world of proliferating weapons. 



53 

keep the peace when it is threatened, and re- 
store peace when it is broken. 

Clearly the task is staggering. 
Global diplomacy is harder than dollar 
diplomacy. It takes more skill to suc- 
ceed if, as is now the case, the United 
Nations no longer towers above others 
to the same degree from the standpoint 
of wealth, influence, and interest. 

Times have changed. Others do 
have wealth. They do exercise influ- 
ence. And they clearly have an interest 
in playing a larger role. It, therefore, 
takes new determination and special 
skills to practice effective diplomacy. 

Certainly ignoring vital U.N. agen- 
cies which are dealing with these top- 
ics is not the way to make progress. 
The United Nations needs more atten- 
tion, not less. Our support of the U.N. 
agencies must increase. We must work 
to strengthen them in their capacity to 
relate to these world problems. 

We are not talking about world gov- 
ernment but world governance. We are 
searching for ways to deal with inter- 
national problems which nation-states, 
acting in traditional ways, can no 
longer solve. 

I think we are making a good start 
in the United Nations in the Carter 
Administration. I want you to know 
that at all times we welcome your 
viewpoints and suggestions for new 
initiatives, for it is only with your 
help that we will be able to push this 
effort forward with the full momentum 
that it deserves. □ 

1 Address before the American Association 
of University Women in New York on Dec. 3, 
1977; Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for In- 
ternational Organization Affairs. 



International Civil Aviation Safety 



STATEMENT BY MR. KENNEDY 1 

My delegation joined in the consen- 
sus on the Chairman's resolution on 
this subject and raised no objection to 
the additions to the chairman's text 
because we believe it urgent that the 
international community express itself 
in clear terms on the unacceptability of 
violent interference with civil aviation. 
We wholeheartedly support the resolu- 
tion's condemnation of violent inter- 
ference. The fact that the scope of the 
condemnation covers all who might 
perpetrate such acts is a clear expres- 
sion of the outrage of the international 
community at any such acts. 



We furthermore believe the requests 
to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and to states to 
take measures to prevent the occur- 
rence of such acts will assist in avoid- 
ing the occurrence of these despicable 
incidents. 

We believe it is in the interest of the 
entire world community to take effec- 
tive collective action against hijacking 
and other unlawful acts which interfere 
with civil aviation. We are con- 
sequently gratified that the resolution 
has been adopted by consensus. Of 
course, the actions of members of this 
Organization in implementing the res- 
olution will be more important than 







CJ 

i 

■•I 

k 

(1 

:3 



54 

the words we have all approved. States 
should take joint and separate 
action — including ratifying the existing 
Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal conven- 
tions — and work with ICAO to develop 
better security procedures and stand- 
ards. 

We would also wish to thank Mr. 
Assad Kotaite, President of the Coun- 
cil of ICAO, and Capt. Derry F. 
Pearce, President of the International 
Federation of Airline Pilots Associa- 
tions, for their lucid and persuasive 
statements which so accurately de- 
scribed the nature and magnitude of 
the problem. 

In sum, the United States believes 
that all members of the world commu- 
nity must act, individually and collec- 
tively, to combat the threat of hijack- 
ing and other illegal acts involving 
civil aviation. 

Finally, one delegation saw fit to 
raise a question with regard to a cer- 
tain individual presently in the United 
States. The individual is not being 
sheltered. After it was found he was 
ineligible for a U.S. visa because of 
the act he had committed, he entered 
the United States illegally under false 
papers; proceedings are underway to 
deport him in accordance with U.S. 
law. We believe that no cause justifies 
the hijacking of planes. Much as we 
sympathize with those who flee re- 
pression to seek freedom, we do not 
condone hijacking or terrorist acts as a 
means to this end. We are committed to 
the extradition or prosecution system 
contained in The Hague, Montreal, and 
protection of diplomats conventions. 



STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN 
WOLFF 2 

My government holds the view, as 
it has for many years, that the entire 
world community, without exception, 
has an immediate and direct interest in 
taking effective collective action 
against hijacking and other unlawful 
acts which interfere with civil avia- 
tion. 

It is appropriate, and most timely, 
that the United Nations has given seri- 
ous attention to this issue which cuts 
across all frontiers and threatens the 
lives of citizens of every country, irre- 
spective of its political structure or 
orientation. 

To what extent does the resolution 
which we have adopted advance the 
international struggle against hijack- 
ing? 

• First, I would stress that my gov- 
ernment welcomes the resolution's 



clear and unequivocal denunciation of 
hijacking. The strong international 
consensus expressed in this resolution 
condemning such lawless actions will 
have an important deterrent effect 
upon those who would resort to this 
particularly abhorrent form of violence 
against the innocent and the defense- 
less and also upon those who would 
support such actions. In addition, our 
action here should serve as further en- 
couragement to states to take the sort 
of vigorous action against hijacking 
which, unfortunately, has been lacking 
in some cases. 

• Second, the resolution makes it 
clear that member states and the ICAO 
should move promptly to implement 
more effectively the security stand- 
ards, practices, and procedures for 
airports which have been established 
through ICAO's security annex [17]. 

• Third, the resolution calls upon 
all states which have not yet adhered 
to the three existing ICAO conventions 
against hijacking promptly to adhere to 
and ratify those conventions. There 
can be no reason for delay on this mat- 
ter. The mutual advantages from this 
form of cooperation are increasingly 
evident. 

• Finally, the resolution recognizes 
that the members of this Organization, 
working within the framework of 
ICAO, should give the highest priority 
to the development of additional 
measures to enhance the security of 
civil aviation. 

My government is pleased with the 
resolution which we have adopted. To 
be sure, it contains some phraseology 
which we believe unnecessary and ir- 
relevant. Nevertheless, on balance, 
this resolution represents a major step 
forward in the collective fight against 
hijacking, because it embodies a 
unanimous and categoric determination 
by the international community to take 
further steps to prevent the use of ter- 
ror, for whatever purpose, against 
those involved in international civil 
aviation. My government concludes 
that the resolution represents an under- 
taking that no state will cooperate with 
hijackers. 

One might ask whether the sorts of 
actions which this resolution envisages 
will really have much impact on 
hijacking. In our view, the answer to 
any such questions can only be an em- 
phatic yes. I would cite in this connec- 
tion the experience of the United 
States in its successful effort against 
hijacking domestically. In 1969, prior 
to the establishment of security meas- 
ures designed to prevent incidents of 
this type, there were 40 attempts to 
hijack U.S. civilian aircraft, 33 of 



Department of State Bult 

which were successful. In 1973, 
first full year after stringent sect 
procedures were made mandatory 
all U.S. airports, the number of i 
incidents fell to two. In 1976 as 4 
there were only two incidents. Tl 
figures speak for themselves. 

Looking at the current situation i 
worldwide basis, we find that; 
number of hijacking incidents is 
again on the rise and that lax sec: 
procedures at airports have beef 
sponsible for most of them. The i 
ures are striking. Of the 28 ai 
hijackings thus far this year — as: 
posed to 16 during all of 1976 
can be attributed to failures in i 
senger screening procedures. Si 
1973 there have been no hijackin, 
the United States which resulted 
a failure to detect guns and d 
weapons during the screening pro 
I might point 1 out that the Ui: 
States has been and continues £ 
willing to share its experience in 
area with other interested couni 
For instance, the United States ha 
fered to share its screening pi 
dures, equipment, and testing rj 
ures with other countries, and thi 
36 countries have taken advanta; 
this offer. 

In calling upon the competent 
cialized U.N. agency, ICAO, tj 
velop additional measures to inc 
international civil aviation sect 
the resolution we have adopted ( 
the way for new initiatives in the 
spected and impartial Organiza 
Among the steps which we be 
ICAO should take are the followir 

(1) Strengthening of the cui 
ICAO standard on passenger sere 
to require specifically the screeni 
all passengers and all carry-on 
gage for all airline flights, 
foreign and domestic; 

(2) Elevation of certain ICAO 
ommended practices dealing wit 
curity to the status of standard: 
eluding: (a) provision of law em 
ment support for aviation securit 
(b) provision of security for ai 
under hijacking or sabotage threai 

(3) Continuing emphasis by 1 
on universal adherence to and raj 
tion of The Hague (hijacking; 
Montreal (sabotage) conventions, 
action would effectively eliminate 
havens for aviation criminals. 

In adopting this resolution 
United Nations has taken a majoi 
forward. Nevertheless, we have' 
ous work before us. It would be 
service to the interests of J 
member of this Organization if tl 
portunity to strengthen the safr 



ary 1978 

national civil aviation is not trans- 
I into practical terms, using the 
ting international and bilateral 
ework available for this purpose, 
government stands ready to sup- 
the spirit and the letter of this 
ution. We look to others to join 
1 achieving, for the benefit of all 
national travelers on civil aircraft, 
;ater measure of security against 
rist hijackings. 



4. Calls upon the International Civil Avia- 
tion Organization to undertake urgently further 
efforts with a view to ensuring the security of 
air travel and preventing the recurrence of acts 
of the nature referred to in paragraph 1 above, 
including the reinforcement of annex 17 to the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944; 

5. Appeals to all Governments to make seri- 
ous studies of the abnormal situation related to 
hijacking. □ 



55 



1 Made in the Special Political Committee of 
the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 2, 1977; 
John Clifford Kennedy is a U.S. Representative 
to the 32d General Assembly (text from USUN 
press release 95 of Nov. 2). 

2 Made in plenary session of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly on Nov. 3, 1977; Congressman 
Lester L. Wolff (of New York) is a U.S. Rep- 
resentative to the 32d General Assembly (text 
from USUN press release 98 of Nov. 3). 

3 Adopted by the General Assembly by con- 
sensus on Nov. 3, 1977. 



HIS 






OLUTION 32/8 3 

• of international civil aviation 

General Assembly, 

ognizing that the orderly functioning of 
ational civil air travel under conditions 
nteeing the safety of its operations is in 
iterest of all peoples and promotes and 
ves friendly relations among States, 
ailing its resolution 2645 (XXV) of 25 
nber 1970, in which it recognized that 
f aerial hijacking or other wrongful inter- 
e with civil air travel jeopardize the lives 
ifety of passengers and crew and consti- 
violation of their human rights, 
ailing also its resolution 2551 (XXIV) of 
cember 1969 as well as Security Council 
tion 286 (1970) of 9 September 1970 and 
Hindi's decision of 20 June 1972, 
'eiterates and reaffirms its condemnation 
i of aerial hijacking or other interference 
ivil air travel through the threat or use of 
and all acts of violence which may be 
:d against passengers, crew and aircraft, 
ix committed by individuals or States; 
alls upon all States to take all necessary 
taking into account the relevant recom- 
tions of the United Nations and the In- 
onal Civil Aviation Organization, to pre- 
cis of the nature referred to in paragraph 
e, including the improvement of security 
ements at airports or by airlines as well 
exchange of relevant information, and to 
id to take joint and separate action, sub- 
respect for the purposes and principles 
Charter of the United Nations and for the 
nt United Nations declarations, coven- 
nd resolutions and without prejudice to 
vereignty or territorial integrity of any 
in co-operation with the United Nations 
e International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
o ensure that passengers, crew and air- 
ngaged in civil aviation are not used as a 
of extorting advantage of any kind; 
ppeals to all States which have not yet 
e parties to the Convention on Offences 
ertain Other Acts Committed on Board 
ft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 
the Convention for the Suppression of 
ful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The 
on 16 December 1970, and the Conven- 
or the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
t the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at 
:al on 23 September 1971, to give urgent 
eration to ratifying or acceding to those 
itions; 



Operational Activities 



by Charles W. Whalen 1 

The several distinct operational pro- 
grams under review account for a major 
part of the budget and the field ac- 
tivities of the entire U.N. system. 
Through cooperating governments, 
they strive to reach out to the ordinary 
people of our globe in very practical 
terms. My government is gratified to 
be able to play an active part in the im- 
plementation of these programs. 

Along with the growing pains, we 
have seen substantial progress — 
qualitatively and quantitatively — 
during the relatively few years since 
this unprecedented and highly construc- 
tive development effort was begun. 
U.N. operational activities have be- 
come an important element in the realm 
of international economic cooperation, 
a fact made clear by the informative 
statements presented by the distin- 
guished gentlemen who head the pro- 
grams under review. My delegation 
would like to thank them for their sig- 
nificant contributions in this regard. 

We naturally would like to see the 
U.N. development system make even 
more progress in expanding and im- 
proving its field programs. With that 
end in mind, it might be helpful to 
summarize my government's policy 
toward the U.N. development system 
and how we believe we can best par- 
ticipate in it. 

• First, we seek strengthened co- 
operative efforts that are devised 
clearly and specifically to meet the 
basic needs of the world's poor major- 
ity, wherever they are found. We also 
place high priority on enhancing the 
role of women in development. 

• Second, we seek improved per- 
formance and efficiency in U.N. de- 
velopment efforts. 



• Third, if the United Nations can 
make substantial progress in achieving 
these objectives, we are prepared to 
consider greater support for such pro- 
grams over longer periods of time. 

I would like to comment selectively 
on the numerous matters before our 
Committee. 

At the conclusion of this month's 
Pledging Conference, the U.N. De- 
velopment Program's (UNDP) very 
able Administrator, Bradford Morse, 
noted that the Program is now back on 
a stable financial footing. My govern- 
ment, of course, is pleased at this posi- 
tive turn of events. We look forward to 
seeing UNDP build on the improved 
situation by strengthening its essential 
role as the U.N. development system's 
central funding and coordinating body. 
This is key to assuring the coherence, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of the 
overall system and, as such, is strongly 
in the interest of all concerned govern- 
ments and U.N. agencies. The UNDP 
Governing Council, at its June 1977 
session, appropriately recognized and 
endorsed this position in its careful re- 
view and approval of the resolution 
dealing with the role and activities of 
the UNDP. We believe that the joint 
planning and other common efforts the 
UNDP is organizing with the coopera- 
tion of its agency partners are addi- 
tional steps in the right direction. 

While welcoming UNDP's return to 
fiscal good health, we nevertheless re- 
main concerned regarding the continu- 
ing lack of progress in dealing with cer-. 
tain longstanding problems. Among 
these are: 

• First, the need to arrive at more 
equitable cost-sharing on the part of all 
member states financially able to sup- 
port the program either through general 



n 

3! 

% 



< 

m» 
V* 

CJ 



i 









56 

voluntary contributions or by defraying 
local program costs; 

• Second, the need for voluntary 
contributions to be made in readily us- 
able currencies, in accord with the 
UNDP's financial rules and regulations 
and in line with the clear logic of the 
Program's requirements. We continue 
to believe that arrangements must be 
made to use the $35 million in noncon- 
vertible, nonusable funds now on hand 
at UNDP for their original purposes but 
on a nonpreferential basis; and 

• Third, the need to reduce arrear- 
ages, which total about $30 million at 
present. 

Progress on these fronts will 
strengthen UNDP's financial base, 
permit the Program to respond more ef- 
fectively to the needs of the developing 
countries, and increase its general at- 
tractiveness and support among 
member governments. 

Other important steps which, in our 
view, would enhance UNDP's position 
include limiting the amount of techni- 
cal assistance financed by the assessed 
budgets of the agencies, adding to the 
protection of UNDP against a recur- 
rence of the recent grave financial dif- 
ficulties by building a strengthened 
reserve for emergency purposes, and 
expanding UNDP's role in joint opera- 
tions involving both multilateral and 
bilateral funds, as in the case of the 
Sahel program. 

Our concluding note on UNDP is to 
recall that we announced at the recent 
Pledging Conference an increase for 
1978 of 15% over our 1977 contribu- 
tion of $100 million. Also at that Con- 
ference, we were pleased to announce 
our initial pledge — $2 million — to the 
U.N. Capital Development Fund as 
well as $1 million to the U.N. Revolv- 
ing Fund for Natural Resources Explora- 
tion. These pledges, along with our 
continuing support of the U.N. Volun- 
teers Program which we consider an 
appropriate mechanism for meeting 
basic needs, demonstrate our interest in 
encouraging new U.N. initiatives of 
technical cooperation with the develop- 
ing countries. 2 

Let me next touch upon the United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), its 
operations, and the 1977 executive 
board meeting and report. In our view, 
UNICEF continues to perform its vital 
functions in an exemplary manner 
under the able leadership of its Execu- 
tive Director, Henry Labouisse. The 
25% increase this year in our contribu- 
tion to UNICEF reflects our confidence 
in this organization's capacity to utilize 
effectively significant resource 
increases. 

The International Year of the Child 



(IYC) will place new responsibilities 
not only on UNICEF but also on the 
other elements of the U.N. system. 
Full cooperation from all concerned 
U.N. bodies is essential if we are to 
seize upon the Year as an opportunity 
to highlight and assess the needs of 
children and to strengthen programs to 
meet them. We are confident that such 
cooperation will be forthcoming. 

In terms of national activities, the 
U.S. Government has formed an Inter- 
national Year of the Child interagency 
committee to coordinate official U.S. 
participation in the Year. All depart- 
ments and agencies of government with 
an interest in children are represented 
on the committee. We look forward to 
a fruitful, cooperative relationship and 
exchange of views with the recently 
appointed U.N. Special Representative 
for the Year, Dr. Estefania Aldab-Lim 
[of the Philippines], and the IYC Sec- 
retariat. As you know, we recently 
pledged $250,000 for 1977 for 
worldwide IYC activities. 

The United States participated ac- 
tively at the 1977 UNICEF board meet- 
ing. We considered it a most useful 
dialogue between board members and 
the UNICEF Secretariat on a wide 
range of subjects. One decision taken 
at the board session was agreement that 
the Secretariat would prepare, for the 
next session, a comprehensive over- 
view statement of UNICEF assistance 
policies and priorities, a review of the 
functional categories of UNICEF as- 
sistance, and indications of future 
trends. We look forward with interest 
to that statement, as well as the other 
studies agreed upon at the 1977 
session. 

Permit me now to turn to U.N. Fund 
for Population Activities (UNFPA), 
which my country has been glad to 
support since its inception. One clear 
measure of UNFPA's utility to de- 
veloping countries is that, as reported 
by the Fund's most distinguished 
Executive Director, Rafael Salas, it is 
facing a gap between the cost of spe- 
cific projects ready for implementation 
and the level of financial resources 
available to it. Accordingly, it is in- 



Department of State Bulk 

cumbent upon member states to cc 
sider increasing substantially thji 
pledges to the Fund. This situation ai 
underlines the need for U.N. agenc; 
cooperating with the Fund to redi: 
their charges to it for overhead co; 
and infrastructural support. 

My government, which regula 
has provided its proportional share I 
the Fund's resources, has just < 
nounced a special $4 million contril 
tion to help it meet outstanding ass 
ance requests. Along with the Fun 
impressive record, we nevertheless ; 
several areas in need of further i 
provement. These include develop 
basic country programs and, throi 
them, intercountry programs; focus: 
on core programs; establish) 
priorities for future allocation of 
sources; and increasing the share 
country programs and decreasing t 
of regional or global programs. 

The United Nations itself is the si 
ond largest UNDP executing agen( 
We commend the United Nations for. 
operational activities, especially for- 
focus on the least developed countf 
and its promotion of integration; 
women in development. However, ' 
must stress our view that no regu, 
U.N. funds should be budgeted 
these operations. Instead, they sho.' 
be financed by UNDP, the U.N. Fi| 
for Drug Abuse Control, and the tJJ 
Trust Fund for Southern Africa. 

Finally I would like to emphasize 
government's support of the Woi 
Food Program. Previously we have < 
pressed our reservations regarding I 
established Program target of $950 ir 
lion for 1979-80. Despite this, we 
tend to increase the level of our a 
tribution to $220 million for tU 
period. 



1 Statement made in Committee II (Econo 
and Financial) of the U.N. General Asseir 
on Nov. 15, 1977; Congressman Whalen 
Ohio) is the U.S. Representative in that C 
mittee (text from USUN press release 11' 
Nov. 15). 

2 For text of the statement made at the Pie 
ing Conference on Nov. 2, 1977, see Bulle 
of Dec. 12, p. 872. 



Outer Space Programs 



by Marjorie Craig Benton ' 

The year 1977 was one of significant 
accomplishments in the exploration of 
outer space and productive work by the 
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful 



Uses of Outer Space. The United SM 
has regularly reported major devel 
ments in our national and internatio 
space programs to the Outer Sp< 
Committee and its subcommittees, j 
I would like to draw the attention of ■ 



ry 1978 



57 



ral Assembly to some of the high- 
5 of our ongoing and planned 

programs. 

: are pleased to report that the 
: Transportation System, includ- 
le reusable National Aeronautics 
>pace Administration's (NASA) 

shuttle orbiter and the Spacelab 

developed by the European Space 
:y (ESA), is progressing satisfac- 
. The first shuttle orbiter success- 
completed its approach and land- 
sts in October. 

mid-year 1979, an engineering 
I of Spacelab, consisting of two 
tory modules and two experiment- 
ing pallets, should arrive from 
>e. The first flight unit is sched- 

arrive in Florida by the end of 
mber 1979. The shuttle orbiter it- 
vill become operational by mid- 

An early operational flight will 
h the first Spacelab in a joint 
\/ESA mission in December 

Experimenters from 16 nations 
been selected to fly their experi- 

> as contributions to the first 
lab pay load. 

he applications area, I would like 
nmarize briefly our experimental 
e sensing activities. Data ob- 

1 by NASA's Landsat satellites 
supported research projects spon- 
by agencies in some 50 countries 
iternational organizations. In ad- 
, users from about 100 countries 
jurchased Landsat data from the 

Resource Observation Systems 
Center at Sioux Falls, South 
a. 

dsat ground stations now operate 
lada, Brazil, and Italy receiving 
lirectly from U.S. satellites. An 
>nal station is under construction 
in and others are planned in 
tina, Chile, and Sweden. We ex- 
hat Japan, Australia, India, and 

> may be joining the Landsat 
d station system in the near 

:e the Landsat satellites now in 
ire nearing the end of their opera- 
lifetimes, NASA plans to launch 
ird Landsat satellite — Landsat 

February 1978. Funding has 
approved for a fourth Landsat 
[e in the early 1980's. These new 
ites should assure continuous 
3ility of remote sensing data. 

first remote sensing satellite 
ited to oceanographic studies — 
-A— is scheduled to be launched 
VSA in May 1978. Seasat will 
data on changes in ocean topog- 
due to tides, currents, gravity 
ons, etc.; the extent and move- 
af sea ice; ocean dynamics; and 
;r. 

applications program also in- 



cludes ongoing experiments using 
communications satellites. The Appli- 
cations Technology Satellite series con- 
tinues to demonstrate new and different 
kinds of communications services. 
These include TV broadcasting to 
small receivers and mobile communica- 
tions to ships, aircraft vehicles, and 
hand-held equipment. Experiments are 
also being conducted in the communi- 
cations area in a joint project with 
Canada using the Communications 
Technology Satellite (CTS). 

We are making good progress toward 
the test and demonstration of a search- 
and-rescue satellite system for the loca- 
tion and assistance of distressed aircraft 
and ships. The project has been 
planned with Canada, and the Soviet 
Union has agreed to participate. A pro- 
posal has also been received from 
France to join in this project. Wide in- 
ternational use of such a search-and- 
rescue system could be anticipated 
after the initial experimental phase. 

We are especially pleased to report 
three important new international co- 
operative space agreements which were 
reached in recent weeks. 

Officials in the Federal Republic of 
Germany have entered into an agree- 
ment with NASA to take an important 
part in a Jupiter orbiter probe mission, 
scheduled for early 1982. This mission 
is designed to conduct the most de- 
tailed scientific investigation yet of 
Jupiter — its environment and moons — 
including the first direct measurements 
of the planet's atmosphere. 

Moreover, NASA and the Nether- 
lands Agency for Aerospace Programs 
have entered into an agreement for a 
cooperative infrared astronomical satel- 
lite project. The United Kingdom also 
will participate in this program. Sched- 
uled for launch in 1981, this mission 
will conduct the first astronomical sur- 
vey of the entire sky at infrared 
wavelengths undetectable by Earth- 
based telescopes because of the obscur- 
ing effects of the atmosphere. 

Finally, the European Space Agency 
has signed an agreement with NASA 
for substantial contributions to and par- 
ticipation in an extended space tele- 
scope program. In 1983 a 2.4-meter 
space telescope will be carried into 
Earth's orbit by NASA's space shuttle 
and will be used to study the universe 
with much higher resolution than has 
ever been possible before. With the 
new space telescope, astronomers 
should be able to observe some 350 
times more volume of space than can 
be seen now with the largest ground- 
based telescope. 

During 1977, the Viking mission to 
Mars entered a phase that will permit 
scientific observations through an en- 



tire Martian year of 25 months, thereby 
observing important seasonal changes. 
Viking I orbiter cameras took detailed 
pictures of Mars' tiny moon Phobos 
from a distance of 48 km. 

A high-energy astrophysics research 
program began in 1977 with the launch 
of an observatory — the High Energy 
Astronomical Observatory I — to per- 
form a detailed X-ray survey of the 
celestial sphere. This is the first of a 
series of three planned spacecraft to do 
high-energy studies. 

NASA also launched two Voyager 
spacecraft this past summer for an ex- 
tensive survey of the outer planets. 
Over a 10-year period they may visit as 
many as 15 major celestial bodies, in- 
cluding Jupiter, Saturn, several moons 
of both planets, and possibly Uranus. 
The great distances across which radio 
signals between Earth and Voyagers 
must travel and the long lifetime of the 
mission require that the spacecraft be 
able to care for themselves and perform 
long, detailed, and complex scientific 
surveys without continual commanding 
from the ground. 

The international Sun-Earth 
Explorers — a so-called mother-daughter 
double spacecraft on a single 
rocket — were launched in October in a 
cooperative program between NASA 
and the European Space Agency. The 
project's objective is to gain a better 
understanding of how the Sun interacts 
with the Earth's near-space environ- 
ment. Circling Earth for 3 years or 
more, the instrument-laden spacecraft 
are expected to provide detailed data on 
how solar wind particles behave in the 
boundaries between Earth space and in- 
terplanetary space. 

We wish to commend and endorse 
the work of the Outer Space Committee 
[U.N. doc. A/32/20] and work of the 
Scientific and Technical and the Legal 
Subcommittees as reflected in their re- 
spective reports. The subcommittees 
have done particularly valuable work 
this year in carrying out their mandates 
from the parent committee and from 
the General Assembly. I do not intend 
to discuss here all of the issues covered 
in these reports, as our views are on 
record in the debates which led to their 
adoption. However, we would like to 
make a few remarks in regard to the 
principal topics discussed. 

The Legal Subcommittee has con- 
tinued consideration of several com- 
plex and difficult issues. Negotiation of 
a draft treaty dealing with the Moon 
and other celestial bodies has continued 
in earnest. An important question in 
that regard concerns the exploration 
and exploitation of the natural re- 
sources of such bodies. We believe that 
efforts toward resolving this question 









.a 

9 



58 



Department of State Bui; 



should be continued in 1978. 

The elaboration of principles guiding 
the direct broadcast of television by 
satellite has evoked considerable inter- 
est. In this connection, I would like to 
note that while we share in general a 
positive evaluation of the work on di- 
rect television broadcast satellites that 
is underway in the Legal Subcommit- 
tee, we think it would be wrong to 
underestimate the difficulties which 
must be resolved in order to reach 
agreement on a mutually acceptable 
and comprehensive set of guidelines for 
this new technology. 

It is well known that many states 
wish to include in the guidelines a 
principle that would require prior con- 
sent before broadcasting begins. Others 
have joined with the United States in 
opposing any such requirement as in- 
compatible with the fundamental con- 
cept of free and unfettered exchange of 
information and ideas between coun- 
tries, peoples, and individuals. Still 
others have proposed formulations of a 
possible principle that would seek to 
bridge the gap between these positions. 
The gap is wide and it will require the 
earnest efforts of all members of the 
Outer Space Committee to overcome it. 
The process of exploring and under- 
standing the complex matters involved 
in this subject should be continued in 
the Legal Subcommittee. 

Remote sensing of the natural envi- 
ronment of the Earth from space is prov- 
ing to be one of the most beneficial 
practical applications of space technol- 
ogy. In addition to its usefulness in the 
location and management of natural re- 
sources, cartographic applications, and 
land-use planning, remote sensing 
holds promise in the fields of environ- 
mental monitoring and in disaster pre- 
diction and research. 

The United States has been exploring 
a full range of these applications and is 
particularly pleased to note the increas- 
ing interest of many countries in deriv- 
ing benefits from this technology. We 
look forward to a productive discussion 
in the Outer Space Committee of the 
application of remote sensing to the de- 
tection and monitoring of pollution. 

The era of space-based remote sens- 
ing of the Earth's natural environment 
began in 1972 with the launch of the 
first of the U.S. Landsat satellites. As 
I have noted earlier, more than 5 years' 
success has been realized in this ex- 
perimental program involving two 
satellites now in orbit, a third to be 
launched early next year, and a fourth 
presently being engineered. 

In view of the benefits already de- 
rived from Landsat and the great inter- 
est in the subject on the part of the in- 
ternational community, some form of 



operational remote sensing undoubt- 
edly will be established in the future. 
It will be very important for the Outer 
Space Committee to continue its de- 
tailed consideration of technical and 
organizational aspects of remote sens- 
ing to encourage obtaining the greatest 
possible benefits from this technology. 
The Legal Subcommittee should con- 
tinue its development of draft princi- 
ples guiding remote sensing activities 
with due account of the wide range of 
potential configurations involving gov- 
ernments and nongovernmental 
entities. 

A number of countries have ex- 
pressed an interest in holding a U.N. 
conference on outer space matters 
oriented toward development needs. 
The United States is particularly aware 
of the value of science and technology 
to development and strongly supports 
the planned 1979 U.N. Conference on 
Science and Technology for Develop- 
ment. Countries will have an opportu- 
nity in that conference to focus on the 
aspects of science and technology they 



feel are most important for their < 
velopment. Thus, the confere: 
should provide countries an oppci 
nity to consider all areas of science 
technology according to their woi 
ness in competition for scarce finai 
resources. A special U.N. space 9 
ference could be designed on the h 
of needs shown by the 1979 conferei: 
Before closing I would like to: 
press our appreciation to Dr. Perek 
his associates in the Outer Space 
fairs Division of the U.N. Secreta 
We all know that their continuous 
forts behind the scenes are indispe 
ble to the successful work of the C 
Space Committee and its subcom 
tees. We look forward to our cont 
ing productive association with t 
and with these committees in the 
ahead. 



1 Statement made in Committee I (Pol 
and Security) of the U.N. General Assemfc 
Nov. 22; Ms. Benton is the U.S. Alte 
Representative in that Committee (text* 
USUN press release 120 of Nov. 22). 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
Jamaican Prime Minister 
Visits United States 



White House Statement 1 

Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica 
and President Carter met today for an 
hour and 15 minutes in the Cabinet 
Room and then proceeded to a working 
luncheon for an hour and a half. They 
discussed a wide range of subjects of 
mutual interest. Mr. Manley was in- 
vited to have lunch at the White House 
by Mrs. Carter during her visit to 
Kingston in May of this year, and the 
December 16 date was selected as the 
time most convenient to both the Presi- 
dent and Prime Minister Manley. 

The Prime Minister and President 
Carter discussed multilateral and bilat- 
eral issues during their meeting and 
luncheon. Jamaica, as chairman of the 
Group of 77, 2 plays an important role 
as spokesman for many developing 
countries. The Prime Minister and the 
President reviewed the general state of 
the North-South dialogue, as well as 
several individual issues of importance 
including the assistance needs of de- 
veloping countries and the negotiations 
on a common fund. 

The two leaders also discussed cer- 
tain bilateral issues, including our ef- 
forts to assist Jamaica resolve its eco- 



nomic difficulties and Jaman 
contribution to a broader hemispi 
commitment to human rights. Se\ 
important regional issues were 
cussed, including the question of 
lize. Prime Minister Manley rece 
hosted a conference of seven L 
American and Caribbean leaders to 
cuss the future status of Belize, anc 
Prime Minister related some of 
conclusions of that conference to 
President, and they explored in ger 
terms ways to insure a peaceful 
durable settlement to that problem, 
two leaders also discussed the Pan 
Canal treaties and regional coopers 
in the Caribbean. 

The meeting was extremely cord 
Attending on the Jamaican side \ 
Prime Minister Manley, Mrs. Mar 
P. J. Patterson, Minister of Foreign 
fairs, Foreign Trade and Touri 
Alfred Rattray, Jamaican Ambassa 
Richard Fletcher, Minister of Si 
Ministry of Finance; Keith R< 
Member of Parliament; Owen Je 
son, Director, Program Divisi 
Ministry of Finance and Plann ; 
Gordon Wells, Permanent Secret: 
Office of the Prime Minister; E. F 
Francis, Permanent Secretary, Mim 



ry 1978 



59 



reign Affairs, Foreign Trade and 
an; and Herbert Walker, Perma- 
Representative to the Jamaican 
on to the Specialized Agencies of 
nited Nations at Geneva, 
ending on the U.S. side were 
lent Carter; Vice President Mon- 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; 
iew Brzezinski, Assistant to the 
lent for National Security Affairs; 
I Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the 
lent for National Security Affairs; 
ce A. Todman, Assistant Secre- 
jf State for Inter-American Af- 
Frederick Irving, American Am- 
ior to Jamaica; and Robert Pas- 
national Security Council staff 



member. The following U.S. officials 
also attended the luncheon: Anthony 
M. Solomon, Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Monetary Affairs; and 
Guy Erb, National Security Council 
staff member. □ 



1 Prime Minister Manley visited Washington 
December 14-19, 1977 Text of statement dated 
Dec. 16 from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 19. 

2 The Group of 77 is a caucus of developing 
countries formed in 1964 at the first U.N. Con- 
ference on Trade and Development to present a 
unified bargaining position in their negotiations 
with industrialized countries. It is now com- 
posed of 115 developing countries. 



TREATIES: l/JS. 5 UJ£. 

Aviation Agreement 



fius L. Katz 1 

n pleased to appear before you 
to discuss the vital question of 
international aviation policy in 
of the recently concluded U.S.- 
Air Services Agreement. I under- 

that the committee wishes to 
on this agreement in these hear- 
nd to address other aviation pol- 
testions at further hearings to be 
t a later date. 

i important to consider the specif- 
that agreement because its provi- 
govern one of the largest single 
ational air transportation markets 
ffect many parties of interest, in- 
g airlines, travelers and shippers, 
unities, and our workers. It is 
mportant, however, to view the 
nent in an historical and overall 

context. 

las been asserted by some that 
ional U.S. aviation policy has 
to negotiate more for the benefit 
■ airlines than for the consuming 

in such areas as expanding the 
ir of U.S. cities receiving inter- 
al service and assuring the lowest 
»le cost to travelers and shippers, 
iew U.S. -U.K. agreement has 
held out by some as an example 
> policy. 

ether the agreement is good or 
or somewhere in between, is a 
on of judgment and of assessment 
at the alternatives were. But it is 
ly wrong to charge that U.S. avi- 
policy is now, or has been, one of 
ting our airlines at the expense of 
>nsumers. 

United States was the original 
ate of an open skies approach 



after World War II. We sponsored a 
multilateral convention for this purpose 
and, in the negotiations leading to the 
original U.S. -U.K. agreement of 1946, 
we opposed any requirement that 
capacity and tariffs be subject to prior 
agreement among either airlines or 
governments. We had to abandon the 
multilateral convention because of 
united foreign opposition to it, and we 
ultimately reached a compromise with 
the British in the original Bermuda 
agreement on capacity and tariffs, ac- 
cepting prior control of the latter but 
not the former. Postwar U.S. interna- 
tional aviation prospered under the lib- 
eral Bermuda-type agreement, to the 
benefit of airlines and consumers alike, 
despite the fact that only the United 
States continued to use the Bermuda- 
type agreement as a model. 

The United States has negotiated 
over 50 bilateral air transport agree- 
ments, virtually all of which follow the 
Bermuda precedent. On occasion, we 
have had to accept less liberal condi- 
tions than we wanted because of 
foreign opposition to certain policies 
we sought. It needs to be emphasized 
in this connection that most foreign 
countries have a single national airline 
engaged in international service, that 
these airlines are often protected as a 
matter of national policy, and that 
many foreign countries simply do not 
believe in open competition in the field 
of aviation. 

I believe these foreign perceptions 
are wrong, but the United States cannot 
force its views on the rest of the world. 
The United States has, however, done 
more to contribute to a healthy interna- 
tional aviation environment than any 



other country through our emphasis on 
a competitive market structure and 
through the development, manufacture, 
and export of safe, efficient, and reli- 
able commercial aircraft. 

In any negotiation where there is 
serious disagreement, the bottom-line 
question is what the alternatives are. Do 
we insist on our position and run the 
risk of a confrontation including unilat- 
erally imposed restrictions on, or sus- 
pension of, air services, or do we try to 
make the best compromise possible? 
There can be no general answer to this 
question, but I suggest that those who 
believe we should hold out for all or 
nothing should consider the public 
interest consequences of getting 
nothing. 

I believe it is generally recognized 
that U.S. aviation policy has favored 
competition in international aviation, 
that this has been a longstanding U.S. 
policy, and that opposition to it has not 
come from within the U.S. Govern- 
ment but from abroad. But you want to 
know, and you are right in asking, 
whether the new U.S. -U.K. agreement 
adequately protects competition and 
consumer interests. 

The British served notice of termina- 
tion of the 1946 agreement because 
they had, for some time, been dissatis- 
fied with that agreement. We had been 
having aviation difficulties with the 
United Kingdom at least since the early 
1970's, stemming for the most part 
from what the United Kingdom be- 
lieved was the excess capacity of U.S. 
airlines and from differences of views 
on interpretation of the agreement. The 
actual notice of termination did not, 
therefore, come as a complete surprise 
to us, which is not to say that we ac- 
cepted the validity of United Kingdom 
dissatisfaction. In fact, the first 6 
months of negotiations were largely 
devoted to attempting to convince the 
United Kingdom that it would fare bet- 
ter under a liberal agreement than the 
restrictionist one it sought. We did not 
wholly convince the British side, but 
we did lay the basis for the minimum 
U.S. demands in the negotiations. 

The basic issue was really quite sim- 
ple. The United Kingdom wanted an 
agreement which would reduce the 
risks of imbalance as much as possible. 
Although the United Kingdom formally 
denied that it wanted a guarantee of 
50-50 market share, its insistence on 
complete predetermination of capacity, 
one airline per country per route, and 
turnaround U.S. -U.K. routes with no 
beyond rights amounted to the same 
thing. For our part, we opposed the 
concept of guaranteed balance on 
grounds that it would thwart market 
development and increase costs and. 



SfteW 



A 

H 



•:■':■'■' 



■ 






•5 
» 

til 



■■■ ■ 



60 

therefore, the price to the consumer. 
We argued that a system which might 
be suited to the United Kingdom and its 
airlines was not suited to the U.S. in- 
ternational air transport system or to 
U.S. travelers and shippers. 

In the final agreement reached, we 
did not achieve all our objectives but 
neither did the British. Our basic 
strategy was to trade those elements 
which were not crucial for those that 
were. Thus, we refused to accept the 
right of one side to have an absolute 
veto over any increase in capacity. The 
capacity procedures we finally ac- 
cepted always allow some increase and 
moreover these procedures are appli- 
cable only on North Atlantic routes and 
only for passenger services. 

North Atlantic all-cargo services and 
the Pacific, Bermuda, and Caribbean 
routes are not subject to any prior 
capacity control. We had to accept 
some limitations on designation of air- 
lines, but even here there is a right to 
add another airline if a market reaches 
a certain size. On routes, we held fast 
to retaining rights to carry traffic to 
points beyond the United Kingdom and 
its territory where such rights are cru- 
cial, and we obtained rights to carry 
transit and connecting traffic beyond 
the United Kingdom to any points. We 
gave up beyond rights not being used 
and others of marginal value. 

In an agreement as important as this 
one, there are bound to be differences 
of view over whether the right trade- 
offs were made. But trade-offs had to 
be made. Neither side had, after all, an 
absolute voice in dictating solutions. 
We had to be mindful of British desires 
as they had to be of ours. The bottom 
line issue was whether we could have 
done better and, if so, should we have 
broken off the negotiations and sus- 
pended air services in order to 
maximize our leverage. Personally, I 
doubt that the United States could have 
achieved a significantly better overall 
agreement had we broken off negotia- 
tions and suspended air services. 

I can testify that it was a close ques- 
tion; we could have as easily taken the 
plunge and it was tempting to do so. 
But what would have happened then? 
The traveling public would have been 
greatly inconvenienced, our airlines 
would have incurred additional costs 
from rerouting flights, and our foreign 
commerce would have been affected. 
This situation could not have been al- 
lowed to continue indefinitely. Both 
governments would have resumed 
negotiations and faced the same issues, 
and it is unrealistic to assume that 
either government would have capitu- 
lated to the other. 
The new U.S. -U.K. Air Services 



Agreement has been given the short- 
hand of Bermuda II which implies that, 
since Bermuda I became the standard 
for other agreements, so should Ber- 
muda II become the new standard. This 
is unfortunate and misleading. In 1946 
the Bermuda agreement was a 
precedent-setting event because it was 
the first major postwar agreement and 
it was concluded with a country whose 
overseas territories made it, by any 
test, the most important link in the 
U.S. international transportation sys- 
tem. Thirty years later, this is no 
longer true. The new U.S. -U.K. 
agreement is now merely one of almost 
60 U.S. agreements and the United 
Kingdom no longer has extensive over- 
seas territories where we need aviation 
rights. 

It is often part of the bargaining 
process for one country to demand 
rights comparable to those given 
another country where this tactic hap- 
pens to suit a country's interest. I am 
not concerned that some foreign coun- 
tries are asking for a Bermuda II-type 
agreement. 

• First, they will want to have it 
both ways by demanding that we ac- 
cord them the same treatment as the 
British got only in areas which are to 
their advantage while seeking to be 
more restrictive than Bermuda II in 
other areas. 

• Secondly, we are not about to ac- 
cept the most-favored-nation principle 
in exchanging aviation rights any more 
than other countries do. 

• And thirdly, the U.S. -U.K. market 
and air transport structure has its own 
characteristics which are not necessar- 
ily applicable elsewhere. 

The central question remains. Does 
the new agreement with the United 
Kingdom adequately protect competi- 
tion and consumer interests or is it an 
aberration inconsistent with our 
policies? I believe that, when viewed in 
light of a hardhead ed appraisal of the 
realities and the alternatives, it does 
adequately — and I stress the word 
"adequately" — protect our interests. 
At the same time, we have developed 
some new insights which will stand us 
in good stead for the future. The most 
significant of these is that we are deal- 
ing with a total international air trans- 
portation system which includes both 
scheduled and charter air services, We 
should, and we will, insist on negotiat- 
ing to increase the opportunities in both 
areas of transportation in package 
agreements. Achievement of this objec- 
tive is all the more important now be- 
cause of the impact which the recently 
introduced deep discount air fares may 



Department of State Bull 

have on the viability of charter i 
services. 

We also intend to focus our atten 
on opportunities to expand inten 
tional air services to more U.S. cili 
and communities, including service; 
foreign airlines, if we can obtain c 
cessions in return which liberalize i 
air transportation environment in s: 
areas as low air fares and remova 
capacity controls. As has been a 
stated, we want to trade opportunit 
not restrictions. These approaches i 
focus on particular elements more t; 
they have in the past, but the cer 
theme of a liberal, competiti 
oriented U.S. policy is not fundan 
tally different today than it was 
years ago. We face formidable fore 
opposition to these policies, as we 1 
in the past. However, I am confii 
that through determination and per 
sion and by offering real benefit, 
foreign countries, we can achieve 
increasingly better international a 
tion system which serves the best ii: 
ests of the public, of our foreign c. 
merce, and of our airline compa; 
and workers. i 



1 Statement made before the Subcommitte 
Aviation of the Senate Committee on Comir/ 
Science, and Transportation on Dec. 1, 1977! 
Katz is Assistant Secretary for Economic 
Business Affairs. 



Current Action 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation, 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered 
force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Guinea-Bis 
December 15, 1977. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the co 
tion on international civil aviation (' 
1591). Done at Rome September 15, 
Entered into force September 11, 1975. 
8162. 

Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, Jul) 
1977; Turkey, September 14, 1977. 

Convention on offenses and certain othei 
committed on board aircraft. Done at 1 
September 14, 1963. Entered into forcf 
cember 4, 1969. TIAS 6768. 
Accessions deposited: Mauritania, Junt 
1977; Zaire, July 20, 1977. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the co: 
tion on international civil aviation (1 
1591). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. Er 
into force December 19, 1974. TIAS 80! 



ry 1978 

Ications deposited: Federal Republic of 
:rman>, September 16, 1977; Jamaica, 
ptember 9, 1977; Turkey, September 14, 
77. 

>1 relating to an amendment to the conven- 
on international civil aviation (TIAS 
). Done at Montreal October 16, 1974. ' 
ications deposited: Ecuador, October 25, 
77; Indonesia, November 18, 1977. 

is 

ition concerning the international union 
le publication of customs tariffs, regula- 
tor the execution of the convention, and 
declarations. Done at Brussels July 5, 
. Entered into force April 1, 1891. 
84. 

f ication of denunciation deposited: 
uguay. May 20, 1977; effective April 1, 
J2. 

s convention regarding E.C.S. carnets 
•>mmercial samples, with annex and pro- 
of signature. Done at Brussels March 1, 
Entered into force October 3, 1957; for 
nited States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6632. 
ication of denudation deposited: Nether- 
ds, October 28, 1977; effective Janu- 
28, 1978. 



ent establishing the International Fund 
gricultural Development. Done at Rome 
13, 1976. Entered into force November 
977. 

cations deposited: Ghana, December 5, 
7; Peru, December 6, 1977; Italy, De- 
lber 10, 1977; Austria, France, Iran, Su- 
, Yugoslavia, December 12, 1977; Hon- 
as, Iraq, December 13, 1977. 
sions deposited: Comoros, Gambia, 
^ana, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, Qatar, 
noa, Vietnam, Yemen (Aden), De- 
iber 13, 1977. 

id Agriculture Organization 

ition of the Food and Agriculture Or- 
ition of the United Nations. Signed at 
:c October 16, 1945. Entered into force 
er 16, 1945. TIAS 1554. 
tures: Angola, Comoros, Democratic 
pie's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, 
zambique, Namibia, Sao Tome and 
icipe, and Seychelles, November 14, 
7. 



onal convention on load lines, 1966. 
at London April 5, 1966. Entered into 
My 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 
lion deposited: Honduras, November 
1977. 

e Matters 

ion on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
ltative Organization. Done at Geneva 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17 
TIAS 4044. 

lance deposited: Guinea-Bissau, De- 
ber 6, 1977. 

lents to the convention of March 6, 
as amended, on the Intergovernmental 



Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London Oc- 
tober 17, 1974. Enters into force April 1, 
1978. TIAS 8606. 

Acceptances deposited: Gabon, November 15, 
1977; Guinea-Bissau, December 6, 1977. 

Nuclear Weapons-Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force 
March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Accession deposited: Portugal, December 15, 
1977. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for 
the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 
1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). 
Adopted at London October 21, 1969. Enters 
into force January 20, 1978. TIAS 8505. 
Acceptance deposited: Chile, November 2, 
1977. 

Patients 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. 
Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Enters 
into force January 24, 1978. 
Proclaimed by the President: December 14, 

1977 (with declarations). 
Ratification deposited: France (with declara- 
tions), 2 November 25, 1977. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the protection 
of victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva 
June 8, 1977. Open for signature at Bern De- 
cember 12, 1977, to December 12, 1978. En- 
ters into force 6 months after two instruments 
of ratification or accession have been depos- 
ited. 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the protection 
of victims of noninternational armed conflicts 
(Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Open for signature at Bern December 
12, 1977 to December 12, 1978. Enters into 
force 6 months after two instruments of ratifi- 
cation or accession have been deposited. 
Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Finland, German Democratic Republic, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, 
United States, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, De- 
cember 12, 1977. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 



61 

sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 

November 1, 1974.' 

Ratifications deposited: Liberia, November 

14, 1977; United Kingdom, October 7, 

1977. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977, with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva October 7, 1977. Open 
for signature at U. N. Headquarters October 
28 until December 31, 1977. Enters into force 
January 1, 1978, provided that certain condi- 
tions have been met. 

Signatures: Philippines, November 18, 1977; 
Panama, November 29, 1977; Mauritius, 
November 30, 1977; Guatemala, Madagas- 
car, December 1, 1977; Honduras, 
Paraguay, December 7, 1977; Argentina, 
December 8, 1977; United States, De- 
cember 9, 1977; Brazil, December 13, 
1977. 
Notification of provisional application depos- 
ited: Argentina, December 8, 1977; Brazil, 
December 13, 1977; Guatemala, Madagas- 
car, December 1, 1977; Panama, November 
29, 1977. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, 
with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga- 
Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into 
force January 1, 1975; for the United States 
April 7, 1976. TIAS 8572. 
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, September 26, 
1977. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 
6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency al- 
lotment plan for high-frequency radio- 
telephone coast stations, with annexes and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. 
Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the 
United States April 21, 1976. TIAS 8599. 
Notification of approval: Yugoslavia, October 
6, 1977. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris November 23, 1972. Entered into force 
December 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Acceptance deposited: Brazil (with declara- 
tion), September 1, 1977. 

World Meteorological Organization 

Convention of the World Meteorological Or- 
ganization. Done at Washington October 11, 
1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. 
TIAS 2052. 

Accession deposited: Guinea-Bissau, De- 
cember 15, 1977. 



,:-, 









BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Project grant agreement relating to Central 
Helmand drainage (phase II). Signed at 
Kabul August 29, 1977. Entered into force 
August 29, 1977. 



62 

Agreement concerning the prohibition of opium 
poppy cultivation in the project area of the 
Central Helmand drainage project (phase II). 
Signed at Kabul August 29, 1977. Entered 
into force August 29, 1977. 

Agreement concerning the prohibition of opium 
poppy cultivation in the project area of the 
integrated wheat development project. 
Signed at Kabul September 29, 1977. En- 
tered into force September 29, 1977. 

Cuba 

Maritime boundary agreement. Signed at Wash- 
ington December 16, 1977. Enters into force 
provisionally January 1, 1978; definitively 
on the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 

Haiti 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 
22 and 23, 1976, as amended, relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles and textile products, with annexes. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
November 23, 1977. Entered into force 
November 23, 1977. 

Turkey 

Agreement extending the agreement of July 8, 



Department of State Bull 



1976, (TIAS 8371) on procedures for mutual 
assistance in the administration of justice in 
connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Cor- 
poration and the McDonnell Douglas Corpo- 
ration matters. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Washington December 6, 1977. En- 
tered into force December 6, 1977; effective 
July 8, 1977 

Yugoslavia 

Air transport agreement, with memorandum of 
understandings. Signed at Washington De- 
cember 15, 1977. Entered into force provi- 
sionally December 15, 1977; definitively on 
the date of an exchange of notes indicating 
that the agreement has been approved by the 
parties in accordance with their constitu- 
tional requirements. 

Agreement amending the nonscheduled air 
service agreement of September 27, 1973 
(TIAS 7819). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington December 15, 1977. Entered 
into force December 15, 1977. □ 



1 Not in force. 

2 Applicable to the territory of the French Re- 
public, including the Overseas Departments and 
Territories. 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



*573 12/15 

574 12/15 

575 12/15 



December 12-January 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, DC. 20520. 



No. Dale 

554 12/12 

♦555 12/12 

*556 12/12 

*557 12/12 

*558 12/12 

559 12/12 

*560 12/12 



* 561 12/12 



Subject 

Vance, Sadat: news confer- 
ence, Cairo, Dec. 10. 

Vance: departure remarks, 
Cairo, Dec. 10. 

Vance: arrival statement, 
Tel Aviv, Dec. 10. 

Vance: remarks following 
first meeting with Prime 
Minister Begin, Jerusa- 
lem, Dec. 10. 

Vance, Begin: exchange of 
toasts, Jerusalem, Dec. 11. 

Vance, Begin: news confer- 
ence, Jerusalem, Dec. 11. 

Shipping Coordinating 
Committee (SCC), Sub- 
committee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on 
radiocommuni cations, 
Jan. 10. 

SCC, SOLAS, working 



*562 


12/12 


*563 


12/13 


*564 


12/13 


*565 


12/13 


566 


12/13 


*567 


12/13 


*568 


12/14 


*569 


12/14 


570 


12/15 



*576 
577 



group on international 
multimodal transport and 
containers, Feb. 1. 

U.S., Haiti amend textile 
agreement. 

Vance, Dayan: remarks to 
the press, Ben Gurion 
Airport, Dec. 12. 

Vance: arrival statement, 
Amman, Dec. 12. 

Vance: departure statement, 
Amman. 

Vance: press conference, 
Beirut. 

Vance: arrival statement, 
Damascus. 

Vance: remarks to press, 
Damascus, Dec. 13. 

Vance: departure state- 
ment, Damascus. 

U.S. -Hungarian joint com- 
munique on the return of 
the Crown of St. Stephen. 

National Women's Confer- 
ence, Washington, D.C., 
Dec. 15. 

SCC, SOLAS, working 
group on standards of 
training and watchkeep- 



* 571 12/15 



*572 12/15 



*579 
*580 

t 581 

*582 



12/16 
12/16 



*578 12/19 



12/20 
12/20 

12/20 
12/21 



*583 12/21 



*584 12/22 



*585 12/27 



586 12/31 

*1 1/3 

*2 1/4 

*3 1/5 

*4 1/6 

*5 1/6 



ing, Jan. 12 and Jan. 
Study group 5 of the • 
National Committee: 
the International Ri 
Consultative Commi i 
Jan. 12. 
Vance: departure statem 

Riyadh. 
Atherton: remarks at c 
ing session of the ( 
preparatory meetinj 
the Geneva peace cc 
ence, Dec. 14. 
U.S. , Yugoslavia sig i 

transport agreement. 
Mondale, Vance: ren 
upon Secretary's arri' 
Andrews Air Force I 
Dec. 15. 
U.S. Advisory Comir 
on Folk Music and 
Jan. 17. 
U.S., Cuba sign bou* 
agreement, Dec. 16., 
U.S., U.S.S.R. excK 
views on limitation ( 
ternational arms track" 
U.S., Mexico initial: 
aviation agreements.. 
Advisory Committe 
Transnational Enterp, 
Jan. 18. 
Study Group 9 of the; 
Organization for the 
national Radio Con! 
tive Committee, Jan 
U.S., Republic of t 
sign interim textile ; 
ment, Dec. 16. 
Study Group 1 of the 
National Committee 
International Telej 
and Telephone Con 
tive Committee 
24-25. 
Release of political p 

ers. 
U.S., Thailand ameni 

tile agreement, Oct 

U.S., Korea sign t< 

agreement, Dec. 23. 

SCC, SOLAS, wo 

group on life si 

appliances, Jan. 30. 

William L. Slayton sw 

as Deputy Assistant 

tary for Foreign Bui 

Operations (biogr 

data). 

Glen O. Robinson r 

chairman of the 

delegation to the 

World Administi 

Radio Conference 

graphic data). 



* Not printed 

t Held for a later edition of the Bulleti 



INDEX 



\RY 1978 
78, NO. 2010 

ontrol 

rview of U.S. -Soviet Relations 

nan) 

id the Test Ban — Cause for Op- 



20 



France. Letters of Credence (Laboulaye) 30 

Human Rights 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day 
and Week (proclamation) 38 

President Carter's News Conference of 

December 15 (excerpts) 12 

Release of Political Prisoners 39 

Television Interview (Carter) 9 

U.S. Observes Human Rights Day at Bel- 
grade Conference (Goldberg) 37 

Hungary 

Crown of St. Stephen (Kaiser, Nimetz, 

Puja, joint communique) 31 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

n «— * 17 



Corrupt Practices, Investment Disclosure 27 
News Conference of December 15 (ex- 
cerpts) 12 

Television Interview 9 

U.S. Balance of Trade and Payments ... 27 
Saudi Arabia. Visit of Secretary Vance 
(Begin, Mondale, Sadat, Sa'ud, 
Vance) 40 

South Africa. Secretary Vance's News 
Conference of December 6 17 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance's 

News Conference of December 6 17 

Space. Outer Space Programs (Benton) . 56 
Syria. Visit of Secretary Vance (Begin, 



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lance of Trade and Payments 

) 27 

Secretary Atherton Interviewed 

"Today" Show 46 

paratory Meeting Opens (Ather- 

47 

Vance's News Conference of 

)er 6 17 

Secretary Vance (Begin, Mon- 

adat, Sa'ud, Vance) 40 

television Interview (Carter) . . 9 

Carter's News Conference of 
'er 15 (excerpts) 12 

Vance Attends NATO Ministe- 
eting in Brussels (Vance, final 

nique) 28 

:rves Human Rights Day at Bel- 

onference (Goldberg) 37 

Letters of Credence (Iloniemi) . 30 

(foreign relations outline) 36 

A Basic Human Right (Young) 33 

Vid. The United States and the 

I'orld (Lake) 24 



Middle nasi reace cnum ^tponLn,,,, 

statement) 49 

President Carter's News Conference of 

December 15 (excerpts) 12 

Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. De- 
cember 14-19 (White House state- 
ments) 48 

Secretary Vance Attends NATO Ministe- 
rial Meeting in Brussels (Vance, final 
communique) 28 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

December 6 17 

Television Interview (Carter) 9 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Secretary Vance Attends NATO 
Ministerial Meeting in Brussels 

(Vance, final communique) 28 

Pakistan. Release of Political Prisoners . 39 
Panama. Television Interview (Carter) . . 9 

Petroleum. U.S. Balance of Trade and 

Payments (Carter) 27 

Presidential Documents 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day 

and Week (proclamation) 38 

Carter Administration's First- Year Ac- 
complishments (White House sum- 
mary) 15 



U.S. Approaches and Initiatives 
(Maynes) 50 

Name Index 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 46, 47 

Begin, Menahem 40 

Benton, Marjorie Craig 56 

Carter, President 9, 12, 27, 38 

Goldberg, Arthur J 37 

Iloniemi, Jaakko Olavi 30 

Kaiser, Philip M 31 

Katz, Julius L 59 

Kennedy, John Clifford 53 

Laboulaye, Francois de 30 

Lake, Anthony 24 

Maynes, Charles William 50 

Mondale, Walter F 40 

Nimetz, Matthew 31 

Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal 40 

Puja, Frigyes 31 

Sadat, Anwar al- 40 

Shulman, Marshall D 1 

Vance, Secretary 17, 28, 40 

Warnke, Paul C 20 

Whalen, Charles W 55 

Wolff, Lester L 53 

Young, Andrew 33 



■•>• 



i 



M 
m 



62 

Agreement concerning the prohibition of opium 
poppy cultivation in the project area of the 
Central Helmand drainage project (phase II). 
Signed at Kabul August 29, 1977. Entered 
into force August 29, 1977. 

Agreement concerning the prohibition of opium 
poppy cultivation in the project area of the 
integrated wheat development project. 
Signed at Kabul September 29, 1977. En- 
tered into force September 29, 1977. 

Cuba 

Maritime boundary agreement. Signed at Wash- 



Department of State Bui. 



1976, (TIAS 8371) on procedures for mutual 
assistance in the administration of justice in 
connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Cor- 
poration and the McDonnell Douglas Corpo- 
ration matters. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Washington December 6, 1977. En- 
tered into force December 6, 1977; effective 
July 8, 1977 

Yugoslavia 

Air transport agreement, with memorandum of 
understandings. Signed at Washington De- 
cember 15, 1977. Entered into force provi- 



*573 12/15 



574 



12/15 



575 12/15 



ing, Jan. 12 and Jan. 

Study group 5 of the 
National Committee 
the International R.I 
Consultative Coram: 
Jan. 12. 

Vance: departure stater 
Riyadh. 

Atherton: remarks at 
ing session of the 
preparatory meetin 
the Geneva peace ci 



No. 


Date 


554 


12/12 


555 


12/12 


556 


12/12 


557 


12/12 



fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Subject 

Vance, Sadat: news confer- 
ence, Cairo, Dec. 10. 

Vance: departure remarks, 
Cairo, Dec. 10. 

Vance: arrival statement, 
Tel Aviv, Dec. 10. 

Vance: remarks following 
first meeting with Prime 
Minister Begin, Jerusa- 
lem, Dec. 10. 

Vance, Begin: exchange of 
toasts, Jerusalem, Dec. 11. 

Vance, Begin: news confer- 
ence, Jerusalem, Dec. 11. 

Shipping Coordinating 
Committee (SCC), Sub- 
committee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on 
radiocommunications, 
Jan. 10. 

SCC, SOLAS, working 



'558 
559 
'560 



12/12 
12/12 

12/12 



*562 12/12 

*563 12/13 

*564 12/13 

*565 12/13 

566 12/13 

*567 12/13 

*568 12/14 

♦569 12/14 

570 12/15 

*571 12/15 

*572 12/15 



*561 12/12 



U.S., Haiti amend textile 
agreement. 

Vance, Dayan: remarks to 
the press, Ben Gurion 
Airport, Dec. 12. 

Vance: arrival statement, 
Amman, Dec. 12. 

Vance: departure statement, 
Amman. 

Vance: press conference, 
Beirut. 

Vance: arrival statement, 
Damascus. 

Vance: remarks to press, 
Damascus, Dec. 13. 

Vance: departure state- 
ment, Damascus. 

U.S. -Hungarian joint com- 
munique on the return of 
the Crown of St. Stephen. 

National Women's Confer- 
ence, Washington, D.C, 
Dec. 15. 

SCC, SOLAS, working 
group on standards of 
training and watchkeep- 



586 12/31 

*1 1/3 

*2 1/4 

*3 1/5 

*4 1/6 



*5 



1/6 



iiiiciiiaiiunai ieie 
and Telephone Cor 
tive Committee 
24-25. 

Release of political [ 
ers. 

U.S., Thailand amen 
tile agreement, Oct. 

U.S., Korea sign t 
agreement, Dec. 23 

SCC, SOLAS, wc 
group on life s 
appliances, Jan. 30 

William L. Slayton sv 
as Deputy Assistant 
tary for Foreign Bu 
Operations (biog 
data). 

Glen O. Robinson 
chairman of the 
delegation to the 
World Administ 
Radio Conference 
graphic data). 



* Not printed 

t Held for a later edition of the Bullet 



INDEX 



ARY 1978 
78, NO. 2010 

ontrol 

rview of U.S. -Soviet Relations 

nan) 1 

nd the Test Ban — Cause for Op- 

n (Wamke) 20 

y Vance Attends NATO Ministe- 
leeting in Brussels (Vance, final 

unique) 28 

jn Interview (Carter) 9 

i 

onal Civil Aviation Safety (Ken- 
Wolff, resolution) 53 

K. Aviation Agreement (Katz) . 59 

esh. Release of Political Prison- 

39 

i. U.S., Bulgaria Lift Travel Re- 
Dns on Diplomats (Department 
ent) 32 

s. Crown of St. Stephen (Kaiser, 

s, Puja, joint communique) 31 

Secretary Vance Attends NATO 
terial Meeting in Brussels 

:, final communique) 28 

ng Countries 

! A Basic Human Right (Young) 33 

ted States and the Third World 

24 

cs 

Practices, Investment Disclosure 

) 27 

:ed States and the Third World 

24 

lance of Trade and Payments 

') 27 

Secretary Atherton Interviewed 

"Today" Show 46 

iparatory Meeting Opens (Ather- 

47 

Vance's News Conference of 

ber 6 17 

Secretary Vance (Begin, Mon- 

adat, Sa'ud, Vance) 40 

Television Interview (Carter) . . 9 

Carter's News Conference of 
her 15 (excerpts) 12 

Vance Attends NATO Ministe- 
ring in Brussels (Vance, final 

nique) 28 

erves Human Rights Day at Bel- 
conference (Goldberg) 37 

Letters of Credence (Iloniemi) . 30 

(foreign relations outline) 36 

A Basic Human Right (Young) 33 
Aid. The United States and the 

Vorld (Lake) 24 



France. Letters of Credence (Laboulaye) 30 

Human Rights 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day 

and Week (proclamation) 38 

President Carter's News Conference of 

December 15 (excerpts) 12 

Release of Political Prisoners 39 

Television Interview (Carter) g 

U.S. Observes Human Rights Day at Bel- 
grade Conference (Goldberg) 37 

Hungary 

Crown of St. Stephen (Kaiser, Nimetz, 

Puja, joint communique) 31 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
December 6 17 

Indonesia. Release of Political Prisoners 39 

Israel 

Assistant Secretary Atherton Interviewed 

on the "Today" Show 46 

Cairo Preparatory Meeting Opens (Ather- 
ton) 47 

Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. De- 
cember 14-19 (White House state- 
ments) 48 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

December 6 17 

Visit of Secretary Vance (Begin, Mon- 
dale, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 40 

Jamaica. Jamaican Prime Minister Visits 

United States (White House statement) 58 

Jordan. Visit of Secretary Vance (Begin, 

Mondale, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 40 

Korea. Release of Political Prisoners ... 39 

Lebanon. Visit of Secretary Vance (Be- 
gin, Mondale, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) . 40 

Middle East 

Assistant Secretary Atherton Interviewed 

on the "Today" Show 46 

Cairo Preparatory Meeting Opens (Ather- 
ton) 47 

Chronology of Recent Events 49 

Middle East Peace Efforts (Department 
statement) 49 

President Carter's News Conference of 
December 15 (excerpts) 12 

Prime Minister Begin Visits U.S. De- 
cember 14-19 (White House state- 
ments) 48 

Secretary Vance Attends NATO Ministe- 
rial Meeting in Brussels (Vance, final 
communique) 28 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
December 6 17 

Television Interview (Carter) 9 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Secretary Vance Attends NATO 
Ministerial Meeting in Brussels 
(Vance, final communique) 28 

Pakistan. Release of Political Prisoners . 39 

Panama. Television Interview (Carter) . . 9 

Petroleum. U.S. Balance of Trade and 

Payments (Carter) 27 

Presidential Documents 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day 

and Week (proclamation) 38 

Carter Administration's First-Year Ac- 
complishments (White House sum- 
mary) 15 



Corrupt Practices, Investment Disclosure 27 
News Conference of December 15 (ex- 
cerpts) 12 

Television Interview 9 

U.S. Balance of Trade and Payments ... 27 
Saudi Arabia. Visit of Secretary Vance 
(Begin, Mondale, Sadat, Sa'ud, 

Vance) 40 

South Africa. Secretary Vance's News 

Conference of December 6 17 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance's 

News Conference of December 6 17 

Space. Outer Space Programs (Benton) . 56 

Syria. Visit of Secretary Vance (Begin, 

Mondale, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 40 

Terrorism. International Civil Aviation 

Safety (Kennedy, Wolff, resolution) . . 53 

Trade. U.S. Balance of Trade and Pay- 
ments (Carter) 27 

Treaties 

Current Actions 60 

U.S., U.K. Aviation Agreement (Katz) . 59 

U.S.S.R. 

An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations 

(Shulman) 1 

President Carter's News Conference of 

December 15 (excerpts) 12 

SALT and the Test Ban — Cause for Op- 
timism (Warnke) 20 

Summit Meetings 8 

U.S.S.R.— A Profile 3 

U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (bio- 
graphic data) 5 

United Kingdom. U.S., U.K. Aviation 

Agreement (Katz) 59 

United Nations 

Fulfilling A Basic Human Right (Young) 33 
International Civil Aviation Safety (Ken- 
nedy, Wolff, resolution) 53 

Operational Activities (Whalen) 55 

Outer Space Programs (Benton) 56 

U.S. Approaches and Initiatives 

(Maynes) 50 

Name Index 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 46, 47 

Begin, Menahem 40 

Benton, Marjorie Craig 56 

Carter, President 9, 12, 27, 38 

Goldberg, Arthur J 37 

Iloniemi, Jaakko Olavi 30 

Kaiser, Philip M 31 

Katz, Julius L 59 

Kennedy, John Clifford 53 

Laboulaye, Francois de 30 

Lake, Anthony 24 

Maynes, Charles William 50 

Mondale, Walter F 40 

Nimetz, Matthew 31 

Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal 40 

Puja, Frigyes 31 

Sadat, Anwar al- 40 

Shulman, Marshall D 1 

Vance, Secretary 17, 28, 40 

Warnke, Paul C 20 

Whalen, Charles W 55 

Wolff, Lester L 53 

Young, Andrew 33 







v 

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Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2011 



«*&rOi>iiurfY 



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a 
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fill 

! 






Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2011 / February 1978 



Cover Photo: 
Warsaw greeting. 



The Department of State Bul- 
letin, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to 
provide the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign rela- 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public A 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

■ 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 

Assistant Editor 



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CONTEXTS 



THE PRESIDENT 

1 Visit to Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East 

20 State of the Union 

21 News Conference, January 12 

22 War Powers Bill 



THE SECRETARY 

23 Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978 

ECONOMICS 

25 U.S., Japan Trade Agreement (White House Statement) 

ENERGY 

26 Prospects for the Next Decade (Richard N. Cooper) 
28 Discussion Paper on Energy 



29 

30 
31 
32 



56 
59 



EUROPE 

Crown of St. Stephen (Secretary Vance) 

Secretary Vance Visits Turkey and Greece 

Sixth Report on Cyprus ( Message from President Carter) 

Italy (Department Statement) 



HUMAN RIGHTS 

32 Cambodia (Warren Christopher) 

MIDDLE EAST 

33 Secretary Vance Visits Israel and Egypt, January 16-22 
37 Chronology of Recent Events 

OCEANS 

39 Law of the Sea Conference (Elliot L. Richardson) 
42 Visions of the Future (Patsy T. Mink) 

44 Foreign Fishery Allocations 

POPULATION 

45 World Trends (Marshall Green) 

UNITED NATIONS 

48 Benefits from the U.N. Agencies (Charles William Maynes) 
52 Assessment of the 32d U.N. General Assembly (Andrew Young) 
55 Summary of U.S. Statements 



I,'*! 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

Panama Canal Treaties (Secretary Vance, Elliot L. Richardson) 
Letters of Credence (El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala) 

TREATIES 



59 U.S., Mexico Initial Aviation Agreements 

60 Current Actions 

61 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



V 



j 







With President Giscard d' Estaing on Normandy beachhead 



ruary 1978 



THE PRESIDENT: Visit to Europe, South Asia. 

and the Middle East 



President Carter left Washington December 29, 1977, on a trip to Poland, 
'/i, India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, and Belgium. He returned on January 
1978. y 

Following are remarks by President Carter made on various occasions during 

trip — including his news conference in Warsaw and his addresses in New 
Ihi and Paris— as well as the texts of the joint U.S. -Poland communique and 

Delhi Declaration . ' 



PARTURE, THE WHITE 
>USE, DEC. 29 2 

depart today on a journey that re- 
:ts both the diversity of the world 

live in and also our own nation's 
lity and desire to deal creatively and 
structively with that diversity, 
t's a rapidly changing world, a 
rid in which the old ideological 
;ls have less meaning than ever, in 
ch the universal desire for freedom 

for a better life is being expressed 
re strongly and in more ways than 
r before, a world in which political 
tkening, economic independence, 
I technological progress have 
ited new demands on the foreign 
icy of our people. 

he variety of places that we will 
t over the next 9 days is symbolic 
the breadth and the variety of 
erican interest in this new world, 
i France and in Western Europe, we 

reaffirm the historic bonds and our 
imon values, and we will explore 
s to meet the common problems of 
industrial democracies, 
i Poland, the ancestral home of mil- 
s of Americans, we will nourish the 
roving relationships between the 
ted States and the peoples of East- 
Europe. 

i Iran and in Saudi Arabia, we will 
uss key economic relationships and 
is for a continuation of the dramatic 
?ress that is being made in bringing 
:e to the Middle East. 
i India, which is the largest democ- 
' on Earth, we will seek new paths 
ooperation and communication be- 
en the developing nations of the 
Id and the industrial north, 
nd in all these places, we will be 
firming our dedication to peace and 

support of justice and of human 
ts. 

is a changing world, a different 
Id, and, I believe, that it's also a 
Jrent America whose message we 
carry, an America more confident 
more united, at peace with other 
^ns and also at peace with itself, an 



America which is ready and able to 
cooperate wherever possible and to 
compete when necessary. 

After a long period of doubt and 
turmoil here, we are finding our way 
back to the values that made us a great 
nation. And in this new spirit we are 
eager to work with all countries and all 
peoples in building the kind of world 
and the kind of world community that 
serves the individual and common 
needs of all. 

We undertake this trip to express our 
own views clearly and proudly but also 
to learn and to understand the opinions 
and the desires of others. We will try to 
represent our nation and our people 
well, and I'll take the good will of 
America everywhere we go. 



ARRIVAL, WARSAW, 
DEC. 29 3 



First Secretary Gierek 

On behalf of the highest authorities 
of the Polish People's Republic, in the 
name of our people, I greet you cor- 
dially, Mr. President, on the Polish 
soil. 

We are happy to be able to play host 
to you and Mrs. Carter as well as to 
persons accompanying you. We are 
welcoming and greeting you, Mr. 
President, as the highest representative 
of the great American people for which 
we entertain our sentiments of 
friendship. 

History has linked our two nations 
by manifold ties. They were molded by 
the great sons of the Polish people 
through their participation in the strug- 
gle for American independence. They 
were shaped by the scores of Polish 
emigrants who have contributed their 
significant and valuable share to the 
development and might of the United 
States. They have been further 
strengthened in our joint strife for the 
freedom of all peoples within the great 
anti-Nazi coalition. 

Our desire is to cultivate those tradi- 



tions in the present-day peaceful and 
friendly Polish- American cooperation. 

We trust your visit will contribute to 
its further expansion, beneficial to our 
peoples and promoting the dearest 
cause to all nations, the cause of peace. 
You are arriving in Poland, Mr. 
President, at a time when the process 
of international detente — so important 
as it is to all mankind and the world at 
large — has been again rejuvenated by 
the constructive dialogue of states and 
the expectations of nations. 

You no doubt understand, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that to the people of Poland, 
which has so dreadfully experienced 
the atrocities of war, security is the su- 
preme value, while life and peace is the 
fundamental right. 

We view your present visit, Mr. 
President, as a reaffirmation of the 
friendly feelings of the American 
people toward Poland and an expres- 
sion of the interest in our active peace- 
ful policies. We see in it, too, a mani- 
festation of your personal involvement 
in the further expansion of Polish- 
American cooperation in cultivating the 
traditional friendship between our 
nations. 

We are glad, indeed, that we shall be 
able to acquaint you with the record of 
accomplishment of Socialist Poland, 
with its plans and aspirations with all 
that at a price of a relentless effort, 
painstaking and self-sacrificing labors 
our nation has built on the ruins and 
ashes. 

Ours is the desire that your visit to 
Poland serve actions which link our 
peoples together and that it may en- 
grave well in the good memories of 
yourself, Mr. President, Mrs. Carter, 
and the members of your party. 

Welcome on the Polish soil, Mr. 
President, in the spirit of the Polish 
hospitality. 



President Carter 

We are delighted to be in your great 
country. When I left the United States 
this morning, I told the people of my 
nation that this journey reflects the di- 
versity of a rapidly changing world. It 
is a world in which old ideological 
labels have lost their meaning and in 
which the basic goals of friendship, 
world peace, justice, human rights, and 
individual freedom loom more impor- 
tant than ever. 

I am proud to begin this journey in 



111 i 



C3' 

r.' 



Poland— friend of the United States 
since the time our nation was founded. 
Poland is the ancestral home of more 
than 6 million Americans, partner in a 
common effort against war and depri- 
vation. 

Relations are changing between 
North and South, between East and 
West. But the ties between Poland and 
the United States are ancient and 
strong. 

Not far from our home in the State or 
Georgia, a great patriot of both our na- 
tions, Casimir Pulaski, was mortally 
wounded while leading a cavalry legion 
in the fight for American independ- 
ence. The home of my son's wife is 
Pulaski County, Georgia, named for 
this hero from Poland. 

Also, for his military skill and brav- 
ery, Thaddeus Kosciuszko won the re- 
spect of our first President, George 
Washington, during wartime. And for 
his commitment to freedom and justice, 
he won the admiration of our third 
President, Thomas Jefferson, in time of 
peace. 

These brave men fought alongside 
Americans in the era which produced 
three of the great documents in the 
struggle for human rights. One was the 
Declaration of Independence from 
America. The second was the Declara- 
tion of the Rights of Man from France. 
And the third was the Polish Constitu- 
tion of May 3, 1791. 

Our shared experience in battle has 
also taught us the paramount impor- 
tance of preventing war, which has 
brought devastation to Poland twice in 
this century. At the end of World War I, 
a great American, Herbert Hoover, 
came to Poland to help you ease the 



suffering of war and to observe the 
reestablishment of an independent Po- 
land. Circumstances were different and 
the struggle was long, but Hoover said, 
and I quote, "If history teaches us any- 
thing, it is that from the unquenchable 
vitality of the Polish race, Poland will 
rise again from these ashes." And his 
prediction came true. 

I have come not only to express our 
own views to the people of Poland but 
also to learn your opinions and to un- 
derstand your desires for the future. 
Building on the historical ties between 
us recognizing the new and changing 
realities of life, I look forward to 
strengthening Polish-American friend- 
ship on my visit here in Warsaw. 

We deeply appreciate the warm wel- 
come extended to us tonight by First 
Secretary Gierek and by the Polish 
people. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, WARSAW, 
DEC. 30 4 

It's a great honor for me to be here 
in Poland to reaffirm and to strengthen 
the historic and strong ties of friend- 
ship and mutual purpose which exist 
between our two countries. I have had 
very fruitful discussions with First Sec- 
retary Gierek and the other officials of 
Poland on bilateral questions, on ques- 
tions involving NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact countries, matters relating to the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT), mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions, and general commitments to 
peace in the future. 

This morning I had a chance to visit 
memorials to the brave people of Po- 



Department of State Bulled 

land, and particularly of Warsaw, 
doubt that there is any nation on Eart 
which has suffered more from the rav 
ages of war. In the Second World W; 
the Nazis killed 800,000 people i 
Warsaw alone and 6 million Poles. An 
I was able to pay homage to their com 
age and bravery. 

I also visited the Ghetto Monumen 
a memorial to Polish Jews who stoc 
alone to face the Nazis but who wi 
forever live in the conscience of tl 
world. 

This afternoon I would like to ai 
swer questions from the reporters a 
sembled here. There were a few wl 
wanted to attend who were not pe 
mitted to come. Their questions will I 
answered by me in writing. 

Q [in Polish]. Poland and the e 
tire world has attached great impo 
tance to the relations between tl 
United States and the Soviet Unio 
Could you answer what is your i 
sessment of the chance for a prom 
conclusion on SALT talks and 
other discussions on strategic m< 



ITINERARY 



Dec. 29-31 
Dec. 31-Jan. 
Jan. 1-3 
Jan. 3-4 
■Jan. 4 
Jan. 4-6 
Jan. 6 



Warsaw, Poland 
Tehran, Iran 
New Delhi, India* 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
Aswan, Egypt 
Paris, France** 
Brussels, Belgium 
Washington, DC. 



*On Jan. 3 President and Mrs. Carter vi 
ited the farming village of Daulatpu 
Nasirabad, which was officially renam 
Carter-Poori (Carter Place) in honor of th< 

visit. 

**On Jan. 5 President Carter visit 
Normandy Beach and Bayeux and attend 
an evening reception at the Chateau 
Versailles. 




uary 1978 

and how in this respect do you 
ss the latest pronouncement by 
lid Brezhnev in an interview for 
?ravda Daily? 

In the last few months, the United 
s and the Soviet Union have made 

progress in dealing with a long 
>f important issues, the most im- 
mt of which is to control the de- 
cent of strategic nuclear weapons, 
lope to conclude the SALT II talks 
year, hopefully in the spring. We 

resolved many of the major is- 
. A few still remain. We have 
: good progress in recent months. 

the same time, we have made 
ess for the first time in establish- 
rinciples on which there can be a 
prohibition against all tests of nu- 

explosives in the future. We've 
: progress on prohibiting addi- 
1 military buildup in the Indian 
n, recently commenced talks to 
ce the sale of conventional 
ons to other nations in the world. 
I will pursue this same subject 
President Giscard [d'Estaing of 
e] next week. 

addition, the Soviets and we are 
ig progress in how we can prevent 
se in the future of chemical and 
gical warfare, and we hope that 
an reinstigate progress in the 
d and balanced force reductions 
1 have been stalemated in Vienna 
number of years. So, I would say 
n summary I am very encouraged 

new progress that I have witnes- 
jrsonally among our negotiators, 
ten [Soviet] Foreign Minister 
yko was in Washington recently, 
;w hours we resolved many of the 
ult issues. Our negotiators are at 
on all those subjects at this pres- 
me. There has been no cessation 
brt. And I believe that 1978 will 

resolution of many of these 

Are you likely to go to Egypt 
Wednesday, and if you do, will 
primarily because President 
t has urged you to go, or for 
other purpose, or why? 
I have a standing invitation from 
ient Sadat to visit Egypt that he 
led to me on his trip to Washing- 
^nd he's reemphasized it several 
since that date. We have had no 
ssions with President Sadat on 
articular visit to Egypt while I'm 
is trip. We will try to keep our 
ule flexible. If it's mutually con- 
it and desirable, we would cer- 
consider it. But we have no plans 
i time to stop in Egypt next Wed- 
y or any other time on this trip, 
ught say that our own relations 
he Arab nations, including, cer- 
- Egypt, are very good and har- 




First news conference held by an American President in Eastern Europe 



monious. There has been no change in 
our own position relating to the Middle 
Eastern talks. And we communicate 
almost daily with the Egyptian and Is- 
raeli leaders. And as you know, I will 
be meeting King Hussein [of Jordan] in 
Tehran on our next stop on this trip. 

Q. You said you often don't intend 
and don't desire to dictate the terms 
of a Middle East settlement. 
A. Yes. This is true. 
Q. And yet President Sadat seems 
to think that you have pulled the rug 
out from under him and that you 
are, in fact, dictating terms when 
you are backing an Israeli military 
presence on the West Bank at Gaza 
after there would be a settlement. 

A. We don't back any Israeli mili- 
tary settlement in the Gaza Strip or on 
the West Bank. We favor, as you 
know, a Palestinian homeland or entity 
there. Our own preference is that this 
entity be tied in to Jordan and not be a 
separate and independent nation. That 
is merely an expression of preference 
which we have relayed on numerous 
occasions to the Arab leaders, includ- 
ing President Sadat when he was with 
me in Washington. I've expressed the 
same opinion to the Israelis, to King 
Hussein, and to President Asad [of 
Syria], and also to the Saudi Arabians. 
We have no intention of attempting 
to impose a settlement. Any agreement 
which can be reached between Israel 
and her Arab neighbors would be ac- 
ceptable to us. We are in a posture of 
expressing opinions, trying to promote 
intimate and direct negotiations and 



communications, expediting the proc- 
ess when it seems to be slow, and add- 
ing our good offices whenever re- 
quested. But we have no intention or 
desire to impose a settlement. 

Q [in Polish]. Let me welcome you 
not only as the President of the 
United States but as an eminent 
American Baptist. I am a Baptist 
myself. I am preoccupied with edit- 
ing a Baptist magazine in Poland, 
and I would like to express my glad- 
ness that you have been elected to the 
post of the President of the United 
States, as a man, as a believer who is 
not ashamed of it and of his evangeli- 
cal convictions. This prompts me to 
wish you and your family the best of 
the very best in 1978 and also in your 
activity in strengthening peace the 
world over. 

And now over to our question. We 
all know that you are a practicing 
Christian, as every Baptist should 
be — as every good Baptist should be. 
And I would like to ask whether your 
religious convictions help you in 
executing the job of a President of 
such a big country. Can you quote an 
example in how the evangelical prin- 
ciples helped you in solving any com- 
plicated problem? 

And the second question, we the 
Polish Baptists live in an extra- 
Catholic country, and on occasions 
we are discriminated against. As a 
believer, as a Baptist, can you influ- 
ence the change of a situation? 

A. As you know, the United States 
believes in religious freedom. And I'm 



% 





ll 

& 



very grateful for the degree of religious 
freedom that also exists in Poland. 

Dr. Brzezinski, my national security 
adviser, and my wife, Rosalynn, had a 
visit with Cardinal Wyszynski this 
morning and did this as an expression 
of our appreciation for the degree of 
freedom to worship in this country. 

This is a matter of conscience, as a 
Baptist and as an American leader. We 
believe in separation of church and 
state, that there should be no unwar- 
ranted influence on the church or reli- 
gion by the state, and vice versa. My 
own religious convictions are deep and 
personal. I seek divine guidance when I 
make a difficult decision as President 
and also am supported, of course, by a 
common purpose which binds Chris- 
tians together in a belief in the human 
dignity of mankind and in the search 
for worldwide peace — recognizing, of 
course, that those who don't share my 
faith quite often have the same desires 
and hopes. 

My own constant hope is that all na- 
tions would give maximum freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression to 
their people, and I will do all I can 
within the bounds of propriety to bring 
that hope into realization. 

Q. During those Presidential de- 
bates, in a celebrated exchange, 
President Ford claimed that Eastern 
Europe was not under Soviet domi- 
nation. And you replied, "Tell it to 
the Poles." Well, now that you're 
here, is it your view that this domi- 
nation will continue almost into per- 



petuity, or do you see a day when Po- 
land may be actually free? And if so, 
how would that come about? 

A. This is obviously a decision for 
the Polish leaders and the Polish people 
to make. Our nation is committed to 
the proposition that all countries would 
be autonomous, they would all be in- 
dependent, and they would all be free 
of unwanted interference and entan- 
glements with other nations. 

The Polish people have been bound 
very closely to the Soviet Union since 
the Second World War, and they be- 
long to a Warsaw Pact military al- 
liance, which is, of course, different 
from the NATO relationship to which 
we belong. 

My own assessment within the Euro- 
pean theater— Eastern European 
theater — is that here, compared to 
some other nations, there is a great re- 
ligious freedom and otherwise, and I 
think this is a hope that we all share 
and cherish. I think this has been the 
origin of the Polish nation more than a 
thousand years ago, and it's a deep 
commitment of the vast majority of the 
Polish people, a desire and a commit- 
ment not to be dominated. 

Q. You don't deny that they are 
dominated here? 

A. I think I've commented all I wish 
on that subject. 

Q [in Polish]. What is the potential 
for realization of the Helsinki Final 
Act as an integral entity, especially 
in the view of the Belgrade meeting? 
And what is your opinion about 



JOINT U.S.-POLAND 
COMMUNIQUE, DEC. 31 5 

The President of the United States of 
America and Mrs. Carter paid an official 
visit to Poland December 29-31, 1977, at the 
invitation of the highest authorities of the 
Polish People's Republic. The President was 
accompanied by Secretary of State Cyrus R. 
Vance and by Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. 

The President laid a wreath at the Tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier and placed flowers at 
the Nike Monument to the Heroes of Warsaw 
and at the Monument to the Heroes of the 
Ghetto. He also saw some districts of War- 
saw, acquainting himself with its recon- 
struction and development. 

During the visit, the President held talks 
with the First Secretary of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Polish United Workers' Party, 
Edward Gierek. 

In the plenary talks, which were chaired by 
the President and the First Secretary, there 
took part: From the American side: Secretary 



of State Cyrus R. Vance, Assistant to the 
President Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other of- 
ficials. From the Polish side: The Chairman 
of the Council of State, Henryk Jablonski, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Piotr 
Jaroszewicz, and other officials. 

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance also 
held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Emil Wojtaszek. 

The President and the First Secretary ex- 
pressed their satisfaction with the conversa- 
tions they had held as well as their conviction 
that continued visits at the highest levels, as 
well as visits by other leading personalities 
of both countries, serve the interests of both 
countries and the development of detente and 
international cooperation. 

President Carter expressed his gratitude to 
the First Secretary and to Mrs. Gierek for the 
splendid hospitality accorded in Poland to 
him, Mrs. Carter, and the entire delegation. 

President Carter invited First Secretary 
Gierek to visit the United States. The invita- 
tion was accepted with pleasure. The dates 
for this visit will be agreed upon through dip- 
lomatic channels. 



Department of State Bullet 

[West German] Chancelh 
Schmidt's proposal to repeat in o(, 
or another form the meeting on tl 
top level? 

A. I think the Helsinki agreemer 
which calls for cooperation and sec 
rity in Europe and which has, as a a 
called third basket component, an ins 
tence upon maximum enhancement a 
preservation of human rights, is 
agreement that is important to the Pol 
and also to our country and other si 
natories of that treaty. 

We believe that the Belgrade confi 
ence has been productive. This isi 
question that must be approached on 
multinational basis. The treaty ten 
provide for open and frank criticism 1 
other signatories when standards ;: 
not met. There has been a free d 
change of opinion between ourseb' 
and the Soviet Union and, indeed, I 
the nations involved. 

We hope that this session will cO: 
to a rapid and successful conclusi 
and that there will be repeated schj 
uled meetings based upon the Belgr 
conference that would be held in the; 
ture so that all nations who participa: 
in the Helsinki agreement and all thl 
who didn't become signatories wo; 
have a constant reminder before th: 
of the importance of cooperati! 
mutual security, the sharing of ini 
mation, the recombination of famil'. 
free emigration, and the preservation 
basic human rights. 

So, I hope that this will be a conti 
ing process scheduled repeatedly 
that this issue of human rights i 
never be forgotten. 

Q. Then how satisfied are you V 
your concept of the preservation 
human rights is currently being h 
ored here in Poland? 

A. I think that our concept of hur 
rights is preserved in Poland, as 1 
said, much better than some ot: 
European nations with which 
familiar. There is a substantial de;: 
of freedom of the press exhibited) 
this conference this afternoon; a i 
stantial degree of freedom of rehg 
demonstrated by the fact that appr 
mately 90% of the Polish peel 
profess faith in Christ; and an open 
lationship between Poland and 
country and Poland and Western E i 
pean countries in trade, technolC 
cultural exchange, student exchai' 
tourism. 

So, I don't think there's any a 
that the will of the Polish people 
complete preservation and enha 
ment of human rights is the same ii 
own. 

Q. What steps, then, do you' 
lieve should be taken here in Pd 



■uary 1978 



:ome closer to reaching your 
:ept? 

. I think Poland shares with us a 
mitment, which is sometimes em- 
assing for us and them, to have our 
faults publicized evocatively at 
erences like the one in Belgrade, 
re there's a free and open discus- 
and criticism and a singular point- 
out of violations of high standards 
uman rights preservation. We have 
i criticized at Belgrade, sometimes 
imately; sometimes, I think, mis- 
tily. The same applies to nations in 
:ern Europe and to the Soviet 
in. 

id I think this is the best thing that 
:an do at this point, is to continue 
isist upon a rigid enforcement and 
pretation of the human rights sec- 
of the Helsinki agreement. 
[in Polish]. The United States is 
ig an energy crisis which is also 
nter national problem. How can 
see the possibilities of solving 
crisis, like a multilateral confer- 
i, a European conference or 
eral agreements, and are you of 
opinion that the cooperation be- 
n the United States and Poland 
is respect is possible? 
One of the worst domestic prob- 
that we have is the overconsump- 
and waste of energy. I have no 
t that every country I visit on this 
will be pressing us on the question 
hat will the United States do to 
energy and not to import too much 
ry scarce oil, in particular, which 
ailable on the world markets. We 
iddressing this as a top priority 
ig domestic issues, 
land is, as you know, self- 
:ient in both hard coal and also 
n coal, which is increasing in pro- 
on in Poland itself. We call it lig- 
in our own country. One of the 
s that we can do is on a worldwide 
to try to hold down unnecessary 
nd for oil and natural gas, there- 
providing stable prices, 
other is to consume those energy 
es which we have most available 
r country and in yours, coal; shift 
ermanent sources of energy, 
arily those derived from solar 
:r; and share research and de- 
>ment information and commit- 
s, a subject which I was discus- 
early today with First Secretary 
k. 

w to burn lignite coal so that it 
lave minimum effect on the envi- 
ent and also have maximum heat 
ation is a question of importance 
u and to us. We are now shifting 
i production and consumption of 
e coal in our own country, for in- 
e, and so are you. So, I think 



sharing, on an international basis, of 
data and technological advantages and 
progress in the energy field and con- 
servation of scarce energy sources for 
all nations would be the two basic 
things which we could do jointly. 

Q [in Polish]. What is involved in 
the entity of Polish-American coop- 
eration, so far, and what is your 
opinion as far as this cooperation be- 
tween Poland and the United States 
is concerned, and how in the light of 
today's talks can you see the pros- 
pects for the development of such 
cooperation as well as what the 
United States wants to do to contrib- 
ute to this development? 

A. We already have a good relation- 
ship with Poland in cultural exchange, 
in technological and scientific coopera- 
tion, and in a rapidly growing level of 
trade. About 4 years ago we had a total 
trade with Poland of only about $500 
million. In 1978 the level of trade will 
probably exceed $1 billion. 

I have just informed First Secretary 
Gierek that in addition to the $300 mil- 
lion in commodity credit grain sales 
that has been authorized by our own 
country, that we will increase that by 
$200 million more worth of food and 
feed grains. 

Poland has had a devastating and un- 
precedented 4 years of crop failure be- 
cause of adverse weather conditions; 3 
years of drought, the last year, of ex- 
cessive floods. We, on the other hand, 
have had very good and bountiful har- 
vests. And we want to share our grain 
with Poland on legal credit terms which 
have already been established by our 
government. 

I think another thing that Poland can 
help with is to improve even further the 
better relationships that we are working 
out with the Soviet Union. Poland is a 
nation that has good communications 
and cooperation with the nations in 
Western Europe — with Germany, Bel- 
gium, Holland, France and others — and 
also is an integral part of the Warsaw 
Pact nations. And I think this ease of 
communication and this natural and 
historical friendship is a basis on which 
Poland can provide additional coopera- 
tion and communication between our- 
selves and the Soviet Union. 

I don't say this to insinuate that we 
have a lack of communication now. 
But Poland's good offices can be of 
great benefit to us. 

Q. In your discussions earlier 
today with First Secretary Gierek 
and other Polish leaders, did they in 
your mind express any viewpoints on 
international questions that diverged 
in tone or substance from the view- 
points generally expressed by the 
Soviet Union? 



A. We discussed a wide range of 
subjects. I didn't detect any significant 
differences of opinion between our- 
selves and the Polish leaders, and we 
did not go into detail on matters that 
now are not resolved between ourselves 
and the Soviets. 

For instance, the details of the SALT 
negotiations and the comprehensive 
test ban were not discussed by me and 
Mr. Gierek. So, I would say that we 
found no disharmonies of any signifi- 
cance between ourselves and the Poles, 
or between the Poles and the Soviet 
Union. 

Mr. Gierek did express a concern 
that there might be a bilateral agree- 
ment between Israel and Egypt in the 
Middle East, to the exclusion of the 
other Arab countries. This is an opin- 
ion also held by the Soviet Union. It's 
an opinion also held by us and by Israel 
and Egypt. 

I pointed out to Mr. Gierek that had 
the Egyptians and Israelis wanted to 
seek a solution only for the Sinai re- 
gion and the Egyptian-Israeli relation- 
ship, they could probably already have 
consummated such an agreement. But 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin do not want such an agreement. I 
pointed out this to Mr. Gierek, and he 
was relieved to hear this. 

He also was quite concerned about 
the lack of progress on the mutual and 
balanced force reductions, which have 
been stalemated in Vienna for years. 
He pointed out that the primary respon- 
sibility lay on the shoulders of the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 

This is not exactly the case, because 
we consult very closely with our 
NATO allies before any common opin- 
ion or proposition is put forward. I 
hope to relieve this stalemate shortly. 
And we are consulting closely with the 
Germans and others in the Western 
European theater and also with the 
Soviets on this matter. 

He was very pleased that we want to 
reduce international sales of convention- 
al weapons. This is a subject on which 
we have just begun to talk with the 
Soviet Union, and perhaps Poland is 
ahead of the Soviet Union in this 
particular subject. But I hope that they 
will be amenable to that same 
suggestion. 

So, the answer is, I don't know of 
any disagreements between the Poles 
and the Soviets that came out this 
morning, nor do I know any significant 
disagreements that came out between 
ourselves and the Poles. 

Q [in Polish]. The Soviet leader, 
Leonid Brezhnev has put forward a 
suggestion recently that the Eastern 
and Western countries renounce the 
neutron bomb together. Would you 



,;"! 



-;] 



I 

II 

k 



■ 



Department of State Bullet 



be ready to accept such a proposal? 

A. One of the disturbing failures up 
until this point in nuclear weaponry has 
been a complete absence of discussions 
concerning tactical or theater nuclear 
weapons. The only discussions that 
have ever been held between ourselves 
and the Soviets related only to strategic 
weapons, those that can be fired from 
one continent to another or from the 
sea into a continent. 

I would hope that as a result of the 
SALT II talks we might agree with the 
Soviets to start addressing the question 
of the so-called tactical nuclear 
weapons, of which the enhanced radia- 
tion or neutron bomb would be one. 

This weapon is much less destabiliz- 
ing in its effect, if it should be de- 
ployed, than, for instance, some of the 
advanced new Soviet weapons like the 
SS-20 missile, which is much more de- 
structive than any weapon held by the 
NATO allies and has a much greater 

range. . 

So, my hope is that in general we 
can reduce the threat of nuclear de- 
struction in the European area. There 
are now several thousand tactical nu- 
clear weapons already deployed on 
both sides in the European theater. And 
the whole matter must be addressed in 
its entirety rather than one weapon at 
the time. 

We would not deploy the neutron 
bomb or neutron shells unless it was an 
agreement by our NATO allies. That's 
where the decision will be made. But 
there are other new weapons, including 
the SS-20, much more threatening to the 
balance that presently exists. 

Q. You said that you have agreed 
to expand the agricultural credits to 
Poland. In talking with us the other 
day, your advisers have linked that 
with a human rights concern, 
namely, that the reunification of 
families between the Eastern and 
Western blocs be improved in Po- 
land. Have the Poles agreed to do 
that? Have they given you any satis- 
faction that this, too, would be done? 
A. One of the first subjects which I 
discussed with First Secretary Gierek 
in our private talks today was the 
reunification of families between Po- 
land and the United States. In the last 4 
years there have been about 15,000 
Poles who have been permitted to 
emigrate to our country. We still have 
about 250 families— we call them nu- 
clear families, that is, a father, mother, 
and children — who desire to be unified, 
and permission has not yet been 
obtained. 

First Secretary Gierek said that he 
would give his own personal attention 
to alleviating this problem. And he di- 




rt Jordanian King Hussein and the Shah and Shahbanou in Tehran 



Wi 



rected his Foreign Minister and I di- 
rected our Secretary of State to proceed 
with this discussion during this after- 
noon. Their assurance was that our 
concern would be alleviated. 

ARRIVAL, TEHRAN, 
DEC. 31 6 

His Imperial Majesty 

Mr. President, on behalf of the 
Shahbanou and myself and the Iranian 
people, I welcome you, Mrs. Carter, 
and your delegation on Iranian soil. 

We cherish your arrival as the head 
of state of a country with which Iran 
always had unshakable bonds and the 
best of relations and at the same time 
as an exalted friend and a most es- 
teemed guest. 

We sincerely hope that you will take 
back with you happy memories of your 
short visit to our country, and in the 
meantime we sincerely hope that all the 
stages of your present trip will be 
marked by the best of successes. 

For the Shahbanou and I, it is a great 
pleasure to be your host only a few 
weeks after our trip to your country. 
Your distinguished personality, sincer- 
ity, good will, moral virtues, your hos- 
pitality, and also the kindness of Mrs. 
Carter have remained close to our 
hearts. 

On behalf of all the people of Iran, 
welcome to our country. 

President Carter 

My own nation has been blessed this 
year by an official visit of His Imperial 
Majesty, the Shah, and by the 
Shahbanou, Empress Farah. This was a 



fine gesture of friendship. And we a!? 

benefited from extensive discussic 

between the Shah and myself of imp 

tant issues for Iran and for the Uniil 

States. I am proud and pleased to : 

able to come to Iran at the end of t 

year, my first year in office, and, I U 

lieve, your 37th year as a leader oft 

great nation and to begin another i.' 

year with our close friends and alliej 

In these times of endings and beg; 

nings, I look forward to consult: 

with the Shah about two of the iss 

that have most dominated our thoug 

in the year just past and will reqi 

our best actions in the years ahead. 

One is finding solutions to the e 

nomic problems of the world's rich ; 

the world's poor. None of these pr 

lems is more important than that 

energy. Neither producer nor consul 

nations can survive and prosper if 

recklessly exhaust the world's lim> 

supplies of oil, and neither group of 

tions can solve the problem without 

cooperation of the other. It is beca 

my nation takes this problem senoi 

that we are determined soon to ha\ 

comprehensive energy plan design© 

eliminate waste and to develop all 

nate sources of energy supplies. We 

cooperating closely with Iran, and 

because I respect the leadership oV 

Shah in this area that I have com" 

him for consultation and for advice 

The other great issue is brinjj 

peace to the troubled areas of the w 1 

and turning back the rising tide ol 

maments and dissension. The Shah 

I share the hope that peace will c 

soon to the Middle East and that as" 

military alliance remains unshaks' 

we may help to reduce the level ot ' 

sion and armaments throughout 

world. 



ruary 1978 



he interests of our nations are built 
he interests of individuals. And in 
>f our discussions, both public and 
ate, we emphasize guaranteeing our 
:ens the fullest economic and politi- 
tiuman rights. 

come with warm, personal feelings 
the leaders of Iran, and I bring best 
i Year greetings from the United 
es for the people of this great coun- 

tiank you very much, Your Majesty, 
his warm and hospitable welcome. 



rtARKS TO INDIAN 
tLIAMENT, NEW DELHI, 

I. V 

stand before you in this house, the 
of one of the world's greatest 
.latures, with feelings of profound 
idship and respect, 
bring with me the warm greetings 
good wishes of the people of the 
nd largest democracy on Earth, the 
ed States of America, to the people 
ie largest democracy, the Republic 
idia. 

)t long ago, both of our people's 
srnments passed through grave 
s. In different ways, the values for 
h so many have lived and died 
threatened. In different ways, and 
pposite sides of the world, these 
;s have now been triumphant. 
is sometimes argued that the mod- 
industrial state — with its mate- 
m, its centralized bureaucracies, 
the technological instruments of 
rol available to those who hold 
:r — must inevitably lose sight of 
emocratic ideal. 

e opposite argument is made even 
frequently. There are those who 
hat democracy is a kind of rich 
s plaything and that the poor are 
)reoccupied with survival to care 
t the luxury of freedom and the 
to choose their own government, 
is argument is repeated all over 
/odd — mostly, I have noticed, by 
•ns whose own bellies are full and 
speak from positions of privilege 
>ower in their own societies, 
eir argument reminds me of a 
nent made by a great President of 
Jnited States, Abraham Lincoln, 
lid, "Whenever I hear anyone ar- 
', for slavery, I feel a strong im- 
■ to see it tried on him person- 

e evidence, both in India and in 
nca, is plain. It is that there is 
than one form of hunger, and 
er the rich nor the poor will feel 
led without being fed in body and 
irit. 

democracy important? Is human 



freedom valued by all people? 

India has given her affirmative ac- 
tion and answer in a thunderous voice, 
a voice heard around the world. Some- 
thing momentous happened here last 
March — not because any party in par- 
ticular won or lost, but rather, I think, 
because the largest electorate on Earth 
freely and wisely chose its leaders at 
the polls. In this sense, democracy it- 
self was the victor in your country. 

Together, we understand that in the 
field of politics, freedom is the engine 
of progress. India and America share 
practical experience with democracy. 

We in the United States are proud of 
having achieved political union among 
a people whose ancestors come from all 
over the world. Our system strives to 
respect the rights of a great variety of 
minorities, including, by the way, a 
growing and productive group of 
families from your own country, India. 
But the challenge of political union 
is even greater here in your own coun- 
try. In the diversity of languages, reli- 
gions, political opinions, and racial and 
cultural groups, India is comparable to 
the continent of Europe, which has a 
total population about the same size as 
your own. Yet India has forged her vast 
mosaic of humanity into a single great 
nation that has weathered many chal- 
lenges to survival both as a nation and 
as a democracy. This is surely one of 
the greatest political achievements of 
this century or any other century. 

India and the United States are at one 
in recognizing the right of free 
speech — which Mahatma Gandhi called 
"the foundation-stone of Swaraj" or 
self-government — and the rights of aca- 
demic freedom, trade union organiza- 
tion, freedom of the press, and freedom 
of religion. 

All these rights are recognized in in- 
ternational covenants. There are few 
governments which do not at least pay 
lipservice to them. And yet, to quote 
Gandhi once more, "No principle 
exists in the abstract. Without its con- 
crete application it has no meaning." 

In India, as in the United States, 
these rights do have concrete applica- 
tion, and they have real meaning, too. 
It is to preserve these rights that both 
our nations have chosen similar politi- 
cal paths to the development of our re- 
sources and to the betterment of the life 
of our people. 

There are differences between us in 
the degree to which economic growth is 
pursued through public enterprise on 
one hand and private enterprise on the 
other hand. But more important than 
these differences is our shared belief 
that the political structure in which de- 
velopment takes place should be demo- 
cratic and should respect the human 



rights of each and every citizen in our 
countries. 

Our two nations also agree that 
human needs are inseparable from 
human rights; that while civil and polit- 
ical liberties are good in themselves, 
they are much more useful and much 
more meaningful in the lives of people 
to whom physical survival is not a mat- 
ter of daily anxiety. 

To have sufficient food to live and to 
work; to be adequately sheltered and 
clothed; to live in a healthy environ- 
ment and to be healed when sick; to 
learn and to be taught — these rights, 
too, must be the concerns of our gov- 
ernments. To meet these ends, orderly 
economic growth is crucial. And if the 
benefits of growth are to reach those 
whose need is greatest, social justice is 
critical as well. 

India is succeeding in this historic 
task. Your economic challenges are no 
secret, and their seriousness is well un- 
derstood in the West. 

But what is far less well understood 
is the degree to which Indian social and 
economic policy has been such a suc- 
cess. In the single generation since 
your independence was gained, ex- 
traordinary progress has been made. 

Economic Progress 

India is now a major industrial 
power. Your economy ranks among the 
10 largest in the whole world. You are 
virtually self-assured and self-sufficient 
in consumer goods and in a wide vari- 
ety of other products, such as iron and 
steel. 

There have been notable increases in 
production in nearly every important 
sector of your economy — increases 
which reflect an economy of great 
technological sophistication. This kind 
of growth is doubly important to try to 
reduce trade barriers and to promote 
both bilateral trade and mutual respon- 
sibility for the whole world's trading 
system. 

But most important are the advances 
in human welfare that have touched the 
lives of ordinary Indians. Life expec- 
tancy has increased by 20 years since 
your independence. The threat of major 
epidemics has receded. The literacy 
rate in your country has doubled. 
While only a third of Indian children 
went to school in the years just after 
independence, nearly 90% of primary- 
age Indian children now receive school- 
ing. Nine times as many students go to 
universities as they did before. 

I mention these gains that we tend to 
overlook in our preoccupation with the 
problems that quite properly face and 
engage our attention. 

India's difficulties, which we often 



£31 

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experience ourselves and which are 
typical of the problems faced in the de- 
veloping world, remind us of the tasks 
which lie ahead. 

But India's successes are just as im- 
portant, because they decisively refute 
the theory that in order to achieve eco- 
nomic and social progress, a develop- 
ing country must accept an authorita- 
rian or a totalitarian government with 
all the damage to the health of the 
human spirit which comes with it. 

We are eager to join with you in 
maintaining and improving our valu- 
able and mature partnership of political 
and economic cooperation. 

It's a sobering fact, for instance, that 
in a nation of so many hundreds of mil- 
lions of people, only a few American 
business leaders are now involved, on a 
daily basis, in the economic and com- 
mercial life of your country. 

We need to identify more areas 
where we can work together for mutual 
benefit and, indeed, for the benefit of 
the whole world. 

In the area of development, I am 
deeply impressed with the creative di- 
rection that the Government of India 
has taken in the new economic state- 
ment. You have committed your nation 
unequivocally to rural improvement 
and the creation of rural employment. 
This policy now faces a test of im- 



plementation and, especially, the test 
of bringing its benefits to the very 
poorest areas of your rural population. 
The seriousness and the determination, 
however, of your commitment is a 
cause for optimism. 

We want to learn from you and to 
work with you however we can. 

Agricultural Productivity 

In agriculture, there are also exciting 
new areas of technology on which we 
can work together. After a decade of 
importing grain, India now stands with 
a surplus of nearly 20 million tons. 
This is a tribute to the growing produc- 
tivity of your agriculture and the com- 
petence, also, of your administrative 
services. 

We applaud the grain reserve pro- 
gram that you've begun, and we would 
welcome the opportunity to share with 
you our resources and our experience in 
dealing with storage problems that 
surpluses bring with them. 

Our countries must be in the fore- 
front of the effort to bring into exist- 
ence the international food reserve that 
would mitigate the fear of famine in the 
rest of the world. At the same time, we 
must recognize that today's surpluses 
are likely to be a temporary phenome- 
non. The best estimates indicate that 



Department of State Bulki 

unless new productive capacity is J 
veloped, the whole world, with \ 
rapidly growing population, may 
facing large food shortages in l: 
mid-1980's. 

The greatest opportunities to 
crease agricultural productivity e>< 
here in India and elsewhere in the • 
veloping world. These opportunits 
must be seized not just so that Indii 
can eat better but so that India can 
main self-sufficient and, perhaps, e'| 
continue to export food to countii 
with less agricultural potential than \ 
have. 

In the past, America and India hi 
scored monumental achievementsi 
working together in the agriculti. 
field. But there is still a vast, 
realized potential to be tapped. 

I would like to see an intensified 
ricultural research program aimed b 
at improving productivity in India 
at developing processes that could t 
be used elsewhere. This program cd 
be based on the agricultural universi 
of our two countries but would also; 
tend across the whole frontier of ; : 
search. And beyond research, I wc 
like to identify joint development pi 
ects where research can be tested 
put to work. Perhaps Prime Mini: 
Desai and I may now instruct our [< 
ernments to focus on these matters : 
to come up with specific propo'J 
within the next few months. 

One of the most promising areas 
international cooperation, which 1 1 
already discussed with your Pn 
Minister, is in the regions of eas 
India and Bangladesh, where alte 
ting periods of drought and flood 
cruelly into food production. Sev 
hundred million people live in 
area. They happen to be citizens oil 
dia, Bangladesh, and Nepal. 

Great progress has already b: 
made between your nations in resol 
questions concerning water. And' 
are prepared to give our support v; 
the regional states request a study 
will define how the international d 
munity, in cooperation with the nati 
of South Asia, can help the people 
this area use water from the rivers i 
the mountains to achieve the produ. 
ity that is inherent in the land and 
people. 



Energy Resources 

Sustained economic growth reqi 
a strong base in energy as well i 
agriculture. Energy is a serious d 
lem in both our countries, for bo! 
us import oil at levels that can thn 
our economic health and expos 
even to danger if supplies are ij 



lary 1978 



;d. American firms are already 
ing with Indians in developing the 
roducing area off the shores of 
, near Bombay. 

2 also have a long record of coop- 
>n in the development of nuclear 
:r, another important element of 
t's energy plans. Our work to- 
;r will continue in this field, as 
This is a cold, technological sub- 
But Prime Minister Desai and I 
warm and productive discussions 
t this field. We have notified him 
shipments of nuclear fuel will be 
for the Tarapur reactor. And be- 
: of an accident that did occur in 
heavy water production plant, we 
make available to India, also, 
lies from our reserves of heavy 

ditionally, we stand ready to work 

you in developing renewable 
iy resources, especially solar 
y. There is no shortage of sun- 
in India. And the lack of a mas- 
existing infrastructure tied to fos- 
sl use will make the application of 

and solar-related energy vastly 
• here than it will be in my own 
ry, where we are so heavily de- 
:nt upon other sources of energy. 
:ver, the inherently decentralized 
5 of solar energy makes it ideal as 
nplement to your government's 

on developing self-reliant vil- 
and communities. 
: silent void of space may seem 
e from these challenges. But the 
ite electronics of a space satellite 
e as useful to earthbound farmers 
lew plow. 

: Indian and American Govern- 
i will tomorrow exchange diplo- 

notes confirming that the United 
s will program its LANDSAT 

resources satellite to transmit 
lirectly to a ground receiving sta- 
lat India will own and operate. 
s satellite service will provide 

with comprehensive topographic 
ninerals information and timely 
>n the ever-changing condition of 
er, agricultural, water, and other 
il resources. Under the terms of 
'reement, India will make avail- 
o neighboring countries any in- 
tion that affects them, 
o, India has already reserved 

on board the American space 
' in 1981 to initiate a domestic 
unications satellite system, using, 
llite designed to Indian specifica- 

are very pleased that our space 
ology, together with India's 
J space communications capabil- 
n\\ serve the cause of practical 
;ss in your country. 



Shared Interests and Obligations 

Our scholarly exchanges have al- 
ready enriched the lives of Americans 
who participated in them. And I hope 
the same has been true of Indian partic- 
ipants. 

In matters of culture and the 
arts, we know how much we have to 
gain. Not only India but also the rest of 
Asia and Africa and the Middle East 
have much to offer us. I hope to ex- 
pand the opportunities for our own citi- 
zens to appreciate and to enjoy the 
strong and varied culture in the nations 
of your part of the world. 

In global politics, history has cast 
our countries in different roles. The 
United States is one of the so-called 
superpowers; India is the largest of the 
nonaligned countries. But each of us 
respects the other's conception of its 
international responsibilities, and the 
values that we do share provide a basis 
for cooperation in attacking the great 
global problems of economic justice, 



human rights, and the prevention of 
war. 

This pursuit of justice and peace and 
the building of a new economic order 
must be undertaken in ways that pro- 
mote constructive development rather 
than fruitless confrontation. Every 
country will suffer if the North-South 
dialogue is permitted to founder. 

Because India is both a developing 
country and also an industrial power, 
you are in a unique position to promote 
constructive international discussion 
about trade, energy, investment, bal- 
ance of payments, technology, and 
other questions. I welcome your play- 
ing this worldwide leadership role. 

I know that there will be times when 
we will disagree on specific issues and 
even on general approaches to larger 
problems. But I hope and believe that 
our shared interests and our common 
devotion to democratic values will help 
us to move toward agreement on impor- 
tant global and bilateral issues. 

But neither of us seeks to align with 



DELHI DECLARATION, 
JAN. 3 7 



India and the United States of America, 
despite differences of history and culture, are 
one in the recognition that the ultimate sanc- 
tion of power and of public policy rests in the 
respect for the dignity and well-being of the 
individual. Regardless of race, sex, religion 
or social status, every human being is enti- 
tled to life and liberty, to freedom from want 
and, without threat or coercion, to freedom 
of expression and worship. 

We share an unwavering faith in the demo- 
cratic form of government, which guarantees 
to all citizens fundamental freedoms under 
law and the right to choose their representa- 
tives and determine their own future. 

At the same time, we believe that a co- 
operative and stable world order depends on 
the right of each people to determine its own 
form of government and each nation its own 
political, social and economic policies. 

We are gratified that the process of decol- 
onization has democratized the international 
state-system, giving most nations for the first 
time an opportunity to participate in making 
decisions relating to international peace and 
cooperation. 

The disparities in economic strength that 
exist among nations must be bridged and a 
more equitable international economic order 
fashioned if we are to secure international 
peace. 

We recognize that broad economic de- 
velopment is essential for a modern state, but 
also that such progress is hollow if its bene- 
fits do not reach all the people. 



The present-day world commands scien- 
tific and technological skills to enrich the 
quality of life and give greater social justice 
within and among nations. We call on an 
inter-dependent community of nations to 
work together to protect and nurture the 
common heritage of our planet's resources 
and environment. 

We declare that war is not an acceptable 
means to settle political disputes. Our coun- 
tries will do their utmost to resolve disputes 
with others amicably and, within the 
framework of the United Nations, to help in 
resolving the disputes of others. 

The spectre of war has hung over the world 
for too long. Existing stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons must be reduced and eventually 
eliminated, and the danger of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons must be arrested. Further, 
every effort must be made to progressively 
reduce conventional arms and to redirect the 
productive forces so released to the better- 
ment of mankind. We commit ourselves to 
work towards these ends. 

Beyond the realms of politics and econom- 
ics, the world today affords opportunities for 
freer and fuller intellectual and scientific ex- 
changes. Freedom of ideas and the promotion 
of cultural and artistic interplay, in a world 
where the mind is without fear, can create an 
environment where tolerance and understand- 
ing can flourish. 

Beyond the traditional ideas of state-craft, 
Indians and Americans recognize an obliga- 
tion to themselves and to others that ends can 
never justify evil means. Nations, like indi- 
viduals, are morally responsible for their 
actions. 





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10 

the other except in the pursuit of peace 
and justice. We can even help each 
other to alleviate differences which 
might exist between ourselves and 
other nations. 

Our two countries are part of a 
democratic world that includes nations 
in all stages of development, from 
Sweden and Japan to Sri Lanka and 
Costa Rica. 

We share many common problems. 
But we also share an obligation to ad- 
vance human rights — not by interfering 
in the affairs of other nations, not by 
trying to deny other nations the right to 
choose their own political and social 
system, but by speaking the truth as we 
see it and by providing an admirable 
example of what democracy can mean 
and what it can accomplish. 

The danger of war threatens 
everyone, and the United States is try- 
ing to help reduce that danger — in the 
SALT negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, in talks aimed at a comprehen- 
sive ban of the testing of all nuclear 
explosives anywhere on Earth, and in 
our own policy of restraint on conven- 
tional arms transfers. We are also 
working hard to restrict the prolifera- 
tion of nuclear explosives. 

We are seeking to help the process of 
peace in Africa and the Middle East. 
And we are taking steps to forestall, 
along with the Soviets, great power 
rivalry and the escalation of military 
presence in your own Indian Ocean. 

India is pledged to peaceful coopera- 
tion with your neighbors, and India is 
an important part of almost any U.N. 
peacekeeping force. India is a present 
and frequent member of the Security 
Council and has been in the forefront 



Departure from Riyadh 



of campaigns against colonialism and 
against apartheid. 

The motto of my country is "In God 
We Trust"; India's is Satyameva 
j ayte — "Truth Alone Prevails." I be- 
lieve that such is the commonality of 
our fundamental values that your motto 
could be ours, and perhaps our motto 
could also be yours. 

Our nations share the goals of peace 
in the world and human development in 
our own societies. And we share, as 
well, the conviction that the means that 
we employ to reach these goals must be 
as much in keeping with the principles 
of freedom and human dignity and so- 
cial justice as are the goals themselves. 
This affinity of belief is as strong a 
tie as there can be between any two na- 
tions on Earth. The values that Ameri- 
cans and Indians share have deeply af- 
fected my own life. I come to you, as a 
national leader, yes, in the hope that 
my visit will mark a new and a higher 
stage in the steadily improving rela- 
tions between our two countries. But in 
a more personal sense — a sense that is 
very close to my own heart — I come 
also as a pilgrim. 

This morning I had the honor of lay- 
ing a wreath on the memorial to 
Mahatma Gandhi. In that sacred place, 
so simple and so serene, I recalled 
anew the ways in which Gandhi's 
teachings have touched the lives of so 
many millions of people in my own 
country. 

When I was growing up on a farm in 
the State of Georgia, in the heart of the 
southern United States, an invisible 
wall of racial segregation stood be- 
tween me and my black classmates, 
schoolmates, playmates, when we were 




Department of State Bullei 

old enough to know what segregatii 
was. But it seemed then as if that w] 
between us would exist forever. 

But it did not stand forever. It cm 
bled and fell. And though the rub; 
has not yet been completely remov 
it no longer separates us from c; 
another, blighting the lives of those; 
both sides of it. 

Among the many who marched ;; 
suffered and bore witness against 
evil of racial prejudice, the great; 
was Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J 
was a son of Georgia and a spirit i 
son of Mahatma Gandhi. 

The most important influence in 
life and work of Dr. King, apart fi 
his own religious faith, was the life 
work of Gandhi. Martin Luther K 
took Gandhi's concepts of nonviole 
and truth-force and put them to wor! 
the American South. 

Like Gandhi, King believed t 
truth and love are the strongest foj 
in the universe. Like Gandhi, he ki 
that ordinary people, armed only J 
courage and faith, could overcome 
justice by appealing to the sparfc 
good in the heart even of the evildc 
= Like Gandhi, we all learned th! 
system of oppression damages thos 
the top as surely as it does those at 
bottom. And for Martin Luther K ; 
like Mahatma Gandhi, nonviolence; 
not only a political method, it w 
way of life and a spiritual path to u : 
with the ultimate. 

These men set a standard of cou 
and idealism that few of us can rr 
but from which all of us can draw 
spiration and sustenance. 

The nonviolent movement for n 
justice in the United States, a m 
ment inspired in large measure b> 
teachings and examples of Gandhi 
other Indian leaders — some of w 
are here today — changed and enri 
my own life and the lives of many 
lions of my countrymen. 

I am sure you will forgive me 
speaking about this at some leng 
do so because I want you all to ui 
stand that when I speak of frienc 
between the United States and Inc 
speak from the heart as well as 
head. I speak from a deep, first 
knowledge of what the relationshi] 
tween our two countries has mea 
the past and how much more, eve 
can mean for all of us in the futur 
For the remainder of this centur 
into the next, the democratic coin 
of the world will increasingly tu 
each other for answers to our 
pressing common challenge: hov 
political and spiritual values can' 
vide the basis for dealing with tb 
cial and economic strains to whicH 
will unquestionably be subjected. 






ruary 1978 

he experience of democracy is like 
experience of life itself — always 
nging, infinite in its variety, 
letimes turbulent, and all the more 
lable for having been tested by 
srsity . 

It share that experience with you, 
we draw strength from it. What- 
• the differences between my coun- 
md yours, we are moving along the 
i of democracy toward a common 
I of human development. I speak 
all Americans when I say that I am 
)ly grateful that you and I travel 
road together. 



UVAL, RIYADH, 

I. 3 8 

[. King Khalid 

r. President, I welcome Your Ex- 
;ncy in our country as a great 
id, and I thank you for your efforts 
nd a just and lasting solution for 
>roblem of the Middle East. I wish 
r Excellency a pleasant stay in this 
idly country and success in your 
and commendable endeavors. 

ident Carter 

'salamu elkum. Peace be unto you. 
primary purpose of my trip and 
visit is peace. 

ie first meeting between the lead- 
of Saudi Arabia and the United 
:s of America was when President 
klin Roosevelt came to the Gulf of 

to meet with King Abdul Aziz. 

friendship has now grown to en- 
?ass the millions of people in our 
nations. We work together now, 
we plan together for the future, 
ties which bind us together are 
ig and unbreakable, 
though our time here is all too 
f, I have already learned much 

Crown Prince Fahd [bin Abdul 
, First Deputy Prime Minister], 
:e Sa'ud [bin Faisal, Saudi Foreign 
ster], and other leaders from Saudi 
'ia who have recently visited me in 
own country. Now I am glad to 

with Your Majesty for close con- 
tion on matters of great mutual 
est to our people, 
i Your Majesty has already said, a 

important subject which will be 
issed is the early achievement of a 
and lasting peace in the Middle 

recall the traditional Arabic wel- 
i, Ahlan wa sahlan. It is beautiful 
simple. And my understanding is 
it means, "You are among your 
people, and your steps will be un- 
ered." Seeing the generosity of 



11 




With President Sadat 

this welcome, I feel that I am among 
my own people and know that my steps 
will not be hindered, because I walk 
the same path as Your Majesty, King 
Khalid, toward a common goal of even 
greater friendship among our people, 
between our two countries, and of 
peace for all the people of the world. 

Your Majesty, we are glad to be in 
your great country. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
ASWAN, JAN. 4 9 



President Sadat 

I want to tell you that it is a very 
happy occasion for me and for my 
people, also, to receive our dear friend, 
President Carter, here on the Egyptian 
land. We would have liked that this 
visit would have lasted a bit longer, but 
we know his commitments. 

We had a very intensive and fruitful 
talk upon the whole arena — in particu- 
lar, the conflict here in the Middle East 
and the whole international position 
and our bilateral relations. I am very 
happy to say that our views were iden- 
tical, and we have agreed upon certain 
steps to keep the momentum of the 
peace process. 

All I ask is let us have in a very short 
time the opportunity to welcome Presi- 
dent Carter and to show him the 
gratitude of my people and myself. 

In the same time, may I say that in 
the peace process we welcome all the 
parties concerned. And they are wel- 
come whenever they find it convenient 
to them, because this time, as I have 
already repeated before, we are head- 



ing toward peace and real peace in the 
area, permanent peace. 



President Carter 

It is an honor and a pleasure for us to 
be in this great country, led by such a 
strong and courageous man. 

Mr. President, your bold initiative in 
seeking peace has aroused the admira- 
tion of the entire world. One of my 
most valued possessions is the warm, 
personal relationship which binds me 
and President Sadat together and which 
exemplifies the friendship and the 
common purpose of the people of 
Egypt and the people of the United 
States of America. 

The Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative 
must succeed, while still guarding the 
sacred and historic principles held by 
the nations who have suffered so much 
in this region. There is no good reason 
why accommodation cannot be 
reached. 

In my own private discussions with 
both Arab and Israeli leaders, I have 
been deeply impressed by the unani- 
mous desire for peace. My presence 
here today is a direct result of the 
courageous initiative which President 
Sadat undertook in his recent trip to 
Jerusalem. 

The negotiating process will con- 
tinue in the near future. We fully sup- 
port this effort, and we intend to play 
an active role in the work of the Politi- 
cal Committee of Cairo, which will 
soon reconvene in Jerusalem. 

We believe that there are certain 
principles, fundamentally, which must 
be observed before a just and a com- 
prehensive peace can be achieved. 



,;i 



i 



kRS 



12 




With West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
in Aswan 

• First, true peace must be based on 
normal relations among the parties to 
the peace. Peace means more than just 
an end to belligerency. 

• Second, there must be withdrawal 
by Israel from territories occupied in 
1967 and agreement on secure and rec- 
ognized borders for all parties in the 
context of normal and peaceful rela- 
tions in accordance with U.N. Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338. 

• Third, there must be a resolution 
of the Palestinian problem in all its as- 
pects. The problem must recognize the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and enable the Palestinians to 
participate in the determination of their 
own future. 

Some flexibility is always needed to 
insure successful negotiations and the 
resolution of conflicting views. We 
know that the mark of greatness among 
leaders is to consider carefully the 
views of others and the greater benefits 
that can result among the people of all 
nations which can come from a suc- 
cessful search for peace. 

Mr. President, our consultations this 
morning have reconfirmed our common 
commitment to the fundamentals which 
will, with God's help, make 1978 the 
year for permanent peace in the Middle 
East. 



REMARKS AT THE 
PALAIS DES CONGRES, 
PARIS, JAN. 4 10 

This afternoon I laid a wreath, 
along with the President of France, on 
the grave of the soldier who commemo- 
rated the bravery of the French people. 
And standing on my left was a group of 
men in the same regiment who fought 
with George Washington at Yorktown 
200 years ago. 



When our democracy was born, 
France was there. And for more than 
200 years, our two nations have shared 
the same ideals and the same culture. 

There is one belief above all others 
that has made us what we are. This is 
the belief that the rights of the indi- 
vidual inherently stand higher than the 
claims or demands of the state. This is 
the message that the American and 
French peoples, each in turn, carried 
forward to the world two centuries ago, 
and these are the values which the 
world still depends upon us to affirm. 

Democracy was then a new and an 
untried concept. Now it is a standard 
for our Western civilization. The 
American Declaration of Independ- 
ence, inspired so greatly by French phi- 
losophy, spoke of the "unalienable 
rights" of persons, of life and liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness. These 
rights were controversial then, and now 
they are the measure by which the 
faithfulness of governments is tested. 
Democracy is indeed a compelling 
idea, an idea so attractive that even its 
enemies now attempt to cloak repres- 
sion with false democratic labels. 

But our democratic order has come 
under challenge. There are those who 
question whether democratic values are 
appropriate for contemporary circum- 
stances. Voices in the developing 
world ask whether notions of free 
speech, personal liberty, freely chosen 
governments should not be pushed 
aside in the struggle to overcome pov- 
erty. Voices in the industrialized world 
ask whether democracy equips us for 
the frenzied pace of change in our own 
modern lives. 

We've heard warnings that a demo- 
cratic society cannot impose on itself 
the restraint and self-discipline which 
is necessary to cope with persistent 
economic problems. We've heard that 
the disparate elements of our societies 
cannot cohere in a democratic system. 
Governments everywhere have begun 
to seem remote and impersonal, in- 
competent. Many people question 
whether any government can hear their 
distant and solitary voices. 

These problems are real, and we 
must admit their existence. But we 
must also bear the burden that demo- 
cratic society imposes on those like us 
who are part of it. That is to proclaim 
our unshaken faith in the values of our 
democratic nations and our belief that 
those values are still relevant — to the 
rich and the poor, the North and South, 
East and West, as constant now as they 
were when our forebears signed the 
Declaration of Independence and your 
forebears proclaimed the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man. 

We defend these values because they 



Department of State Bullei 

are right, because there is no high 
purpose for the state than to preser 
these rights for its citizens. But we c 
fend them also in the faith that there 
no contradiction between preservi; 
our democratic values on the one ha! 
and meeting challenges which face c 
modern societies. 

It's precisely when democracy is 
against difficult challenges that , 
leaders must show firmness in resisti; 
the temptation of finding solutions i 
nondemocratic forces. 

This week, in India, I discussed c 
belief that only through respect for 
dividual liberties can developing i 
tions achieve their full economic a 
political potential. That is our fai 
And India, the world's larg< 
democracy — they are proving that it! 
still true. 

Here in France we meet as indi 
trialized powers to affirm that our ci; 
fidence in a democratic future for th: 
developed societies is equally strong 
Democracy is not merely right i 
just. It's also the system that is , 
most consistent with human nature. j 
the most effective way to organize 
ciety for the common good. 

Where the state dominates eve- 
thing, only the narrow talents of 
bureaucrat are free to flower. But' 
pluralistic society that exists withij 
democracy allows for a broad rangv 
succeed — in government, in the arts 
labor, in technology, in the scienc 
and in the marketplace as well. 

Democracy unleashes the inn 
creative energy of each of us. We n 
look no further back than the last tl 
decades to see unparalleled succt 
These years have been extraordinar 
the time for France, for West 
Europe, the United States, and ol 
democratic nations. 

France and its partners in Wesi 
Europe rose from the destruction 
the turmoil of World War II to b 
economies and societies more thri\ 
and productive than ever before am 
regain positions of world leaden 
very rapidly. 

Never have so many new jobs ant 
much new wealth been created oi 
much change in people's lives b 
managed so effectively and yet wit! 
much freedom. 

All of this is no accident. Nat 
with other political systems, in spit 
their great human and natural 
sources, have not done as well. 

And democracy protects us 
against the excesses of modernizat 
It helps us constantly to reduce 
rising complexity of modern liij 
human terms. At a time when the c 
puter makes total state control r 
possible than ever — processing pe 



.ruary 1978 

e numbers — democracy stands 
ird, protecting the uniqueness of the 
ividual. 

his is why the great trend of emi- 
ion is from those states which deny 
ic rights to their people and toward 
free nations of the West. That's 
/ India, under the greatest trial and 
iion, has reaffirmed its commitment 
ule by the people, and that's why 
tugal and Spain and Greece have re- 
ied the ranks of Europe's democra- 
nations. 



d for Responsive Government 

/e do not fear the challenges which 
our chosen form of government, 
today we need a new agenda for 
locracy. The first task on this 
ida is to devise ways in which gov- 
nent and social institutions can bet- 
and more quickly respond to the 
ler standards of leadership and serv- 
which are now being demanded by 
people. 

's a time of testing. Already the 
sd experiments are underway, ac- 
ting to the unique traditions and 
Is of each individual country. In 
tern Europe successful sharing of 
fruits of economic growth at all 
Is has provided a way to help in 
ety overcoming mounting social 
ilems. 

In France you are making a young 
stitution work in balancing au- 
ity between the executive and the 
ilature. 

In some countries, like Germany 
Scandinavia, there are continuing 
:riments in new forms of inter- 
ttionship between labor and 
agement. 

The member nations of the Euro- 
i Community are planning to hold 
:t elections among the nations for 
European Parliament. 
In my own nation, we are trying to 
ce government regulation in areas 
:r left to private enterprise or to the 
riduals. 

And in several nations, including 
e of our own, there is emphasis on 
igthening the role of local govern- 
t, on decentralizing power, and on 
cing through voluntary associations 
eet particular problems and needs. 

these and other ways we can make 
rnment more responsive, account- 
, and also closer to the people, 
'ring a renewed sense of confi- 
e in our national and in our local 
munities. 

e can also find new answers to the 

problems of combining freedom 

responsibility. As President Gis- 



13 




Returning to Paris by train from Normandy 



card d'Estaing wrote in his book, 
"Towards a New Democracy": "The 
pluralism of power guarantees free- 
dom. . . . Democratic progress does 
not result in disorder, but in a better 
balance of order within freedom and 
responsibility." 

Economic Challenge 

The second item on the new agenda 
for democracy is the economic chal- 
lenge. We must not only restore 
growth, control inflation, and reduce 
unemployment; we must also demon- 
strate that our democratic economic 
system can adapt to the demands that 
are constantly changing and placed 
upon it. This means proving again that 
we have the self-discipline to pursue 
our future, no less than our current 
interests, so that contending domestic 
groups will not produce chaos and dis- 
cord but a new harmony of effort for 
the common good. 

It means increasing our efforts to in- 
sure that the fruits of economic growth 
reach all parts of society so that each 
individual will share in the benefits of 
economic progress. And it means using 
our resources to promote human 
development — not just growth for its 
own sake. 

Our democratic economies now have 
unprecedented strength to meet this 
challenge. We have skilled work 
forces. We have productive plants and 
equipment, effective management, and 
the will and the means to cooperate 
closely with one another — both within 
nations and also among nations. 

And in the free market we have a 
means of matching production to 
human needs that is swifter and more 
subtle than any computer, more sensi- 



tive to society's requirements than any 
state committee. 

My country is able and willing to 
join with its partners in building on that 
strength, to put the global economy on 
the path to growth and to rising pros- 
perity. America's efforts will be di- 
rected toward maintaining the strength 
of the dollar, continuing steady prog- 
ress against unemployment and 
inflation, and stimulating private 
investment. 

This year we will cut taxes substan- 
tially for both business and consumers, 
and we'll take these steps primarily be- 
cause they are in our own interests, but 
also because we recognize the impor- 
tance of continued noninflationary re- 
covery in the United States to the 
economies of the rest of the world. 

We are working with our economic 
partners also in the Geneva trade 
negotiations to reach rapid agreement 
that will improve the open trading sys- 
tem, expand commerce, and create new 
jobs. And following the French exam- 
ple, we are hard at work on a com- 
prehensive energy program which will 
lessen our imports of foreign oil, re- 
duce undue dependence, and cut the 
deficit in our balance of trade. 

France and America and the other 
industrial democracies are emerging 
from the economic recession of recent 
years. Some of us can turn our atten- 
tion at once to noninflationary growth, 
like the United States. Others must first 
take painful measures simply to reduce 
inflation. As more nations are able to 
pursue higher growth, our economies 
will create more jobs, and unemploy- 
ment will go down. 

Confidence in steady growth will re- 
duce pressures for trade restrictions, 
protectionism, make it easier for us to 



5«j 



1 












14 

adapt to changes within our societies, 
help us to make more efficient use of 
energy, and make it easier for countries 
with payments surpluses to open their 
markets to developed and developing 
nations alike. 

But there are also many other eco- 
nomic needs today. The economic in- 
stitutions that served us well in the past 
need to be strengthened. We must 
reach a better understanding of basic 
economic forces so that we can solve 
the problems simultaneously of infla- 
tion and unemployment. We've not yet 
been able to do this. 

We must devote much greater effort 
to further advances in high technology 
to help all our nations compete effec- 
tively in tomorrow's markets. 

We must develop new and produc- 
tive industries and services so that we 
can moderate the impact on our peoples 
of change imposed by increased global 
competition for jobs and markets that's 
sure to come. And we must solve the 
problem of youth unemployment. Un- 
less we do, an entire generation could 
be estranged from our democratic 
societies. 

We must take steps to avoid export- 
ing our economic difficulties to other 
nations, whether rich or poor. And we 
must use the tools of shared freedom to 
increase the choices and opportunities 
of our economic system. We can share 
our experience in social development, 
in education, health care, social serv- 
ices, and the organization and man- 
agement of farms and factories. 

At the heart of all these efforts is 
continued cooperation, along with our 
other economic partners, in such ways 
as the economic summits, which were 
first proposed by France. This coopera- 
tion should recognize the individuality 
of each nation, while acknowledging 
that our economic well-being will rise 
or fall together. 



liance and popular support for a strong 
defense. 

Both France and America prove that 
the peoples of a democracy can and 
will support these joint goals of con- 
stant strength and also a commitment to 
peace. The commitment of the Ameri- 
can Government and the American 
people to the security of Europe is ab- 
solute. There should be no doubt that 
we will maintain in Europe whatever 
forces are needed to meet that com- 
mitment. We are also grateful that 
France maintains and improves its 
forces that are essential for defense. 

But we also see the need to move 
beyond confrontation, to resolve the 
differences between East and West, 
and to progress toward arms control 
and disarmament. 

We are determined to seek balanced 
and mutual limits on both qualitative 
and quantitative deployment of nuclear 
weapons, and then substantial reduc- 
tions, leading to the eventual elimina- 
tion of nuclear weapons as a potential 
destructive force among the nations of 
the world. 

We are determined to seek early 
agreement on a comprehensive ban of 
the testing of all nuclear explosives, 
both military weapons and also the so- 
called peaceful nuclear devices. And 
we are determined to seek a substantial 
reduction of the international com- 
merce in conventional weapons. 

We'll work with other nations to 
achieve the advantages which such 
agreements can bring. While the ap- 
proaches of France and the United 
States to these issues may sometimes 
differ, our desire to build a more stable 
peace is one and the same. And in all 
these efforts, we will consult and coop- 
erate closely with you and with our 
other allies, recognizing the independ- 
ence of each nation but also our mutual 
interests and our mutual commitments. 



Mutual Security 

The third task on the new agenda for 
democracy is to provide for our mutual 
security. 

I come to France today recognizing 
that our two nations share a basic 
commitment to preserve our hard-won 
freedom. We are able, with our allies, 
to keep our freedom precisely because 
we are militarily strong. 

Our central security system today 
and our central problem is maintaining 
our will to keep the military strength 
we need, while seeking at the same 
time every opportunity to build a better 
peace. Military power without detente 
may lead to conflict, but detente would 
be impossible without the NATO al- 



European Community 

The fourth task on democracy's new 
agenda is the effort of Europeans to 
shape your future. For the goal that 
you've set for yourselves, with your 
partners in the European Community, 
is nothing less than to transform — in an 
unprecedented fashion in history — and 
to improve relations among states with 
ancient traditions, unique histories, and 
legitimate pride in national 
achievement. 

The United States will give its un- 
qualified support to what you and your 
partners in the Nine are doing to 
strengthen European cooperation, for 
we see European strength and unity as 
a boon and not as a threat to us. The 



Department of State Bullet 

real threat to the interests of us a 
would be economic weakness an 
disunity. 



North-South Relations 

The fifth and the final item on tl 
new agenda for democracy is to cM 
erate among ourselves in adapting 
global change. The same factors whi< 
led to our economic successes over tl 
past two generations — science, tec!; 
nology, education, health, will ai 
wisdom of our people — have also j 
tered the interrelationship between tl 
industrial democracies on the one hai 
and the developing world on the othe 
European nations, individually ort 
gether, also have an increasing role 
play beyond this continent, particular 
in reordering relations between Noi 
and South. 

It was less than 100 years ago tt 
the European powers met and divid 
the continent of Africa among you, a 
yet today colonialism has nearly ende 
Before World War II, 80% of I 
world's land mass and 75% of ; 
people were under Western authori; 
but today there are more than 100 n< 
nations, each with insistent needs a 
insistent demands. A few years aj 
the West made virtually all the d^ 
sions about the global economy, ? 
now important resources are also un( 
the control of the developi 
countries— as the energy crisis 1 
made very clear. The councils of e< 
nomic action can no longer be limi 
just to a few. 

During this trip, I've seen how 
developing nations are creating a n 
role for themselves in the world's e< 
nomic system, redistributing glo 
power, posing new global probler 
and assuming new rights and n 
responsibilities. 

We've long understood that gres 
individual equality can bring fo 
greater prosperity in our domes 
societies. But now we also see n 
greater equality among nations i 
promote the health of the global ec 
omy, including our own. No nati 
nor any small group of nations, can 
longer shape its destiny alone. 

In proposing the North-South c 
ference, President Giscard spoke 
creating new forms of internatic 
cooperation. What he said then sta 
as a watchword of all our efforts 
gether, and I quote him again: "(T 
should not constitute a victory for s< 
countries over others, achieved by 
ing advantage of temporary power r 
tionships. Rather it must be a victor 
mankind over itself. ..." 

If we move in that spirit and <Ji' 



ruary 1978 

efforts together to solving the prob- 
s that face the nations of the world, 
i we shall surely gain that victory of 
:h he spoke. We will vindicate our 
) and abiding faith in the strength 
lemocracy to grow and to develop 
i the times. 

ix days ago, I left the United States 
i tour whose constant theme has 
1 the universal vitality of democ- 
. In Poland, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
pt, India, and now in France, I've 
hasized that our modern struggle is 
only to establish peace but also to 
ect the individual from abuse by 
itate . 

^morrow, with President Giscard 
taing, I will leave Paris to visit the 
:hes at Normandy. If the names 
iha, Utah, Juno, Gold, and Sword 

always live in the memories of 

our peoples, it's because they re- 
1 us at what cost our liberties have 
i purchased and what a precious 
age has been left for us to attend 
to defend. These names remind us 
liberty is not secured with just one 
rise but must be struggled for again 
again and again. 
ir ancestors made their defense 

principles and with revolution, 
'le of my parents' generation, and 
y own, bore arms in the name of 
lorn. Many of them were left at 
nandy Beach and at the thousands 
ther shrines to liberty across the 
i. 

lough we will always be prepared, 
>ray that their sacrifice in battle 

never be repeated. And we know 
war need not come again so long 
e transmit our devotion to those 
:s of free people, strengthened and 
ved, to each succeeding generation 
:omes after us. 



1ARKS, COMMISSION OF THE 
OPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
SSELS, JAN. 6 7 

m glad to meet with you today and 
•ntinue the discussions that began 
i my Administration was only a 
lours old. Before my first week in 
; was over, Vice President Mon- 
began his visit to our traditional 
i, stopping first of all in Brussels, 
i of those international institutions 
epresent our shared hope for a se- 
and prosperous future, 
the first American President to 
the headquarters of the European 
munity, I believe this meeting 
•olizes America's abiding com- 
ent to a strong and united Europe 
o the European Community. 
>as been my pleasure to meet often 



with the Community's leaders. In addi- 
tion to meeting President Jenkins [Roy 
Jenkins, President of the Commission] 
both at the London economic summit 
and in Washington, I benefited from 
meeting with Prime Ministers Cal- 
laghan [of the United Kingdom] and 
Tindemans [of Belgium] during their 
countries' term in the presidency of the 
Council. 

As I have traveled in these last 9 
days, crossing continents and cultures, 
discussing different systems of politics 
and economics, seeing humanity in its 
full, diverse array, I have reaffirmed 
certain constant themes time after time. 
I have stressed the importance of 
democratic political values and the 
steps needed to defend them, the eco- 
nomic challenges we face in our rela- 
tions with the developing world, and 
the need to cope with problems of our 
own. We must also open our hearts to 
improve the chances for peace, while 
always maintaining the strong right arm 
of our defense. 

I have repeated these themes because 
they need repetition, because they ex- 
press to the world the values my nation 
most deeply holds. 

I am proud today to add another — 
that the United States welcomes a 
strong, united Europe as a common 
force for the values our peoples share. 
The United States will do its part to 
work with you. 

Our economy is prosperous and 
growing, continuing its steady recov- 
ery. Because we have confidence in the 
fundamental strength of our economy, 
we have confidence in the fundamental 
strength of the dollar, now and for the 
future. But, we are also aware of the 
degree to which our own prosperity de- 
pends more than ever on international 
economic cooperation. 

We are prepared to work with the 
Community in a wide variety of ways, 
in order: 

• To promote the economic growth 
of nations so as to control inflation, re- 
duce unemployment, and achieve 
monetary stability; 

• To reach a rapid and successful 
conclusion to the multilateral trade 
negotiations and thus to expand inter- 
national trade, create more jobs in all 
countries, and help us all resist protec- 
tionist pressures; 

• To work creatively toward mutu- 
ally beneficial relations with the de- 
veloping nations; 

• To cooperate in providing a role 
for nuclear technology in meeting our 
energy needs without hazarding our 
children's future through the threat of 
nuclear proliferation; and 

• To find answers together to social 



15 



and economic problems facing each of 
our societies. 

As I said in Paris 2 days ago, we 
must use the tools of shared freedom to 
increase the choices and opportunities 
in our economic system. 

We can share our experience in so- 
cial development — in education, health 
care, social services, the organization 
and management of factory and farm. 

As the world's largest trading unit, 
the Community shares with us a clear 
interest in a successful conclusion to 
the multilateral trade negotiations. 
They are progressing well, though 
much remains to be done. 

I welcome the success of the par- 
ticipating nations in reaching the goal 
set last May in London: substantial 
progress by the end of 1977. What has 
been achieved already should enable 
the negotiations to end this year. Speed 
is important if these negotiations are to 
improve the world trading system and 
remove pressure for protectionism. 

We need a broad package of agree- 
ments, with major reductions in tariffs 
and nontariff barriers and with provi- 
sions for agriculture. 

We know that each country will face 
problems of transition to a freer trading 
system. But those are a small price to 
pay for the benefits of more open trade. 
And they are small, too, in comparison 
to the danger of protectionism if we fail 
to reach a comprehensive agreement. 

Our nations also share concern for 
developing comprehensive energy pro- 
grams. Two months ago, I postponed 
my visit here to Brussels in order to do 
everything possible to enact an energy 
program in the United States. My coun- 
try must waste less energy and develop 
alternative sources of supply. As soon 
as I return, I will resume work on this 
crucial legislation. 

I am confident that the United States 
will soon be setting an example for re- 
sponsible energy policy. 

The European Community and the 
United States also share a deep interest 
in promoting relations with developing 
countries, and our cooperation has led 
to constructive results. 

We must continue to work together 
to draw these countries more fully into 
the global economy. They too must be 
able to share more equitably in the 
benefits and responsibilities of global 
economic progress and to play an ap- 
propriate role in making global eco- 
nomic decisions. 

We in the United States also wel- 
come the growing political and eco- 
nomic role of the Community beyond 
Western Europe. The role of the Com- 
munity contributes vitally to reaching 
goals we share. Most recently, I have 



'//'ft*! 



:iCS 



9* 

•i 

2 

9 



16 

been particularly pleased by the close 
cooperation between us — and by the 
firm leadership shown by the members 
of the Community— at the Belgrade 
Review Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. 

Finally, in stressing our commitment 
to European unity, I look forward to 
continuing a close and productive as- 
sociation between the United States and 
the European Community in the years 
ahead. And I can think of no more fit- 
ting tribute to what you are doing than 
to cite the words of Jean Monnet, the 
father of European unity: "You are not 
making a coalition of states; you are 
uniting peoples." 



REMARKS, NORTH ATLANTIC 
COUNCIL, BRUSSELS, 
JAN. 6 7 

I am happy to meet again with the 
North Atlantic Council, after our suc- 
cessful discussions in London last 
May. 

I come to see you at the end of a 
journey which has taken me to seven 
nations and which, from beginning to 
end, has reminded me of the causes for 
which our alliance was formed. 

At every point on this journey, in 
East and West, in nations trying to 
cope with their poverty and those adjust- 
ing to the consequences of material 
wealth, I have emphasized the vitality 
of democratic rule, individual free- 
doms, human rights. 

We in this hall understand those val- 
ues well. Without them, the West 
stands for nothing at all. And we also 
know, too often from personal experi- 
ence, the cost the defense of these 
liberties can demand. 

Yesterday, I walked with President 
Giscard d'Estaing along the beaches of 
Normandy— as I might also have 
walked in Anzio, in Verdun, or here in 
Belgium in Flanders Field. If those 
names fill us simultaneously with 
mourning and with pride, it is because 
they remind us of the price that has 
been paid for our freedom before, the 
price we hope never to have to pay 
again. 

No one who recalls those sacrifices 
can wish them ever to be repeated. The 
ancient soil of Europe bears constant, 
visible evidence of the carnage that war 
inevitably brings. In Warsaw, I saw 
brave people who have rebuilt much of 
the graceful city that war took from 
them; but what is new only emphasizes 
how much of the old was lost. Here in 
Belgium, too often the battlefield of 
Europe, every family knows of friends, 
homes, dreams that have been crushed 
by war. 



That is the challenge for our alliance: 
to defend our values fearlessly, while 
tirelessly working to prevent war. 

We know that the path to lasting 
peace depends on human understand- 
ings, negotiated agreements, acts of 
good will; the brave initiatives in the 
Middle East shine a ray of hope onto 
all international efforts. But we are 
united in believing that our defense 
must always be strong enough to deter 
any thoughts of aggression — that we 
must be prepared for combat we always 
hope to avoid. 

When I met with the leaders of the 
alliance in London this past May, I was 
impressed with the allies' seriousness 
of purpose and by our common deter- 
mination to prepare NATO for the chal- 
lenges of the next decade. 

At that meeting, we agreed to em- 
bark on four major efforts: 

• Short-term measures to meet im- 
mediate military problems; 

• A long-term defense program, sur- 
veying NATO's requirements in 10 
specific areas; 

• An East-West study to gain better 
understanding of trends in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, an over- 
all assessment of Warsaw Pact power, 
and the implications for the NATO al- 
liance; and 

• Intensified effort to improve coop- 
eration in defense procurement. 

We have already taken major steps in 
all four areas. I was pleased by reports 
of the recent ministerial meeting of the 
Defense Planning Committee and the 



Last stop Brussels— President Carter ad- 
dresses NATO meeting 




Department of State Bullet 

North Atlantic Council, and I loc 
forward to the trans-Atlantic dialogi 
on defense trade that the Independe 
European Program Group h 
proposed. 

Together, we are setting the NA 
alliance on a course that will reaffir 
our shared commitment to peace, to 
strong and vital alliance, and to met 
ing any challenge to our strength ai 
cohesion in the years ahead. 

The leaders of the alliance will ha 
the opportunity to review the results 
our efforts in a summit-level NAT 
conference this spring. I am happy 
renew my invitation to the alliance 
hold that meeting in Washington i 
May 30 and 31. 

The defense budget that I will 
submitting to the Congress later tl 
month will provide for real increases 
U.S. defense spending, more th 
compensating for the effects of inf 
tion. Even more important, a ma; 
part of this effort will respond dired 
to our objectives in the long-term c 
fense program and will improve | 
U.S. military commitment to tjj 
alliance. 

The number of U.S. soldiers: 
Europe will increase by more th 
8,000 in the next year and a half, i 
we will substantially improve our re 
forcement capability. 

We have made these efforts in \ 
name of the alliance. We hope t 
with a far-reaching, realistic, long-t< 
defense program, the alliance a; 
whole will match or exceed the i 
provements which we ourselves 
now undertaking. 

The United States will continue 
maintain — undiminished — its fi 
commitment to NATO and will c 
tinue to provide the forces needed 
back up that commitment. 

We will continue to subscribe to 
doctrine, strategy, and policies of 
alliance, including forward defense 
flexible response. 

We will work with you to main! 
deterrence across the entire spectrun 
strategic, theater nuclear, and conv 
tional forces so that the Warsaw I 
states will know that all of us 
united in commitment to defense of 
the territories of NATO members. 

There will be no flagging of Am 
can will or ability to meet all of 
NATO commitments, which have 
firm support of the American peopl 
There are other responsibilities 
ing the alliance. 

We have set an excellent recon 
consulting with one another on a v 
range of issues. That can and shi 
continue, and the United States wil 
creasingly draw the NATO allies 
its counsels. 



iruary 1978 

Vs SALT II proceeds toward an 
eement, which we hope will come 
n, we will intensify our consulta- 
is with all of you, recognizing that 
Council is the focus of our delibera- 
i's. As we move beyond SALT II, 

will undertake broad discussions 
s on all allied security issues. 
Ve must approach these issues to- 
ler, as an alliance, and judge each 
stion in the context of our overall 
urity requirements for the next 
ade. 

^e must assure that our force plan- 
l and arms control strategies serve 
same purpose. In seeking to reduce 
;ions and to build a more stable 
:e, the alliance should continue to 
: high priority to the mutual and 
anced force reduction talks in 
nna. We believe our negotiating 
)osals would lead to a more stable 
tary situation in central Europe, 
i lower force levels on both sides. 
't in the alliance are prepared to be 
ible in seeking progress toward a 
meed outcome that protects our 
•ests. But serious interest in mov- 
the talks forward cannot be one 
d; we look for an equal commit- 
t and contribution toward progress 
he talks from the Warsaw Pact 
s. 

istly, as allies, we must continue to 
lote our strength in other areas — 
omic, political, social, moral. It is 
isely when the challenge to de- 
racy is greatest that our leaders 

most firmly resist nondemocratic 
:ions. 
lave every confidence that the na- 

of the alliance, and NATO itself, 
be more than equal to these tasks, 
return to the United States confi- 

of the prospects for a peaceful 
d which respects human rights; I 
v that the security of our alliance is 
ock on which that hope is built. 

VS CONFERENCE (EXCERPTS), 
»ARD AIR FORCE ONE, 

.6 7 

Would you give us your assess- 
t of the trip and what you think 
accomplished? 

I wanted to project the image of a 
n that stands for what is right and 
it and good, strengthen the con- 
of democracy, both in the develop- 
ed the developed nations, try to 
: progress on resolving the Middle 
:rn dispute. And one thing that 
'ed everywhere I went was an ex- 
ion of interest or concern on the 
of the foreign leaders about how 
'ere going to address the energy 
ion. 



Additionally, of course, I wanted to 
strengthen, if possible, the friendship 
in varying degrees that existed origi- 
nally between our own nation and the 
other countries that we visited. 

I had never been before to India or 
the Middle East — or the countries that 
we went to in the Middle East. These 
were the four or five things that I had 
in mind. I think we did a fairly good 
job. 

Q. I know that's what you in- 
tended to do, but do you think you 
accomplished those? What, in par- 
ticular, do you think you have 
accomplished? 

A. There is no doubt that the friend- 
ship between ourselves and Poland, 
ourselves and India, ourselves and 
Saudi Arabia, ourselves and Iran, our- 
selves and Egypt, ourselves and 
France, and Belgium were enhanced. 
And this was accomplished. 

I believe that we made some prog- 
ress in the Middle East. So far as I 
know, there are no differences that 
separate us from Sadat, for instance. 
We reemphasized the same basic prin- 
ciples that we proposed 6 or 8 months 
ago to the Arab and the Israeli leaders. 
In this respect, the trip was successful. 

I made two or three major speeches, 
too: one on democracy as it relates to 
the developing nations in the world 
under changing circumstances; the 
other one, democracy as it relates to 
the developed or industrialized nations 
in the world in changing circum- 
stances. It's hard to say whether the 
speech has made any impact or not. 

I think we also put forward the 
image of a nation that is strong and se- 
cure and self-confident but which 
doesn't have to prove our strength by 
taking advantage of other nations that 
are not so strong or forceful or secure 
as are we. 

The personal relationships that I 
evolved between myself and the 
foreign leaders was very gratifying. 

I would say the most emotional day 
was yesterday with the visit to Nor- 
mandy and the reception of the people 
in Bayeux and the response of the 
French people along the streets of Paris 
and the tremendous crush of people 
that showed up last night at the Palais 
de Versailles. It was a very deeply 
moving experience. 

Q. Do you think that there were a 
couple of gaffes — I guess it's the 
word? 

A. Yes. There were. 

Q. In the Polish translation, the 
open mike in New Delhi — did that 
cause you any problems in dealing 



17 

with the leaders, or will it cause any 
permanent problem in relations with 
these countries? 

A. Both were inadvertent, of course. 
Gierek, I thought, made a very fine 
statement afterward. He said, "In Po- 
land we don't criticize women or trans- 
lators." [Laughter] That happened the 
first time I met Gierek, and afterward 
we had a very fine personal relation- 
ship. He never commented on it except 
just to smile and say, "Well, it was 
kind of ancient Polish and had a Rus- 
sian influence." But I don't think it 
had any lasting effect. 

And I have read the news reports of 
the statements of the Indian leaders 
after we left, and I think, perhaps, 
without trying to be overly optismistic, 
that it kind of helped me and [Prime 
Minister] Desai both. I was very force- 
ful about our nonproliferation program, 
pointed out to him very frankly and 
bluntly that the Congress was likely to 
pass stringent requirements on fuel 
supplies in the future, with my ap- 
proval. And I wanted him to know at 
least 18 months ahead of time that it 
would affect India. 

And he and I made a joke of it sev- 
eral times after that in a perfectly easy 
way. And after we departed, their re- 
ports to the press were that it was a 
very constructive visit. 

I think it showed Desai was, as I re- 
ferred to him, adamant in the Indian 
position. We tried to evolve some solu- 
tion to this potential conflict about in- 
ternational safeguards on production of 
nuclear power versus an adequate sup- 
ply of fuel. One possibility that we will 
explore is that if we and the Soviets, 
the British, can conclude a comprehen- 
sive test ban, that this would be an 
adequate new factor to permit Desai to 
accept comprehensive safeguards with- 
out having to violate the principles of 
autonomy or independence. 

But I regret that the open mike thing 
occurred. I can't mislead you about 
that. Between me and Desai, it was al- 
ways a matter of humor and good re- 
ception. I think anybody that observed 
me and him closely saw that there was 
a genuine feeling of mutual respect. 
Q. Let me just follow up here. 
A. Please do. But it was a mistake. 
Q. Yes, sir, it was probably a mis- 
take, but was it a mistake because of 
the way the press operates or was it a 
mistake on your part? 

A. It was a mistake on my part. I 
should have said "a very frank and fac- 
tual letter" and not "a blunt and cold 
letter." But what I was trying to talk 
about to Cy Vance — obviously I had 
nothing of ill-feeling toward Desai — 
what I was talking about was it was a 
cold, technical subject, and it ought to 



; ;1 



si 

i 
\ 



i: 



be described to the Indians in no uncer- 
tain terms so that they would know 
what to expect 18 months after the 
legislation takes place. 

Q. I am intrigued that you — I 
don't want to belabor the Middle 
East episode, but it certainly did 
overshadow the trip in many ways; 
developments kept going— you say 
that— Sadat said that you have an 
identity of views, and you say that 
you don't seem to have any differ- 
ences. Does that put you — and Sadat 
has differences with Begin— so where 
does that put you with Begin? 

A. I read the news reports after my 
statement at Aswan, and Begin ex- 
pressed approval of what I said. There 
is a fairly good agreement between 
Begin and Sadat on matters concerning 
the definition of peace. 

Sadat told me that when he met in 
April with me in Washington and I out- 
lined the three basic principles, one 
was complete peace between Egypt and 
Israel — open borders, diplomatic rec- 
ognition, ambassadorial exchange, free 
trade, tourist and student and cultural 
exchanges. And he told me it would 
never happen in his lifetime, which he 
did— he told me that in April. 

He told me the other morning in 
Aswan that he was completely wrong, 
that not only was he well accepted in 
Israel but he was a hero when he came 
back to Egypt, that when the Israeli 
negotiators came to Cairo, that they 
were embraced and the Egyptians wept. 
And he said to me, "My people were 
far ahead of me, and what you pro- 
posed in April that I thought was never 
possible has already proven to be pos- 
sible." That's one aspect. 

The withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from the West Bank, with minor excep- 
tions on the western boundary, is a 
principle that we espoused back in Feb- 
ruary or March publicly. And I think 
this is still an acceptable approach to 
the Arabs, although publicly I wouldn't 
expect them to espouse it now because 
it violates, in effect, the statements in 
Rabat. They are able and, obviously, 
willing to speak for themselves. But 
this is something we've been very clear 
on. 

The other question, the resolution of 
the Palestinian problem, I think, can be 
resolved with an interim solution for a 
joint administration. I don't want to be 
definitive about it, but possibilities in- 
cluding Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, 
Gaza Strip, Palestinians, perhaps the 
United Nations for a period of time, 
specifically outlined ahead of time, and 
then the right of the Palestinians to de- 
cide their own future between whether 
they should continue that kind of ad- 
ministration or affiliate with Jordan— 



those are the kinds of principles that we 
have described very clearly and in writ- 
ing beginning 8 months ago. 

The details are going to be a prob- 
lem. But on those expressions of prin- 
ciple, I don't know of any differences 
that separate me and Sadat. 

Q. Do you call that self- 
determination? 

A. Yes, I don't think it's — I have 
never thought and do not think that it's 
advisable for us, for the Middle Eastern 
countries, or for the world to have an 
independent Palestinian nation located 
between Israel and Jordan. I think they 
would be a target of subversion. I think 
there would be a concentrated influ- 
ence, perhaps, exerted there by some 
of the more radical other leaders of the 
world. And I think that that Palestinian 
entity or homeland ought to be tied in 
at the least in a very strong federation 
or confederation with Jordan. 

But now I want to say that's our 
preference. And if Israel and Jordan 
and the Palestinians and Egypt should 
work out something different, we 
would not object. But that's our posi- 
tion. And we made it very clear from 
the very beginning of my Administra- 
tion to the Israelis and the Arabs that 
that's our preference. 

Q. I was wondering, were there 
any unexpected gains or losses 
throughout the past 9 days? 

A. That's hard to describe. You 
know, I'm not an objective analyst. 
But I felt that the progress we made 
with India was extraordinary. 
Q. In what specific area? 
A. Under Mrs. Gandhi, there is no 
doubt that the orientation of India, 
which has been an historic friend of 
ours, has been away from us, perhaps 
toward the Soviets. 

I felt like Desai and his government 
has at least come back to a completely 
neutral or nonaligned position. And 
there was a genuine feeling of com- 
patibility and friendship, based on deep 
religious convictions, a commitment to 
democracy, the principle of human 
rights, that was very encouraging to 

me. . . 

It was more than I had anticipated. 1 
don't want to analyze it myself, but the 
French news media have said that we 
have- never had better relationships 
with France in this past hundred years 
than we have right now. I feel very 
close to Giscard d'Estaing. 

I think the French outpouring of 
emotion and friendship toward us and 
the tremendous crowds that evolved on 
the streets of Paris — Giscard d'Estaing 
said that's a very rare occasion. 

The French are almost as blase about 
foreign visitors as are the people in 
Washington, because it's such a center 



Department of State Bullet 

for diplomatic visits. But I thought 
was a very good expression ( 
friendship. 

And as I said earlier, I thought tl 
community of memories, of history e 
pressed on the beach near Omaha ye 
terday was something that you can't a 
ticipate and you can't contrive, 
thought it was really genuine. Tho 
are a couple of things that impress. 

me. j 

Rosalynn's and Dr. Brzezinski 
visit with Cardinal Wyszynski show 
that there's a pluralism in the Poli 
society that is not frequently acknov 
edged in an Eastern European country 
It's obvious that as far as the infl 
ence on the minds and hearts and fun 
of the Polish people that there's a sh 
ing between a great religious leader a! 
the political leader. And privately th 
expressed admiration for each oth 
And I think this is a good, kind oi 
pleasant, surprise to know more ab; 
the nations behind the Iron Curtain. 
I think the curtain is being parted 
think it's a good step forward. We c- 
summated an additional proper act 
today by returning the crown to Hi 
gary. 11 We're not trying to driv< 
wedge between those Warsaw Pact 
tions and the Soviet Union. But we 
trying to get them to look to us. 
friends who want peace, who recogiji 
the horrible suffering that they've 
perienced, and who are building a b 
for friendship and trade and muf 
exchange. 

We signed a nuclear agreement v 
the Iranians that will provide billion: 
dollars of trade for American indus 
a lot of jobs for American people, 
won't violate at all our nonprohferai 
policies. 

There were some things that 
hadn't really laid down on the age 
ahead of time that occurred. But 
hard for me to be objective about it 
Q. What about any kind of nfl 
tive aspects? Were you surprised 
anything that didn't go as well as i 
thought it might have? 

A. No. I can't think of anything, 
perhaps you can. 

Q. As a followup on your disi 
sions about Poland, I have two q 
tions: One is why didn't you youi 
see Cardinal Wyszynski, and did i 
make any efforts to suggest to 
Gierek that he should allow his i 
sident journalists into your p 
conference? 

A. Yes. We requested that the ]■ 
conference be open ahead of tl 
That's his country. He made that I 
sion And I made the decision to" 
ment on it publicly. And he made 
decision, I presume, for my com 
to be published very freely in 



ruary 1978 

ish newspapers and also on the tele- 
on that evening. 

Vt extended an invitation to Cardi- 
Wyszynski to come and meet with 
But he said it was not proper for a 
iinal to come to pay his respects to 
So, we thought it was a good solu- 
there, at the last moment I might 
, for Rosalynn to accompany Dr. 
ezinski, who had planned to see 
dinal Wysznyski all the time, 
wrote him a private message. He 
te me a little note, and it was a 
ually beneficial thing. But I think 
contact with him through Zbig and 
alynn was adequate. 
>. Can you be more specific — 
ybe you don't want to be — on 
it you mean when you say Pales- 
ans have the right to participate 
heir own self-determination? 
. I don't really want to spell out in 
more detail what the procedure 
tit to be. Dayan [Foreign Minister 
;he Dayan of Israel] and Kamel 
eign Minister Ibrahim Kamel of 
pt] will be meeting in Jerusalem on 
15th of January. Cy Vance will be 
B, We'll offer our good offices. 
[y own preference is that the Is- 
is and Egyptians negotiate that 
"im procedure with a final referen- 
themselves. We'll try to find some 
promise between them. I think if 
can evolve an acceptable set of 
ciples, then it would be much 
it for King Hussein and, perhaps 
on, the Syrians to join in the elis- 
ions. I did not try to convince Hus- 
to participate now. 
feel and he feels also that Sadat is 
|uately representing the Arab posi- 
And I think Sadat, in an almost 
ue way, not only has the trust of 
own people and the rest of the 
d but also, to a substantial degree, 
rust of the Israeli citizens. 
II of us feel for now, until Sadat 
ifically requests it, that Hussein 
Id stay out of the direct negotia- 
!■ The Shah will be supportive, the 
lis were very encouraging about 
future, and Hussein, and we agree 
pletely. 

tid so, I think that the present pos- 
is a good one. But exactly how the 
should be handled or when or 
: the options might be offered to 
Palestinians, I don't want to say. I 
t know. 

. Can I also ask you, do you 
k that as a result of your visit 
e, that Sadat's position with the 
lline critics of the Arab world 
been improved and that he's 
igthened his hand as a result of 

■ I don't think I would be violating 
confidence to say that all the Arab 



leaders with whom I met said they sup- 
port Sadat unequivocally. Now, the 
feeling of Syria is something that I 
can't assess. I didn't happen to talk to 
Asad lately, but the feeling of Iraq and 
Libya and the more radical Arabs is 
obvious. They don't want peace to pre- 
vail. They don't want a settlement to 
be reached. They don't want the 
Geneva conference to be concluded. 
And many of them still have as a 
unique purpose the destruction of 
Israel. 

I don't think that Asad or King Hus- 
sein or Sadat or the Saudis — the ones 
with whom I've talked — I don't think 
any of them feel that way. I think they 
all are perfectly willing to accept Israel 
now as a permanent entity in the Mid- 
dle East, living in peace. 

Q. Before we left, you said you 
were going to talk about human 
rights, and you certainly did, I 
think, just about every place we 
went. But since we were in Poland, 
where you told us about Gierek's 
commitment to you on emigration 
rights, I don't think we had any 
specific information that any of the 
leaders have given to you, any reac- 
tion to your own position. Is there 
anything specific? In particular I am 
thinking about Iran. Have there been 
any concessions that we haven't 
learned about? 

A. No. Obviously, we don't seek 
concessions on human rights in Bel- 
gium or Egypt or France. In Iran, the 
Shah and I have had very all- 
encompassing discussions about human 
rights. I am not inclined to reveal the 
private conversations. But the basic 
question in Iran is the law that exists 
that outlaws the Communist Party and 
that outlaws communism are very simi- 
lar to the laws that we have enforced in 
the past very rigidly. And this is the 
basis for the problem. 

But the Shah is very deeply con- 
cerned about human rights, and I men- 
tioned human rights in my statement in 
Iran. But we've seen in Iran, in many 
ways, the opening up of the rights of 
women, the welcoming of disparate re- 
ligious and racial groups to Iran — a 
very fine movement forward, I would 
say, equivalent to what we've done in 
the last 20 years. 



Q. Do you think you would have 
liked to have been Viceroy of India? 
[Laughter] 

A. I don't know. I tried to learn 
while I was in India what their feelings 
are toward the British. And my sense 
was that they have a genuine apprecia- 
tion of what the British did, that the 
viceroys' administrations were in gen- 



19 



eral very benevolent. There was no 
India before the British came. It was 
just a collection of a large number of 
independent states in all forms. The 
British brought the subcontinent to- 
gether in unity. 

After Gandhi's historic and unbe- 
lievable crusade, the British left with 
good spirits. They turned over the 
power to Nehru on their departure. 

And they were very proud to take me 
to a room, for instance, where no 
American or European has ever been. 
It's a beautiful portrait gallery, under- 
neath the palace where we stayed, of 
all the British viceroys and other ad- 
ministrators who had been there and 
their wives. Every portrait is, I'd say, 
twice life-size. And it's very beauti- 
fully done, and it shows the respect 
that the Indians feel toward the British. 
So, I didn't have any yearning to be a 
viceroy. [Laughter] I'd rather be Presi- 
dent. [Laughter] I think the British left 
with a good feeling among the Indians. 

. D 






1 Remarks by President Carter made on occa- 
sions during the trip other than those printed 
here are in the Weekly Compilations of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Jan. 2 and 9, 1978. 

2 Vice President Mondale's remarks omitted 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Jan. 2). 

3 Exchange of remarks were made at the Civil- 
ian Terminal, Okecie International Airport. First 
Secretary Edward Gierek spoke in Polish (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Jan. 2). 

4 Held in the Grand Ballroom at the Victoria 
Hotel. It was broadcast live via satellite on radio 
and television in the United States and was taped 
for broadcast later that evening in Poland. Sev- 
eral reporters spoke in Polish, and their ques- 
tions were translated by an interpreter (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Jan. 2). 

5 Issued at the conclusion of President Car- 
ter's visit (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 2). 

6 Exchange of remarks were made at the Im- 
perial Pavilion at Mehrabad International Airport 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Jan. 2). On Jan. 1 President Car- 
ter met with King Hussein I of Jordan in Tehran. 

7 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Jan. 9. 

8 Exchange of remarks were made at Riyadh 
Airport. His Highness spoke in Arabic (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Jan. 9). 

9 Made at Aswan Airport following their 
meeting (text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Jan. 9). 

10 Made before an audience invited under the 
auspices of several French-American business, 
civic, and cultural societies (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Jan. 9). 

1 ' The Crown of St. Stephen and other Hunga- 
rian cornation regalia were returned to the Hun- 
garian people by a delegation headed by Secre- 
tary Vance at a ceremony in Budapest on Jan. 6. 









,1 

4 



20 



State of the Union (Excerpts) 



In our foreign policy the separation 
of people from government has been, 
in the past, a source of weakness and 
error. In a democratic system like ours, 
foreign policy decisions must be able to 
stand the test of public examination and 
public debate. If we make a mistake in 
this Administration, it will be on the 
side of frankness and openness with the 
American people. 

In our modern world, when the 
deaths of literally millions of people 
can result from a few terrifying seconds 
of destruction, the path of national 
strength and security is identical to the 
path of peace. 

Tonight I am happy to report that be- 
cause we are strong, our nation is at 
peace with the world. 

We are a confident nation. We've re- 
stored a moral basis for our foreign pol- 
icy. The very heart of our identity as a 
nation is our firm commitment to 
human rights. 

We stand for human rights because 
we believe that government has a pur- 
pose to promote the well-being of its 
citizens. This is true in our domestic 
policy; it is also true in our foreign pol- 
icy. The world must know that in sup- 
port of human rights, the United States 
will stand firm. 

We expect no quick or easy results, 
but there has been significant move- 
ment toward greater freedom and hu- 
manity in several parts of the world. 
Thousands of political prisoners have 
been freed. The leaders of the world — 
even our ideological adversaries — now 
see that their attitude toward fundamen- 
tal human rights affects their standing 
in the international community, and it 
affects their relations with the United 
States. 

To serve the interests of every 
American, our foreign policy has three 
major goals. 

U.S. Security 

The first and prime concern is and 
will remain the security of our country. 
Security is based on our national will, 
and security is based on the strength of 
our armed forces. We have the will, 
and militarily we are very strong. 

Security also comes through the 
strength of our alliances. We have re- 
confirmed our commitment to the de- 
fense of Europe, and this year we will 
demonstrate that commitment by fur- 



ther modernizing and strengthening our 
military capabilities there. 

Security can also be enhanced by 
agreements with potential adversaries 
which reduce the threat of nuclear dis- 
aster while maintaining our own rela- 
tive strategic capability. In areas of 
peaceful competition with the Soviet 
Union, we will continue to more than 
hold our own. At the same time, we are 
negotiating with quiet confidence, 
without haste, with careful determina- 
tion, to ease the tensions between us 
and to insure greater stability and 
security. 

The Stragetic Arms Limitation Talks 
have been long and difficult. We want 
a mutual limit on both the quality and 
the quantity of the giant nuclear arse- 
nals of both nations — and then we want 
actual reductions in strategic arms as a 
major step toward the ultimate elimina- 
tion of nuclear weapons from the face 
of the Earth. If these talks result in an 
agreement this year — and I trust they 
will — I pledge to you that the agree- 
ment will maintain and enhance the 
stability of the world's strategic bal- 
ance and the security of the United 
States. 

For 30 years concerted but unsuc- 
cessful efforts have been made to ban 
the testing of atomic explosives — both 
military weapons and peaceful nuclear 
devices. We are hard at work with 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union on 
an agreement which will stop testing 
and will protect our national security 
and provide for adequate verification of 
compliance. We are now making, I be- 
lieve, good progress toward this com- 
prehensive ban on nuclear explosions. 

We are also working vigorously to 
halt the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons among the nations of the 
world which do not now have them and 
to reduce the deadly global traffic in 
conventional arms sales. Our stand for 
peace is suspect if we are also the prin- 
cipal arms merchant of the world. So 
we've decided to cut down our arms 
transfer to abroad on a year-by-year 
basis and to work with other major 
arms exporters to encourage their simi- 
lar constraint. 

Regional Security 

Every American has a stake in our 
second major goal — a world at peace. 
In a nuclear age, each of us is 
threatened when peace is not secured 



Department of State Bullet 

everywhere. We are trying to promo 
harmony in those parts of the wor 
where major differences exist amoi 
other nations and threaten internatiori 
peace. 

In the Middle East we are contribi 
ing our good offices to maintain t 
momentum of the current negotiatio 
and to keep open the lines of commui 
cation among the Middle East leadei 
The whole world has a great stake 
the success of these efforts. 

This is a precious opportunity for 
historic settlement of a longstandi 
conflict — an opportunity which m 
not come again in our lifetime. Q 
role has been difficult and sometirr 
thankless and controversial, but it \ 
been constructive and it has be t 
necessary and it will continue. 



Economic Security 

Our third major foreign policy gf 
is one that touches the life of ev< 
American citizen every day — wo 
economic growth and stability. 

This requires strong economic p 
formance by the industrialized derm 
racies like ourselves and progress hv 
solving the global energy crisis. L 
fall, with the help of others, we sjj 
ceeded in our vigorous efforts to m? 
tain the stability of the price of oil. ! 
as many foreign leaders have ej 
phasized to me personally and, I ' 
sure, to you, the greatest future con 
bution that America can make to 
world economy would be an effect 
energy conservation program here 
home. We will not hesitate to take 
actions needed to protect the integi 
of the American dollar. 

We are trying to develop a more j 
international system. And in this spi 
we are supporting the struggle 
human development in Africa, in A: 
and in Latin America. 

Finally the world is watching to 
how we act on one of our most imp 
tant and controversial items 
business — approval of the Pana 
Canal treaties. The treaties now bel 
the Senate are the result of the worl 
four Administrations — two Demot 
tic, two Republican. They guarai 
that the canal will be open always 
unrestricted use by the ships of 
world. Our ships have the right to g< 
the head of the line for priority of | 
sage in times of emergency or ne 
We retain the permanent right to 
fend the canal with our own mill 
forces, if necessary, to guarantee 
openness and its neutrality. 

The treaties are to the clear ad; 
tage of ourselves, the Panamani; 
and the other users of the canal. Rai 
ing the Panama Canal treaties 



jruary 1978 

monstrate our good faith to the 
rid, discourage the spread of hostile 
ologies in this hemisphere, and di- 
:tly contribute to the economic 
11-being and the security of the 
ited States. 

rhere were two moments on my re- 
it journey which, for me, confirmed 

final aims of our foreign policy and 
at it always must be. 
)ne was in a village in India where I 
t a people as passionately attached 
their rights and liberties as we are 

whose children have a far smaller 
nee for good health or food or edu- 
lon or human fulfillment than a child 
n in this country. 

'he other moment was in Warsaw, 
ital of a nation twice devastated by 
■ in this century. There, people have 
uilt a city which war's destruction 
t from them; but what was new only 



emphasized clearly what was lost. 

What I saw in those two places crys- 
tal ized for me the purposes of our own 
country's policy: to insure economic 
justice, to advance human rights, to 
solve conflicts without violence, and to 
proclaim in our great democracy our 
constant faith in the liberty and dignity 
of human beings everywhere. 

. a 



1 Address before a joint session of the Con- 
gress on Jan. 19, 1978 (for complete text, see 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Jan. 23, p. 90). On Jan. 19 President Carter 
also transmitted a separate, more detailed State 
of the Union message to the Congress which de- 
scribes Administration priorities in the areas not 
fully covered in his address; the complete text of 
that message is printed in the Weekly Compila- 
tion referred to above, p. 98. Also printed as H 
Doc. 95-273. 



News Conference 
of January 12 (Excerpts) 



luch has been said about the mes- 
js that I carried on behalf of the 
erican people to leaders of the na- 
s which I visited on the recent trip. 

it's also important to focus on the 
sage that I received from them and 
lght back home. 

hey are looking to our country to 
whether we have the will, the re- 
e to deal squarely with our energy 
)lems, which are also becoming 
r problems. It's clear that our will- 
iess to curb the enormous American 
jnal appetite for imported oil will 

consideration, for instance, in fu- 

OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
siting Countries] oil prices, 
s a nation, we are increasing our 
ands for foreign oil. We may have 
iervation forced on us by unex- 
ed and rapid increases in oil prices 
ie future. Our consumers and our 
stries will pay more and more to 
gn countries, and with those dol- 
that go overseas we are, in effect, 
'rting American jobs. 

Paris and in Brussels, our own al- 
expressed concern about whether 
:an and will enact strong energy 
lation. If our own economy is not 
ig, if our strength is being sapped 
excessive imports, then we can't 
ide the kind of leadership and sta- 
y on which the economic well- 
l of the Western democracies rests 
-avily. 

ie United States has had, and is 
raced with, a very large trade defi- 
'hich has led recently to exchange 



market disorders and exchange rate 
speculation. It's clear that our heavy 
dependence on imported oil is a main 
part of our trade problem and that our 
failure to adopt a comprehensive 
energy program has badly weakened 
confidence in our ability to deal with 
that problem. 

Almost every foreign leader stressed 
the importance of our energy program 
in terms of our responsibilities for in- 
ternational monetary order and the 
maintenance of the integrity of the 
dollar. 

We all recognize that while the 
energy program will not reduce our oil 
imports overnight, that it will reduce 
our dependence on foreign oil over the 
long pull and also permanently. It 
would improve our trade position, our 
national economy, the strength of the 
dollar in a fundamental way. 

I believe that we do have the resolve 
and the national will to deal with the 
energy problem. The debate in the 
Congress has been long and devisive 
and arduous. It has, at times, tried the 
patience of all of us. And delay has de- 
ferred action, unfortunately, on a 
number of other important national 
priorities. 

But when we do succeed — and I be- 
lieve we have an excellent chance to 
succeed early in this session — we will 
have accomplished something in which 
we can take pride, not just here at 
home but before the other nations of 
the world as well. 



21 

Q. Everywhere you traveled, ex- 
cept Poland, we were told that you 
and the leaders talked about Soviet 
and Cuban penetration in the Horn 
of Africa, but we only got very 
generalized and vague statements on 
this. Can you enunciate the depth of 
our concern, and what can we do 
about it except jawbone? 

A. We've taken a position concern- 
ing Africa that we would use our influ- 
ence to bring about peace without ship- 
ping arms to the disputing parties and 
without our injecting ourselves into 
disputes that could best be resolved by 
Africans, both those parties that are in 
dispute and the Organization of African 
Unity. The Soviets have done just the 
opposite. 

They, in effect, contributed to the 
war that's presently taking place be- 
tween Somalia and Ethiopia. They sold 
excessive quantities of arms and 
weapons both to Somalia and to 
Ethiopia. The war began using Soviet 
weapons, and now they are shipping 
large quantities of weapons, some men, 
and they are also dispatching Cubans 
into Ethiopia, perhaps to become com- 
batants themselves. We have expressed 
our concern to the Soviets in very 
strong terms. 

We have shared the concerns that we 
feel with the leaders that I have visited, 
both the cumulative group of countries 
that join with us in the NATO alliance, 
and specifically with France, the Mid- 
dle Eastern countries, and India. We've 
had unanimous response from them 
sharing our concern about the Soviet 
Union's unwarranted involvement in 
Africa. I am very concerned about the 
loss of life now. 

Our hope is that the Somalians might 
call publicly for negotiations to begin 
immediately to resolve the Ogaden 
dispute. One possibility, of course, 
would be to go to the Security Council 
of the United Nations or to the perma- 
nent members of the Security Council. 
But the basic negotiation ought to take 
place between those two nations 
themselves. 

I think that there are things that we 
can do to express our concern publicly, 
to offer our good services in support of 
the African nations who are responsi- 
ble, to support the Organization of 
African Unity, and in the United Na- 
tions to let our voice be heard. But I 
hope that we can induce the Soviets 
and the Cubans not to send either sol- 
diers or weapons into that area and call 
for and achieve a rapid initiation of 
negotiations. 



Q. When talking about the aggra- 
vation of oil imports, the U.S. Gov- 






ii 

1 



22 

ernment's strategic petroleum 
stockpile — I think your decision is to 
acquire 1 billion barrels of oil — 

A. That's correct. 

q. — on the world market. Now, 
the GAO [General Accounting Of- 
fice] and others have recommended 
that we use oil we already own, in 
the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Re- 
serve, and that would save, I think, 
as you're going now, to about $20 
billion you're going to spend on 
foreign oil. We could reduce this by 
half, a $10 billion saving, if we used 
our existing naval supplies. Why 
don't we do that? 

A. We are, in effect, increasing the 
production of American oil to cut down 
on the amount that we have to pur- 
chase. At Elk Hills, at Teapot Dome, 
we're trying to increase the importing 
of oil to the continental United States 
from Alaska. We're trying to maintain 
the production of oil, sour oil, to some 
degree, in California in addition to re- 
ducing overall consumption of oil and 
energy and shifting to coal. 

And at the same time, it's very im- 
portant to us to have stability in the 
world oil market and protect us from 
some interruption in the future over 
which we have no control. 

We've set a goal for ourselves that 
by 1985, we'll have a billion barrels of 
oil stored in a secure place in salt 
domes in the United States so that we 
can have an 8- or 10-month supply in 
case overseas oil is interrupted in com- 
ing to us. 

The sum total of what we propose is 
to do exactly what you describe. 
Whether domestic oil actually goes into 
the supply system of our country and 
foreign oil goes into the underground 
storage is really of no consequence, 
because the overall consumption of oil 
plus the import or use of oil to build up 
our reserves is the factor that controls 
how much we import. 

Q. My question is — what it goes to 
the point of— the $10 billion savings. 
We already own the Elk Hills naval 
oil reserve. 

A. When we sell that oil, if it's on 
the commercial market, the Federal 
Treasury gets the money back for that 
oil. So, there's just really swapping 
dollars. It may be very difficult to 
transport the oil from Elk Hills and 
identify a particular gallon or barrel of 
oil that has to go into a salt dome in 
Louisiana. 

Q. They talked about swap ar- 
rangements, particularly with Japan. 
Japan would be very happy to have 
that very sweet Elk Hills oil, and 
they'd give us their Mideast oil. 
A. I understand. But we're trying to 



do what I've just said: build up the 
adequate supply of oil for reserve and 
cut down consumption and imports at 
the same time. 



Q. When you were in Egypt meet- 
ing with President Sadat, President 
Sadat emerged from that meeting 
saying that your views and his on the 
Middle East were essentially identi- 
cal. Does that mean that you think 
the Israelis should withdraw from all 
20 settlements they have in the Sinai 
plus their West Bank settlements be- 
fore there can be peace in the Middle 
East? 

A. It's not for me to decide the spe- 
cifics of an ultimate settlement, either 
between Israel and Egypt or Israel and 
Jordan or Israel and the other nations 
involved or the Palestinians. 

I think that it's accurate that Presi- 
dent Sadat and I see the Middle East 
question almost identically. I've not 
been involved and don't intend to get 
involved in the military settlement 
that's now being negotiated in Cairo. 
The position of our government is now 
and has been that Israeli settlements on 
occupied territory are illegal and that 



Department of State Bullet 

they contravene the Geneva conferem 
decisions that were made. 

The U.N. Resolution 242 is the bas 
for the ultimate decision. All the n 
tions involved have espoused 242, ai 
338 later on, which set up the Gene 
conference with ourselves and tl 
Soviets as chairmen. We have in th 
language that says Israel will withdn 
from occupied territories. 

Combined with that requiremer 
though, is that Israel will have seen 
borders including a realization of sec 
rity from the attitude of her neighboi 
This is an extremely complicated si 
ject as you well know. I can't say tl 
on every specific instance that Pre 
dent Sadat and I will agree on detai 
We didn't discuss those details. 

And I think that it's best for us jij 
to add our good offices when we c; 
support both men as they go to I 
negotiating table. Secretary Vance v 
be in Jerusalem with the foreign mir 
ters of the two countries involved, i 
our position on the settlements has i 
changed. 



1 For full text, see Weekly Compilation 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 16, 1978, p. 



War Powers Bill 



Statement by President Carter 1 

I am today signing H.R. 7738, an act 
"with respect to the powers of the 
President in time of war or national 
emergency." 

H.R. 7738 is the result of a coopera- 
tive effort by the Congress and this 
Administration. Its broad purpose is to 
differentiate between those economic 
powers available to the President in 
time of war and those available in time 
of declared national emergency. The 
bill is largely procedural. It places ad- 
ditional constraints on use of the Presi- 
dent's emergency economic powers in 
future national emergencies and insures 
that the Congress and the public will be 
kept informed of activities carried out 
under these powers. Enactment of the 
bill will not affect embargoes now 
being exercised against certain coun- 
tries, nor does it affect the blockage of 
assets of nationals of those and other 
countries. 

In approving the bill, I must note my 
serious concern over the provision con- 



tained in section 207(b), which wc 
allow Congress to terminate a natic 
emergency declared by the Presideni 
concurrent resolution. 

Provisions such as these raise \ 
found constitutional questions, si 
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitu 
requires that congressional action 1 
ing the force of law be presented to 
President for his signature or veto 
addition, such provisions have the 
tential of involving Congress in 
execution of the laws— a responsib 
reserved exclusively to the Presii 
under the Constitution. This featur 
the bill may be unconstitutional. I 
therefore treat the provision as rec 
ing only that I "notify and wait" 
respect to national emergencies < 
ered by section 207(b) of this act. 



' Made on signing H.R. 7738 into la- 
Dec. 28, 1977 (text from Weekly Compilati 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 2, 1978) 
enacted H.R. 7738 is Public Law 95-22. 
proved Dec. 28. 



truary 1978 



23 



THE SECRETARY: Foreign Policy Decisions 

for 1978 ' 



3ur country, within sight and mem- 
- of some Americans still living, has 
:n transformed from a largely agrar- 

society to the world's greatest in- 
strial power — one in which eco- 
nic, political, and social mobility 

the accepted order of the day. The 
tastic stories of Horatio Alger, as 
11 as those of H. G. Wells, have 
ne true. Of course, there is still pov- 
/ in America. There is still lack of 
ficient opportunity for many. There 
till discrimination. 
Jut, day by day, and despite a few 
•lorable detours, we have held re- 
rkably to the journey begun by our 
inding Fathers — toward a new na- 
i in a new world in which each citi- 

might stand free and equal beside 
neighbor, able to make the most of 
or her human potential. 
VTien I am asked about the Ameri- 

people — as I often am by leaders of 
;r countries — I say that as a people 
have today a renewed faith in our 
dreams, and this is something Pres- 
nt Carter and I believe in very 
ply. Because of who and what we 
, both the basic interests and the 
lis of our people must be present in 

foreign policy, or it will not be 

I sustained. 

We must maintain a defense estab- 
ment modern and strong enough to 
:ect ourselves and our allies. 

We must protect American in- 
:ment overseas and insure continu- 
access to vital raw materials. 

We must be strongly competitive 
nomically so that American families 

continue to enjoy their standard of 
ig- 

We must maintain our close rela- 
s with our allies, while we seek at 
same time improved contacts with 
main competitor, the Soviet Union, 

with the nonaligned nations. 

II of this, and more, can be 
sued — as we pursue our national 
rest — while still expressing the 
?er ideals and aspirations that have 
us to our remarkable economic and 
al progress here at home. 

ur strength lies not only in our 
Is but in the practical way we iden- 
problems and work systematically 
ird their solution. We do the best 
n we are true to ourselves, 
hat is why America was at her best 
ie Marshall plan, why we have felt 
ome with Food for Peace and the 



Peace Corps. That is why I find such 
broad public support for President Car- 
ter's emphasis upon human rights — 
including not only rights to the integ- 
rity of the person and political rights 
but the rights to food, clothing, shelter, 
housing, health, and education. 

That is why, with all its difficulties, 
we have embarked on a course of di- 
plomacy in the Middle East which may 
help bring peace to the people of that 
region. 

That is why we are trying to help 
bring solutions — not our solutions but 
solutions through free elections — in 
Rhodesia and in Nambia so that people 
there will have their chance for human 
emancipation and development. 

That is why we seek arms control ar- 
rangements through negotiations and 
have adopted a conscious policy of re- 
straint on conventional arms transfers. 

That is why we took tangible first 
steps in 1977 toward other goals, as 
well: to stop further nuclear prolifera- 
tion; to reach agreements on the control 
of strategic weapons, agreements that 
will enhance the security of our nation 
and all the world; to reach agreement 
with our Western industrial partners on 
policies leading to economic revival 
and growth; to reaffirm our commit- 
ment to normalization of relations with 
the People's Republic of China; to re- 
duce military competition in the Indian 
Ocean; to emphasize our support for 
racial equality and full political partici- 
pation of all the people of South 
Africa. 

The Carter Administration in 1977 
made a conscious and deliberate effort 
to construct a foreign policy based 
upon American interests and upon 
American values and ideals. 

In 1978, there are actions, decisions, 
and choices which we must make here 
in America — some of them 
difficult — which will help determine 
how such a policy can be nourished and 
further evolve. 

Panama Canal Treaties 

One involves the decision of the 
U.S. Senate on the Panama Canal 
treaties — treaties which are the culmi- 
nation of 14 years' work by four 
American Presidents of both major 
political parties and their Secretaries of 
State. This is a decision which is being 
watched not only by all the nations of 
Latin America — all of which favor the 



treaties — but by other nations around 
the world. 

Through these treaties, we can 
secure — definitively and permanent- 
ly — our right to use the canal and to 
protect it. It is a place for us to put the 
lie, once and for all, to the wornout 
charge that we Americans are in- 
terested only in making the Southern 
Hemisphere safe for our own economic 
interests. 

Imagine, if you will, that a foreign 
country controlled and administered a 
10-mile-wide strip of land running the 
length of the Mississippi River. How 
long do you think the people of this 
country would willingly accept such a 
situation? This is an issue requiring 
understanding and foresight. 

If we ratify the treaties, we can make 
clear to the world that disputes can and 
should be settled peaceably — through 
the rule of law and negotiation. And, 
most importantly, we can insure and 
safeguard the long-term usefulness and 
viability of the canal itself to all who 
use it, including ourselves. 

Economic Relations 

Another decision we must make is 
one regarding our economic relations 
with the rest of the world. 

In 1978 we shall be moving toward a 
conclusion of the Tokyo Round of trade 
negotiations with other importing and 
exporting countries. 

In 1962, when President Kennedy 
argued for the passage of the historic 
Trade Expansion Act, which led to 10 
years of worldwide economic expan- 
sion, he rightly pointed out that "a ris- 
ing tide lifts all boats." 

Today the world is badly in need of 
economic recovery. Other major na- 
tions are suffering rates of inflation and 
unemployment which rival or are even 
higher than ours. The Tokyo Round, of 
and by itself, will not instantly restore 
worldwide economic prosperity. It 
will, however, encourage new invest- 
ment and profitable exchange. If it fails 
and falls victim to a new wave of inter- 
national protectionism, we can be sure 
that many of the "boats" will founder 
and some may sink. 

I know that this is not an abstract, 
theoretical matter for the American 
worker or businessman or farmer who 
depends for his family's living on pro- 
duction of steel, CB radios, color tele- 
vision sets, microwave ovens, textiles, 



:« 









24 

footwear, automobiles, computers, 
sugar, and many other items. The 
changing world economy has made 
other nations competitive in production 
of these products, and we are feeling 
the result of it. 

The Carter Administration knows 
this and is doing its best to help the 
American industries and people af- 
fected. The new steel program, an- 
nounced in December, is a part of that. 
So are our present discussions with 
Japan on reducing its import barriers 
and increasing its rate of growth. 

But we and others must help our- 
selves in ways that do not throw the 
world back into the kind of disastrous 
protectionist spiral that we all experi- 
enced in the Great Depression. 

Under economic pressure, one coun- 
try, and then another, in the 1930's 
closed its borders to foreign goods. 
High tariffs increased the price of ev- 
erything to everyone, everywhere. 
Then we closed our banks and our 
businesses and our farms as we fell into 
worldwide depression. The great ports 
of our country were, as you well know, 
empty and forlorn places. 

A new wave of protectionism would 
imperil the American profits and 10 
million jobs which depend on those ex- 
ports. The hardest hit of all would be 
the American farmer, who is having a 
hard time staying in the black right 
now. California is an agricultural state. 
I have just learned that there is more 
acreage under cultivation in the United 
States to produce food which we sell to 
Japan than there is total acreage under 
cultivation in Japan. If Japan, for in- 
stance, were to close its borders to our 
food and fiber as part of a trade war, 
farms and rural communities in this 
State and elsewhere in America would 
be severely harmed. 

So we must make the necessary deci- 
sion to keep our commitment to both 
domestic and world economies which 
are open to competition and which re- 
ward productivity. That will involve 
knocking down barriers to our products 
elsewhere in the world. But it will also 
involve our acceptance of the fact that 
to buy from us, other countries must be 
able to sell to us. 

Third World 

We also have decisions to make — 
beyond those surrounding the Panama 
Canal treaties and the Tokyo Round- 
about a whole range of relations with 
the so-called Third World. These coun- 
tries, most of them gaining their inde- 
pendence after World War II, are in- 
creasingly involved in our daily lives. 

You know how the amount and cost 



of oil from these countries affect this 
country. 

We also get more than 50% of the 
tin, aluminum, and manganese we need 
from less developed countries and sub- 
stantial amounts of our lead, tungsten, 
and copper. 

In addition, we depend on the emerg- 
ing countries for an important share of 
our exports. Recent figures show, for 
instance, we exported $29 billion in 
goods to the non-oil-producing de- 
veloping countries. This was three 
times the 1970 figure, three times our 
exports to Japan, and $3 billion more 
than our exports to all of industrialized 
Europe. These exports, of course, 
mean American jobs. 

At the same time, it is in the de- 
veloping world that many of the so- 
called global problems are most 
evident and threatening. 

Inefficient and wasteful use of the 
Earth's resources, pollution of the 
oceans and atmosphere, nuclear prolif- 
eration, unchecked arms competi- 
tions — all of these are problems which 
involve not only these countries but 
also the safety of the human race. 

Most countries of the Third World 
have too little food; many lack the 
means to produce enough of their own. 
Almost all have exploding populations. 
Even the most optimistic projections 
for the future point to population in- 
creases in the Third World of some 
75% by the year 2000. Perhaps even 
more troubling, this growth seems cer- 
tain to be concentrated in already 
hard-pressed urban centers. Imagine, if 
you will, as the projections indicate, a 
Mexico City with 32 million people; 
Sao Paulo with 26 million; and Cal- 
cutta, Bombay, Rio de Janeiro, Seoul, 
Peking, and Shanghai each with some 
19 million in 22 years. 

In the years immediately ahead, 
many of the key nations of the Third 
World will be even more a part of our 
daily dialogue than they are today. We 
must decide how we shall relate to 
them. 

These countries believe that they 
should no longer be the "hewers of 
wood and drawers of water" for the 
rich Western nations, and we under- 
stand this. In the past year, we have 
reduced their suspicion of the United 
States and, thereby, lessened the likeli- 
hood that we could be faced with at- 
tempts at new cartels, built around raw 
materials and commodities other than 
oil, and unending political and eco- 
nomic hostility. 

The countries of the Third World 
now feel that we regard them as impor- 
tant and sovereign nations and that we 
identify with their human aspirations. 



Department of State Bullet 

The emerging nations of the world ca 
be constructive partners of the Unite 
States. 

Make no mistake about it. Thes 
countries are not early-day miniatun 
of the United States. Many will choo: 
paths of political and economic d 
velopment which we will not approv 
But a majority, at least, will be lookir 
to us for understanding and assistant 
as they seek to build modern societie 

Will we be willing to share our tec 
nology with these countries? Will v 
be ready to help stabilize the bas. 
commodity prices on which many 
their economies are based? Will v 
treat their products fairly in the intern 
tional marketplace? Will we be willii 
to support their national economic d 
velopment plans when they do not ; 
ways suit our own tastes? All the 
questions are complex and some po 
difficult problems. But this Administi 
tion fully realizes that we shall ha' 
our own interests and we shall not' 
true to our own values if we fail to a 
dress these issues sympathetically. 



; 



Southern Africa 

An immediate and tangible test 
our intentions toward the Third Wo: 
lies in southern Africa. I speak of ' 
three principal problems of Rhodes; 
Namibia, and the situation within So; 
Africa itself. We cannot impose so 
tions in southern Africa. We cant 
dictate terms to any of the parties; c 
leverage is limited. 

But we are among the few gove 
ments in the world that can talk to b< 
white and black Africans frankly a 
yet with a measure of trust. We woi 
lose our ability to be helpful if we 1 
that trust. It is, therefore, essential t 
our policies of encouraging justice 
people of all races in southern Afr 
be clear to all. 

After careful consideration, tl 
Administration is actively pursuing 
lutions to all three southern Afrn 
problems. These problems must 
addressed together, for they 
intertwined. 

Some have argued that apartheid 
South Africa should be ignored for 
time being in order to concentrate 
achieving progress on Rhodesia ; 
Namibia. Such a policy would be wr. 
and would not work. It would be bl 
to the reality that the beginning 
progress must be made soon wit 
South Africa if there is to be a possi 
ity of peaceful solutions in the Ion 
run. It could mislead the South A 
cans about our real concerns. It wc 
prejudice our relations with our Am 
friends. It would do a disservice to 






ruary 1978 

i beliefs. And it would discourage 
:e of all races who are working for 
;eful progress within South Africa. 
fe believe that we can effectively 
uence South Africa on Rhodesia 

Namibia while expressing our con- 
is about apartheid. 
ft believe that whites as well as 
ks must have a future in Namibia, 
babwe, and South Africa. We also 
eve that their security lies in prog- 
. Intransigence will only lead to 
ter insecurity. 

^e will welcome and recognize 
tive action by South Africa on each 
hese three issues. But the need is 
for progress on all of them, and we 
I need the continued support of the 
jrican people for a policy which 

encourage and press for that 
;ress. 

is Limitation 

nother decision facing us, as a 
>le, is one which is now reflected 
ur discussions on strategic arms 
ation with the Soviet Union. Secu- 
is the issue here. We pursue our 
rity in two ways: 

By maintaining a military estab- 
nent which will see to the safety of 
elves and our allies and 
By arms control. 

hat we cannot achieve by mutual, 
1 limitations, we insure by our own 
igth. 

ius, we have to think of the 
tegic Arms Limitation Talks 
^T) as a process. It is a process of 
)vering whether we can work out 
J of our security problems with the 
et Union. It is a process also in the 
i that we try to solve what strategic 
lems we can at each stage; then, 
nove on to the next stage and the 
level of problems, 
e do not seek reductions in arms 
leir own sake but only when reduc- 

promote security. But there can 
i important result from arms reduc- 

alongside an increase in our secu- 
the potential for us and for others, 
Jding those in the developing 
i, to cut spending on armaments 
:o reorder priorities, 
we have the courage and patience 
e it through, I believe we can both 
:r the threshold of international 
er and release new resources for 
vorks of peace through SALT and 

such negotiations. But we must 
non the will to do it. For it is in 
elations with the Soviet Union that 
and peace issues and decisions are 

involved, 
ir policies toward the Soviet Union 



are based upon a realistic appreciation 
that this is a serious competitive rela- 
tionship and that Soviet objectives in 
the world are very different from ours. 
It is also important to recognize, how- 
ever, that there are specific matters on 
which our interests are not in 
conflict — not least, in the avoidance of 
nuclear war. 

In the cause of peace and of our own 
interest, we have engaged the Soviet 
Union on a wide range of concrete mat- 
ters intended in the first instance to 
stabilize the military competition and 
to regulate the political competition. 
These are our first objectives, because 
they go to the heart of the issue of war 
and peace. 

Beyond these objectives, we seek to 
enlarge areas of common understanding 
and common action on a range of inter- 
national issues, including human 
rights; cooperation on matters affecting 
the lives of people everywhere, such as 
disease, food supply, pollution of the 
environment, and the application of 
science and technology. 

Progress in these fields is uneven 
and may take a long time, but we draw 
patience and a long-term perspective 
from our realization of how far we have 
come from the intense and dangerous 
cold war spirit that prevailed only a 
few decades ago. 

The alternative to this active 
dialogue with the Soviets implies a re- 
turn to the tensions and mutual isola- 
tion of the cold war. Many of you and 
the leadership of this Administration 
remember what that period was like. In 
good conscience, we cannot recom- 



25 

mend that we lead the country back to 
the troubles and fear of that era. 

Middle East 

Tomorrow I leave for Jerusalem to 
assist at an event that we all would 
have regarded as impossible just a few 
short months ago. The Foreign Minis- 
ters of Egypt and Israel will sit down 
together, around a conference table, to 
start the detailed negotiation of peace 
between Israel and the Arab states. 
After three decades of estrangement 
and hostility, the process of reconcilia- 
tion has begun. 

I am sure that you, as all Americans 
and peoples the world over, have been 
as moved as I was by the dramatic 
events of the weeks just past. President 
Sadat's sudden and spectacular visit to 
Jerusalem captured the imagination of 
all of us; it was an act of vision and 
statesmanship. The warmth of his re- 
ception by Prime Minister Begin and 
the people of Israel, surmounting the 
bitter memories of four wars which 
had brought tragedy to every family, 
gave clear testimony to the desire for 
peace. 

President Sadat's initiative and 
Prime Minister Begin 's response have 
set in motion a negotiating process 
which began with the Cairo preparatory 
conference in December and will con- 
tinue at ministerial level in a Military 
Committee in Cairo and a Political 
Committee in Jerusalem. Both Egypt 
and Israel have emphasized that they 
view the negotiations now underway as 
laying the groundwork for negotiations 
among all parties to the Arab-Israeli 






ECONOMICS: U.S., Japan 
Trade Agreement 



White House Statement ' 

The President is pleased by the 
agreement reached between Ambas- 
sadors Strauss and Ushiba on behalf of 
the U.S. and Japanese Governments 
regarding trade and other economic is- 
sues of common concern. 2 The Presi- 
dent believes that the agreed measures 
constitute a promising development in 
the two countries' efforts to strengthen 
economic relations; he is gratified at 
the provision for followup meetings to 
discuss both implementation of this 
agreement and further progress. 

This agreement should strengthen the 
bonds of friendship between the two 
countries, underlining their will and 



ability to cooperate with each other and 
with other nations in devising common 
actions to meet common problems. The 
President is gratified at the role played 
by Prime Minister Fukuda in helping to 
bring about this outcome. He looks 
forward to working in concert with the 
Prime Minister in regard to continuing 
efforts to promote a healthy world 
economy. □ 



1 Issued on Jan. 13, 1978 (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Jan. 23). 

2 Robert S. Strauss is the U.S. Special Repre- 
sentative for Trade Negotiations; Nobuniho 
Ushiba is Japanese Minister of State for External 
Economic Affairs. 



ViS\ 



;; 






26 

conflict, looking toward a comprehen- 
sive peace in the Middle East. 

After his discussion with President 
Sadat last week, President Carter made 
clear the task facing the Middle Eastern 
Political Committee meeting in 
Jerusalem. 

• First, true peace must be based on 
normal relations among the parties to 
the peace. Peace means more than just 
an end to belligerency. 

• Second, there must be withdrawal 
by Israel from territories occupied in 
1967 and agreement on secure and rec- 
ognized borders for all parties in the 
context of normal and peaceful rela- 
tions in accordance with U.N. Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338. 

• Third, there must be a resolution 
of the Palestinian problem in all its as- 
pects; it must recognize the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people and en- 
able the Palestinians to participate in 
the determination of their own future. 

I believe that these principles, as 
stated by the President, should be ac- 
ceptable to the governments and 
peoples on both sides of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. 

To move from principles to concrete 
achievement will require flexibility and 
courage, qualities of statesmanship of 
which the leaders of Egypt and Israel 



have already given full display. 

For our part, we stand ready to help 
Arabs and Israelis achieve their peace. 
It is important to our national interests 
that we do so; our values and character 
as a people demand no less than our 
greatest effort to help resolve this 
tragic conflict. 

We will participate actively in the 
work of the Jerusalem meeting, as the 
parties have asked us to do. When dif- 
ficulties in the negotiations arise, we 
may be able to make some helpful 
suggestions to bridge the gaps between 
the parties; however, we will not im- 
pose a blueprint for resolution of issues 
which ultimately only the peoples of 
the area can resolve. 

There can be no turning back from 
Jerusalem. Arab and Israeli peoples 
would bitterly resent a diplomatic fail- 
ure now that these long-hostile nations 
have found the will and the capacity to 
approach each other in mutual respect. 
From what I have said today, I be- 
lieve that you can tell that I am ba- 
sically optimistic about our foreign pol- 
icy and the chances for future advances 
in the cause of peace. 

Despite our problems, this is a 
strong and free country and one which 
is filled with hope and vitality. 

Some 33 years into the nuclear age, 
the world has not blown itself up. In- 
deed, we have in those years, through 



Department of State Bullet 

diplomacy and international leadershi 
lessened the chances of that ev 
happening. 

We have, since World War II, se< 
more than 100 new countries ent 
nationhood. They are becoming pr 
ductive, self-sustaining members oft 
international community. 

The task ahead, as I see it, will be 
persevere on the course we ha' 
charted. This is a time when politic 
and economic change is taking place 
rapidly— Peter Drucker has aptly call 
this "an age of discontinuity" — that! 
might tempt some to retreat to our ot 
inward fortress America habitudes. 

However, we are now being true 
ourselves, and faithful to what o 
200-year-old document called 
decent respect for the opinions of im 
kind." In the past year, President C 
ter has led us to make the hard de 
sions that have shown again that c 
country has not lost its faith in mai 
perfectability. 

We have great strength. Prope; 
channeled, our strength can be a cata 
tic and vital force in bringing peai 
opportunity, and material well-being 
millions of people — in America as W 
as abroad. 



1 Address before the Los Angeles World, 
fairs Council on Jan. 13, 1978 (press releas? 
of Jan. 13). 



E1\ERGY: Prospects for the Next Decade 



by Richard N. Cooper 1 

Four years ago, the energy crisis 
was visible at every gas station. Last 
winter the energy crisis was felt in 
cold homes and closed factories. But 
in between emergencies, the energy 
crisis becomes a matter of statistics 
and political argument rather than 
palpable distress. I am concerned that 
we as a nation are not aware of the 
full peril we face. As imported oil 
approaches 50% of our domestic con- 
sumption, for example, only about 
half of the American people even 
realize that we must import oil. And a 
recent poll indicated that only 12% of 
the public thinks there could be a 
shortage of oil within the next 15 
years. 

This lack of awareness is in some 
ways understandable. Not only are 
there no lines at the gasoline stations 
today, but there is more worldwide 
capacity to produce oil at present than 



there is demand at prices set by the 
14-nation Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). With 
new sources of production from 
Alaska and the North Sea, we may 
have a few years of a soft oil market. 
But as we enter the 1980's, there is 
every reason to believe that the mar- 
ket will get tighter — unless we take 
tough action now to curb demand and 
increase domestic supply. 

In 1985, according to recent 
studies, the total demand for OPEC 
oil by the non-Communist countries, 
assuming present energy policies con- 
tinue, could range between 44 and 49 
million barrels per day. Although 
OPEC's productive capacity might 
amount to as much as 40-45 million 
barrels per day, its likely level of 
production, due to economic and 
political considerations, might be 
more on the order of 36 million bar- 
rels per day, up from 31 million bar- 
rels per day in 1977. We, therefore, 



have a potential daily shortfall of 
to 13 million barrels. This prosp 
tive shortfall translates into the thi 
of another leap in prices, with all I 
went with the last one — inflate 
recession, and prolonged econoi 
disruption. 

I hardly need remind you how i 
ferent the impact of an increase in 
price of oil is from that of ot 
commodities. A drastic rise in 
price of strawberries may cause 
guish among strawberry lovers 
may compel some minor adjustmi 
among the consumption habits of 
public at large. But the economy : 
whole would not be affected. Oi 
different. A price rise here is pe 
sive in its inflationary impact, 1 
directly and indirectly through 
prices of many other produt 
Perhaps paradoxically, it also h; 
powerful deflationary— or perl 
one should say contractionary— el 
on aggregate economic activity. 



iruary 1978 

process of adjusting our economy 
I society to sharply higher energy 
ts is particularly long and difficult. 
)ur physical capital stock has been 
It up over the past 30 years on the 
umption of cheap and plentiful oil 
I gas. We can see this in the style 
1 location of our homes and build- 
s, the structure of our cities, our 
isportation systems, and the choice 
productive techniques in our fac- 
es and on our farms. Because the 
umption of cheap energy is so 
ply rooted in the current structure 
our economy, adjustment to a 
iod of shortage is exceedingly dif- 
jlt. (By "shortage" I use the 
nomist's conception, which will 

typically involve physical short- 
;s if prices are free to move; 
ler, the hardship takes the form of 
rply higher energy bills and pain- 
induced retrenchment of demand.) 

avoid sharply higher prices, 
:ed-pace adjustment, and severe 
ial and economic dislocations, we 
;t anticipate the coming crisis be- 
: we get all of the market signals, 
he pain of adjustment can be 
atly reduced if it can be spread 
r a period of time and adapted to 

natural capacity of our economy 
djust. We need to make sacrifices 

—to alter lifestyles and business 
:tices — to enable us to meet and 
rcome a crisis looming in the 
ewhat distant future. Anticipating 
re calamities is perhaps the most 
icult challenge for a democracy. 

it is a challenge that we, as well 
)ur allies, must meet if our eco- 
lic and political systems are to 
ain healthy and vigorous in the 
O's. 



t>al Dependence on Oil 

he domestic and international as- 
s of the energy problem are in- 
wined. Whatever our problems, 
situation of other industrialized 
ocracies is more precarious. Most 
far more dependent on imported 

and since most now use energy 
e sparingly than do we, they have 
less fat to shed before their 
lomies become hostage to a short- 

of oil. They are limited, how- 
", in what they can do on their 

to improve their situation, and 
" financial circumstances are typi- 
/ weaker than ours, 
have emphasized thus far the 
'lems arising from a likely short- 
of oil in the mid-1980's. I do not 
I to remind you that we may not 
■ to wait until then to experience 
e problems. We are presently 
erable to disruption in the supply 



of oil from any source, whether it be 
from a politically motivated embargo 
or even a significant terrorist disturb- 
ance. Our vulnerability was dramati- 
cally demonstrated in late 19/3; it is 
far greater now. Even the mere possi- 
bility of a supply disruption has a 
significant effect not only on eco- 
nomic decisons but also on national 
security considerations. A concen- 
trated dependence on foreign sources 
for any vital material reduces our 
freedom of action and leaves us open 
to threats. The potential effects are, 
of course, even greater on our allies 
with their greater dependence on im- 
ported oil. Their sense of vulnerabil- 
ity to disruption of oil supplies in- 
creases considerably the burden upon 
us. 

With only 6% of the world's popu- 
lation, we consume one-third of the 
world's energy production at a rate of 
the equivalent of a barrel of oil per 
week per person. We use twice as 
much energy per person as Germany 



27 

or Sweden — nations with roughly our 
standard of living. Although our own 
production is still substantial, we 
now, in addition, absorb nearly one- 
third of total OPEC oil production. 

The United States is the world's 
largest energy consumer and the 
largest oil importer. If we do little to 
reduce our dependence on imported 
oil, the most ambitious efforts of the 
other industrialized nations to prevent 
a future shortfall will be futile. De- 
spite this fundamental truth, our ef- 
forts to reduce our dependence will 
not prevent a shortage if others con- 
tinue to significantly expand their oil 
consumption. 

If our nations do not prepare for 
the oil shortfall in the 1980's, the 
framework of international coopera- 
tion which we have worked so hard to 
build since World War II will be im- 
periled. Severe economic disturbances 
would be followed in some countries 
by political instability. The trend to- 
ward freer international trade, which 



U.S. OIL CONSUMPTION BY SOURCE 



1955 



1960 



1965 



1970 



1974 



1976 



85% 



15% 



DOMESTIC 




IMPORTS 



81% 



19% 



79% 



21% 



77% 



23% 



63% 



37% 



58% 



42% 




(mmb/d) 

Source: Department of Energy 



:r«i 



ii 

u 

Jj 

■4 



28 

has been responsible for much of our 
post-World War II prosperity, would 
surely be reversed under conditions of 
recession and oil-induced balance- 
of-payments difficulties. The prosper- 
ity and cohesion of the Western in- 
dustrialized nations would be at 
stake, putting in jeopardy our own 
security and ultimately our way of 

life. 

The non-oil-producing developing 
countries would also be hard hit eco- 
nomically. These nations are not prof- 
ligate energy users; they use very lit- 
tle energy, but their economic 
development — both in industry and in 
agriculture — depends on the availabil- 
ity of imported energy. If oil prices 
are rising, the burden on the already 
fragile external financial condition of 
these countries could become insup- 
portable. The cost of their imports 
would rise, and in world recession 
their exports would contract. Eco- 
nomic development would stop if not 
regress. 

To prepare for the energy crisis as 
it affects us now, and will affect us 
even more seriously in the future, 
President Carter determined that one 
of the first priorities of this Adminis- 
tration would be to develop a com- 
prehensive energy program that will 
cut the growth of our energy con- 
sumption and reduce the demand for 
imported oil. The President's program 
aims at lowering the annual growth of 
energy consumption in the United 
States to less than 2% by 1985, com- 
pared to an average of 3.5% from 
1950 to 1973. And it would reduce 
our oil imports in 1985 from a possi- 
ble 12 million barrels per day to 6 
million. 

This program would have the not 
merely incidental benefit of helping 
to reduce our huge trade deficit, 
which with oil imports now costing 
$45 billion a year is more than fully 
accounted for by our recent heavy de- 
pendence on imported oil. 

Our energy program is only part of 
a broader effort to insure that the 
energy crisis does not suddenly over- 
whelm the entire international system. 
We intend to continue our nation's 
leading role in the work of the Inter- 
national Energy Agency (IEA), an or- 
ganization that includes Canada, Ja- 
pan, and most of the industrialized 
democracies of Western Europe, as 
well as the United States. The IEA 
has already done much to transform 
the energy problem from a potentially 
divisive force into a unifying one. It 
has developed an emergency plan 
which would insure that the burden of 
supply disruptions would be borne 
equitably, thus avoiding a repetition 



Department of State Bullet 



In November 1977 the Department of State 
released a discussion paper entitled The 
United States and World Energy. It was pre- 
pared by Ralph Stuart Smith, a special ad- 
viser in the Bureau of Public Affairs. 

Generously illustrated with tables, charts, 
and photographs, this 39-page paper (with 
bibliography) reviews some of the interre- 
lated diplomatic, commercial, and technical 
aspects of the energy question, with their im- 
plications for the United States and its 
foreign policy. It chronicles the events lead- 
ing up to and following the crisis of 1973- 
74; describes the impact that crisis had on the 
industrial democracies, the oil-producing 
countries, the non-oil developing countries, 
and the Communist countries; and reviews 
the types of energy resources available — oil, 
natural gas, shale oil, coal, nuclear, solar, 
and geothermal. 

The paper concludes that: "Large in- 
creases in domestic oil production seem 
clearly ruled out, apart from the contribution 



of Alaska; and a substantial part of our 
foreign sources are located in the Middle 
East, an area of high political tension and 
risk. A basic objective of our foreign policy 
has been and must be to bring about peace 
and security in that area; but regardless of 
what success we may have in such efforts, 
the fact remains that oil located abroad is not 
under our control. We cannot rely on its 
being invariably available in quantities which 
will insure that its price is one we can afford 
to pay . ' ' 

This discussion paper is not a statement 
of policy; rather it is an attempt to bring to- 
gether, for convenient reference, some es- 
sential facts and alternative views on 
energy. 

Single copies of this paper are available 
without charge from the Correspondence 
Management Division, Office of Public 
Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 



! 



of the uncoordinated and collectively 
harmful reaction to the 1973 oil 
embargo. 

The IEA is also vitally concerned 
with reducing its members' depend- 
ence on imported oil. Ministers of the 
IEA nations, including Secretary of 
Energy James R. Schlesinger, agreed 
recently in Paris to hold their total oil 
import demand to not more than 26 
million barrels a day by 1985; down 
from a probable figure of 36 million 
barrels if current policies continue. 

Obviously, this goal has to be 
backed up by strong domestic action 
by each of the member nations, or it 
will simply float off to join so many 
other well-intentioned but ineffectual 
objectives uttered at international 
forums. We and other members intend 
to examine closely the energy policies 
of all IEA nations and to treat seri- 
ously any lack of progress toward 
reaching our collective goal. But the 
United States is the key country; un- 
like any other nation, if we alone fail 
to do our share, the goal will never 
be reached. 

We are urging the non-oil- 
producing developing countries to 
make maximum use of private sector 
resources to expand their production 
of energy. To help meet the financial 
requirements of such an effort, we are 
supporting an increase in World Bank 
lending for energy development. 

And in the coordination of interna- 
tional economic policy with our major 
allies, we are trying to insure that the 
efforts of individual countries to cope 
with the burden of oil debt do not 
result in trade protectionism or 



exchange restrictions that could ul 
mately undermine the liberal intern 
tional economic system. 

Consuming nations are, of coun 
only one side of the energy equatiC 
Actions of the oil-producing natiop 
particularly the members of OPE 
are critical to the world economy a 
to the future of the world's ener 
supply. In our view, internatior 
energy policy must be a cooperati 
endeavor. The oil-consuming natioi 
particularly the United States, have 
responsibility to the rest of t 
world — as well as to themselves- 
control their consumption and to ( 
velop alternative sources of enerj 
The oil-producing nations, in tui 
must take into account the effect 
their price and supply actions on I 
world economy. It is in their o< 
interest, as well as that of the c 
veloping and developed worlds, 
avoid further disruption in woi 
trade and prosperity. 

Thus, there is a kind of inescapal 
bargain which must be made betwt 
oil producing and oil consuming i 
tions. It is an arrangement based 
deeds, not words or agreements, £ 
it is dictated both by the self-inter 
of each side and by the econon 
facts of life. The terms are simp 
Consumers must restrain demai 
producers must restrain prices a 
expand production to meet tl 
demand. 

The basis for this relationship < 
be clearly seen by considering the 
ternative. If consumers do not restr 
demand, production will be 
adequate and prices may take anot 



jruary 1978 

amatic leap. If producers raise 
ices continually and without eco- 
mic justification, the world econ- 
ly will suffer cumulatively increas- 
» damage, and the financial and 
litical stability will be undermined. 



mestic Energy Plan 

would now like to return briefly 
the President's energy plan. As 
11 know, it operates both on the 
)ply and demand for oil and the 
>ply and demand for energy. The 
) do not always correspond. An in- 
ase in the demand for energy need 

be accompanied by an increase in 

demand for oil. In fact, the plan 
vides for modest growth in energy 

while it would hold oil consump- 
i to just slightly above the 1976 
el. 
Vith respect to demand for energy, 

potential for additional conserva- 
l is clear. As noted above, we use 
ce as much energy per person as 
■many or Sweden. Some of that 
rgy use is careless waste, reflect- 

a bygone era of cheap energy, 
ch is built into existing structures 
I location patterns. Reducing 
rgy demand in these sectors often 
lot free; it requires investment and 
uld be judged by a test of cost- 
ctiveness. Measured by that test, 
e is enormous potential for profit- 
e investment in conservation — 
ie insulation, new energy control 
iniques in existing plants, new 
its and equipment which are op- 
ized according to current and fu- 
i energy prices. Conservation is 
simply a slogan or an exhortation 
;ood citizenship. It is a field of 
ortunity for investment and inno- 
ion by American business and 
leowners. 

lany of the programs you have 
pted in California — utility rate re- 
a, incentives for utilities to under- 
: vigorous conservation programs 

for customers to purchase solar 
ipment — have helped shape the na- 
al energy plan and can be a model 
Jther States. 

upply is an equally important fea- 
i of the President's energy 
tegy. The plan calls for an in- 
se by two-thirds in the production 
oal, to more than a biliion tons 
year by 1985. It provides steps to 
ulate substitution of coal for oil 

natural gas, as well as to over- 
e some of the present economic, 
a U and environmental constraints 
i its use. 

ie production of nuclear energy is 
ected to increase significantly. 
Plan is directed toward use of the 



light water reactor and defers the 
early commercialization of technol- 
ogies which have not been fully de- 
veloped or safeguarded against poten- 
tial misuse, particularly the breeder 
reactor. Expansion of the production 
of nuclear energy is an essential part 
of the effort of the United States and 
other industrialized nations to reduce 
our collective dependence upon im- 
ported oil. We believe it can be 
done in a manner which will not 
threaten our safety or our environ- 
ment. 

The plan also provides incentives 
for the development of new sources 
of domestic oil and natural gas. Con- 
trary to widespread misinterpretation, 
the price incentives — after allowance 
for taxes — are generous by any rea- 
sonable standard — more generous, in 
fact, than incentives to produce new 
oil and gas almost anywhere else in 
the world. 

We cannot afford, however, to lull 
ourselves into the expectation that 
domestic drilling will tap vast new re- 
serves of oil or gas. Our nation has 
probably been explored as thoroughly 
as any other. We can expect to in- 
crease production somewhat over the 
next 10 years, but for the supply of 
domestically produced energy to fuel 
an expanding economy, we will have 
to look to coal, nuclear, and other 
sources. 

We must also keep in mind that oil 
and natural gas may ultimately be 
most valuable to us as raw materials. 
They are used as feedstocks for pet- 
rochemicals, fibers, plastics, and 
pharmaceuticals as well as in lubri- 
cants, waxes, and asphalt. While we 
have now and expect to develop al- 
ternatives for many of the uses of oil 
and gas as fuels, it may be more dif- 



29 



ficult or more costly to find adequate 
substitutes for these other uses. 

A longrun solution to the energy 
problem involves more than oil and 
gas. The world economy must shift 
over time to nonfossil fuels, particu- 
larly to renewable resources. Sources 
which once seemed exotic, and which 
are now small-scale or experimental, 
will one day be routine. Solar energy, 
for example, offers enormous poten- 
tial for the future and specific, cost 
effective applications for today. Solar 
water heating is already competitive 
with gas or electricity in parts of the 
country. Costs of photovoltaic cells 
are declining substantially, and this 
form of solar electricity may soon be 
practical for numerous remote areas. 
Wind and geothermal energy could 
make a useful contribution by the 
year 2000. And the U.S. Government 
is actively pursuing, along with other 
nations, advanced forms of nuclear 
fusion and fission which would meet 
our concerns about the nonprolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons. 

For as far as we can see into the fu- 
ture, we shall have to make difficult 
decisions about energy. There is no 
"quick fix," no single policy cure- 
all. Instead there are a series of prac- 
tical measures that we can take now 
in order to preserve our chances for 
prosperity and security for the years 
to come. It is a privileged position for 
any generation to be able to foresee 
and adapt to the problems of the fu- 
ture. We should not miss that oppor- 
tunity. □ 



,<'.';■■■■ 



1 Address before the annual Business Fore- 
casting Conference at the University of 
California in Los Angeles on Dec. 8, 1977; 
Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs. 



EUROPE: Crown of 
St. Stephen 



by Secretary Vance ' 

It is often said that America is a na- 
tion of nations, and indeed we have 
grown and prospered because of the 
contributions of people from all over 
the world. We have drawn courage and 
inspiration from those who have come 
from other nations to settle in America, 
or to give us their help. 

Throughout two centuries, the des- 
tinies of the Hungarian and American 
peoples have frequently been linked. 
Our infant republic, struggling in its 



war of independence, welcomed Col. 
Michael Kovats who helped to found 
and train the cavalry forces of Gen. 
George Washington. Col. Kovats gave 
his life for American independence at 
the battle of Charleston, South 
Carolina. Hungarian journals of the day 
were filled with detailed reports of 
America's struggle for independence. 

Slightly more than half a century 
later, Americans saw the founding of 
the Hungarian republic. Not only did 
our republic recognize the Hungarian 
republic but became the only country to 



8W 






••■■\ 



1 


■ ■■■:■:■ 




. •'• 




. •'" - • •.''.-" 




■' '".•'• J 






c» 




II 




s» 




»1 




1 




■ 5 




- 




;! 




:'J 





30 

accredit a diplomatic minister to that 
government. 

When the republic was crushed, 
America welcomed with open arms the 
struggle's greatest hero, Louis Kos- 
suth. The impact of this great man and 
his ideals is reflected in the many 
American cities, villages, and counties 
which bear his proud name. 

A century ago, the pull of new land 
and new opportunity in the United 
States beckoned many people of Hun- 
gary. Indeed, this first great wave of 
immigration to the United States from 
Hungary — which lasted until the be- 
ginning of the First World War- 
brought tens of thousands of Hungar- 
ians to our country. They became 
farmers and skilled workers; they be- 
came businessmen and scientists and 
leaders in the arts. 

In 1944, as the battle lines moved 
westward into Hungary, the Crown of 
St. Stephen and other coronation re- 
galia were moved from their traditional 
place of safekeeping in Budapest to 
western Hungary under the protection 
of their custodial guard. In March 
1945, they were moved by the guard 
from Hungarian soil into Austria. 
Later, the guard turned over the crown 
and regalia to elements of the U.S. 
Army for safekeeping. 

We accepted this responsibility in 
the knowledge that the crown belongs 
to the Hungarian people. This histori- 
cal and religious treasure, which has 



played a central role in the history of 
the nation for nearly 1,000 years, 
should be in Hungary for its people to 
cherish. 

President Carter has written to your 
President a letter in which he states: 

It is with a genuine sense of pride that I am 
able to return to the people of Hungary this 
priceless treasure, which the United States has 
been privileged to shelter since the terrible dev- 
astation of the Second World War. I see in this 
act the reaffirmation of the traditional bonds of 
friendship between our two peoples. 

The return of the crown reflects the 
improved relations between our peoples 
and governments and responds to the 
national hopes of the Hungarian 
people. We also believe that it will 
foster the spirit of the Helsinki Final 
Act, to which the American and Hun- 
garian peoples are fundamentally 
dedicated. 

It is my unique privilege, on behalf 
of President Carter and the people of 
the United States, represented here by 
distinguished Members of the Congress 
of the United States and other distin- 
guished American citizens, to return to 
the people of Hungary the Holy Crown 
of St. Stephen. □ 



'Statement made at the ceremony on the return 
of the Crown of St. Stephen and other corona- 
tion regalia in Budapest on Jan. 5, 1978 (press 
release 7 of Jan. 7). 



Secretary \ance Visits 
Turkey and Greece 



Before returning to the United States 
from his trip to the Middle East, Secre- 
tary Vance visited Turkey and Greece 
(Jan. 20-22) to meet with government 
officials. Following are remarks to the 
press by Turkish Foreign Minister 
Gunduz. Okcun and the Secretary upon 
the latter 's arrival in Ankara and re- 
marks by Greek Prime Minister Con- 
stantine Caramanlis and the Secretary 
in Athens. ' 



ANKARA, JAN. 20 2 

Foreign Minister Okcun: I want to 
welcome Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
United States and would like to wish 
him a good, a pleasant stay in Turkey. 
Mr. Vance is a very famous statesman 
in the international field, and he is 
known as a troubleshooter No. 1 in in- 
ternational affairs. 



We have some trouble spots in the 
region, but I don't think that Mr. 
Vance would have time to be interested 
in some trouble spots like Cyprus and 
the Turkish-Greek relations. We be- 
lieve that these issues could be solved 
by the parties interested to these issues 
without any interference or involve- 
ment by any foreign and/or major 
power. 

The trouble spot which Mr. Vance 
would be interested in, I think, will be 
the Turkish- American relations, which 
have had a low profile recently. We 
would like to develop these relations, 
and we would like to discuss the prob- 
lems of common interest and to find 
out solutions which would be to the 
interest of both nations. I believe — I'm 
sure that a statesman like Mr. Vance, a 
statesman of high standing and long 
experience in international fields, 
would contribute to the development of 
Turkish- American relations. I welcome 



Department of State Bullet 

him and his wife and his colleague 
and again I wish him success and 
pleasant stay in Turkey. 

Secretary Vance: I am delighted 
return to Turkey at the kind invitatii 
of Prime Minister Ecevit. I am e 
tremely pleased that the Prime Mini 
ter's gracious invitation provided 
early opportunity for me to come i 
Ankara to review with the Prime Min 
ter and the Foreign Minister a broi 
range of world problems and issues th 
face our two countries. 

Let me emphasize that the U.i 
Government, and the American peop. 
value very highly our relationship w: 
Turkey and our longstanding alliani 
We share a very strong and deep co 
mitment to democratic ideals afl 
values. 

I am sure that I will benefit grea, 
from the discussions which I will s 
having tonight and tomorrow with i 
Prime Minister and other members 
his government. I look forward vj 
much to those discussions and frul 
him again for his kind invitation <i 
inviting me to come to your country 
Q. [Unofficial translation] Afi 
the Ecevit government came * 
power, the spokesman of the Ui 
State Department gave some optini 
tic and positive statements on 
subject of Ecevit's approach to wo 
issues and Turkish-Greek relaticSi 
Therefore, I wonder whether 
American Government hopes ti 
the defense agreement will pass m 
easily through Congress. 

Secretary Vance: Let me say I 
we will be discussing a whole rangi 
issues with the Foreign Minister i 
the Prime Minister. I'm sure that 
of the issues which will be coming 
will be the issue of our relationsh 
That is a very important relationship 
us. It always has been in the pas 
will be in the future. I think the atn 
phere between our two governmenl 
a very good one, and I look forwar 
a very fruitful relationship between 
two nations. 

Q. I talked with [U.N. Secreli 
General] Mr. Waldheim last wee 
Tehran. He was very hopeful 4 
respect to the Cyprus matter, 
you as hopeful to solve this prob 
as Mr. Secretary General in Tehii 
He assured me the problem wil' 
solved by the end of 1978. 

Secretary Vance: I'm dehgnte< 
hear that. I had a chance to talk 
him, too. He and I had a phone cori 
sation when he was in Tehran. He' 
very pleased with his conversaf 
when he was here in Ankara and | 
encouraged as a result of those dii' 
sions. I hope very much that t: 
hopes for the future will be acme 



'ebruary 1978 

ecause I think they're the hopes of 
veryone. Everyone would like to see 
rogress in that longstanding and dif- 
cult problem. 



31 



THENS, JAN. 22 3 

Q. Will you tell us about the issues 
tat you reviewed? 

Prime Minister Caramanlis: That 

what we will do. That is why we are 
sre. First, I would like to say how 
ippy I am about Mr. Vance's visit to 
reece and also to express my satisfac- 
on about the talks we had. 

As we know, Mr. Vance is in our 
mntry as a guest of the Greek Gov- 
nment. Consequently, he has not 
>me to propose solutions to our prob- 
ms; but he came to exchange views 
ith us on issues of mutual concern. 
First ,_$& discussed with Mr. Vance bi- 
teral issues, such as the aid provided by 
merica to Greece — which will amount 

$175 million this year — as well as the 
estion of the military facilities Greece 
providing to America. 
We also discussed the questions of 
VTO and ascertained that this ques- 
>n is connected with the settlement of 
i Cyprus issue. 

Next, we reviewed developments in 
5 Cyprus issue. Regarding this last 
estion, Mr. Vance stated to me that 
s government, because it is con- 
rned about peace in this area of the 
>rld, would like an early and just so- 
ion to be found but does not intend 

propose or recommend solutions, 
e U.S. Government will, neverthe- 
is, be at the disposal of the U.N. 
cretary General in order to help if the 
erested parties find this useful. 
[ had the opportunity to tell Mr. 
»nce — or rather to give Mr. 
ince— an account of the position of 
! Greek Government on all these is- 
:s as outlined in my election plat- 
m. And I can say with satisfaction 
1 1 was met with understanding, 
-inally, we discussed current inter- 
lonal problems and, more specif- 
ic, the developments in the Middle 

St. 

Hie conclusion is I had a very useful 
cussion with Mr. Vance, carried out 
an atmosphere characteristic of the 
iitional friendship which binds our 
) peoples. 

). Did Mr. Vance bring you any 
)posals on behalf of the Turkish 
vernment? 

'rime Minister Caramanlis: He 
'Ught no proposals. But he gave me 
impressions of the discussions he 
d in Ankara. However, from what I 
'e been told I can make no predic- 
ts about the future. 



Q. What does that mean; that you 
are pessimistic? 

Prime Minister Caramanlis: 

Neither optimistic nor pessimistic. If 
the proposals which Mr. Ecevit prom- 
ised to make should lead to an honora- 
ble and just solution of our differences, 
they will be sure to meet with a favora- 
ble Greek response because Greece — as 
I have often declared — sincerely wants 
to restore good relations with Turkey. 
If the aim of Ankara is only to create 
impressions, then I might say that it is 
a mistake, because to deny the hopes 
which it creates would aggravate the 
situation. 

Q. Will there be another meeting 
with Mr. Vance before his 
departure? 

Prime Minister Caramanlis: No, 

we have finished. We said all we had 
to say. This proves that we had no dif- 
ficulties. The fact that we need not 
have a further meeting proves that we 
had no difficulties. 

Q. Do the views put forth by Mr. 
Vance greatly differ from the Greek 
views? 

Prime Minister Caramanlis: You 

have been answered already. He [Mr. 
Vance] showed understanding. [Unof- 
ficial translation] 

Secretary Vance: Let me just make 
a very brief statement. I appreciate 
very much the opportunity to meet with 
the Prime Minister and to discuss the 
issues which have been reviewed for 
you. I have found it most informative 
and useful, and it will be very helpful 
to me and to President Carter in our 
understanding of these issues which are 
of great importance. 

With respect to the bilateral issues, 
of course, we both have a mutual inter- 
est in seeing these issues resolved in a 
mutually satisfactory way. And in that 
regard, I found our discussions also 
very useful. 

So again, let me express my deep 
thanks to the Prime Minister for his 
kindness in inviting me to come with 
him and exchange views on these bilat- 
eral issues and on the international is- 
sues of broad, worldwide scope. 

Q. Did you discuss the new Am- 
bassador's appointment? 

Secretary Vance: That subject did 
come up and we discussed it. 

Prime Minister Caramanlis: We 
discussed it and we found a solution. 
[In English] 
Secretary Vance: That's right. □ 



Sixth Report 
on Cyprus 



'Other press releases relating to Secretary 
Vance's trip are Nos. 42 and 43 of Jan. 21, 
1978; 44 and 47 of Jan. 23; and 46 of Jan. 25. 

2 Press release 41 of Jan. 21. 

'Press release 45 of Jan. 22. 



Message to the Congress 1 

As required by Public Law 94-104, this re- 
port describes the progress that has been made 
during the last sixty days towards a negotiated 
settlement on Cyprus. 

In my last such report to the Congress, sub- 
mitted on October 28, I described with cautious 
optimism the efforts that the Administration 
had been undertaking to promote an early re- 
sumption of meaningful intercommunal negoti- 
ations under the auspices of the United Na- 
tions. Over the past sixty days we have con- 
tinued to discuss the Cyprus issue extensively 
with Turkish, Greek and Cypriot representa- 
tives and with U.N. officials, our purpose re- 
maining that of persuading the parties to re- 
sume intercommunal talks at the earliest possi- 
ble date and to be prepared to come to the table 
with substantive, negotiable proposals. 

The Cyprus situation was discussed in the 
bilateral meetings that Secretary Vance held 
with Greek Foreign Minister Papaligouras and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil in Brus- 
sels in early December. These conversations 
and contacts with the two Cypriot communities 
have fortified our belief that a Cyprus settle- 
ment is earnestly desired by the parties con- 
cerned, and that they accept the need to resume 
negotiations to this end. Foreign Ministers 
Papaligouras and Caglayangil also met bilater- 
ally in Brussels, and in a joint communique 
stated that Greece and Turkey would continue 
to encourage a prompt resumption of negotia- 
tions as a means of promoting a comprehensive 
solution of the Cyprus problem. 

We hope that the recent elections in Greece 
will give new momentum to the search for a 
Cyprus settlement. Prime Minister Caramanlis 
said in his policy statement to the Chamber of 
Deputies in Athens on December 14 that his 
government "will continue to support the in- 
tercommunal talks under U.N. aegis and will 
provide its full support to the people of 
Cyprus ..." 

The Turkish Government has in recent weeks 
given public evidence of its favorable attitude 
towards a settlement on Cyprus. In a series of 
public interviews late in November, Foreign 
Minister Caglayangil declared his support for 
an early resumption of negotiations and indi- 
cated Turkish flexibility with respect to both 
territorial and constitutional aspects of a pack- 
age agreement. He also called for economic 
cooperation between the two Cypriot com- 
munities, and reaffirmed the Turkish Govern- 
ment's intent to withdraw its troops from the 
island once a settlement is in effect. This ad- 
ministration has welcomed Foreign Minister 
Caglayangil's statements as containing a 
number of positive elements, and we have also 
noted as steps in the right direction the Turkish 












I 



a 






32 

Government's decisions to withdraw an air 
force unit and 700 of its ground forces from 
Cyprus. It is our hope and expectation, based 
on the Turkish Government's announcement, 
that additional troop withdrawals will be made. 
Steps such as these might improve the general 
atmosphere so as to encourage the sense of 



Italy 



Department Statement 1 

U.S. Ambassador to Italy Richard N. 
Gardner's visit to Washington has pro- 
vided an occasion for a general policy 
review with senior Administration 
officials. 

There has been no change in the 
Administration's attitude toward West- 
ern European Communist Parties, in- 
cluding that of Italy, although recent 
developments in Italy have increased 
the level of our concern. 

As the President and other members 
of the Administration have publicly 
stated on a number of occasions, our 
Western European allies are sovereign 
countries and, rightly and properly, the 
decision on how they are governed 
rests with their citizens alone. At the 
same time, we believe we have an ob- 
ligation to our friends and allies to ex- 
press our views clearly. 

Administration leaders have re- 
peatedly expressed our views on the 
issue of Communist participation in 
Western European governments. Our 
position is clear: We do not favor such 
participation and would like to see 
Communist influence in any Western 
European country reduced. 

As we have said in the past, we be- 
lieve the best way to achieve these 
goals rests with the efforts of democra- 
tic parties to meet the aspirations of 
their people for effective, just, and 
compassionate government. 

The United States and Italy share 
profound democratic values and inter- 
ests, and we do not believe that the 
Communists share those values and 
interests. 

As the President said last week in 
Paris: "It's precisely when democracy 
is up against difficult challenges that its 
leaders must show firmness in resisting 
the temptation of finding solutions in 
nondemocratic forces." O 



trust required to make meaningful talks possi- 
ble. 

Since late October the Administration has ac- 
tively encouraged the two Cypriot communities 
to reach agreement on formulation of a joint 
committee— with International Red Cross 
participation— to investigate cases of persons 
reported as missing and unaccounted for since 
the intercommunal violence of the 1960's and 
the Turkish intervention of 1974. Work to- 
wards establishment of such a committee is 
proceeding. Tracing missing persons is, of 
course, a humanitarian rather than a political 
matter. Nevertheless, the experience of these 
past two months demonstrates that practical so- 
lutions to the problems that divide Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots might indeed be attainable. 
The readiness of both Cypriot parties to accept 
a simple and non-controversial resolution on 
missing persons in the U.N. General Assem- 
bly's Third Committee testified to a construc- 
tive attitude on this issue. 

The United Nations General Assembly con- 
ducted its annual debate on Cyprus November 
7-9, and the Security Council approved on De- 



Department of State Bulleti 

cember 15 the extension for a further si 
months of the mandate of the U.N. peacekeei 
ing force on Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Gener; 
Assembly debate provided the opportunity for 
thorough debate of the issues involved in tl 
Cyprus dispute. Renewal of the UNFICY 
mandate, in itself an important step, was signi 
icant also for the commendable spirit of cor 
promise displayed by the several parties co 
cerned. 

Resolute movement towards intensifie 
negotiations is still required, and in the wee 
and months ahead we will persist in our effoi 
to achieve this goal. We believe we are pr 
ceeding in the right direction, and we rema 
hopeful that substantive progress towards a ji 
and lasting Cyprus settlement can be achieve 
Jimmy Carter. 



'Transmitted on Jan. 20, 1978; this rep 
covers the period Nov. -Dec. 1977 (text fr i 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documas 
of Jan. 23). 



HUMAN RIGHTS: Cambodia 



by Warren Christopher 1 



While there is not time for a review 
of human rights conditions around the 
world, I do want to call your attention 
to what is among the most flagrant and 
massive abuses of human rights to be 



■Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman John Trattner on Jan. 12, 
1978. 



The Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs is the focal point 
for the advocacy of human rights and 
humanitarian concerns within the De- 
partment of State. It is actively involved 
in day-to-day policy development and 
the implementation of important foreign 
policy decisions. 

Public Law 95-105 requires a report 
on the current mandate and operations of 
that bureau, the mandate and operations 
of its predecessor offices, and proposals 
for the reorganization of the Department 
of State that would strengthen human 
rights and humanitarian considerations 
in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy 
and promote the ability of the United 
States to participate effectively in inter- 
national humanitarian efforts. This re- 
port was submitted to the Congress by 
Secretary Vance on January 31, 1978, 
and was printed in the Congressional 
Record of February 7, p. 51422. 



found in the world today— those i 
Cambodia. 

No one outside Cambodia can kn> 
the full dimensions of the systems 
terror and grinding down of the Call 
bodian people which has taken pi < 
under those who have seized pov 
there. The many detailed firsthand i 
ports from the stream of refugees fl: 
ing that country provide a picture c 
regime bent on destroying virtin 
every vestige of the existing society 
order to impose its will upon the po- 
lation. Hundreds of thousands] 
human beings— not only supporters: 
the former regime but people fromi 
elements of society— have pens: 
under this regime. 

While the United States has no rl 
tionship whatsoever with Cambou 
we condemn what has taken place tli 
and will take every suitable opportu J 
to speak out, lest by our silence I 
seem to acquiesce in the unspeak' 
human rights abuses that are occurr 
there. Moreover, we will be supporr 
international efforts to call attentio 
this egregious situation. 



'Excerpt from remarks before the Nan 
Foreign Policy Conference for Editor;! 
Broadcasters at the Department of Sta 
Jan. 18, 1978; Mr. Christopher is Deputy 
retary of State. 



February 1978 



33 



MIDDLE EAST: Secretary Vance Visits 
Israel and Egypt, January 16-22 



Secretary Vance visited Israel (Jan. 16-20) and Egypt (Jan. 20-22) to meet 
with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat. He headed the U.S. delegation 
at the opening session of the Political Committee in Jerusalem. Following are 
remarks and news conferences by Secretary Vance and foreign leaders on various 
occasions during the trip, as well as the texts of a White House statement on the 
Secretary's report to the President and Secretary Vance's statement before the 
House Committee on International Relations. ' 



OPENING SESSION, 
POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 
JERUSALEM, JAN. 17 2 

Let me first express to you, our host, 
my delegation's appreciation for the ar- 
rangements that have been made for the 
meetings that are opening today. 

We owe a deep debt of gratitude to 
President Sadat and to Prime Minister 
Begin for their steps toward peace 
*vhich have brought us to this room. 
We are here because of the courage and 
/ision of President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin in sweeping aside the 
carriers that for so long separated 
\rabs from Israelis, barriers that have 
:aused so many wars and so much 
)loodshed. We are here to work to 
'ring to fruition the task begun by Pres- 
dent Sadat and Prime Minister Begin 
n Jerusalem and in Ismailia and in the 
"airo conference, of which this com- 
nittee is an outgrowth. 

President Carter has sent me to rep- 
esent the United States at the opening 
>f these talks to demonstrate the impor- 
ance that we attach to them and to 
heir success. Since the very beginning 
>f the Arab-Israeli conflict, we have 
'layed an active role in the search for a 
ettlement. Our friendships with all of 
he parties are warm and strong. For 
he meetings that begin this morning, 
<t pledge to support the efforts of the 
arties to reach agreement. 
The common goal of all— Egypt, Is- 
ael, the United States, and those ab- 
ent today but who we hope will soon 
Jin in our efforts— is a just, lasting, 
nd comprehensive peace. If this com- 
putet is to succeed in its goal of pre- 
anng the way for such a peace, it 
lust come to grips with the difficult 
roblems of substance which continue 
> separate the parties. As President 
arter has said, we believe there are 
srtain principles which must be ob- 
-rved before a just and comprehensive 
eace can be achieved. 

• First, true peace must be based on 
Jrmal relations among the parties to 



the peace. Peace means more than just 
the end to belligerency. 

• Second, there must be withdrawal 
by Israel from territories occupied in 
1967 and agreement on secure and rec- 
ognized borders for all parties in the 
context of normal and peaceful rela- 
tions in accordance with U.N. Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338. 

• Third, there must be a resolution 
of the Palestinian problem in all its as- 
pects. The solution must recognize the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and enable the Palestinians to 
participate in the determination of their 
own future. 

Those of us here today bear a special 
and very heavy responsibility as repre- 
sentatives of our governments and as 
individuals. We must deal with and 
overcome many difficult problems. We 
will be held accountable — today by 
world opinion, tomorrow by history. 
We will not be judged lightly if we 
fail. 

It is entirely fitting that this work be 
done in Jerusalem — Jerusalem, city of 
peace, city which has known so much 
strife and bloodshed, city holy to our 
thiee religions. We must carry forward 
here the work already begun. As Presi- 
dent Carter recently suggested, the 
road to peace can lead through 
Jerusalem and Cairo ultimately to a 
comprehensive peace. 

It is also fitting that this work should 
begin as Israel approaches its 30th an- 
niversary. There could be no greater 
gift to the people of Israel and to the 
people of the Arab world than to make 
this anniversary the birthday of peace. 
So in this place and at this time, let 
us strive to make a reality of the peace 
for which the peoples of this area have 
so long yearned. 



State. This visit is a very special one. 
What makes it special is that today the 
Foreign Ministers of Israel and of 
Egypt have begun the process of seri- 
ous, direct, substantive negotiations, 
and all of us have a sense of the impor- 
tance of this day and of this moment. 

The meetings which we began today 
will have to deal with many difficult 
and serious issues which will affect the 
national interests of all parties. We 
have before us an historic opportunity 
for peace. We know this opportunity 
must be seized or it may slip from our 
grasp. But we must ever keep in mind 
that no truly important problem is ever 
solved without perseverance, hard 
work, and flexibility on both sides. I 
am sure that, in the work which began 
today, we will have times of success 
and moments of difficulty. We must 
build on the momentum which has been 
created and not allow moments of dif- 
ficulty to discourage us. We must keep 
constantly in front of us the goal which 
all of us seek — namely, a just and last- 
ing peace. 

Let me conclude with a brief per- 
sonal observation. The direct contacts 
that are now taking place offer the op- 
portunity for a new dimension that has 
been absent in all past efforts to resolve 
this conflict. I refer to the opportunity 
to listen and to make a genuine effort 
to understand the perceptions and 
points of views of others. The impor- 
tance of this new dimension should not 
be underestimated. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to 
raise your glasses to the two great lead- 
ers to whose statesmanship we owe our 
presence here this evening — Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat. 
Let us take inspiration from their cour- 
age, their vision, and dedicate our- 
selves to the task that they have put in 
our hands. 



TOAST, JERUSALEM, JAN. 17 3 

This is my fifth visit to this beautiful 
and historic city in the period of just 1 
year that I have been the Secretary of 



REMARKS TO THE PRESS, 
JERUSALEM, JAN. 19 4 

Prime Minister Begin: The Foreign 
Minister [Moshe Dayan] and I just 
finished a conversation with the Secre- 
tary of State, Mr. Atherton [Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.], 
and with Ambassador Lewis [U.S. 
Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. 
Lewis]. It was one of the best talks. All 






1 



J' 

Hi 

'■ -i 

J 



34 



of them are good ones, but this was 
even better. 

Tomorrow the Secretary of State will 
go to Cairo and will see President 
Sadat. The Secretary was gracious 
enough to take it upon himself to try to 
convince President Sadat that the 
negotiations within the framework of 
the Political Committee should be re- 
newed. 

As far as the Military Committee is 
concerned— from our point of view 
they are intertwined — the Cabinet of Is- 
rael will take the proper decision after 
we are informed by the Secretary of the 
results of his talks in Cairo. We hope 
that the mission — very important mis- 
sion of the Secretary in Cairo— will be 
successful. We wish him Godspeed and 
full success. 

Secretary Vance: I appreciate very 
much your kindness in coming today to 
meet with us. We did, indeed, have a 
very good discussion of the situation 
and the plans for the future. I will be 
reporting to the Prime Minister and to 
the Foreign Minister after my talks to- 
morrow, and then we shall determine 
how we proceed from there. 

Q. In other words, from now on 
everything is up to President Sadat. 

Secretary Vance: No, I wouldn't 
say that. We first want to hear what he 
has to say and hear his views as to how 
we should proceed. Of course, he is 
one of the parties, and this is for all of 
the parties to decide. 

Q. If he says no, that's the end of 
the Political Committee and the 
foreign ministers' conference. 

Secretary Vance: 1 think you are 
jumping to conclusions at this point. 

Q. Does that mean you are coming 
back here personally? 

Secretary Vance: No, I am going to 
be going from Cairo, directly to Ank- 
ara. I promised to spend a night and 
part of 2 days in Ankara on my way 
back to the United States and also the 
same in Athens, and I shall be going 
from Athens back. 

Mr. Atherton is going to be staying 
here along with the other members of 
our delegation, and, as I've said many 
times on many occasions before, that 
should it be useful for me to come back 
again at any time, I'll come back. 

Q. During the talks have you 
explored the possibility of another 
summit between Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat or even 
more a possible summit inviting Mr. 
Begin, Mr. Sadat, and President 
Carter? 

Secretary Vance: No, we have not 
explored that at this point. 

Q. Do you think that would be a 
worthwhile idea? 

Secretary Vance: I think that's up to 



the principals to comment on. 
Q. [Inaudible] 

Prime Minister Begin: If the Presi- 
dent of the United States invites me to 
come to Washington to meet him, I 
will with gratitude accept his invita- 
tion. If he invites me to come to Wash- 
ington together with President Sadat, 
the representative of Israel will be 
there. 

Q. You just said that if Mr. Sadat 
went to Washington and if you were 
invited by President Carter, that 
there would be a representative of Is- 
rael. Does that mean — 

Prime Minister Begin: No, I said 
the representative. I represent Israel. 
[Laughter] 

Secretary Vance: Good for you. 
Q. So that we can gauge the 
chances of renewing these talks, can 
you tell us, having spoken, I know, 
with the President and with others, 
why were the talks broken off? 

Secretary Vance: I don't really 
frankly know the answer to that ques- 
tion. President Sadat said he would 
discuss that with me tomorrow, and I'll 
be able to give you a better answer to- 
morrow. 

Q. I understand that President 
Carter is interested in seeing the 
military talks continue. This was his 
position, if I understand it, is that we 
are prepared to see the political talks 
continue, and we haven't yet decided 
about the military talks. Does this 
mean that the resumption of the mili- 
tary talks is dependent on the re- 
sumption of the political talks? 

Prime Minister Begin: We reserved 
yesterday the decision which we will 
take after we hear from the Secretary 
and perhaps also we shall hear Presi- 
dent Sadat's speech on Saturday. There 
was a publication to the effect that our 
Defense Minister has been invited to 
come to Cairo on Shabbat. We don't 
travel on Shabbat. So this is excluded, 
and in the meantime we shall listen to 
the speech by President Sadat. To- 
gether we shall be able perhaps— I have 
to make this reservation— at the weekly 
Cabinet session, which convenes usu- 
ally at 10 o'clock in the morning on 
Sunday, to take a decision about our 
participation in the Military Commit- 

tee 

Q. What do you think the United 
states _ w hat do you think the 
Americans could do to restore the 
negotiating process? 

Prime Minister Begin: You heard 
the Secretary of State. He can do 
much, so America will do much. 

Q. But I want to know what you 
think the United States could and 
should do to restore the process. 

Prime Minister Begin: I already 



Department of State Bulletir 

said the Secretary of State will go to- 
morrow to Cairo and speak to Sadat. I 
think it is very much indeed. We onlj 
expect good results. 

Q. [Unofficial translation]. Yoi 
stated this afternoon that Israel has 
reached agreement on five issues out 
of seven on the first paragraph of tht 
agenda. Could you indicate what an 
the five points of agreement? 

Prime Minister Begin: The number; 
are not so important. We ever 
examined them together, the Foreigi 
Secretary of Israel and the Secretary o 
State, and our colleagues and myself 
the draft declaration of principles, an* 
we found that real progress was made 
Some issues are outstanding and shouli 
be subject to further negotiations 
Within the framework of the Politica 
Committee— may I be allowed to finis' 
another sentence? I don't think it woul 
be advisable now, useful to the publi 
interest to go into the details. What; 
can say, and the Secretary of State wil 
bear me out, is that we made real pro? 
ress, and there are still some problen 
to negotiate about. 

Q. Would you prefer the resumin 
of the Political Committee or woul 
you prefer a new, less publi 
framework would be more advissj 

ble? 

Prime Minister Begin: There is r 
need to look for new formulas. Tl 



formula of a Political Committee and 
Military Committee, which met wi: 
Mr. Sadat's approval in Ismailia, 
very reasonable. We have politic; 
problems. We have security problem 
i.e., military problems. Therefore, v 
have established the two committee 
and both should be resumed. 

Q. Both you and the Prime Mini 
ter categorized the talks this afte 
noon as good and very good. Wh 
was so good about them? 

Secretary Vance: We went into tl 
various issues which have to be consi 
ered and determined. We explort 
them in depth. We found a great de 
of agreement on these issues, and the 
was a full exchange of views, and 
considered them to be very good talk 
Q. The atmosphere to many obser 
ers seems strained here. There' 
been suggestions that improp 
speeches have been made in t 
wrong place and that guests of t 
Israeli Government are saying thwj 
that maybe they shouldn't say. 
would like to hear your estimate 
the social niceties with particuli 
reference to the way you found t 
about the Egyptian Foreign Ministi 
being withdrawn. Were you 
formed in a proper way? 
Secretary Vance: I 






February 1978 

omebody telling me that there had just 
teen reported over the radio that the 
Minister of Information of Egypt had 
aid that the delegation was being 
ailed back to Cairo. I really don't 
vant to comment on whether that was 
ppropriate or not. 

Let me say I think we have just got 
a keep our eye on the task that we 
sally all have ahead of us and that is to 
et the talks going again and try and 
ind a solution. 

Q. You made a very strong speech 
»day. Do you think this is the time 
>r strong speeches? 

Prime Minister Begin: If it was a 
:rong speech it means that it was a 
ood speech, and this is the time for 
ood speeches. 

Q. Can you tell us what you will 
ly to President Sadat that could 
lake him reverse his position? 

Secretary Vance: You know I can't 
iswer that question, and it would be 
lappropriate for me to do it. I really 
in't. 

Q. Do you see the possibility that a 
ew framework other than the exist- 
ig Political and Military Commit- 
es could be decided upon in order 
• continue the talks? Some other 
amework? 

Secretary Vance: The two commit- 
es still exist. There has been a 
iggestion that the Military Committee 
ill resume its discussions on Sunday 
Monday of next week. That's a deci- 
an which has to be taken. Insofar as 
e Political Committee is concerned, 
hen the Foreign Minister left yester- 
iy, he indicated that he did not con- 
ier the talks broken off nor the Polit- 
il Committee dissolved; so they both 
11 exist. 

Q. Do you see another framework 
•ssible at this point? 
Secretary Vance: Anything can 
ppen, but I think we've got these 
o, and I think you ought to deal with 
i two we've got. 

Q. Including your shuttling back 
d forth between the two capitals? 
Secretary Vance: I don 't see that is 
eded at this point. I'm going to take 
s one trip, and I said if I have to 
me back, I will. 

Q. On the status of the declaration 
principles, was there additional 
>rk done between yourself and the 
ime Minister on that document so 
at when you go to see Mr. Sadat, 
u can inform him of the situation 
>ere, at least as far as Israel is con- 
rned, it could accept some ideas 
t torth by the United States on the 
maining problems? 
Secretary Vance: We had further 
Hussion about that document. Any 



ultimate decision, of course, will have 
to be a decision taken by the Israeli 
Cabinet when there is such a document 
and the same thing would be true of 
Egypt. Any decision would have to be 
taken by the President of Egypt. 

Q. I would like to ask a personal 
question which is not of strict refer- 
ence to politics. Would you ever 
think for a second this afternoon, 
while you were delivering the speech, 
that President Sadat was on the other 
side of the television just staring at 
you and trying to find out what was 
behind your words? 

Prime Minister Begin: You know 
when I make a speech, I think about 
the speech. And the audience is vast! 
And, of course, I always bear in mind 
that people listen to my speeches. I 
think it was a good and constructive 
speech. This is my opinion and my 
conviction. 

Q. Do you in any way feel that the 
public dialogue between you and 
President Sadat as manifested in 
your speeches has hampered negotia- 
tions in either of the two committees? 
Prime Minister Begin: I had a long 
discussion on this with the Foreign 
Minister of Egypt yesterday when he 
came to see me. We sat together for 
some 75 minutes, and we really dis- 
cussed this problem. I don't want now 
to go into details, but you should re- 
member, as the facts go, that suddenly 
there appeared an article in the Egyp- 
tian press with some name-calling, 
which I don't want to repeat. And, of 
course, it hurts. 

Then there appeared an article in 
which we were threatened with another 
October. As you remember, to every- 
body concerned, not to threaten us at 
all, because war threats cannot influ- 
ence our attitude. Nobody frightens us 
with threats otherwise where are we go- 
ing. This is the attitude of the whole 
people of Israel. 

We want to negotiate, we produced a 
peace plan — a positive plan — we heard 
the most complimentary adjectives 
about our plan in the United States, in 
Great Britain, elsewhere. And on this 
we proved here our good will, and then 
suddenly we hear threats, so we didn't 
go into polemics. We only appealed not 
to issue such threats. 

Then, in fact there was an interview 
given by President Sadat to the weekly, 
called October, which was also very 
regrettable. And again we didn't want 
to go into polemics. 

Yes, ultimately that when we hear a 
guest saying that we must give up our 
capital city, the heart of our people, of 
course it was not only our right but our 
duty to tell him what we think about it, 
at the proper place, at the proper mo- 



35 

ment. So this is the actual develop- 
ment. 

Time and again we suggested that 
the negotiations should be conducted in 
a calm atmosphere. Time and again on 
American television you heard me sev- 
eral times. 

Now as the Egyptian Government is- 
sued its statement yesterday, which I 
read, it is a very, may I say, extreme 
statement. I suggest to you read it. Of 
course, our government had to issue its 
statement and to put the position clear. 

Yes, today I spoke to a delegation 
from France. It was after the disruption 
of the talks in the framework of the 
committee — of the Political Commit- 
tee — and I had to make a statement. It 
was a public meeting, and I did my 
best. 

As far as the future is concerned, I 
can assure you from our point of view, 
if the Secretary is successful in con- 
vincing President Sadat that both com- 
mittees should renew negotiations and 
we continue, we shall then be prepared 
to refrain from any public statement. 
Of course, in the basis of reciprocity, 
and let the two committees, in calm 
atmosphere, negotiate. 

Q. As a mediator, an arbitrator, 
would you say that the basic problem 
lies in the fact that you're dealing on 
one hand with an emotional people, 
on the other hand with a pragmatic 
people? In other words, on the one 
side, one that can be swept by a 
dramatic peace initiative; on the 
other side, one that says: "No, wait a 
minute. What do you mean, ac- 
tually?" 

Secretary Vance: No, I wouldn't 
characterize it that way. I think that the 
difficulty is that we are dealing with 
very difficult and deep-seated issues 
that are very hard to reconcile, and that 
is the problem. One has to find the 
bridge between the positions on these 
very tough issues. 

Q. Do you think you have a na- 
tional consensus in favor of maintain- 
ing these settlements in northeastern 
Sinai the way you have a consensus 
against the establishment of a Pales- 
tinian state? 

Prime Minister Begin: Like I said, 
it is a national consensus that these set- 
tlements cannot be removed, and I 
think I can also say that in the presence 
of my colleague, the Foreign Minister, 
that any government of Israel which 
would take a decision to remove the 
settlements would fall in Parliament, 
would have a vote of no confidence. 
And as we want to continue with our 
service, so we told openly, as I said to 
President Sadat at Ismailia, the settle- 
ments have to stay, and we have a 




C3 

p 

h 



■■ 






36 

principle that we have to give Jewish 
settlements Israeli defense. 

That is what I said to President Sadat 
at Ismailia. He heard it from me and 
was taking the minutes. I can inform 
you about my statement. Of course, I 
cannot tell you what President Sadat 
said. It is up to him. I will not divulge 
our private talk from his point of view. 
Q. In all the forums that have 
taken place since President Sadat 
came to Jerusalem, he was remarka- 
bly consistent. He has said the price 
of peace is Israeli acceptance of all 
his demands, notably, the return of 
all Arab land including East 
Jerusalem, a Palestinian state, etc. 
Do you have any reason to believe 
that Sadat doesn't mean exactly what 

ne said? • «,u U 1A 

Prime Minister Begin: Why should 
V But I would like to remind you that 
the day before President Sadat arrived 
here _excuse me, several days before 
he arrived here— he made that state- 
ment to the effect that Israel must 
withdraw from all the territories, as the 
name goes, and agree to a Palestinian 
state to be formed, in my language, in 
Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. 
And I answered him that both demands 
are absolutely unacceptable by Israel 
and will not be accepted by Israel. I 
added, if you Mr. President, want to 
come to Jerusalem and put out those 
two demands, you are entitled to, but 
you should know they would be unac- 
ceptable to us. 

On these terms, President Sadat ar- 
rived in Jerusalem. Everyone of us 
knew his stand. In the Knesset he made 
a speech to the same effect, but I an- 
swered him and again explained our 
position. Now, what did we decide to 
do, both in Jerusalem and at Ismailia? 
We agreed that we have differences of 
opinion, and we agreed to start negotia- 
tions knowing that we have differences 
of opinion. And it is absolutely natural. 
If you study all the negotiations to 
conclude peace treaties after the First 
World War, after the Second World 
War, in many parts of the world, you 
will see, and the Secretary of State will 
bear me out. He himself was involved 
in negotiations in Korea and about 
Vietnam. All the negotiations start 
from difference of opinion. Therefore, 
that was and that is the hope. We start 
from differences of opinion, and we do 
our best to reach an agreement. This 
principle stands. 

Q. What is your assessment on the 
same point? Do you think that the 
Egyptians are prepared to give on 
these demands? 

Secretary Vance: There are still dif- 
ferences on views on some of the issues 
involved, and insofar as their position 



is concerned, I think it would be inap- 
propriate for me, while we're deeply 
involved in private discussions, to dis- 
close what their position is. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, 
BARRAGES, EGYPT, JAN. 20 5 



President Sadat: Really, I must 
seize President Carter and Secretary 
Vance for the very genuine efforts that 
they have done in the last few days to 
bridge whatever differences have arisen 
between us and the Israelis. Foreign 
Minister Kamel has reported to me yes- 
terday, and I have expressed to Secre- 
tary Vance my gratitude for all the help 
that he has done there. 

I think the peace process should head 
toward what we always are after and 
that is peace. Peace cannot be achieved 
through imposing settlements on 
others' land and also, not only imposed 
but to be defended also. This is really 
something, some logic that no one can 
understand in the world. The door to 
peace is not closed. But there should 
be in this moment, a revaluation ot 
the whole thing because peace con- 
tradicts with any tread on sovereignty 
or land. This should be clear. 

I don't want to answer or comment 
on what Premier Begin said yesterday 
in the Knesset. But I think anyone who 
reads his speech there can feel that I 
was right, because they want land, they 
want security, they want everything, 
and they are not ready, I mean to un- 
derstand that peace cannot be achieved 
except when it is built on justice. 

We don't seek peace at any price, 
not at all. They will be wrong in Israel 
if they thought of this and, as I said, 
whenever they want to be in this area in 
cooperation and recognize, in spite ot 
the fact that Mr. Begin, in his arrogant 
way said in the Knesset that he doesn t 
need the recognition of anyone here. 
Very well, let us not start commenting 
on this because this is still the old ar- 
rogant way, and today or tomorrow he 
will see that Israel will not gain by it at 

all- ■ u u i 

But peace, as everyone in the whole 

world knows, means that no one will 
tread on the land or sovereignty of the 
other. These are principles that should 
be known in this precise moment. 

I must tell you also that in our dis- 
cussions, Secretary Vance and me as 
you may have never known and atter 
President Carter contacted him and 
contacted me, we have agreed that the 
Military Committee resume its hard 
work here in Cairo like it was agreed 
on before, and we have agreed also that 
constant contact should take place be- 
tween us in the future like it has taken 



Department of State Bulleti 

place before. And he has conveyed t( 
me messages from President Carter 
And I also asked him to convey to Pres 
ident Carter certain precise messages. 
Secretary Vance: I want to expres 
my great thanks to President Sadat fc 
receiving me today. We had a ver 
good opportunity to exchange view 
fully on the situation as it now stanc 
and on the prospects for the future. 

As President Sadat indicated, th 
door for peace is not closed. We a 
have the same objective of achieving 
just and lasting peace. Insofar as tl 
United States is concerned, we wi 
continue to work with the parties to fu 
ther this objective. And we will keep 
the closest of contact to bring abo 
this result. 

Q. The President's views will u 
doubtedly be communicated by y» 
to the Israelis. Now that you 
cranked the peace talks down oj 
notch, what are the conditions f 
getting the full talks going again? 

President Sadat: I fear you a 
using the same phrasing of conditio! 
It's not conditions at all. I'm sayi; 
this: Peace means that no one treads 
land or sovereignty of the other. 

Q. Does that mean a declaratji 
from the Israelis softening their pci 
tion on settlements in the Sinai? 

President Sadat: Which one den 
ration? 

Q. I'm saying, if you say the c 
ditions to get the talks going ag 
are that neither impose on i 
sovereignty of the other, does ti 
mean that Israel give up its insiste 
in keeping settlements in the Sinai! 
Egyptian soil? 

President Sadat. Yes, until no\ 
didn't receive any change in this p 
tion and as I told you from my 
really, I think it is a joke rather th;< 
fact. 

Q. If the Israelis will pull back 
that position and say that they'll 
up the settlements in Sinai, Ej 
will return to the political talks, 
full peace talks? 

President Sadat: Whenever Is 
chooses to agree to the principles n 
tread on other's land of sovereigi 
everything can be resumed again. 

Q [Inaudible]. Would you ac| 
that the question of si 
determination for the Palestinian 
the result by evolution of the prd 
of peace? Or do you insist that 
political decision should be U 
right now even before there isi 
beginning of peace between E! 
and Israel? 

President Sadat: I don t see r 
the meaning of this question. We ' 
working, all of us, upon a declar 






ebruary 1978 

f principles in which Israel shows its 
etermination to end the occupation of 
le land occupied after 1967 and the 
^-determination for the Palestinians, 
don't know what do you mean by 
eace is not achieved between Egypt 
id Israel so that they can agree upon 
lis. 

We are working, as I told you, upon 
comprehensive settlement. The 
jeded minimum for continuing our 
ork on straight lines should be this 
:claration of principles, the land of 
967, withdrawal from it, and the 
:lf-determination. Whatever time is 
:eded to perform this, it is a matter of 
igotiation, and it can be agreed upon 
■ it can be negotiated in a less danger- 
is situation like Israel is raising now. 
Q. Do you think a declaration of 
rinciples should include the right of 
alestinians to determine their own 
iture the same way you put it in 
>ur statement at the Political Com- 
ittee and as Mr. Carter stated it in 
swan? 

Secretary Vance: The statement 
ade by President Carter at Aswan re- 
acts the views of the United States. In 
at statement we clearly stated that we 
lieve that provision should be made 
hereby the Palestinians should be en- 
led to participate in the determina- 
>n of their own future. 
Q. Is your delegation going back to 
rusalem after Ankara and Greece? 
Secretary Vance: Yes, Mr. Ather- 
i will be going back to Jerusalem, 
d there will be two or three others 
io are part of that delegation who 
11 be there. 

Q. Could you indicate to us what 
:nt wrong since the Ismailia sum- 
it between you and Mr. Begin? 
President Sadat: I think if you read 
5 statement of Premier Begin during 
: dinner of 2 days before and then 
id his speech again in the Knesset 
sterday, I think you shall find what 
u are after. 

Q. To clarify a previous question, 
means that there can be no peace 
Jaty on the Sinai without a declara- 
nt of principles being first issued? 
President Sadat: We are not after a 
ace treaty on the Sinai, as I say. We 
i after a comprehensive settlement, 
id in this comprehensive settlement 
rtain principles should be agreed 
on. 

Q- The American side — Mr. 
mce— -has he presented to you any 
ernatives and are they acceptable 
"the declaration of principles? 
President Sadat: As a matter of 
*, yes. And we shall be studying it, 
a we shall be in contact, as I said, 
tn him. 

Q. According to Mr. Begin, there 



are only two questions remaining in 
the Political Committee which didn't 
reach any agreement. Do both of you 
agree to this assessment? 

Secretary Vance: There are several 
questions or principles involved in a 
draft of declaration of principles which 
we have been working upon. I don't 
want to go into detail except to say that 
there has been one principle which is 
the most difficult of all and that is the 
one which deals with the Palestinian 
problem and that is the one in which 
the differences remain and which is the 
most difficult of the issues. 



37 

President Sadat: I quite agree with 
what the Secretary says. 

Q. Can we understand that you 
have reached any kind of agreement 
here in Cairo which Mr. Atherton 
will be carrying back to Jerusalem, 
and if you have reached any kind of 
understanding with the Israelis for 
further steps or there is no change in 
the Israeli position? 

Secretary Vance: Yesterday I had 
conversations with the Prime Minister 
and with the Foreign Minister. I had 
further conversations with the Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Dayan. As a result of 



Chronology of Recent Events 



Jan. 



Jan. 4 



Jan. 11 



Jan. 13 



Jan. 14 



Jan. 15 



Jan. 16 



Jan. 17 
Jan. 18 



President Carter meets with King 
Khalid and other government of- 
ficials in Saudi Arabia. 
President Carter meets with Presi- 
dent Sadat in Aswan, Egypt. 
President Carter makes departure 
statement dealing with the Pales- 
tinian problem. 
President Carter departs for France. 
Military Committees headed by De- 
fense Ministers Mohamed Abdel 
Ghani el-Gamassi of Egypt and 
Ezer Weizman of Israel begin 
talks in Cairo. 
Israel and Egypt recess Military 

Committees' meeting. 
Defense Minister Weizman returns 

to Israel. 
Secretary Vance postpones depar- 
ture for Jerusalem; he was to at- 
tend meeting of Political Com- 
mittees (headed by Foreign 
Ministers Moshe Dayan of Israel 
and Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel of 
Egypt) scheduled to begin 
January 16. 
Political Committees' meeting de- 
layed until January 17. 
Secretary Vance departs for 

Jerusalem. 
Secretary Vance arrives in 
Jerusalem. He meets with Prime 
Minister Begin and other gov- 
ernment officials and gives the 
Prime Minister a letter from Pres- 
ident Carter. 
Political Committees begin talks in 

Jerusalem. 
President Sadat recalls Egyptian 
delegation to the Political Com- 
mittees' Jerusalem meeting and 
announces that the scheduled 
January 19 meeting of the Mili- 
tary Committees will not be held. 



Jan. 19 
Jan. 20 

Jan. 21 



Jan. 22 



Jan. 23 



Jan. 26 



Jan. 27 



Jan. 28 



Jan. 29 



Jan. 30 



Jan. 31 



President Carter telephones Pres- 
ident Sadat. 
Secretary Vance meets with Prime 

Minister Begin in Israel. 
Secretary Vance meets with Presi- 
dent Sadat in Egypt. 
Secretary Vance departs for Turkey. 
President Sadat states that he will 
continue his peace efforts 
(speech to the Egyptian Parlia- 
ment). 
Assistant Secretary Atherton leaves 
Secretary Vance's party and re- 
turns to Jerusalem. 
Israeli Cabinet unanimously agrees 
to delay returning the delegation 
to the Cairo Military Commit- 
tees' talks which had been post- 
poned until January 22. 
Prime Minister Begin makes a 
speech to the Israeli Parliament 
dealing with the status of the 
peace negotiations. 
Assistant Secretary Atherton and 
U.S. Ambassador to Israel 
Samuel W. Lewis meet with 
Prime Minister Begin and other 
government officials in Israel. 
President Carter invites President 
Sadat to visit the U.S. for extended 
talks on February 4-5. President 
Sadat accepts the invitation. 
Assistant Secretary Atherton pays a 
courtesy call on King Hussein in 
Amman, Jordan. 
Israeli Cabinet unanimously votes 
to resume participation in Mili- 
tary Committees' talks in Cairo. 
Assistant Secretary Atherton ar- 
rives in Cairo to meet with Egyp- 
tian government officials. 
Israeli Defense Minister Weizman 
arrives in Cairo to resume Mili- 
tary Committees' meetings. □ 



1 ■ i 






i 






C9 

i 

S3 



:3 



38 

those conversations, I think we made 
progress. I have reported what took 
place in those conversations to Presi- 
dent Sadat. We had a very good ex- 
change of views on that. I think as to 
what follows from here, this should be 
carried out by quiet conversations and 
it would not be appropriate for me to 
talk about them in a public press 
conference. 

Q. You began today by expressing 
your gratitude to President Carter 
and Secretary Vance for the help 
that they have given you in the last 
couple of days. Have they given you 
help on substance as well as proce- 
dure? Can you enlighten us about 
what the Americans have done for 

President Sadat: I don't think it is 
easy to tell the details of what has 
taken place, but I seize this opportunity 
really to express my gratitude because 
Secretary Vance really has made tre- 
mendous efforts to bridge whatever dif- 
ferences that have arisen between us 
and it is a fact, but this closing, what 
has taken place, there may be some 
time moment. 

Q. When you came back from 
Jerusalem, you said that if you were 
not successful in the peace process 
you would go before your National 
Assembly and offer your resignation. 
It has been speculated now that that 
is precisely what you plan to do to- 
morrow when you meet with your 
National Assembly. Is this so, and if 
not, what are you going to tell them? 
President Sadat: It is a matter of 
less than 24 hours, or a little more, 
when I shall be giving my speech to- 
morrow in the afternoon in my assem- 
bly, and I advise you to wait until you 
hear my speech. 

Q. Just for clarification, you talk 
about the door to peace being open. 
Do I understand you correctly to say 
that if the Israelis were to make a 
statement on the settlements, that 
could revive the peace talks? And 
what kind of statement precisely 
would you want? 

President Sadat: I feel you have not 
got the real conception of what I have 
already said. It is exactly as Secretary 
Vance has answered now. There is a 
very vital point — and this is concerning 
the Palestinians— that we didn't agree 
upon. The matter of settlements and so 
is another point of difference, but 
really, what worries me really is this: 
The whole approach to peace is being 
twisted because we are losing time on 
discussing, for instance, this settlement 
problem. And we shouldn't lose any 
time on it because, as I said, it is a 
joke. No one can agree for anyone to 



impose settlements in his land and also 
continue in arrogance and say that we 
shall defend it there. I mean the correct 
approach is not, from the Israeli side, 
is not serious at all, to build peace 
based on justice. So let us try and find 
the proper approach again and I think it 
is, in its dimension, this approach is 
much bigger than the settlement prob- 
lem also. 

Q. Do you accept what President 
Carter said on the Palestinians about 
their legitimate rights and their 
being enabled to participate in the 
determination of their own future? 
Does that word-for-word, satisfy 
you? And if the Israelis accepted that 
word-for-word, would you agree to 

that? 

President Sadat: We have agreed 
upon this fact in Aswan; about the 
statement President Carter gave in As- 
wan. Still, I must tell you this: The 
spirit behind the initiative is not cor- 
rectly understood among Premier Begin 
and his aides. For that, I think the 
peace process would be useless now to 
continue on false principles. 

Q. There is a feeling in Israel that 
you are using the reconvening and 
suspension of the Political Committee 
in order to create some pressure on 
Israel upon the ongoing of the 
negotiations. Wouldn't it be prefera- 
ble to use the framework of the Polit- 
ical Committee in order to settle dis- 
putes of this nature? 

President Sadat: This logic also 
again. It is not pressure at all when I 
say that peace cannot be built when 
someone is treading on others' land and 
sovereignty, and you are just using the 
same logic they use there in Israel. We 
don't agree to this at all. If the princi- 
ple itself is agreed upon that no one 
should tread on others' land or 
sovereignty and these are principles, 
not conditions, and very essential for 
any understanding to come in the fu- 
ture, well, everything will be easy after 
that. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Isn't the place for such a dis- 
pute in the framework of the Political 
Committee in Jerusalem? 

President Sadat: As I told you, it 
appears that the proper channel that we 
should have adopted— the proper 
approach — has been twisted. For that I 
ask for this stand. I'm not putting pres- 
sure or conditions; I'm just putting a 
logic. Can peace be achieved when 
someone treads on others' land and 
even proceeds in his arrogance and 
says that he will defend it, also, on m> 
land? Can peace be achieved by this? 
Or by treading on others ' sovereignty: 
These are not conditions. And if it i; 
like your Foreign Minister's speech the 
other day saying that we sit togethei 
and negotiate and bargain and ther 
come half way or so. What is the hal 
way for us? The halfway for us is los 
ing land, losing sovereignty? No, i; 
this is the form that you want us t( 
work in, no. 

Q. Do you think these mutual ar 
guments about arrogance are con 
tributing to the peace process? 

President Sadat: Premier Begu 
used even much more harsh language 
than this. 



CORRECTION 

On page 910 of the Dec. 26, 1977, issue of 
the Bulletin, Amir Abbas Hoveyda is listed 
under "Principal Government Officials" in 
the profile on Iran as Prime Minister. Al- 
though he held that position in Dec. 1976 
(the date of the Background Note from 
which the profile was taken), Jamshid 
Amouzegar was appointed Prime Minister of 
Iran in Aug. 1977. 

The Editor 



ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORC 
BASE, JAN. 22 6 

I. have just completed a week of ii 
tensive discussions on the Arab-Israe 
peace negotiations in Jerusalem an 
Cairo and a very useful review of oi 
relations with Greece and Turkey. 

I said in Jerusalem, and I repe; 
again here, that you have to expect uj 
and downs in negotiations which de 
with issues vital to the negotiating pa 
ties. The United States has played th 
week, and will continue to play, an a 
tive role in helping to steady the cour: 
of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Diffici 
decisions will have to be made as tl 
negotiations continue. We are dete 
mined to do all that we can to help tl 
parties move forward. 

The parties have made it clear the do 
to peace is open. We have urged bo 
parties to resume their discussions in tl 
Security Committee of the Cairo conte 
ence as soon as possible. Assistant Seer 
tary Atherton will remain in Jerusalem 
help them prepare for the resumption 
discussions in the Political Commute 
We believe it is essential the parties p 
behind them the public exchanges of t 
cent days and try to recapture the spi 
of a common search for peace. 

I will report to President Carter tonu 
row and to the appropriate committees 
the House and of the Senate later ti 
week. 



>ruary 1978 

HITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

N. 23 7 

Secretary Vance reported this even- 
; to the President on his trip last 
ek to the Middle East to attend the 
:ning sessions of the Political Com- 
ttee of the Cairo conference in 
usalem and on his visits to Greece 
I Turkey this past weekend. 
)n the Middle East, Secretary Vance 
cribed for the President the work on 
eclaration of principles which would 
'era the negotiation of a comprehen- 
e peace settlement in the Middle 
>t that had begun in the Political 
umittee before the Egyptian delega- 
1 was withdrawn. 

"he Secretary expressed his judge- 
nt that, while the work of the Politi- 

Committee is temporarily sus- 
ided, the negotiating process can 
tinue. Both the President and the 
retary have urged that discussions 
tveen Egypt and Israel in the Secu- 

Committee of the Cairo conference 
tinue. They hope that these talks 
y resume soon. The President 
ssed that we are prepared to con- 
ie the exchanges with Prime Minis- 
Begin and President Sadat that the 
retary began last week on a declara- 
i of principles. Assistant Secretary 
erton is staying in the Middle East 
ie helpful in this effort, 
he President and the Secretary ex- 
ised the hope that the public ex- 
iges of recent days are now behind 
tnd that every effort will be made to 
ipture the spirit that followed recent 
Jtings between Prime Minister 
in and President Sadat and to turn 

attention through quiet diplomacy 
ie substance of the negotiations. 



VTEMENT, HOUSE 
MMITTEE ON 
rERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

^. 24 8 

irst, [in the Military Committee 
tings in Cairo] there are only repre- 
atives of Israel and Egypt; there is 
American representative sitting in 
hose meetings. 

econd is the Political Committee, 
meeting of the Political Committee 
held last Tuesday in Jerusalem, 
re was a delay of one day in the 
imencement of those discussions as 
suit of differences of view with re- 
:t to the agenda for that meeting, 
y were resolved, however, and we 
e able to get started on Tuesday 
rung. 

t the Tuesday session, we first had 
opening statements in the plenary 



meeting. Subsequently we went into 
closed session, at which time there was 
a preliminary discussion and there was 
an exchange between the parties of 
drafts of a declaration of principles. In 
addition, the Israelis tabled the self- 
rule proposal which Mr. Begin had 
previously exposed prior to the 
meeting. 

The remainder of the discussions at 
the Jerusalem meetings were held in 
closed sessions or in informal discus- 
sions between the parties. There was a 
large number of informal discussions 
between the parties themselves and be- 
tween each of the parties and our- 
selves. We addressed our activities dur- 
ing those 2 days exclusively to the 
issue of the declaration of principles. 
We made progress during that period. 
There are still difficult issues which 
remain to be resolved which relate to 
the declaration of principles. But, as 
you know, the talks were suspended as 
a result of a decision by President 
Sadat to recall to Cairo his delegation 
for consultations with him. 

Subsequent to that, I remained for a 
day in Jerusalem to continue my talks 
with the Israelis, including a long talk 
with the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister. I subsequently went 
to Cairo and met with the President for 



39 

several hours, and then we had a meet- 
ing with him and members of his staff. 
The situation at this point is that both 
the Security Committee talks and the 
Political Committee talks are in recess. 
It is our hope that these talks can be 
resumed in the not-too-distant future. I 
think that one of the most important 
things that can be done now is to have 
a period of quiet in which we can get 
down to discussions in closed sessions 
where there can be direct and quiet dis- 
cussion of the very difficult and deli- 
cate issues. □ 



'Other press releases relating to Secretary 
Vance's trip are Nos. 26 of Jan. 17, 1978; 30 of 
Jan. 18; 31 and 32 of Jan. 19; and 35 of Jan. 20. 

2 Press release 28 of Jan. 17. 

'Press release 29 of Jan. 18 (remarks by Is- 
raeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Kamal omitted). 

"Press release 39 of Jan. 20. 

5 Press release 40 of Jan. 21. 

6 Press release 47 of Jan. 23 (closing paragraph 
and question and answer omitted). 

7 White House press release of Jan. 23 (last 
paragraph concerning the Secretary's visit to 
Turkey and Greece omitted). 

8 Press release 50 of Jan. 24. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



OCEANS: Law of the Sea 
Conference 



by Elliot L. Richardson ' 

In the life of international confer- 
ences, a moment arrives when the ele- 
ments of negotiations are so arranged 
after exhaustive and exhausting debate 
that a fair compromise comes within 
reach. If not seized, the opportunity for 
striking a final bargain which rea- 
sonably accommodates the fundamental 
interests of all may quickly and com- 
pletely vanish. Such a moment has 
been reached by the Third U.N. Con- 
ference on the Law of the Sea. We 
shall soon know whether the delegates 
to this conference have the resource- 
fulness and whether their governments 
have the political will to find the for- 
mula for success. 

This conference, unique in diploma- 
tic history, is entering its fifth year. Al- 
though some observers have disparaged 
it as a tedious talkathon, the conference 
has in fact made remarkable progress 
on a vast range of issues of vital impor- 
tance to the United States and the 



world community. Provisions have 
been negotiated which safeguard tradi- 
tional high seas freedoms within the 
200-mile economic zone except for 
specific resource-related rights ac- 
corded coastal states by the conven- 
tion. The generally satisfactory texts on 
transit passage of straits have survived. 
There have been improvements over 
previous texts in respect of environ- 
mental control and settlement of 
disputes. 

Deep Seabed Mining 

It is precisely because so much prog- 
ress has been made that it would be bit- 
ter irony if the conference were to fail 
to resolve the single most difficult 
problem facing it — an international re- 
gime for the mining of the deep seabed. 

You will recall the sense of frustra- 
tion and disappointment we felt at the 
end of the last session of the confer- 
ence [May 23-July 15] 2 because the text 
of the exploitation and governance of 



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40 

the seabeds area grafted at the last 
moment onto the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (ICNT) departed so 
radically from the compromise drafts 
which had emerged from full, fair, and 
open discussion. And yet, although the 
ICNT provisions on seabeds are totally 
unacceptable to the United States, the 
ingredients of a fair and reasonable 
compromise are still within the grasp of 
the conference. 

The compromise, which I am con- 
vinced we can achieve, must accom- 
modate the essential interests of the 
proponents of contending philosophies. 
Further, it must be premised on accept- 
ance of the fact that the maximum ob- 
jectives of neither can be fully realized. 
The key to producing the requisite 
change in the dynamics of the confer- 
ence is the readiness to concede that 
politics — international or national — is 
still the art of the possible. 

That the search for consensus on 
seabed mining should be the most con- 
troversial, complex, and difficult busi- 
ness still before the conference is 
hardly surprising. Unlike much of the 
work of the conference, drafting a con- 
stitution for the seabeds is not an 
exercise in codification of existing or 
emerging international law, but rather 
an effort de novo to create by consen- 
sus new international institutions in a 
field where there is no prior experience 
or legal precedent. 

The conference unanimously agrees 
that the resources of the deep seabed 
are the common heritage of mankind. It 
agrees that their exploitation should be 
managed on behalf of all mankind by 
an appropriately designed international 
authority. It also agrees that the de- 
veloping countries should share in the 
proceeds of mining the deep seabeds. 

Key Issues 

Disagreement centers on three prin- 
cipal issues. 

• The first is the system of exploita- 
tion of the seabed. This issue opposes 
those whose optimum position calls for 
unlimited access to mine sites for qual- 
ified companies and state enterprises 
against those who would prefer to see 
all exploitation reserved for the interna- 
tional equivalent of a government 
monopoly. The issue posed is essen- 
tially one of economic pluralism versus 
state centralism projected on a global 
scale. 

• The second is the resource policy 
which guides and regulates seabed pro- 
duction. This issue involves many 
complex international economic ques- 
tions, such as whether all minerals on 
the seabed are subject to control by the 



[International Seabed Resource] Au- 
thority and whether the Authority's 
powers should extend to fixing prices 
and regulating markets. The question 
which perhaps most sharply divides the 
conference is the extent to which the 
production of seabed minerals should 
be limited. Here the interests of con- 
sumers of these minerals — mainly nic- 
kel and copper — clash with those of 
land-based producers of the same min- 
erals. Consumer interests would benefit 
from a liberal policy of unfettered pro- 
duction of seabed minerals; land-based 
producer interests, conversely, would 
benefit from a restrictive policy of lim- 
ited production. 

• The third contentious issue is the 
question of the governance of the inter- 
national institutions created to manage 
seabed mining. This too is a multifa- 
ceted problem. The point of most in- 
tense dispute concerns the degree to 
which the international authority 
should be controlled on a one nation, 
one vote basis versus the degree to 
which recognition should be accorded 
to such major interests as those in pro- 
duction, investment, and consumption. 

A country's position on any one of 
these three issues does not in itself, of 
course, determine the country's posi- 
tion on either of the other two. For 
example, some land-based producers 
favor a pluralistic exploitation system 
and rigid production controls. Some 
developing-nation consumers favor a 
monopolistic approach to exploitation 
but a liberal resource policy. 

Despite these disparate interests, the 
seabeds debate has tended to divide all 
participants in the conference into two 
groups. The first group favors a 
pluralistic exploitation system, a liberal 
resource policy, and a council which 
encourages production. The second 
group takes the opposite position on all 
three issues. 

The first position would in combina- 
tion have the effect of transforming the 
concept of the common heritage of 
mankind from a noble aspiration into a 
reality for the practical benefit of all. 
The second position, in contrast, would 
leave the common heritage a promise 
unfulfilled. 

One might suppose that the develop- 
ing nations would take an approach 
which would give practical meaning to 
the idea of the common heritage. That 
they have not consistently done so is 
surprising. The result is a triumph for 
ideology over economic interest. It has 
led, ironically, to an artificial division 
between the developed and developing 
countries. All developing countries are 
consumers; few are land-based produc- 
ers. All developing countries, 



Department of State Bulleti 

moreover, could share in the proceed 
of seabed mining. Despite conferenc 
rhetoric that has so often assumed th 
contrary, the seabed mining issue doe 
not on its merits lead to confrontatio 
between developed and developin 
countries. To the extent that confronta 
tion has developed, it has been in spit 
of the real interests of the great majoi 
ity of states. 

These underlying interests hav 
helped, nevertheless, to bring the thre 
key issues of exploitation, resourc 
policy, and governance to the point c 
possible resolution. But there i 
another reason why compromise 
should now be achievable. It is that th 
negotiations to date have demonstrate 
that neither side of the conference ca 
impose on the other its preferred a[ 
proach with respect to these issues. 

Exploitation. As to the system c 
exploitation, those who favor an inte 
national monopoly have realized th; 
their approach will certainly condeni 
exploitation of seabed minerals und< 
an international regime at least to inde 
inite postponement, for such a regin 
will not attract investment and cann< 
generate technology. The monopolis 
have therefore had to yield to econom 
realities. Those who favor a pluralist 
approach have had to recognize that tl 
developing countries cannot accept 
system under which they will share 
the. proceeds of seabed mining but n 
in its operation and developmen 
Awareness of these realities has fore* 
the negotiation in the direction of 
dual system embracing both modes 
exploitation. All that is now necessa 
for a final bargain is for each side 
agree that the other's half of the du 
system must be made workable and th 
both halves will be permanent until ai 
unless otherwise agreed at a revie 
conference. 

For such an understanding to becon 
a reality, two mutually binding cone 
tions must be met. 

• The economic viability of tl 
pluralistic side must not be undercut 1 
such deterrents to investment as unre 
sonably burdensome financial arrang 
ments, impossibly vague terms f 
negotiation of contracts, or unrestricti 
discretion in the international Authc 
ity. Any constraint on deep seabl 
mineral production must 
straightforwardly set forth in the i 
source policy, not smuggled in throui 
a side door. 

• By the same token, the intern 
tional entity (the "Enterprise") mil 
be given the practical means of getti! 
into production, not stifled at birth ' 
inability to gain access to funds j 
technology. This is why, in response) 



;bruary 1978 

e fears of the developing countries 
at without startup financing for its 
•st site the Enterprise could be an 
ipty shell, we offered some time ago 
assist in such financing. 

Resource Policy. With regard to re- 
urce policy, the developed countries 
lieved that they had made a major 
ncession when they agreed that sea- 
d production might be limited to the 
mulative growth of the world market 
r nickel, thus protecting land-based 
xlucers from adverse consequences 
their economies as a result of seabed 
eduction. Unfortunately, the land- 
sed nickel producers pressed their 
vantage, unreasonably we think, and 
listed that they should be guaranteed 
If the growth of the nickel market 
thout regard to economic factors, 
ey were able, moreover, to enlist the 
jport of the land-based producers of 
pper, although seabed production of 
pper will not significantly affect the 
rid copper market in the foreseeable 
ure. Given current estimates of the 
e of growth of the nickel market, the 
>ult would be a ceiling on seabed 
>duction so low as to prevent both its 
icient development and its equitable 
iring. The degree of protection 
ich the land-based producers seek is, 
our view, far greater than they need 
should reasonably expect, 
n this area, too, there will be no 
y out if either side persists in an ex- 
me approach. Stringent controls 
ich stifle production simply cannot 
1 will not be accepted by the indus- 
ilized importing countries. 
jovernance. Regarding governance 
the institutions to manage seabed op- 
tions, the dispute centers on the ques- 
n of how best to afford adequate 
ognition to interests which it is es- 
pial for the world community, not 
rely the developed countries, to fos- 
and promote. 

Vs it now stands, the ICNT would 
ate an assembly with "supreme" 
islative and regulatory power. The 
embly would be founded on what is 
best an anomalous principle — one 
ion, one vote — which bears no ra- 
lal relationship either to the princi- 
s of democracy or to the distribution 
power, values, and interests. The 
ie is not one of a "majority" versus 
'minority." It is a question, rather, 
the identification and the balancing 
the valid interests at stake — those of 
isumers, producers, investors, 
ional groups, and developing coun- 
s. "Sovereign states" are only sur- 
ates for such interests, and imper- 
t ones at best. To allow resources 
istituting the common heritage of 



mankind to be disposed of by a nose- 
count of nations would be a bad prece- 
dent for the international institution- 
building of the future. 

The conference itself, be it noted, 
has recognized that no true consensus 
can be produced by majoritarian proce- 
dures. It is for this reason that the con- 
ference rules permit a vote only when 
every effort to achieve consensus has 
been exhausted. It is for this reason 
also that the leaders of the conference 
share the aim of deferring all voting 
until the last possible moment and of 
restricting it then to the smallest possi- 
ble number of issues. If fair com- 
promises are reached on the first two of 
the key seabeds issues — exploitation 
and the resource policy — it will be on 
the basis of accommodations fairly re- 
flecting legitimate interests in due 
proportion to their true weight. It fol- 
lows that a fair compromise on the 
issue of governance must rest on the 
creation of a council which operates as 
the executive branch of the Authority 
with membership, powers, and voting 
procedures that can -achieve the same 
kind of accommodation. 

Given a readiness to strike fair bar- 
gains on each of the three key issues I 
have outlined, the deep seabed mining 
problem can be solved. 



Future Prospects 

What are the prospects that this will 
happen? The intersessional meeting of 
the conference to be held in New York 
early in February may provide some 
answers. This will be the first real test 
since last summer of the readiness of 
the conferees to entertain compromise 
solutions on major substantive issues. 
We have some reason to be encour- 
aged. Recent informal consultations 
showed strong, broadly based senti- 
ment in favor of procedural arrange- 
ments which could facilitate agree- 
ment. Such procedural innovations, if 
carried into effect, should meet the 
concerns about due process in the de- 
liberations of the conference which I 
expressed at the end of the last session. 
The consultations also reached agree- 
ment on a list of specific difficulties 
with the seabeds part of the current 
negotiating text. These are precisely 
the ones which the United States be- 
lieves require urgent attention; collec- 
tively they will comprise one of the 
three agenda items at the intersessional 
meeting. 

I must say in all candor, however, 
that the road to successful conclusion 
of the conference will be arduous. 
Sharply divergent economic and 
ideological perceptions still prevail. 



41 

Communication across the lines that 
divide the participants remains dif- 
ficult. And yet, as I have tried to show, 
the elements of a fair deal are present 
nonetheless. 

Do the parties really want one? 
There is a pervasive sentiment among 
most that successful conclusion of the 
conference is so important as a prece- 
dent for constructive international 
cooperation that the conference cannot 
be allowed to fail. 

The United States will do its part to 
achieve an equitable and durable out- 
come. We will go halfway to meet 
those with whom we differ. To go be- 
yond that would be not only to sacrifice 
our own essential interests but to ac- 
quiesce in a global system incompatible 
with the interest of all countries in en- 
couraging efficiency and innovation. I 
will not support, nor would I commend 
to the President, a treaty which creates 
a regime for the seabed that I cannot 
honestly defend as offering a reason- 
able basis for American companies to 
risk the enormous investments de- 
manded by deepsea mining. 

Rather than accept outcomes which 
we consider wrong for the United 
States and, we believe, would be 
wrong for the world community as 
well, we would reluctantly choose to 
forego a treaty. The United States does 
not need a comprehensive treaty more 
than other nations. Seabed mining can 
and will go forward with or without 
such a treaty. We have the means at 
our disposal to protect our oceans 
interests if the conference should fail, 
and we shall protect those interests if a 
comprehensive treaty eludes us. 

If, however, others are prepared to 
bring understanding, good will, and 
common sense to the effort to achieve a 
fair and broadly acceptable comprehen- 
sive treaty, the United States is pre- 
pared to join in that effort. For such a 
treaty in our view is objectively the 
best assurance that there will be predic- 
tability, stability, and order in the uses 
and management of ocean resources. 

If these past 4 years of travail are fi- 
nally crowned with success, as I hope 
they will be, the results will be felt far 
beyond the oceans in every endeavor 
where nations come together in an at- 
tempt to bring a sense of sanity, order, 
and stability to a troubled world. □ 



i 



'I 
4 



1 Address to the Seapower Symposium of the 
Cincinnati Council of the Navy League of the 
United States, Cincinnati, Jan. 18; Ambassador 
at Large Richardson is Special Representative 
of the President for the Law of the Sea 
Conference. 

2 For Ambassador Richardson's statement to 
the press on July 20, see Bulletin of Sept. 19 
1977, p. 389. 



42 



Visions of the Future 



by Patsy T. Mink ' 

I am particularly pleased to have the 
opportunity to take part in this most aus- 
picious gathering. "Oceans '77," 
both this conference and the particular 
concept which it represents, provides a 
unique occasion to view the oceans not 
only from our own contemporary 
perspective but also to assess the role 
of the oceans in the future. 

We live in a precarious age, an age 
of uncertainty. Our global commonality 
is based upon the simple fact that we 
share, in the words of one leading 
commentator, a community of danger. 
The most characteristic feature of our 
period is its multiple dilemmas. Ours is 
a time in which humanity has reached a 
critical crossroads, an historical 
juncture where hard choices and dif- 
ficult decisions must be confronted. 
Diverse and complex dilemmas even 
now pervade and dominate our public 
life. 

• We exert every national effort to 
insure peace, not only for ourselves but 
among all nations of the world. Yet, at 
the same time, we continuously prepare 
for war, devising increasingly sophisti- 
cated weaponry, the production of 
which consumes substantial quantities 
of our national resources and creativ- 
ity. 

• We are, by any given index, the 
most powerful nation on Earth; yet, we 
often seem to be unable to effectively 
use this power. In a world of unbridled 
sovereignty and untempered 
nationalism, we sometimes fail to in- 
fluence even small states from political 
abberrations at home — especially in the 
area of human rights — and military ad- 
venturism abroad. 

• We, both developed and develop- 
ing societies, are deluged by a rising 
tide of demands and expectations, issu- 
ing both from our national and interna- 
tional environments; yet we face 
squarely the reality of insufficient dis- 
posable resources. 

• We live in a world of obvious 
interdependence — indeed some would 
speculate that we are even now witnes- 
sing the emergence of a truly global 
society; yet our international institu- 
tions and processes are still 
characterized — as the recently con- 
cluded sixth session of the Law of the 
Sea Conference amply demonstrates — 
by political, economic, and ideological 
fragmentation. 



• We — and here, I think, the United 
States can be fairly excluded from this 
generic category— cling to an interna- 
tional diplomacy which postulates con- 
flict and confrontation as cardinal val- 
ues; yet the global problems and issues 
which we face — and which may yet 
consume us — require the maximum of 
multilateral collaboration and coopera- 
tion for their resolution. 

Contrasting Views 

Opposing trends and contrasting val- 
ues in our contemporary national and 
international existence have thus given 
rise to diametric visions of our future. 
Ironically, our present age of uncer- 
tainty has fostered optimism in some 
and pessimism in others. Indeed, there 
are two prominent visions of our future 
world, both buttressed by attitudinal 
assumptions and presuppositions, both 
molded by the character of our times, 
and both pertinent — indeed central — to 
the role of the oceans in our future 
global development. 

The first vision holds that we are 
moving toward a postindustrial soci- 
ety, an age of growing technological 
wonder, a nirvana of ever-increasing 
growth and development. The advo- 
cates of this view are 20th century fol- 
lowers of the cult of enlightenment, the 
progency of our own technological era. 
They come from areas developed, 
technologically advanced, and heavily 
industrialized as well as areas still in 
the throes of development. 

Disciples of this view believe 
strongly in the curative powers of sci- 
ence and technology and embrace 
progress, advancement, and growth as 
a global creed — an ideological motif 
which they see as the salvation of man- 
kind and to which they cling with abso- 
lute confidence. They are certain that 
the twin pillars of science and technol- 
ogy can and will solve the world's 
problems, whether localized or of 
planetary dimensions. They see no per- 
ceivable impediments to growth and, if 
any exist, they believe we can over- 
come them through either the prospec- 
tive abundance of extraterrestrial re- 
gions or from resources on Earth — 
from areas such as the oceans — which 
will soon become available for man's 
wide-ranging exploitation and intensive 

use. 

This view holds that with our current 
technological potential, growth is — and 
will remain — purely a matter of human 



Department of State Bulleti 

choice. If one accepts this concept 
then rather than a desperate hour o 
crisis, we are now at the threshold of 
global renaissance — the most creativ 
and expansive period of our history. 

There is, of course, a contrastin; 

view. In this second vision — the at 

titude of unbounded optimism, the poi 

trait of unlimited growth an 

development — the prospect of "mor 

and better for everyone" is considere 

unrealistic and perhaps irresponsible 

The Earth, in this somewhat pessimi; 

tic view, cannot sustain unlimite 

growth and expansion, economicall 

and/or demographically. Advocates ( 

this view, who adhere to the concept ( 

limited growth, therefore assert th; 

our first vision of the future is not onl 

incorrect in its prognosis but also e: 

sentially false in its assumptions. Tr 

message which they bring echoes 

common theme: If we unwittingly ai 

mindlessly proceed with unfettere 

growth and development, we shall I 

advancing toward a global precipk 

(perhaps a universal Armageddoi 

marked by famine, resource depletion 

and environmental collapse. 

Thus, we must now begin to reco 
nize that the Earth is both finite a. 
exhaustible; that it is subject to irrevei 
ible disruption, disorder, and perha' 
even collapse if care is not taken 
maintain its essential integrity. Shoii 
we fail to perceive correctly the limit 
carrying capacity of our global en; 
ronment, should we fail to recogni 
limits to our own human propagatio 
we may imperil our own survive 
Their call, therefore, is for rational i 
tion and planning on a global scale, 
long-term programmatic approach 
growth and development — one whi 
highlights, in a rather urgent a 
dramatic way, the need for a deter 
between society and nature. 

These, then, are the contrasts 
views we must consider. As public < 
ficials charged with a mandate to pi 
tect a wide variety of national interes 
both present and future, while at 1 
same time recognizing that our ve 
survival as a nation — or even huma 
ty's survival — may depend on t 
choices we now make, we — tl 
Administration — have assumed a t 
mendous responsibility. 

In recognition of this, President C 
ter, in his May 23 environmental m 
sage, directed the Council on Envin 
mental Quality and the Department 
State — working in cooperation with j 
Environmental Protection Agency, ' 
National Oceanic and Atmosphc 
Administration, and other appropri' 
agencies — to make a 1-year study 
the probable changes in the worl 
population, natural resources, and i 






ibruary 1978 

ronment through the end of the cen- 
ry in an effort to assess the state of 
; future. This study will serve as the 
undation for longer term planning, 
ms, the imagination and energies of 
; highest political authorities of our 
id are now focused on these prob- 
ns. But what of the warning sounded 
the limits-of-growth advocates? 
Although many of you may disagree 
th their conclusions (of the limits- 
-growth scenario) you cannot deny 
; validity of certain trends in our con- 
nporary global development. 

• Population, on a global scale, is 
;adily increasing. If we maintain 
i current growth rate of 2%, we can 
pect that world population will 
iuble every 35 years. This means 
at by the year 2011, the world's 
pulace will have increased from its 
rrent 4 billion to 8 billion people, 
this average growth rate were to be 
iintained until this time next cen- 
ry, it would take only 1 year to add 
billion to the existing population 
d only 4 years to add the equivalent 
our present world population. 

• Resources are being depleted. 
r en the most conservative estimates 
; projecting that we will literally 
n out of certain mineral and energy 
sources, given anticipated world 
:es of consumption, within the next 
"ee decades. In a world of uncon- 
•lled population increase, this trend 
indicative of the magnitude of chal- 
iges which coming generations will 
:e. 

• Although more difficult to quan- 
y, ecological imbalance has indeed 
come an issue of grave concern and 
foreseeable consequences. Ominous 
irnings of environmental degrada- 
»n are issued daily. Some predict 
it we are depleting our protective 
one layers. Headlines warn of our 
jbal despoilation of rivers, lakes, 
d streams. The flow of pollutants 
ough rivers and the atmosphere is 
sponsible for 80% of the contamina- 
•n of the world's oceans. Increas- 
lly frequent spills of oil and chemi- 
ls are growing and disturbing oc- 
rrences. Continued rapid and pro- 
sssive depletion of our forest and 
getative cover could produce, in the 
Jg term, dire environmental and ag- 
ultural consequences. And the un- 
own ability of our oceans and at- 
>sphere to continually absorb the 
'-plus billion tons of carbon 
oxide, emitted annually from 
isil-fuel combustion, is an issue of 
ijor public and political concern. 

The causes of these phenomena are 
ternational in origin and transna- 
»nal in scope and impact. They have 



become major concerns of multilateral 
diplomacy and constitute an important 
element in American foreign policy. 
They are, therefore, important issues 
not only on the agenda of America 
but also on the agenda of the world. 

These cataclysmic warnings of our 
future — warnings which have ema- 
nated primarily from within the scien- 
tific and technological community — 
confirm that we have reached a criti- 
cal period in human history. 

Role of the Oceans 

Given our two visions of the future 
and our current state of uneasiness 
and uncertainty, what is the role of 
the oceans and their possible de- 
velopment in promoting a desired fu- 
ture world? Can the oceans help us in 
our efforts to avert future global dis- 
asters? Are they a boundless pool of 
resources which will sustain man- 
kind's needs for generations to come? 

For those concerned with ocean af- 
fairs, these are questions of some 
urgency. This is especially true since 
we are now entering a new stage of 
ocean development — a period of vast 
potentialities as well as possibly un- 
foreseen dangers. Almost certainly 
the oceans can help in solving some 
of the world's present and impending 
problems. However, depending upon 
our long-term efforts at management, 
preservation, and conservation, we 
could, at the same time, intensify and 
broaden the dimensions of our present 
dilemmas. In the oceans, as on land, 
we are thus confronted with a situa- 
tion of grave decision and choice. 

The oceans can, given substantial 
commitments of capital and the req- 
uisite scientific and technological 
breakthroughs, help in supplying the 
food and nutritional requirements of a 
growing world population. However, 
given current population trends, the 
specter of a neo-Malthusian world 
will continue to persist. This specter, 
this alarming expectation of an im- 
pending population crisis, can only be 
dispelled through more vigorous na- 
tional actions — especially by those 
developing countries most affected — 
coupled with enhanced international 
assistance to accelerate social and 
economic development and to curtail 
population growth. 

Although we will certainly augment 
our agricultural and other food- 
producing resources in the long term, 
this prospective achievement cannot 
successfully and totally defuse the 
population timebomb. Nor for that 
matter can we simply insure the 
worldwide availability of affordable 
contraceptive means and expect to 



43 

limit population growth thereby 
within reasonable bounds. What is 
needed — indeed what is imperative — 
are: 

• First, a simultaneous attack on 
poverty and population growth with 
all of the attendant economic, politi- 
cal, social, and agricultural reforms 
inherent therein; and 

• Second, conscious and collective 
efforts and policies which seek to 
balance population with available re- 
sources. 

Unless and until these efforts are 
undertaken, continued population 
growth implies the possibility of 
wide-spread famine, increased en- 
vironmental degradation, turbulent 
civil disorder and political fragmenta- 
tion, and a consequent destabilization 
of international order and progress. 

Food from the sea can help to delay 
and perhaps alleviate some of the 
problems. Although we now harvest 
an average world fish catch of 70 mil- 
lion tons, many experts believe that 
this total can be considerably in- 
creased. Estimates vary, but many 
agree that a future annual global fish 
catch could be doubled or even tri- 
pled. 

This would require the exploitation 
of new areas and presently un- 
exploited resources — unconventional 
species such as midwater fish or 
krill — as well as the application of 
new technology. There are a host of 
anticipated improvements in fishing 
methods and technology, including 
new ship and gear designs and the 
application of novel location and cap- 
ture techniques. Such increased effi- 
ciency when achieved on a large scale 
will, of course, redound to the benefit 
of the consumer, both here and 
abroad, resulting in an enhanced 
availability of nutritionally rich 
foods, at lower costs, in an increas- 
ingly protein-short world. 

In another area, the full potentials 
of mariculture have not yet been 
adequately studied. One source, al- 
though perhaps overly optimistic, has 
calculated that there are about 1 bil- 
lion acres of coastal wetlands in the 
world. If only 10% of these — 100 
million acres — were put into simple 
extensive mariculture projects, this 
could result in the production of 100 
million metric tons of fish per year. 

Of course, living resources of the 
oceans are not a panacea for an im- 
pending world population explosion. 
However, foreseeable developments 
in fish culture and technology — which 
can only be made possible by farsight- 
ed policy decisions and the necessary 
advances in science and technology — 



Ji 



9 



1 

a 

:3 



m 



44 

could give us a much needed leadtime 
until a runaway population growth is 
slowed, in much the way the "green 
revolution" has provided a respite. 
Moreover, as the rate of population 
growth decreases, food from the seas 
could provide a reasonable hope that 
future problems of world hunger and 
nutritional deficiency can be alleviated 
and perhaps even overcome. 

We have another problem where 
the oceans may help us. With di- 
minishing supplies of land-based min- 
erals and energy, the oceans contain 
vast unrealized reserves which we 
may be able to increasingly draw 
upon to meet energy and resource 
needs in both developed and develop- 
ing countries. This is an aspect of 
oceans development which impinges 
directly upon the national security 
and economic prosperity of the 
United States. Our dependence upon 
foreign sources of petroleum is 
growing — 42% of our oil was im- 
ported in 1976; projections estimate 
that imports will exceed 50% by 
1980. Consequently, we will and 
must, in the interest of our own na- 
tional security and welfare, increas- 
ingly turn to the oceans for our 
needed energy supplies. Currently, 
U.S. offshore oil and gas production 
constitutes about 20% of total U.S. 
production. If we assume an expe- 
dited Outer Continental Shelf leasing 
schedule, offshore production could, 
according to some sources, reach a 
peak of 1.5 billion barrels a year by 
1990. Given current projections, this 
would represent approximately 14% 
of our total national consumption by 
1990. 

Globally, offshore crude oil pro- 
duction has and is expected to con- 
tinue to expand at a comparable rate. 
For example, between 1969 and 1973 
global offshore production increased 
from 6.2 million barrels per day — or 
15% of global production — to 10.4 
million barrels per day — or 18% of 
total world production. Also, new 
offshore discoveries of oil and gas are 
being made at a steady pace. 

In addition to traditional energy 
sources, the oceans also house a po- 
tentially inexhaustible reservoir of 
energy in the form of hydroelectrical 
power from wave and tidal motion, 
mechanical energy from the exploita- 
tion of oceanic temperature and/or sa- 
linity differentials, and the possible 
conversion of marine plants into use- 
ful fuel (e.g., methanol) or fuel- 
extenders. These ocean-generated 
power sources, although still in the 
experimental stages of development, 
are possible sources of energy which 
may in the future be harvested for so- 



ciety's benefit and utilization. 

We also know that the bounty of 
the oceans in terms of mineral re- 
sources approximates the magnitude 
of its wealth in fossil fuels. Prospec- 
tive deep seabed mining for man- 
ganese nodules, as we are all well 
aware, is currently a focal point of 
world attention. From a national 
perspective, the United States is a net 
importer of all of the metal compo- 
nents recoverable from the nodules. 
We import nearly 98% of our total na- 
tional consumption of manganese and 
cobalt and with regard to nickel and 
copper, about 70% and 10%, respec- 
tively. Because of the various uses to 
which these metals are put, they are 
considered by many as strategic to 
our national security and economic 
well-being. 

Furthermore, the oceans contain — 
in unconsolidated sediments, brines, 
seawater, and subfloor deposits — a 
host of other minerals and chemicals 



Foreign Fishery 
Allocations 1 



Under the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976, the De- 
partment of State, in cooperation with 
the Department of Commerce, annu- 
ally determines the allocation among 
foreign countries of the total allowa- 
ble level of foreign fishing within 200 
miles off the coasts of the United 
States 

Due to the increasing U.S. fishing 
capacity and the poor condition of 
certain stocks, foreign allocations for 
fish off the Atlantic coast have de- 
clined over 50% from 1977. The 1978 
Pacific allocations are approximately 
the same as for 1977. 

Each country with an allocation has 
signed a governing international 
fisheries agreement with the United 
States which establishes the principles 
and procedures under which a country 
may apply to catch a portion of any 
surplus resources available for foreign 
fishing. Foreign countries can only 
fish for resources which are beyond 
the present harvesting capacities of 
U.S. fishermen and must fish in ac- 
cordance with U.S. regulations and 
permit procedures. The main fisheries 
on the Atlantic are hake and squid; on 
the Pacific they are hake, cod, floun- 
der, pollock, and squid. □ 



1 Tables on 1978 fishery allocations by 
species for each country are omitted; for full 
text, see press release 541 of Dec. 2, 1977. 



Department of State Bulleti 

which may also help to ward off in- 
pending mineral shortages or deple 
tions. A characteristic list of thes 
mineral and chemical resources woul 
include phosphorite, silica, sand an 
gravel, gold, tin, platinum, zircor 
sulfur, monazite, magnetite 
diamonds, iron ore, titaniurr 
chloride, magnesium, sodiuir 
bromide, and a variety of toxin; 
drugs, and pharmaceuticals from 
diverse spectrum of marine oi 
ganisms. 

This list of ocean resources, boi 
potential and actual, could obvious 
be expanded, but most of you he: 
are better schooled than I in the; 
technicalities and details. My purpo: 
is simply to underline the increasii 
importance of the oceans in any f 
ture world view. 



Danger of Exploitation 

But a cautionary note must 1 
sounded: There are as many inhere 
dangers as potentials in our develcj 
ment of the oceans. Without prop 
planning and coordination, we coiji 
overfish, overexploit, overcontan 
nate, and, consequently, further & 
grade the oceans in our efforts to j 
trieve their bounty. 

• We could view — or continue,: 
view — the oceans as an immense c' 
posal with unlimited capacity for jl 
gorging our seemingly interminal 
flow of wastes. 

• We could forget that the oceai 
natural ability to treat and recy«; 
manmade wastes is a global neo 
sity. 

• We could disregard the real: 
that the oceans are a central factor i 
the total world ecological equation. 

• We could, in other words, in < 
hasty pursuit of growth, forget t 
the oceans too have their limits. T 
lack of vision, this lapse in ecologii 
consciousness, could only quicken 
reality of a global crisis. 

In earlier times, when human net 
could not totally be met on the 1; 
we occupied, we turned to the si 
These earlier ventures led to gr: 
explorations, new discoveries, i 
exciting vistas. New empires w 
built. The oceans opened to us a 1 
midable frontier which we have si: 
overexploited to the point that mi 
are now beginning to question 
continued endurance of our planet. 

Today we look to the oceans 
help. (The terms of reference h 1 
changed somewhat.) We no Ion: 
seek to conquer the oceans to t\ 
treasures of gold, silver, and spied 
foreign lands. Now we are in pun 



>mary 1978 

fish, oil, and natural gas; nonfossil 
iirces of energy, manganese 
iules, and a host of other minerals. 
Ne are now at a new era. We seek 

the horizons but the wealth of the 
sans themselves. We seek not to 
ster the oceans but rather to be- 
ne partners for the benefit of man- 
d as a whole. 

n the oceans, as on the land, we 
e a classic dilemma: We can plun- 

or preserve, protect or pollute. 

can forcibly take the ocean's re- 
rces or, with her acquiescence, 
itly nudge them from her embrace, 
m my vantage point, our choice is 
ler clear. 



This evening, I call upon you — 
scientists, technical experts, environ- 
mentalists, and corporate executives — 
to summon up the courage, concern, 
creativity, and conscience to learn to 
live in harmony with the oceans. If 
generations which follow us are to in- 
herit at least our world, my call is more 
than an issue of challenge, more than 
an expression of hope; it is truly a 
moral imperative and a question of 
human survival into the year 2000. □ 



1 Address before the Oceans '77 Conference 
in Los Angeles on Oct. 18, 1977; Ms. Mink is 
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Interna- 
tional Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 



POPULATION: World Trends 



Marshall Green ' 



greatly appreciate the privilege of 
ig included in this distinguished 
lering to discuss world population 
es and their impact upon the lives 
.11 of us and especially upon the for- 
:s of our children and grandchil- 
l. 

Iy comments will be directed to- 
ri the world at large, with special 
)hasis on the less developed re- 
ns. That is where population- 
erated and population-exacerbated 
Jlems are most acute. Developed 
ntries have their own population 
)lems, but they are of a different 
: and scale. 

here are two aspects of this confer- 
; that deserve special mention. 

One is that participants are drawn 
n so many walks of life, promi- 
tly including economists and busi- 
: leaders. As a rule, population is 
rather exclusive domain of demog- 
lers, doctors, and — I might say — 
msayers as well. But it must also 
ude diplomats, development plan- 
, and dozens of other disciplines, 
ve all, it must engage the interests, 
imitment, and active involvement 
ie political leaders of the world. 
The other noteworthy feature of 
conference is the context in which 
Lilation issues are raised. We are 
to talk about the relationship be- 
en demographic trends, employ- 
t, change, and the quality of life, 
oo often we think of population 
vth in the all too narrow Malthusian 
is of food and population — that is, 



whether there will be enough food to 
go around for a world that is currently 
adding over 200,000 more human be- 
ings every day. I do not wish to 
minimize the crucial importance of the 
food-population ratio, bearing in mind 
the problem of chronic malnutrition in 
less developed countries (LDC's) and 
its grim ramifications; the recent up- 
turns in death rates in parts of India, 
Bangladesh, and elsewhere due to local 
food shortages; and also bearing in 
mind the dependence of less developed 
countries on grain imports which help 
drive the poorer among them ever 
deeper into debt. Even with decelerat- 
ing growth rates — projected under the 
somewhat outdated but still broadly 
useful U.N. medium variant — LDC 
population will be adding some 78 mil- 
lion a year in the beginning of the 
1980's. Toward the end of this century, 
this increment may gradually rise to 
over 90 million a year. 



Other Implications 

So food is obviously a vital concern, 
but there are other serious implications 
of these aggregate numbers. 

Family Hardship. First and foremost, 
rapid population growth creates im- 
measurable hardship on the family, par- 
ticularly the wife and mother. Women 
in many LDC's have little function in 
life save constant childbearing and 
drudgery. Maternal mortality is still 
very high. A large proportion of chil- 
dren die before reaching adulthood. 
And the larger the family, the dimmer 
the prospects of surviving children. 

Ecological Deterioration. On the 



45 

national level, there is the problem of 
ecological deterioration whose relation- 
ship to population pressure is just be- 
ginning to be appreciated and studied. 
Europe, North America, and Japan are 
the big polluters, but desperate efforts 
by developing nations to keep food 
production in step with both the grow- 
ing population and rising demand have 
resulted in slash-and-burn farming, 
overcropping, and overgrazing. To- 
gether with the destruction of forests 
for fuel, these practices have resulted 
in the removal of millions of hectares of 
forest cover and the attendant loss of 
irreplaceable topsoil washed away by 
rains. 

It would be no exaggeration to de- 
scribe Nepal, Haiti, Java, and other 
places as ecological disaster areas. 
Likewise, overgrazing in the Sahelian 
Africa and firewood collection contrib- 
ute to advancing deserts and a total des- 
iccation process that affects virtually 
all countries of Northern Africa, even in- 
cluding the coastal states on the Gulf of 
Guinea. The United Nations Environ- 
mental Programme estimates that dur- 
ing the fourth quarter of this century, 
twice as many hectares will be lost to 
urbanization and soil degradation 
(mainly erosion) as will be added to 
land under cultivation. 

Frustrated Development. It is not 
necessary to underscore before this au- 
dience the fact that excessive popula- 
tion growth frustrates economic de- 
velopment and the fact that production 
increases are literally eaten up by the 
rapidly increasing number of mouths 
and by swelling costs for social infra- 
structure. I heard that Bangladesh, for 
example, has to provide 350,000 more 
tons of grain each year to feed its grow- 
ing population. It likewise must pro- 
vide each year something on the order 
of 300,000 more dwellings and 
700,000 more jobs just to accommo- 
date the additional population. How 
does development proceed when infra- 
structure costs are so high? 

Urban Overpopulation. Perhaps the 
most vividly perceived ills of over- 
population in less developed countries 
can be found in their cities. During the 
first half of this decade, the rate of 
growth of urban populations acceler- 
ated to an average of 4.0% a year, 
compared with a 2.3% growth rate for 
the total LDC population. Due to a 
combination of natural increase (excess 
of births over deaths) and heavy immi- 
gration from rural areas (estimated at 
over 70 million between 1970 and 1975), 
the total LDC urban population has now 
surpassed the absolute number of urban 
dwellers in the highly urbanized de- 
veloped countries. 

This demographic milestone is par- 



;|ijg> 



i 
9 



I 

:3 



46 

ticularly significant because, despite 
the huge absolute size, the urban com- 
ponent in LDCs still comprises only a 
little over one-fourth of the total popu- 
lation, compared with two-thirds in the 
developed world. Moreover, despite 
the heavy outflow of people to urban 
areas in search of jobs and higher 
standards of living, the LDC rural 
population, due to high birth rates, was 
still increasing by an average annual 
rate of 1.7% during the early 1970's. 
By sharp contrast, rural population in 
the developed regions has been declin- 
ing over the past Vh decades. 

The surge of humanity from rural 
areas, combined with high birth rates, 
has also produced unprecedented con- 
centrations of people in single urban 
agglomerations. As an example of an 
urban planner's nightmare, we may 
take note of one U.N. projection which 
envisages a Mexico City of 32 million 
inhabitants by the year 2000. All the 
while, as observed in a 1977 report by 
the Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific, "pressure on 



arable land and poverty in the rural 
areas is increasing, while problems of 
unemployment, squatters, and shan- 
tytowns in the urban areas are becom- 
ing immense." There is little doubt 
that deplorable living conditions— 
whether in rural or urban localities — 
spawns unrest, crime, and political 
extremism. Many governments feel 
constrained in this situation to increase 
authoritarian controls to preserve law 
and order. 

Increasing Unemployment. Now 
we come to a major concern of this 
conference — population and employ- 
ment. Most less developed countries 
face a prolonged period of rapid expan- 
sion in the size of their population of 
working ages. Taking LDC's as a 
whole (excluding China), population 
15_64 years of age will be growing at 
an annual average rate of about 2.9% 
throughout the remainder of this cen- 
tury. In the next 25 years, working-age 
populations in LDC's will more than 
double. During the same period the so- 
cially and politically volatile, 



POPULATION GROWTH 
BY MAJOR REGIONS 

1975 and 2000 



AFRICA 



LATIN AMERICA 
and CARIBBEAN 



NORTH AMERICA 



EAST ASIA 



SOUTH ASIA 



MIDDLE EAST 



1975 
2000 

(MEDIUM VARIANT) 



USSR 




1,960.7 



|East | West 473.1 

I 539.8 



OCEANIA 



WORLD TOTAL 

1975 - 3,967 million 
2000 6,253 million 



SOURCE: U.N. POPULATION DIVISION 



Department of State Bulletii 

unemployment-stricken age group 
15_24 years, is projected to grow al 
most as rapidly, even with the built-i 
assumption of moderately decreasin 
fertility. 

The rate of growth of the labor fore 

in less developed countries is expecte 

to accelerate in the next 20 years. Wit 

due regard to the perils of estimatin 

future labor participation rates, espc 

cially among young people an 

women, the International Labor Oi 

ganization projects an increase in tr 

rate of growth of the labor force froi 

2.4% a year between 1975 and 1980 I 

2.6% in the early 1990's. As high 

this pace of expansion is, we must be; 

in mind that about two-thirds of tl 

total" LDC labor force is still in agricu 

ture. Thus, the much more rapidly e 

panding requirements for job creatk 

outside the agricultural sector are like 

to outpace in many LDC's the grow 

of necessary capital. Clearly, dire 

remedial and broadly development 

policies will have to deal with both t| 

increasing backlog of unemployed a: 

underemployed and with the large a 

nual in-flows of new entrants into t. 

labor market. 

Here I wish to enter a note of cauti 
with regard to what advanced technt 
ogies can do to alleviate unemplc 
ment. In fact, they can aggravate t 
employment. When I was Ambassac 
to Indonesia [1965-69], I joined Pre 
dent Suharto one year in the annual r 
harvesting ceremonies. Together w 
countless hundreds of thousands 
Javanese farmers, we all began to < 
the rice, one single stalk at a time, w 
a little knife (called ani-ani) tied acr< 
the middle finger of the right hand, 
agricultural machinery was used, i 
even scythes and sickles. Had such i 
plements been used, it would have c< 
tributed to a major expansion 
unemployment and underemployme 
tearing apart the social fabric of ov 
crowded Java, an island with a popt 
tion today of 85 million. Similar 
powered fishing vessels could thr. 
thousands of Javanese fishermen oun 

work. 

I am not concluding that If 
Javanese and others in poorer counti: 
are doomed to continuing forever s 
low-productivity methods of farm 
and fishing and other pursuits, but 1 
suggesting that there are great sol 
and political difficulties involved 
any change in present low-technol! 
methods. 

On the whole, the labor supply sil 
tion is virtually irreversible in this (i 
tury. Birth control can have no et< 
on the number of potential job seel 
already born. Intensified efforts to" 



jruary 1978 

ce current fertility levels are, 
/ertheless, essential: 

• As a means of controlling total 
isumption to forestall deterioration 
the still inadequate per capita con- 
nption levels; 

» As a means of maintaining the 
bility of family life; and 
► As a means of laying the founda- 
n for a situation with which our suc- 
sors can cope and perhaps succeed 
providing productive jobs, adequate 
d, shelter, and other essentials of 
in a habitable environment. After 
it is not only a matter of how many 
>ple can survive on this planet but 
v many can live on it decently. 

ntrolling Population Growth 

_et me now turn to what is being 
le to control population growth. For" 
ately, there has been, over the past 
iecades, growing concern in many 
irters over excessive population 
wth. Programs of corrective action 
'e been undertaken in more than 30 
icerned nations. These programs 
'e received increasing amounts of 
'port from donor nations, interna- 
nal organizations (especially the 
^. Fund for Population Activities 

the World Bank), as well as from 
:ens of international and national 
/ate voluntary organizations, 
^s a result of this upsurge of interest 

support, over three-quarters of the 
pie in developing nations now live 
countries whose governments have 
pted population programs to reduce 
ility in the interest of national eco- 
lic development. Of the remaining 
-fourth or so, the great majority live 
ountries where private family plan- 
g programs are encouraged or at 
it tolerated in the interest of family 
Ith and welfare. 

he greatest single LDC success 
y in reducing population growth is 
bably occurring right now in the 
pie's Republic of China, although 
have no official information with 
ch to quantify our conclusions or to 
ge the means by which this success 
eing achieved. 

lsewhere in the developing world, 
lificant declines in birth rates have 
:n place in the rapidly modernizing 
ig Kong and city-state of Singapore; 
1 in South Korea and Taiwan. There 

also significant reductions now 
'g registered in some of the more 
ulous nations like Colombia, Thai- 
l, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as 
I as in smaller countries like Costa 
J, Tunisia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Mauritius, 
hese are welcome and hopeful signs 



indeed. They must not, however, 
create an unwarranted sense of relief 
and, even less so, complacency. 
Clearly, far more needs to be done. 

It is a particular matter of concern 
that, according to recent surveys, the 
average couple in Asia and Latin 
America desires a completed family 
size of four children; in Africa, it is 
six. As long as most couples want 
families of four, five, and six children, 
rather than one, two, or three, it will be 
impossible humanely to bring down av- 
erage fertility to a replacement level — a 
level necessary for eventual cessation 
of population growth. 

And even if, through some almost 
miraculous transformation, it were pos- 
sible to achieve by the end of this cen- 
tury an average of a little over two 
children per woman in the developing 
world (fertility rates in the developed 
world are already hovering around re- 
placement levels), the world's popula- 
tion, now over 4 billion, would not 
cease to grow before exceeding 8 bil- 
lion people. 

If, as is much more likely, the re- 
placement level fertility were not 
achieved throughout the world until the 
early 2020 's, world population would 
halt its growth at about 11 billion. 
Thus, accelerating fertility reduction by 
2 decades would reduce that dangerous 
pressure on world resources by approx- 
imately 3 billion people. 

So, the crucial question comes down 
to how to achieve as soon as possible 
average family sizes of two rather than 
the five-six children which are now 
prevailing in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa. 

Obviously, this cannot be achieved 
by family planning programs alone, no 
matter how widespread, how freely 
available, and how acceptable and ef- 
fective the means of birth control. To 
be sure, improving family planning 
services and better methods of con- 
traception must be given high priority. 
There is ample evidence that public 
provision of these services has signifi- 
cantly accelerated the diffusion of fam- 
ily planning practices in some three 
dozen LDC's. Whether it can initiate a 
fertility decline is much less certain. 

Of greatest importance, then, is the 
question of motivation, of inducing 
people to want to have smaller 
families. This is obviously a vastly 
complex undertaking, involving such 
wide-ranging and basic issues as reduc- 
tions in infant and child mortality, the 
full integration of women into the de- 
velopment process, a vigorous growth 
in national product, wide educational 
opportunities for both sexes, delayed 
marriages, and, of course, development 



47 

of a kind that benefits the masses 
through more equitable distribution of 
income and land. These requirements 
have been spelled out in the World 
Population Plan of Action, a document 
agreed to by the consensus of 136 na- 
tions represented at the World Population 
Conference of 1974. 2 

Of course, it is not that these things 
should be accomplished exclusively for 
purposes of moderating fertility. They 
should be done anyway. Yet, a slow- 
down in population growth would be a 
major byproduct of these measures 
whose primary purpose would be to 
improve the quality of life for countless 
millions around the world. 

Hopefully, the world's population 
can be stabilized at levels closer to 8 
than 1 1 billion. But in order to do this, 
it will be most important that world 
leaders bestir themselves and become 
more involved; also, that the village 
and the community become more in- 
strumental in developing and imple- 
menting their own family planning 
program, with rewards and incentives 
being given to the most successful 
among them; and also, that paramedics 
be trained to provide simple health 
services — including family planning — 
in villages, however remote, where 
these paramedics are known and 
trusted. 

There may be scant prospects for any 
absolute closing of the income gap be- 
tween rich and poor nations, but there 
can be a significant narrowing of this 
gap through a combination of: 

• Developing nations putting their 
own houses in order, nurturing and en- 
gaging the talents of all their people; 
and 

• Greater assistance and support by 
developed nations. 

At the same time, I think, we should 
give further thought as to what our as- 
sistance goals are all about. Is it some- 
thing that can be measured in economic 
terms like per capita GNP? Or in terms 
of quantifiable quality-of-life indices 
like high educational attainment, low 
infant mortality, extended life expec- 
tancy? Or are there unquantifiable 
quality-of-life factors that are equally 
important — perhaps more so — such as 
kinship, participation of the individual 
in his community's affairs, social mo- 
bility, freedom to move and to create? 

I do not argue that a high material 
level of living is a goal which surpasses 
all others. I recognize that the rich may 
be poor in many ways, and the poor 
rich in other ways. Yet, there are cer- 
tain basic human needs that everyone 
absolutely requires and craves. Perhaps 
the best summation of what we all 



m 



hi* 

■I 



\ 



48 

see k — and need — is set forth in that 
memorable passage in the U.S. Decla- 
ration of Independence: 

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that 
all Men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pur- 
suit of Happiness. . . . 

Excessive population growth, 
perhaps more than any other single 
phenomenon on the world scene, 
threatens denial to our children and 



their children and endless generations 
to come of those very goals which 
mankind seeks: life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. □ 



1 Address to the International Seminar on 
Population, Employment, and Change in La 
Hulpe, Belgium, on Nov. 3, 1977; Ambassador 
Green is Coordinator of Population Affairs. 

2 For U.S. statements at the World Population 
Conference at Bucharest Aug. 19-20, 1974, and 
text of the World Population Plan of Action, see- 
Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1974, p. 429. 



UNITED NATIONS: Benefits From 
the l/JV. Agencies 



by Charles William Maynes l 

At the beginning of November, the 
U.S. Government chose — for the first 
time in its history— to withdraw from a 
major U.N. institution. A decision of 
such watershed proportions demands an 
explanation. 

America's interest in and support for 
the United Nations and its affiliated 
agencies has never been higher. Not for 
several decades have the President and 
the top leadership of our government 
been so committed to multilateral ap- 
proaches to peace and economic prog- 
ress. President Carter expressed this 
determination to rise above traditional 
bilateral diplomacy even before he took 
office; and since then — in both style 
and substance — he has gone out of his 
way to insure that America makes 
greater use of the diplomatic machinery 
that is available through the U.N. sys- 
tem and to strengthen American sup- 
port for the vital work of its family of 
agencies. How, then, do we explain the 
decision to leave the International 
Labor Organization (ILO)? 

We all know that the ILO is a highly 
unique institution among U.N. agen- 
cies, the only one based upon a tripar- 
tite membership system where, in prin- 
ciple, each nation is represented not 
only by its government but also by 
delegations of workers and employers. 
We also should all know that the 
ILO does valuable work. We can take 
the field of development as an exam- 
ple. The World Employment Program 
of the ILO has been of tremendous im- 
portance to our own Agency for Inter- 
national Development in policy de- 
velopment and has had a significant 
impact on policy formulation in such 
multilateral institutions as the World 
Bank. The ILO pioneered the strategy 
of focusing development assistance on 



"basic human needs," a strategy 
which has influenced development 
planning around the globe. 

Our own efforts to develop alterna- 
tive technologies for the developing 
countries build on ILO experience. The 
ILO pioneered innovative development 
measures and the establishment of uni- 
form technical standards for the im- 
plementation of labor-intensive de- 
velopment projects. 

We could list similar achievements 
in the fields of human rights, industrial 
relations, and workers' rights, and all 
of them contributed to ILO's award of 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969. How, 
then, could the United States leave an 
organization that so clearly makes a 
major contribution to a more peaceful 
and decent international system? 

To answer this question, we have to 
examine some of the difficulties the 
ILO has experienced in carrying out 
one of its principal functions — the 
monitoring of compliance with ILO 
conventions. One fundamental purpose 
of the ILO — perhaps the fundamental 
purpose — is to observe and report on 
compliance with these voluntarily ac- 
cepted conventions. Now it has always 
seemed clear that this could only be 
done effectively if it were done objec- 
tively. Were states to begin to 
politicize the compliance process, it 
would begin to lose much of its effec- 
tiveness. Yet over the years precisely 
this kind of politicization began to 
creep into the work of the ILO. 

In considering compliance with ILO 
conventions on forced labor and free- 
dom of association, the membership 
applied one set of standards against 
Communist countries and another set 
against non-Communist countries. The 
ILO Group of Experts would objec- 
tively call into question Soviet com- 
pliance, but the membership would ig- 



Department of State Bullet 

nore the report. Then, the sarr 
phenomenon of the double standai 
began to develop in the ILO consider 
tion of Middle East issues. 

Against this background, one begi 
to understand why in November 19' 
the United States informed the ILO th 
it intended to withdraw from the c 
ganization unless conditions could 
created to restore to the ILO its trad 
tions of due process, objectivity, and 
single standard of compliance for 
states. Regrettably, the response oft: 
majority at the June 1977 conferen 
was to refuse to confirm some refon 
steps taken earlier, and then, for or 
the second time in 50 years, to refii: 
to endorse the report of the Conferen: 
Committee on the Application i 
Conventions and Standards — a repl 
which itself did represent an object! : 
review of the degree to which the ID 
members had adhered to II) 
conventions. 

It is rare that any single question c 

produce such an intensive coalesce*! 

of foreign affairs and domestic vie 

points and pressures as this one invo 

ing the ILO did. The issue concert: 

the balance between benefits of me 

bership, which were considerable, ;< 

trends in the organization, which w,< 

alarming. The President pondered } 

problem up until almost the final hS 

and then decided the United Stg 

should let its letter of withdrawal i 

effect. He did so, however, in the sfi 

that the United States will return to 

ILO if its performance improves. 

are currently exploring the conditi i 

under which we would decide 

return. 2 . \ 

The very difficulty of the decisn 

however, forces us to consider rrt 

carefully our overall policy toward i 

specialized agencies and other pj 

grams in the U.N. system. There is i 

in some quarters that the ILO decij 

will encourage those who would * 

America to get out of more organ; 

tions, or even out of the United Nan 

itself. A prominent columnist has ej 

suggested that complete withdra; 

from the United Nations would be ai 

sirable result. My own personal vie 

that such suggestions develop fro 

profound ignorance of the real ad 

tages that the United States den 

from membership in the U.N. famil 

institutions, and I would like to sj 

much of my remaining time todayl 

scribing these benefits. 

I can start by noting that the u 
system is important to the United St 
from two critical points of view. 



• First, it provides a variety of' 
placeable mechanisms for the pursi 
America's foreign policy goals. 



binary 1978 

» Second, it provides many concrete 
nefits to this country. 

annels for U.S. Policy 

'resident Carter's reaffirmation of 
importance of the U.N. role in 
lerica's foreign policy has been an 
jortant departure for this Adminis- 
ion. It was not a decision he took 
itly. The hard reality is that a grow- 
; number of the world's pressing 
ues cannot be handled by nations 
ing alone, or even through small co- 
ions with others. Use of universal 
a such as those provided by the 
!f. agencies often is an irreplaceable 
I central part of our overall strategy 
the solution of many key issues. 
rhus, facilitating the dialogue be- 
:en the rich countries and the poor 
intries is one of the most important 
:s the United Nations plays. Here 
lerica has a direct and high national 
:rest in more effective cooperation. 
; less developed nations are the 
us of many of the raw materials 
ded by us; they provide many im- 
tant and steadily growing markets 
our products. About a third of our 
jign trade is now with the develop- 
nations. These countries provide 
fastest growing export markets. 
w they live can affect very directly 
quality of life in this country. The 
ited Nations and its family of agen- 
> stand ready to serve as vehicles to 
mote the economic dialogue and 
gress that are so vital, 
'he importance of the United Na- 
is is also growing in the political 
a. Our initiatives to bring about 
ceful settlements in Namibia and 
odesia have been taken in part 
hin the U.N. framework. This has 
n done not because of any doc- 
aire belief that the United Nations 
st be involved but because the par- 
most directly concerned are anx- 
s to see the United Nations seized 
h the issue. 

'he peacekeeping efforts undertaken 
the Security Council reflect still 
ther way that a multilateral forum 
achieve something that no single 
ion could do alone. The two 
cekeeping forces in the Middle East 
e been essential to the maintenance 
he cease-fire, and they have created 
atmosphere in which negotiations 
a peaceful settlement could occur. 
TC is no way to price the benefits 
derive from the U.N.'s peacekeep- 
efforts. 

'he annual convening of the General 
iembly in New York — in our own 
intry — provides us with another vital 
lomatic instrument. Critics deride 
United Nations as a "debating so- 



ciety," and, of course, it is much more 
than that. But diplomacy, after all, is 
debate — debate which provides struc- 
ture, debate which promotes consen- 
sus, debate which identifies and iso- 
lates differences. The United Nations 
can be unmatchable in this regard. If 
we wish to use the opportunities that it 
presents — and this Administration 
does — we will find it of inestimable 
value. 

Specialized Agencies and Programs 

Let us turn to the specialized agen- 
cies and programs of the United Na- 
tions, however. They add a dimension 
to our diplomacy which is simply not 
appreciated. Without them we would 
lose a functional edge to our diplomatic 
efforts which would make it impossible 
to carry out some critical initiatives 
that are profoundly in our national 
interest. 

Our interest in economic develop- 
ment in other nations is furthered by 
the U.N. Development Program 
(UNDP), the World Bank, and the 
regional development banks, and 
monetary stability is provided by the 
International Monetary Fund. We all 
recognize that developmental assist- 
ance often is more palatable to both 
recipient and donor when there is a 
multilateral agency serving as inter- 
mediary. These agencies are making 
significant strides in the direction of 
America's own foreign assistance ob- 
jectives. Both the humanitarian and 
economic interests that America has in 
the developing nations are well served 
by the program activities of these 
agencies. 

In particular, the UNDP, with proj- 
ects in more than 140 countries and ter- 
ritories, has been working hard to meet 
our own goal of improving the living 
situations of the world's poorest 
people — those without clean water, 
food, clothing, shelter, or health care. 
Administered by former U.S. Con- 
gressman Brad Morse, UNDP serves as 
a channel for development assistance to 
individual nations and regions. It does 
preinvestment work for projects to be 
funded later by the World Bank, re- 
gional banks, bilateral aid programs, or 
the private sector and also provides fel- 
lowships and training. From 1972 to 
1976, for example, UNDP stimulated 
some $19 billion worth of followup 
investment activity. In natural re- 
sources projects alone during 1976, 
UNDP promoted followup investment 
valued at nearly $1.4 billion. This in- 
cluded some $256 million in opportuni- 
ties for private sector investment, 
mostly undertaken by private firms 
from the United States. 



49 

UNDP has helped to uncover $20 
billion worth of mineral deposits for 
the benefit not only of the developing 
nations, where most sites are located, 
but also of mineral consumer countries 
like the United States. The discoveries 
include 100 million tons of bauxite in 
the South Pacific, a copper belt that 
stretches from Yugoslavia to Pakistan, 
and a vein containing 40 billion tons of 
iron ore in the mountains of Bolivia. 
And while it is promoting the economic 
development of poor nations around the 
world, the UNDP is, in fact, spending 
in excess of $100 million in the United 
States each year in fellowships to citi- 
zens of other nations for study or train- 
ing here, in contracts with United 
States consulting firms, for employ- 
ment of American experts, for equip- 
ment purchases, and for headquarters 
expenses. 

America's chief interest is in support 
of programs that benefit the entire 
membership of the U.N. Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). But UNESCO makes 
countless contributions to this country. 
In recent years these have gone virtu- 
ally unnoticed in the face of congres- 
sional attacks, the cutoff of U.S. funds 
in violation of our treaty agreements, 
and reduced public support in this 
country because of some admittedly 
misguided resolutions in UNESCO 
meetings, mainly dealing with Israel. 

I need not recount the domestic im- 
pact of UNESCO before this audience 
or the reasons that the United States 
needs to remain a fully active member 
and supporter, but brief mention of a 
few items, I think, will serve as a use- 
ful reminder. 

Probably the most important area is 
science. America derives benefits and 
opportunities that would be available 
only at far greater expense and effort, 
if they were available at all. The "Man 
and the Biosphere" program is giving 
us vital information on management of 
the nation's forests, on avalanche pre- 
diction in the Rocky Mountains, and on 
reduction of the encroachment of desert 
areas in the southwest. Other scientific 
programs are providing assistance in 
earthquake prediction, which will be of 
vital benefit to our Western States, re- 
search on the protection of ocean re- 
sources, and on the identification of 
economically exploitable foreign 
sources of minerals of which we are a 
major importer. 

UNESCO also provides American 
scientists with information and oppor- 
tunities that enable them to maintain 
leadership in their fields, as well as to 
help shape the conditions for interna- 
tional exchange of information in the 
future. Indeed, for the 25% input that 



■ 



a 9 

£» 

i 
:3 



50 



America makes to UNESCO's budget, 
we get access to 100% of the research 
output of its scientific bodies. We must 
recall that only a minority share of the 
world's nondefense basic research is 
now done within the United States, so 
we very much need as many scientific 
ties to the rest of the world as possible. 
On the cultural side, the Smithsonian 
Institution — and thus all of the Ameri- 
can people — has been a major benefi- 
ciary of UNESCO facilities for the 
exchange of cultural property. And 
UNESCO's work in preserving and re- 
storing elements of man's natural and 
cultural heritage, such as the Nubian 
monuments in Egypt, will enable future 
generations of Americans — the scien- 
tist, the educator, and the ordinary 
citizen — to visit, enjoy, and learn from 
these important factors in mankind's 
historical development. 

On the educational side, a notable 
element of American benefit is present 
right here in Detroit at Wayne State 
University. At the request of Wayne 
State, UNESCO last year sent a mis- 
sion of specialists in university educa- 
tion for adults to conduct a study which 
focused on Wayne State's weekend col- 
lege program. The impact of the study 
will extend far beyond Wayne State, 
but the university here will be the prin- 
cipal beneficiary of the work. 

In sum, our participation in UN- 
ESCO proves the fallacy of ethnocen- 
tric tendencies which seem to appear 
all too frequently in our society. 
America does not have all the answers 
to all the world's problems, even to 
our own problems. We do have much 
to learn from other nations, in many 
areas, and UNESCO is helping us do 

so. 

Let us remember also areas of the 
U.N. system which we take for granted 
but which touch us all everyday — the 
mail, the telephone and telegraph sys- 
tem, and international radio and TV. 
The functioning of these systems may 
seem relatively automatic to the man in 
the street, but complex international ar- 
rangements are needed to make them 
happen. The Universal Postal Union 
(UPU) and the International Tele- 
graph Union (ITU), both U.N. agen- 
cies, are what make this possible. 
Direct television broadcasts of the 
dramatic Begin-Sadat meetings in 
Jerusalem in November, beamed not 
just here but all over the world, were 
possible in part because of the exist- 
ence of an agreed upon international 
system of frequency allocations and 
broadcast standards and regulations 
that are set up by the ITU. 
Americans— as the world's greatest 
users of international mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, and television— get 



ample benefits for the minimal amounts 
that we invest. 

Weather is also something we take 
for granted, and we tend to assume 
there is not very much we can do about 
it. But the World Weather Watch, op- 
erated by the U.N.'s World 
Meteorological Organization 
(WMO), is providing important data 
for U.S. meteorological, hydrological, 
and ocean-related services. Through 
the World Weather Watch, the U.S. 
Weather Bureau has been able to dou- 
ble the amount of data it has available 
to predict whether rain will fall or 
storms will strike. One result, for U.S. 
aviation, is better route forecasting for 
trans- Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights, 
and that means fewer accidents and 
more comfortable flights. Another re- 
sult, for U.S. shipping, is wind and 
wave analyses that provide forecasts of 
minimum-time-and-distance for spe- 
cific voyages. And another result, for 
all of us, is a vastly improved ability to 
prepare for approaching weather 
problems — severe winters in the East, 
droughts in the West, and similar prob- 
lems all over the world — and to avert 
what could be genuine disasters. This 
means fewer lives lost, fewer crops 
destroyed. 

The scientific research of the WMO 
is also providing us with important in- 
formation about long-term climate 
change, which is essential to future 
U.S. agriculture and other economic 
activity, as well as information on at- 
mospheric pollution and the status of 
the highly important ozone layer. 

The U.N. Environmental Program 
(UNEP) has begun development of a 
global environmental monitoring sys- 
tem which will assess critical environ- 
mental factors on a worldwide basis. 
And UNEP's worldwide surveillance 
system called Earthwatch is using a 
network of national and international 
programs to check on conditions and 
changes in our environment, including 
pollution of air and water in this coun- 
try. This may enable mankind to avoid 
making the kind of serious environmen- 
tal mistakes from which there is no 
recovery. 

As airline hijacking continues to get 
prominence and to endanger the lives 
of not only Americans but citizens of 
all nations, the importance to us of the 
U.N.'s International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) increases. U.S. 
flag carriers account for nearly half of 
all international air traffic. Americans 
travel more than any other people in 
the world. And the United States man- 
ufactures much of the world's civil avi- 
ation fleet. The role of ICAO is, there- 
fore, highly vital to us. Largely at U.S. 
initiative, ICAO has persuaded member 



Department of State Bulleti 

states to upgrade security at interm 
tional airports in order to reduce tei 
rorism. It is also promoting interne 
tional standards on control of aircra 
noise and on pollution from aircra 
engines. 

Also, ICAO is about to make a dec 
sion on worldwide standards for tl 
microwave landing system, which wi 
provide increased safety for aircra 
landing in adverse weather. This dec 
sion could result in major equipme 
exports for the United States, and 01 
continued involvement here is high 
vital. 

In maritime affairs, the United Stati 
is the world's largest generator i 
oceanborne traffic, and it has mo 
than 12,000 miles of coastline. As a r 
suit, the United States receives substa 
tial benefit from its participation in t! 
U.N.'s Inter-Governmental Maritin 
Consultative Organization (IMCC 
even though it pays only 4.09% j 
IMCO's costs. Each year more th: 
1-1/3 million tons of oil are discharge 
or spilled into the oceans of t 
wor l c l_85% of it intentionally— a 
IMCO is working to develop new cq. 
ventions which will prohibit these d 
charges. Since there is no way that t 
United States could unilaterally conti 
or prevent such discharges that occ' 
on the high seas, we must recognf 
that it is only through an international 
ganization which includes all of ' 
ship-operating countries that effect; 
standards can be accepted a! 
enforced. 

The World Health Organizatn 
(WHO) has made phenomenal progre 
in combating disease in other natio 
After a 10-year campaign, it is mi 
total victory over smallpox and hoj 
to eradicate it completely in the com: : 
months. Although smallpox has be 
virtually unknown in this country 
many years, this dramatic developm 
has great significance to the Uni: 
States. WHO spent about $95 mill i 
in this 10-year effort to elimini 
smallpox. In comparison, the Um< 
States used to spend $120 million «' 
year simply for smallpox surveillan: 
vaccinations, and quarantine measui; 
With the eradication of smallp' 
routine vaccinations are no longer j 



quired, and the United States is rea: 
ing significant financial savings. 

WHO has also established; 
worldwide network to warn against' 
outbreak of flu and other contagu 
diseases. It has undertaken a mi 
study in India to prove that tubercuM 
patients can be ambulatory and W 
not be confined in hospitals j 
sanitoria; the result will be large i 
ings in all nations, including this <j 
And WHO is doing important W 



bruary 1978 

i cancer and on cardiovascular 
search. 

Health care is one of those areas 
lere we tend to believe that America 
s nothing to learn. We spend pheno- 
;nal amounts of money on health 
re— in 1976 a total of $132 billion, 
more than $600 per person. We have 
physician-to-population ratio of ap- 
)ximately 1 to 700, when the world 
io is 1 to 50,000. Yet America still 
;s behind many countries in terms of 
erall health status. In infant mortal- 
, we have only the 16th place among 
veloped nations. Our life expectancy 
lower than that in 14 other countries. 
r e expectancy for residents of the 
strict of Columbia is actually lower 
in for residents of Sri Lanka, a coun- 

with a per capita income of less 
n $200 a year. What this tells us is 
t we do indeed have much to learn 
m the experience of other nations, 
i our participation in the World 
alth Organization is helping us do 
t that. 

Mso in the health field, it is worth 
ing that the International Labor 
ganization, which we have just left, 
developing, at the request of the 
S. Department of Labor, an interna- 
ial health hazard alert system which 
1 facilitate the issuance of interna- 
lal warnings about newly discovered 
upational hazards and to collect in- 
mation on techniques dealing with 
h problem. Despite our withdrawal, 

intend to continue our cooperation 
ause it is in our interests, 
^nd while the chief focus of the 
)d and Agriculture Organization 
iO) is on stimulating agricultural 
/elopment and alleviating food 
rtages in other nations, much of its 
rk also has favorable impact on the 
ited States. It has an early warning 
tern that uses remote sensing and 
und contacts to give information on 
>ending crop and food shortages. 
: FAO's Codex Alimentarius Corn- 
's ion is the only international body 
ing criteria for fish products and is 
ecially important to the United 
tes as a nation which imports 
80% of the fish it consumes. The 
3's research work in tropical forest- 
may be of critical importance to us 
he mid-1980's when America's de- 
id for forestry products is expected 
»utstrip our productive capacity. 

ntributions of U.N. Agencies 

inally, there are three general con- 
utions of the U.N. agencies across 
board which are of great impor- 
:e to the U.S. 

)ne is the current work on codes of 
duct which will affect many aspects 



of American private enterprise. Among 
the various U.N. forums, codes are 
being developed with topics ranging 
from multinational corporations to 
technology. UNESCO, as you know, is 
circulating a draft code on the use of 
the mass media, and it currently raises 
important questions about possible in- 
trusions on the independence of the 
mass media. In all of these instances, 
America's energetic participation is es- 
sential. We need to be present to pro- 
tect our interests. 

The second general product is the 
highly valuable information, statistics, 
and documents which flow out of virtu- 
ally all of the U.N. agencies. The U.N. 
agencies are able to gather information 
around the world without the impedi- 
ment of national sponsorship, and it is 
data which simply would not otherwise 
be available to researchers in this coun- 
try or anywhere else. The U.N.'s 
Statistical Office produces materials 
that are invaluable to U.S. scholars, to 
the government, and to many private 
sector agencies. They include a 
monthly bulletin of statistics, a statisti- 
cal yearbook, a demographic yearbook, 
a yearbook of national accounts statis- 
tics, a yearbook of industrial statistics, 
a compendium of housing statistics, 
and much more. An appreciation of the 
effectiveness of UNESCO's programs 
in exchanging information can be 
gained from the fact that they generated 
$140 million in book and journal sales 
in the United States alone from 1949 to 
1970. 

And the third major product is the 
overall contribution to international 
cooperation and the reduction of ten- 
sions that results from the individual 
programs of the U.N. agencies. This is 
a product that is hard to measure. But 
by bringing together educators, scien- 
tists, cultural leaders, development ex- 
perts, economists, professionals in 
many fields, and government leaders of 
many nations, the U.N. agencies in- 
evitably build a growing global com- 
munications network. It is a network of 
people who have learned to cooperate 
toward some shared objective and who, 
in the process, have learned much 
about each other and even about each 
other's countries — removing ster- 
eotypes and reducing misunderstand- 
ings. Their national governments may 
even be unfriendly, but on an indi- 
vidual basis the participants in this ac- 
tivity are able to continue to communi- 
cate and gradually to strengthen the ties 
between nations which will make 
armed conflict steadily unthinkable. 

In short, I think we can all feel very 
good about America's contributions to 
these agencies. In most of them we 



51 

play a leading role. Our involvement 
helps them to do important work 
which, among other things, certainly 
provides valuable benefits to the 
United States. 

Future Ties 

I acknowledge that there have been 
problems in some of these agencies, 
and there has been dismay about them 
in some quarters here. There has, of 
course, been introduction of irrelevant 
political issues in agencies that should 
be kept immune from those consid- 
erations. All of us need to keep in mind 
that this type of politicization generally 
takes place only in the once-a-year 
meetings of the general conferences of 
these agencies; for most of each year, 
these agencies continue to carry out 
their important substantive respon- 
sibilities. Nevertheless, we will all 
keep working to reduce and eliminate 
this phenomenon of unnecessary 
politicization, and I would note that we 
have made significant progress in the 
last 18 months. In many instances we 
are being helped by other nations. And 
the secretariats of many of the agencies 
are making outstanding efforts to keep 
the organizations focused on the sub- 
stantive issues which they were in- 
tended to pursue. 

We are also working to strengthen 
the management of those agencies 
which are undergoing some of the trad- 
itional problems of rapid growth and 
hew responsibilities. When the agen- 
cies were young and the budgets were 
small, there may have been less moti- 
vation to pursue sound management 
techniques. But we are now talking 
about big business, big budgets, big 
payrolls. The "big four" agencies — 
ILO, UNESCO, FAO, and WHO— in 
1976 had assessed budgets totaling in 
excess of $400 million, and they also 
had sizable inputs through special pro- 
grams and voluntary contributions. In 
the early days of the United Nations — 
in 1947— the total budget for all pur- 
poses was $124 million. In 1976 it was 
nearly $2.5 billion. With that kind of 
funding, the United Nations has the 
capacity for major impact, and indeed 
it has become a significant force in the 
world's developmental process. 

As a result of that growing financial 
capability, the nations which have pro- 
vided the most support have begun to 
look more insistently at management 
improvements and effective work pro- 
ducers. Nearly 89% of the financing of 
the United Nations is provided by only 
27 countries, just 17% of the member- 
ship. In the specialized agencies 
financing arrangements are similar. 
These are the governments that have 






.1 



1 

1 

:3 



m 



52 

the greatest stake in the orderly man- 
agement of the international system 
which the United Nations promotes, 
and they want to know and have a right 
to know how their funds are being 
spent. 

For this reason we are working to 
promote greater coordination among 
the various agencies in order to 
minimize wasteful duplication of effort 
and potential overlap. We are seeking 
to improve systems of planning, budg- 
eting, and evaluation to strengthen 
personnel management and to effect 
various other reforms. We are urging 
improvements in these agencies pre- 
cisely because we care about them very 
deeply. And we intend to keep working 
in that direction. 

These agencies provide the United 
States with a tremendous opportunity 
for leadership in foreign affairs fields 
where it is important that we maintain a 
central policy voice. Although it is 
true, as I hope I have shown, that we 
derive substantial direct benefits from 
the United Nations system, our chief 
reason for participating in United Na- 
tions agencies is not these immediate 
benefits; rather, it is the vital opportu- 
nity for leadership. 

Thus our involvement helps us to in- 
sure that America's foreign policy 
goals are achieved in the most practical 
way. Our involvement provides us with 
the flexibility to use either bilateral or 
multilateral approaches to important 
issues — or both, depending on which is 
most appropriate. Our involvement en- 
ables us to insure that the components 
of the international system evolve in a 
way that is compatible with our system 



of government, our moral standards, 
and our place of leadership in the 
world. Our involvement enables us to 
influence developments in areas that 
are central to our political and eco- 
nomic well-being and that will have in- 
creasing impact on us as the world 
grows more and more interdependent 
with the passage of time. 

A major challenge before us now is 
to persuade the American public and 
the Congress of the continued vitality 
and importance of these agencies and 
programs. The President is very in- 
terested in this task. He has instructed 
the members of his Cabinet to help in 
the process of explaining these benefits 
to the American public. But we need 
the help of private citizens too. We 
need the help of you in the U.S. Na- 
tional Commission for UNESCO, the 
World Affairs Council chapters, the 
United Nations Association chapters, 
and other influential people in other 
organizations which are interested in 
the role that America plays in these 
organizations. 

It is only with your help that we will 
be able to play the leadership role that 
others expect us, as a great power, to 
assume. It is only with your help that 
we can succeed in maximizing the ef- 
fectiveness of the U.N. system and its 
contributions to us all. C 



1 Address before the U.S. National Commis- 
sion for UNESCO in Detroit on Dec. 8, 1977; 
Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Organization Affairs. 

2 For text of President Carter's statement on 
the termination of U.S. membership, see Bul- 
letin of Dec. 26, 1977, p. 912. 



Assessment of 
S2d 1/.1V. General Assembly 



by Andrew Young 1 

I am pleased to say that I believe we 
have achieved an important and hope- 
ful shift in the development of the 
General Assembly. We are drawing to 
a close what has been, in many ways, 
the most constructive session in many 
years. In this General Assembly we 
have seen a clearer consensus of the 
concerned emerge to replace some of 
the politics of frustration which seemed 
often to drive the work of the Assembly 
in the past. 

This year we all saw an obvious 
change of mood, a sign that all of our 
governments and delegates are begin- 
ning to question the value of the slo- 



gans and cliches which have governed 
their activities so often during the past 
several years. I sense an increasing 
agreement that slogans lead nowhere, 
that purely political and tactical ma- 
neuvers in isolation from the substance 
not only are wasteful and damaging to 
this institution but they engender un- 
productive confrontation which inhibits 
progress toward solution of the crucial 
problems of mankind. 

In short, this has been a good As- 
sembly. It may even have been histori- 
cally important because of progress on 
several fronts but mainly because of 
this new will to talk together about re- 
solving our common problems. This is 
a solid record that my government val- 



Department of State Bullet 

ues highly and a record that I intend t 
convey to the American people in th 
months ahead. 



Middle East 

What has this Assembly accon 
plished, and why did this occur? 

First, let us turn to the area whe^ 
the United Nations has, for 30 year 
borne special responsibilities for mail 
taining peace and security — the Midd 
East. This fall we saw in Preside 
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem one of tl 
most courageous moves in the histo 
of modern diplomacy. His action, ai 
the response of Prime Minister Begi 
have created an unprecedented oppc 
tunity. Their visit demonstrated t 
profound desire for peace by peopl 
who have undergone the devastation 
four tragic wars. 

On most other issues this fall, tl 
Assembly gave the impression of bei 
closely conscious of, and relevant 1. 
real events. But resolutions which w| 
adopted in the Middle East tended 
reflect the unhelpful rhetoric of the p;t 
rather than the refreshing and hope 
developments of the present. The 
seemed a very real possibility that | 
world was passing the United Natid 

b y- 

In all fairness, I think that the de- 
gates and their governments may hijl 
sometimes found it difficult, becau 
of the swift pace of developments,: 
reflect in New York the dynamic _m 
possibilities for progress in the Mid. 
East. 

Despite the unreality of some' 
these debates, the role of the Unn 
Nations as an institution in Middle E> 
affairs remained important and o 
structive. We must all keep this i 
mind, as Prime Minister Begin I 
when he called on the Secretary Gi 
eral to discuss the contribution 
United Nations can make to the pe 
process. U.N. peacekeeping efforts : 
many years now have helped provl 
the breathing space which is recess* 
to permit the parties concerned 
hammer out the terribly difficult 
essential decisions which must be ta; 
if we are to have an enduring peace-i 
long last— in the Middle East. 

Amidst the headlines this fall, a 
overlooked was that the Security Ccr 
cil renewed without controversy i 
mandate of the Disengagement I 
server Force in the Middle Eas 
process that in the past has bj 
drawn-out and painful. Nor did 
world or the media focus on the 
that General Assembly approval 
funding for the Middle East peacekj 
ing efforts this year, in contrast tot 
past, was routine and noncontrovem 



ruary 1978 

lor did the public place sufficient 
(ortance on the U.N. role this fall in 
bling intensive consultations to take 
:e among the leaders of the govern- 
its principally concerned with a 
Idle East settlement. This included 
opportunity for U.S. and Soviet 
:ign ministers to further their talks 
his subject. 

l11 of these developments helped 
>are the way for the kind of agree - 
its on meaningful measures which 
required for the ultimate settlement 
all desire in the Middle East. 

thern Africa 

n important part of the new atmos- 
re in this General Assembly was 
;ndered by what my government 
:iders to be significant movement 
tie U.N. community toward a new 
■ee of consensus on the common 
s in the southern African issues. I 
proud that my government and the 
>le of the United States have drawn 
er in association and cooperation 

our African friends. 
ie world community is virtually 
limous in its support for the goals 
beration of the people in southern 
ca. There are few who would reject 
work that has been launched to 
antee freedom, independence, and 
rule for all of the people of this re- 
. My government is committed to 
monumental task. 

Rhodesia we have been sharply 
•e of the breathing room granted 
U.K. -U.S. effort by the way the 
:ral Assembly treated this problem 
1 its debates, in committee as well 
enary. We also understand and ac- 

the significance of the postpone- 

of further debate in the Security 
icil. 

ie tragic actions of the Government 
)uth Africa this fall sparked a justi- 
e explosion of protest from around 
vorld that found its expression in 
Organization through the unani- 
; decision of the Security Council to 
'Se mandatory sanctions on South 
:a — the first time sanctions under 
ter VII of the charter have been 
>sed on a member state of the 
id Nations. This was a true con- 
's. It was an historic step forward 
e United Nations in its long effort 
hieve freedom and human dignity 
rica. 



industrialized and the developing na- 
tions. Many thought we would not be 
able to come to terms on even the pro- 
cedure for carrying on this dialogue — 
for we had failed numerous times in the 
past — but we were able to carry it off. 
In addition, after a 2-year study on 
restructuring of the economic and so- 
cial functions of the United Nations, 
we reached agreement on some highly 
significant changes that should clearly 
improve the efficiency and effective- 
ness of these operations and insure that 
the delivery of services of the U.N. 
agencies to the world's poor is greatly 
enhanced. 

We have also made some progress on 
human rights. This was the Assembly 
at which the President of the United 
States signed the International Cove- 
nants on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and Civil and Political Rights. It 
was the Assembly at which broad co- 
sponsorship of the proposal to create 
the position of High Commissioner for 
Human Rights reflected support in 
most geographic regions, even though 
ultimate passage was not possible this 
year. This was also the Assembly at 
which delegations from a number of 
regions made significant human rights 
proposals. I think we have taken impor- 
tant steps toward achievement of more 
awareness and agreement on action in 
this sensitive but critical field than we 
have ever had. At the same time, we 
have much work to do. 



iomic and Social Issues 

i economic and social issues, we 
reached two important milestones 
d in consensus. We have achieved 
; ment on a mechanism to oversee 
:ontinuing dialogue between the 



Arms Control 

One of the most encouraging things 
about this fall's General Assembly was 
the extent of agreement we reached on 
arms control issues. 

On a comprehensive test ban, for 
example, the key resolution com- 
manded very broad support — not only 
from the Soviet Union and the United 
States but also from almost all of the 
nonnuclear nations. 

On nonproliferation, there was a 
genuine readiness to exchange views 
seriously and to develop an acceptable 
resolution that recognizes the broad re- 
sponsibility of all nations not to con- 
tribute to proliferation. 

Resolutions calling for nuclear free 
zones in Africa, the Middle East, and 
South Asia commanded strong accept- 
ance, and my government was pleased 
to be able to support them. And both 
the United States and the Soviets were 
to vote for a resolution endorsing goals 
in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

The action of this Assembly in 
adopting by consensus — I emphasize 
by consensus — a resolution on aircraft 
hijacking was a particularly significant 
achievement of this session, making 



53 

the world 's airways safer for peoples of 
all nations. 

In addition, this fall negotiations in 
the United Nations have made substan- 
tial progress toward establishing a joint 
committee on missing persons in Cy- 
prus, a positive indication that there is 
willingness on both sides to resolve 
differences through negotiation. 

We have taken steps to support the 
important recommendations of the In- 
ternational Civil Service Commission 
for improvements in the staffing of the 
United Nations. We have expanded the 
U.N. membership as we work toward the 
ultimate goal of universality. We 
reached a consensus resolution on 
Guam and avoided the confrontational 
resolutions of the past. We have even 
taken radical steps to curb first-class air 
travel for all U.N. employees below 
the level of the Secretary General 
himself. 



Positive Assembly Record 

The reasons for this quite positive 
record are many. I do not need to recite 
them to delegates here, but I believe it 
is particularly important for people out- 
side this body to focus on them. 

First, I think, is the emerging 
agreement that the time for oppor- 
tunism on many issues before the 
United Nations is passing. The issues 
are too pressing, the dangers too great. 
This year's Assembly gives us more 
hope that this body has taken a new and 
positive course. While we clearly can- 
not agree on all precise policy prescrip- 
tions, there is growing agreement that 
it is incumbent on all of us to advance 
serious proposals for dealing with criti- 
cal issues. 

Second, there is, I believe growing 
agreement among members that the de- 
veloped and the developing countries 
have fundamental, long-term interests 
that converge more often than they di- 
verge. In my own country, for exam- 
ple, changes of policy have resulted in 
deeper interest in the problems of 
southern Africa, progress on a Panama 
Canal treaty, renewed concern about 
human rights, and closer relations with 
many countries in the developing 
world. There are differences, to be 
sure, and some are hard to bridge. But 
for all nations — large and small — it is 
increasingly absurd to refuse to recog- 
nize the impact we all have on one 
another. 

On economic issues, for example, 
my country, which has historically 
been oriented toward our industrialized 
trading partners, now finds that the de- 
veloping nations constitute its fastest 
growing markets and continue to be a 
prime source of many of its raw mate- 



■ 



\ 



54 



rials. So we find that all regions are of 
growing importance to America's wel- 
fare and interests. 

In turn, the developing countries are 
finding that the industrialized societies 
offer indispensable markets, needed 
capital, and vital technical assistance. 
Increasingly, we have to understand 
jointly that our task is not to pressure 
one another— both sides, after all, are 
quite capable of resisting pressure— but 
to find a much better process to help 
both sides to discern and develop then- 
common interests in cooperation. This 
is why the agreement of this Assembly 
to an overview mechanism for the 
North-South dialogue is so critical. 

Xhird — and this will be disputed by 
some, although I strongly believe it is 
true — we are moving toward a more 
widely shared set of common values 
and interests. Thirty years ago, few in 
the developed world cared one way or 
the other about economic or social 
conditions in the developing nations. In 
that period, few in the developing 
countries realized that internal domes- 
tic policies of the industrialized coun- 
tries could have such significant impact 
on economic conditions in their own 
faraway lands. Today there is an in- 
tense international debate about the 
best means for achieving a new interna- 
tional economic order which will be 
more just and healthy. Two questions 
is not whether we should do this, but 

how. 

Fourth— and the world largely ig- 
nores this — effective new forms of de- 
cisionmaking have been employed in 
compiling our record at this General 
Assembly. One is the important de- 
velopment of small-group techniques of 
reaching agreement on potentially divi- 
sive issues. So-called contact groups, 
consisting of representatives of the var- 
ious interest groups or "friends of the 
chairmen" of larger committees, have 
been able to make important progress 
in informal sessions. 

The other major procedural tech- 
nique that deserves mention is that of 
consensus decisionmaking. The public 
tends to focus on disagreements among 
us, but over the past 2 years about 63% 
of the decisions in the General Assem- 
bly have been taken by consensus. Al- 
though important differences are some- 
times inappropriately covered over by 
consensus decisions, in most cases the 
differences have been so narrowed by 
intensive negotiation and debate that it 
is not even necessary to take a vote on 
these issues. Consensus decisions dur- 
ing the current Assembly have, I be- 
lieve, been even more frequent than 
last year. 

If we are striking a more construc- 
tive and cooperative tone in the con- 



duct of our deliberations here, I do not 
mean to suggest that we be complacent. 
We have a difficult agenda facing us in 
the 12 months ahead. 



The Future Agenda 

On the vital issues of maintaining the 
peace, first of all, we must keep the 
momentum going. Almost all of us 
agree that the time is right for move- 
ment. We must maintain that consen- 
sus, and this is only possible by con- 
tinuing our efforts to clarify the issues 
and achieve agreements on the prob- 
lems that threaten us all. 

In the Middle East, let us build on 
the historic steps already taken, aban- 
don destructive positions, and seize an 
unprecedented opportunity for peace. 
Let us set our minds, in the interses- 
sional months ahead, to contribute our 
ideas, our information, and our wisdom 
in conducting the affairs of the United 
Nations to support the moves toward 
peace . 

In Cyprus, now that the parties have 
moved close to agreement on one im- 
portant issue— the committee on miss- 
ing persons— let us in the United Na- 
tions maintain the momentum to 
broaden the areas of agreement and 
reach a lasting settlement. 

In Rhodesia, the supportive consen- 
sus created here by this body has un- 
doubtedly played a major role in bring- 
ing Ian Smith to understand that he 
must step down in favor of a legitimate 
majority government elected by the 
people of Zimbabwe. We continue to 
believe that the initiative which the 
United States has been pursuing in 
support of the United Kingdom remains 
the best framework for an internation- 
ally acceptable transition to majority 
rule. Let us continue to work together 
to bring about the necessary peaceful 
conclusion to this effort. 

In Namibia, the five Western ambas- 
sadors have just completed another 
round of talks with the front line states, 
the South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
The differences between the parties 
have been narrowed considerably over 
the last several months since our con- 
tact group began functioning. But the 
remaining issues stubbornly resist final 
agreement between the parties. Let us 
continue to work together in pursuance 
of an internationally acceptable settle- 
ment which will lead to true self- 
determination and independence for the 
people of Namibia. 

In South Africa itself, let us build on 
the new consensus— not merely on the 
utter unacceptability of apartheid but 
also on the need to convince South Af- 
rica to move in a progressive direction. 



Department of State Bullet 

The consensus of the world communi 
is more solid and sweeping than ev 
before. Let us make clear that our gc 
is not to isolate South Africa but to e 
courage the kind of meaningful soc: 
change that can bring full participati. 
by all South African citizens in th< 
own governance and national life. 

Next year we will mark the 30th a 
niversary of the signing of the Univi 
sal Declaration of Human Rights. 
adoption was accomplished at a vt 
early stage of the life of this Organi; 
tion. It was virtually our first prior/ 
in those days. While there has bei 
some progress in human rights sir: 
then, we still have a long way to | 
There are still far too many abuses. ; 
we mark this significant anniversa 
let us restore to high priority this < 
ganization's concern for human rig! 
and let us resolve that next year's G 
eral Assembly will be a high point 
constructive collective action to jj 
vance this vital cause. 

Next year will also provide us wit! 
significant opportunity for progress'i 
arms control issues. Our Special S; 
sion on Disarmament next May a 
June is unprecedented. Never bef< 
has the United Nations sponsored 
gathering of this magnitude on this si 
ject. Never before have we haj 
chance to concentrate the attention i 
all nations on these life-and-death qv 
tions in this way. This is no longc 
concern of only the nations of the l< 
and West: The developing countr 
the nonnuclear countries — indeed 
countries — have an important stake 
these discussions. Let us all pledgf 
work within our governments to mal 
major effort to bring this Special 8 
sion successfully to meaningful un< 
standings and practical ways to 
hance our disarmament goals. 

This session of the Assembly 
another major step in the impro: 
economic dialogue between the 
veloping countries and the ind^ 
trialized countries. As the resumed 
session of this Assembly ended, 
prior to the opening of this one, it 
clear to all that a major task woulc 
to find a mutually acceptal 
framework for the continuation j 
high-level overview of economic c<j 
eration within the U.N. system. 
32d General Assembly has met 
challenge; let us all work for const 
tive discussions in the Committer 
the Whole we have agreed upon. 

For the United States, expectat 
will be high. If the construction 
new international economic order 
be a growing consensus and not a 
bal contest, each group of countn 
East and West, oil producers and ' 
sumers, industrialized, industrials 






ruary 1978 

agricultural — must explore ways in 
ch change can be achieved consist- 
with economic security for all. We 
w each others' needs and concerns, 
have learned even more about them 
ng this Assembly. Let us get on 
i the work that remains to be done, 
i many areas once characterized by 
greement, we have achieved con- 
ius. In others, we have thus far 
:d. 

ne area in which more work re- 
is to be done relates to the negotia- 
> for a common fund under the aus- 
s of the U.N. Conference on Trade 

Development. The suspension of 
negotiations in Geneva took place 
;r late in our session; with so much 
under way, it was certainly a dif- 
t task for all of us here in New 
c to provide a real impetus for their 
tructive resumption, 
nfortunately, we were not able to 
i agreement on a resolution which 
Id have facilitated resumption of 
negotiations. As you know, we 
:ed toward a resolution in the Sec- 
Committee last week that would 

permitted the negotiations to be 
ned on a constructive basis. Re- 
ibly, it was not possible to achieve 
iitive nonprejudicial statement. Let 
here fore, work together to find a 
to minimize polemics and to con- 

a balanced and dispassionate 
;sment of the important issues in- 
id. We believe that such an as- 
ment is necessary before any 
er progress can be made, 
t me mention one final area that 
ts urgent attention next year. 
ie budget we have just approved is 
y a 30% increase over that of the 
)iennium. We have approved many 

programs and projects. Indeed, 
y all of them are good. But the 
's resources are not unlimited. I 

it is fair to say we are sponsoring 
nany conferences, too many spe- 
interest programs, too many "pri- 
bills" of assistance in individual 
tries when such steps should be re- 
d for only the most critical cases, 
vill be the first to admit that my 
rnment has not always followed a 
y of fiscal restraint itself. But the 
for fiscal stringency is paramount. 
plies to all of us. We need to get 
ities, carefully analyze all propos- 
:larify our objectives, and restrain 
:lves on expenditures until we 

sorted out for ourselves exactly 
i actions are the most pressing, 
consensus resolution of this As- 
ly last year expressed concern 
: this problem and requested the 
ance of the Secretary General in 
ifying expenditure priorities. The 

system budget was $124 million 



in 1947. It was nearly $2.5 billion in 
1976. These are significant sums which 
we all know can — with proper pro- 
gramming and management — be better 
used. Let us commit ourselves to this 
task in the coming year. 

In short, we have a difficult agenda 
before us. The problems do not vanish 
with the sound of the last gavel. But 
with the consensus of the concerned 
that has clearly emerged at this year's 
General Assembly, we have begun to 
search for the common elements of our 
own interests, to stop shouting and to 
do more listening. 

A senior official of another govern- 
ment told me early in this Assembly 
that the United Nations seemed to be 
catching its "second wind." I think 
that is clearly true. This emerging con- 
sensus on how to work together on 
world issues provides us all with a 
source of new hope and optimism. That 
is good for the United Nations. It is 
good for the world. It is good for the 
people we represent. □ 



1 Statement in plenary at the close of the 32d 
U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 21, 1977 (closing 
paragraphs omitted); text from USUN press release 
150 of Dec. 21. Andrew Young is U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations. 



Summaries of 
l/JS. Statements 



During the closing weeks of the 32d 
U.N. General Assembly, members of 
the U.S. delegation made numerous 
statements on a wide range of sub- 
jects. Following are summaries of 
those statements taken from selected 
USUN press releases. 1 

Decade for Women 

The United States contributed $3 
million to the programs for the U.N. 
Decade for Women. (Koryne Kaneski 
Horbal in the Pledging Conference on 
the Voluntary Fund for the U.N. Dec- 
ade for Women on Nov. 8, 1977; 
USUN press release 104, Nov. 8.) 

Food 

In support of global efforts for a vi- 
able world food policy, the United 
States has: (1) committed $200 million 
toward the $1 billion International 
Fund for Agricultural Development, 
(2) established a domestic food grain 
reserve program, (3) contributed up to 
125,000 tons to the international 
emergency food reserve, and (4) in- 



55 



creased our pledge to the World Food 
Program from $188 million in 1977- 
78 to $220 million for 1979-80. (Dr. 
Ruth Schacter Morgenthau in Commit- 
tee II on Nov. 3, 1977; USUN press 
release 97, Nov. 3.) 



Human Rights 

The United States cosponsored a 
resolution concerning the situation of 
human rights in Chile. It was adopted 
by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 
1977, as A/RES/32/1 18. (USUN press 
release 138, Dec. 8.) 

Refugees 

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Com- 
mittee for the Announcement of Vol- 
untary Contributions to UNRWA on 
Dec. 6, 1977, the United States 
pledged $42.5 million for 1978. 
(Charles W. Whalen, Jr.; USUN press 
release 134, Dec. 6.) 

Southern Africa 

Zimbabwe, Namibia. The United 
States is deeply committed to the in- 
dependence, self-determination, and 
majority rule in southern Africa. In 
concert with other Western powers 
and with African support, it is en- 
gaged in a series of negotiations aim- 
ing toward equitable and lasting solu- 
tions resulting in the independence for 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. While suc- 
cess is not assured, negotiations are 
proceeding. 

In Zimbabwe pressures of the armed 
struggle and international action have 
played and continue to play an impor- 
tant role in the efforts to reach a just 
solution. Now is the appropriate mo- 
ment to let the negotiating process 
work; if it stalls or fails, that is the 
time to increase the pressures on the 
Smith regime. In that case, the United 
States is prepared to take those steps 
and participate in measures necessary 
to secure cooperation by all parties to 
implement the settlement proposal. 

The U.S. Government holds a simi- 
lar position on Namibia. Exploratory 
talks have been held with the South 
West Africa People's Organization 
and the South African Government, in 
cooperation with other Western pow- 
ers. 

For these reasons the United States 
announced that it would vote against a 
draft resolution requesting all states 
to: refrain from any investments in, or 
loans to, minority regimes in southern 
Africa and agreements to promote 
trade; take effective measures to end 
the supply of funds and other forms of 
assistance, including military supplies 



^ 
■§«! 



£3 

ii 

i 



56 

and equipment; and cease all exports 
of crude oil and petroleum to southern 
Africa. (Marjorie Craig Benton in 
Committee IV on Oct. 28; USUN 
press release 86, Oct. 28.) 

The draft resolution was adopted by 
Committee IV on Oct. 28, 1977, and 
by the General Assembly on Nov. 28 
as A/RES/32/35. 

Southern Rhodesia. The United 
States supports completely the propos- 
als outlined in the British White Paper 
on Rhodesia and will continue its ac- 
tive pursuit of a settlement based on 
these proposals. (The full text of that 
paper is printed in the Bulletin of 
Oct. 3, 1977, p. 417.) It believes that 
these proposals represent the best 
available option for providing all the 
people of Zimbabwe with an opportu- 
nity to choose their own political lead- 
ership and to bring freedom and 
majority rule to that country in a way 
which will restore the peace and foster 
economic progress. (Charles W. Wha- 
len, Jr., in Committee IV on Dec. 9, 
1977; USUN press release 142, 
Dec. 9.) 

Apartheid. Concerning a series of 
15 resolutions on apartheid, the U.S. 
"no" and "abstention" votes were 
explained, and our representative 
noted the reservations on those resolu- 
tions which the United States en- 
dorsed. The General Assembly 
adopted Resolutions 32/105-A-N on 
Dec. 14, 1977, and 32/105-0 on Dec. 
16. (Charles W. Whalen, Jr., in ple- 
nary session on Dec. 14; USUN press 
release 146, Dec. 14.) 

Torture 

The United States supported a draft 
resolution against torture and other 



cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat- 
ment or punishment out of a deep 
sense of outrage over the number of 
persons who have died in recent years 
while detained in South Africa's pris- 
ons. The General Assembly adopted, 
by consensus, that draft resolution on 
Dec. 8, 1977, as A/RES/32/65. (Ed- 
ward M. Mezvinsky in plenary session 
on Dec. 8; USUN press release 139, 
Dec. 8.) 

Three other draft resolutions on tor- 
ture were adopted by the General As- 
sembly on Dec. 8 and were strongly 
supported by the United States: (1) a 
request to the Human Rights Commis- 
sion to draw up a draft convention 
against torture (A/RES/32/62), (2) a 
request to the Secretary General to in- 
ventory the efforts of various 
governments to combat torture (A/- 
RES/32/63), and (3) a request to 
members to unilaterally adhere to the 
declaration against torture (A/RES/- 
32/64). (Edward Mezvinsky in Com- 
mittee III on Nov. 2, 1977; USUN 
press release 94, Nov. 2.) 

UNICEF 

For the calendar year 1978 the 
United States pledged $25 million, a 
25% increase over 1977. In addition 
we are contributing $250,000 for the 
International Year of the Child. (Her- 
bert G. Wing in the U.N. Pledging 
Conference on the U.N. Children's 
Fund on Nov. 3, 1977; USUN press 
release 99, Nov. 3.) □ 



1 The full texts of the press releases may be 
obtained from the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations, 799 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 
10017. 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE: 

Panama Canal Treaties 



by Secretary Vance 1 

I appreciate this opportunity to come 
to New Orleans tonight to talk to you 
about a major decision we now face as 
a nation. In a few weeks, the U.S. 
Senate will decide whether to ratify the 
treaties that have been negotiated be- 
tween the United States and Panama to 
provide for the future of the Panama 
Canal. 2 It is a decision that has aroused 
strong feelings, although I think most 
Americans have reserved final judg- 
ment until they have considered all the 
arguments. 



The debate over the treaties has been 
lively, at times even heated. It draws 
us back to a story Abraham Lincoln 
used to tell when discussions in his 
Oval Office began to boil over. Lincoln 
would interrupt and tell the story of a 
hunter who got lost in the forest when a 
fierce storm broke. The hard rain made 
it almost impossible for him to see 
where he was going. Night soon fell 
and he had to fight the darkness as well 
as the rain to find his way. The thunder 
was deafening. Only occasional flashes 
of lightning showed him the trail. Fi- 
nally, wet, tired, and frustrated, he fell 



Department of State Bullet 

to his knees in prayer: "If it's all 1: 
same to You, Lord," he cried, ' 
appreciate a little less noise and a t 
more light." 

Perhaps some of you have cons- 
ered a similar prayer as you have I 
tened to the canal debate. 

This evening, I want to describe ' 
treaties for you and then respond 
rectly to many of the concerns t 
have been expressed. I hope I will si 
more light than noise. 

From the day we started construct t 
over 70 years ago, the Panama Cat 
has always had an extra dimension 
us, beyond its basic military and cc 
mercial importance. Building the cai 
was a remarkable feat for a young ;< 
emerging nation. Others had fail 
Yet we were able to cut through 
mountains, cross the swamps, and ci 
trol the diseases to complete a wa' 
way that finally linked the Atlantic jl 
the Pacific. The canal came to rej^ 
sent American perseverance and J 
genuity, qualities that, to this day, ci 
tinue to be among our most valud 
assets as a nation. 

But we all recognize as well tha 
the final analysis, the Panama Canti 
not a monument. It is a navigatici 
link that is important to this count/ 
national interests. Our first con<;: 
must be to assure our continued ab;t 
to use the canal in the future. f 

. It was that concern which led Pi 
dent Johnson in 1964, after consul i 
with former Presidents Truman 
Eisenhower, to begin negotiations f 
new treaty. Every American Presin 
since has concluded that a new trl 
was necessary to secure the f u i 
availability of the canal for the ship' 
all nations. For that same reason, F 
ident Carter, on September 7th, sifl 
the treaties that resulted from thosd 
years of negotiations. 

Actually, two treaties have b: 
negotiated. The first provides fori 
operation and defense of the canal r 
the end of this century [Panama Ci 
Treaty]. The second treaty provide: 
the permanent neutrality of the ci 
and has no termination date [Tn 
Concerning the Permanent Neutri 
and Operation of the Panama Cana 
Under the terms of the first tn 
the United States will continue to C 
ate the canal until the year 200( 
U.S. government agency, to be c: 
the Panama Canal Commission, ' 
run the canal and will decide, irJ 
cordance with U.S. law, such ma; 
as tolls and employment practice 
majority of its governing board mu 
American citizens. Panama will as;' 
jurisdiction over the area of the pr<- 
Canal Zone— the 5-mile strip on d 
side of the canal— and the Canal 1 



ruary 1978 

;uch will cease to exist. However, 
1 the end of this century, American 
es and troops will remain in 
ama, and the United States will 
S primary responsibility for defend- 
the canal. 

fter the year 2000, Panama will be 
ionsible for operating the canal. 
1 over 70% of the canal workforce 
idy is Panamanian. Over the next 

decades, we will be training 
imanians in all aspects of operating 
managing the canal, 
le treaty provides extensive protec- 
l and privileges for the Americans 

will be working in Panama in con- 
ion with the canal until the year 
) and provides priority job place- 
t and liberalized early retirement 
Americans now working on the 
il whose jobs ultimately will be 
1 by Panamanians, 
le second treaty — the neutrality 
y — is of unlimited duration. It will 
lin in effect even after the year 
I. It commits each of the parties — 
Jnited States and Panama — to de- 

the canal and to keep it open to 
hips of all nations, 
ider the neutrality treaty — and I 

to make this point very clear — the 
:d States has the right to take any 
on we decide is necessary — 
iding the use of troops — to meet 
:hreat or aggression directed either 
ist the canal or against the passage 
iy ship — ours or anyone else's — 
igh the canal. That does not mean 
we have the right to meddle in the 
nal affairs of Panama. It does 
i, however, that we can defend and 
ct the canal before and after the 
2000. 

e neutrality treaty also provides 
expeditious passage through the 
I for American and Panamanian 
ary vessels. In case of need or 
gency, our military ships can pass 
igh the canal more quickly than 
1, and if necessary they can go to 
ead of the line. 

ir interpretation of these rights is 
tical to Panama's. In October, 
dent Carter and General Torrijos 
inama issued a statement of under- 
ing which confirmed, in authorita- 
erms, these clear rights. 3 
ere are other provisions in the 
es. One of them deals with the 
bility of building a new sea-level 
• The existing canal is too small 
nany of the modern supertankers 
the giant new aircraft carriers, 
ral years ago, the United States 
ncted a study to determine whether 
'Uld be feasible and economical to 
1 a new and larger canal. This 

indicated that, if we were to go 
*rd with plans for a new canal, the 



least expensive option by far — and the 
only feasible option that would not re- 
quire nuclear explosives — would be to 
build such a canal in Panama. Under 
the new treaties, we have agreed to 
reexamine — together with Panama — the 
feasibility of a new sea-level canal. 
The Panamanian Government has 
agreed that it will permit no one other 
than the United States to construct an 
interoceanic canal in Panama for the 
remainder of this century without our 
consent. We, in turn, have agreed that 
we will not build a new interoceanic 
canal anywhere in the Western Hemi- 
sphere except Panama during this same 
period. 

The treaties also commit the United 
States and Panama to carry out their 
treaty responsibilities in a manner con- 
sistent with protecting the natural envi- 
ronment of Panama, and they establish 
a Joint Commission [on the Environ- 
ment] to advise both governments on 
these essential environmental ques- 
tions. 

There are other provisions in the 
treaties, but those are their basic terms. 

A number of questions and concerns 
have been raised about the treaties. I 
want to address them directly. 

Military Concerns 

It has been asked whether these 
treaties adequately provide for our mili- 
tary needs. Do they safeguard our right 
to protect and defend the canal? The 
first place to look for an answer to 
these questions is to our top military 
advisers— the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have the initial responsibility for 
our military defense. The Joint Chiefs 
worked closely with our negotiators 
every step of the way. In their judg- 
ment, these treaties fully satisfy our 
military interests. They afford us the 
rights we need to defend the canal and 
to assure that it remains open. 

In fact, it is the view of the Joint 
Chiefs that these treaties not only pro- 
tect our military position, they improve 
it. There are several reasons why. 

• First, in the process of negotiating 
the new treaties, we have separated out 
what is important to us — that is, con- 
tinued use of the canal — from what is 
not important to our national inter- 
est—such as who has jurisdiction over 
traffic violations on the roads near the 
canal. We thus avoid the possibility of 
being drawn into disputes over matters 
that do not directly affect American 
interests. 

• Second, the treaties enhance our 
ability to defend the canal because, if 
that were ever necessary, we would be 
doing so based on agreements freely 



57 

entered into by both parties and sup- 
ported by the nations of Latin America 
and by world opinion. 

• Finally, our military position is 
enhanced because we would be defend- 
ing the canal along with the govern- 
ment and people of Panama. Panama's 
interest in defending the canal, and 
keeping it open, would be as great as 
our own. The old treaty does not have 
the support of the Panamanian people. 
For them, it means their nation is di- 
vided in two. It means that a Panama- 
nian traveling from one side of the 
country to the other must pass through 
foreign jurisdiction. It means that they 
cannot call all of their country their 
own. We do not think of our presence 
in Panama as colonial, but the Pana- 
manians do. 

All of these elements of an outmoded 
relationship would be eliminated with 
the new treaties. The longstanding 
dream of the Panamanian people for a 
nation undivided would be fulfilled. 
The people of Panama would receive a 
fair share of the revenue from the canal 
which is, after all, their most valuable 
national resource. 

Two-thirds of the Panamanian voters 
in their recent plebiscite [October 23] 
expressed their support for these 
treaties. Many of those who voted 
against the treaties did so because they 
were concerned that Panama had con- 
ceded too much to the United States. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that these 
treaties have the broad approval of the 
Panamanian people. 

If we ever have to defend the canal, 
we will do so. But by standing together 
with Panama in defense of the canal, 
we reduce the risk that our soldiers will 
ever be called upon to fight and to die 
defending the canal. 



Commercial Interests 

What about our commercial interests 
in the canal? What effect will the new 
treaties have on the American econ- 
omy? And what effect will it have on 
the Port of New Orleans? The primary 
consideration for businessmen who use 
the canal is to assure that it remains 
open and efficiently operated, that tolls 
remain reasonable, and that ships pass- 
ing through the canal are safe. Com- 
panies that use the canal also want 
certainty about the future; they want a 
stable situation for the canal so that 
they can plan effectively. The treaties 
promote those interests. 

As I have noted, the United States 
will operate the canal until the end of 
this century. During this period, 
Panamanians will gradually move into 
all aspects of canal operation. Running 



i 

9 
->t 



IS 



58 



Department of State Bullet 



ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON* 



It is no secret that in 1976 I supported the 
Ford Administration in its negotiations with 
the Panamanian Government toward a new 
Panama Canal treaty. Today, I support the 
treaties negotiated by the present Administra- 
tion. My support for the treaties is not based 
on some considerations which 1 regard as 
more important than national security. On the 
contrary, I support the treaties precisely and 
primarily because I believe that their ratifica- 
tion will enhance our national security— in 
the canal itself and in the vital Caribbean 
region. 



Let us examine the possible threats to our 
continued use of the canal. 

• First, there is a strategic nuclear threat. 
Presumably, nuclear arms would be used 
against the canal only in the context of a 
general nuclear exchange which would give 
us problems much more serious than just the 
defense of the canal. But the point is that no 
force stationed in what is now the Canal 
Zone could by itself prevent such an attack. 
General Torrijos has pointed out that the 
canal is "as defenseless as a newborn babe." 
It could be argued that, if anything, the canal 
is less likely to be a nuclear target if it is not 
under American control. 

• Second, hypothetically there is a con- 
ventional naval threat to the canal. But the 
United States retains overwhelming naval 
preponderance in the area and can protect the 
approaches to the canal. 

• Third, there is the threat of guerrilla 
warfare, terrorism, or sabotage. Defense 
against such a threat, in the jungle terrain of 



the canal area, would be extremely dif- 
ficult. . . . 

With or without the new treaties, no one 
can promise you a foolproof defense against 
sabotage. But the new treaties would give the 
Panamanian people a greater stake in keeping 
the canal open and would give the Panama- 
nian Government an increasing role in its op- 
eration and defense. The incentive for sabo- 
tage by individual Panamanians would be 
diminished; the capability and the motivation 
of the Panamanian Government to deter sabo- 
tage would be increased. 

I have tried to show why I think that the 
new treaties would enhance our national se- 
curity interests in the canal itself. But our 
decision on ratification of the treaties will 
have an effect on the nations of the Carib- 
bean (in which I include Mexico and Central 
America) which is perhaps equally important 
to our national security. 

We continue to regard the Caribbean as 
important to us strategically. We are ex- 
tremely sensitive to Soviet and Cuban ac- 
tivities aimed at the other nations of the re- 
gion. But we also rely on the Caribbean for 
our imports of commodities from bauxite to 
bananas. And like other independent nations, 
they have the ability to influence the resolu- 
tion of many of the new issues of interna- 
tional interdependence, such as the law of the 
sea— in which I am deeply involved- 
energy, food, population, the environment, 
and so forth. 

Since the Caribbean countries are impor- 
tant to us, and since we can no longer simply 
impose our will on them, it is in our interest 
to pay attention to what they think. And from 
their point of view, American influence in 



the canal is a complex job, but the abil- 
ity to perform the many tasks involved 
is not a question of nationality; it is a 
question of training. The treaty ar- 
rangements insure that Panama will be 
fully prepared to operate the canal ef- 
fectively by the end of this period. 

Keeping the canal open and running 
smoothly will be an economic impera- 
tive for Panama. It already derives 
more than 10% of its gross domestic 
product from canal-related activities. 
Moreover under the new treaties, un- 
like the present situation, Panama's 
earnings from the canal will be directly 
related to the amount of traffic which 
passes through the canal. More ships 
will mean more money for Panama. 
For Panama to cut off access to any 
country, let alone to close the canal, 
would be for it to inflict a terrible 
wound on itself. As much as anything, 
that practical fact of life safeguards fu- 



their countries has not always been benign. 
They prize their national sovereignty and 
self-determination — concepts which we were 
the first to realize in the New World — but 
they find that their economic underdevelop- 
ment and dependence on the outside world, 
particularly on us, threatens their ability 
really to determine their future. There exists 
within the Caribbean the potential that 
nationalist forces would take an anti- 
American form, as they did in Cuba. 



While it would be absurd to say that a res- 
olution of the Panama Canal issue would also 
resolve the problems of the Caribbean, it is 
quite accurate to say that our ratification of 
these treaties would have a powerful effect 
on opinion in the area toward the United 
States. It would show the peoples of the re- 
gion that the United States is prepared to be 
fair in its dealings with smaller and poorer 
nations. Our enemies would find it much: 
more difficult to blame all the region's prob-1 
lems on "Yankee imperialism." And ourj 
friends in the region would find it easier to„ 
cooperate with us in solving those problems. 



* Excerpts from an address to the Kansas 
City Lawyers Association in Kansas City on 
Jan. 12, 1978 (complete text of the "Panama 
Canal Treaties— A National Security Impera-: 
tive" may be obtained from the Corre-; 
spondence Management Division, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, Wash-, 
ington, D.C. 20520); Ambassador at Large 
Richardson is Special Representative of the 
President for the Law of the Sea Conference 
and was formerly Secretary of Health, Edu- 
cation, and Welfare; Secretary of Defense; 
Attorney General; Secretary of Commerce; 
and Deputy Secretary of State. 



ture access to the canal for the ships of 
all nations. 

The United States insisted during the 
negotiations that all payments to 
Panama for its contribution to the canal 
enterprise be drawn from the canal's 
revenues. To accomplish this and main- 
tain the canal on a self-sustaining 
basis, some increase in the toll rate will 
be necessary. Our current study of the 
likely size of that increase is not yet 
completed, but it appears that it will be 
on the order of 30%. Is such an in- 
crease justified? And what will it mean 
for U.S. consumers and exporters? 

Over the last 40 years, canal tolls 
have increased less than 400 per canal 
ton _f ro m 900 to $1.29. These charges 
are far lower than tolls for the Suez 
Canal. The economic impact of the 
likely toll increase will not be substan- 
tial. For a bushel of Iowa corn being 
shipped to Japan from New Orleans, a 



40% increase in canal tolls would 
crease current transportation cos 
which are approximately 660, by ! 
than 1/2 cent per bushel. In terms' 
the overall purchase price, such a I 
increase would represent a small fr 
tion of 1%. 

Based upon analysis that we hjj 
undertaken, a toll increase on this or: 
would produce no significant imp: 
upon the volume of trade to and fa 
the Port of New Orleans. Tolls o 
make up a small part of the total cos: 
shipping a product or commodity. 

But this port and this city and I 
entire region could be adversely ' 
fected if we don't act now to assui 
secure future for the canal. Most of i 
country's grain exports are ship 
from gulf coast ports. Virtually all: 
the grain exported to the Far H 
passes through the canal. Thousand:: 
jobs rely on that trade. 



mary 1978 

hat trade — and those jobs — will be 
more secure under the new treaties 
i the old. 

he treaties mean far greater assur- 
; that the canal will always remain 
i, that our use of it will never be 
erupted, that ships passing through 
canal will be safe, and that it will 
tinue to operate as an important 
Id trade route. I think that is impor- 
to each of us. 

'hat about the cost of these treaties? 
as been said that we are "paying 
una to take it." That simply is not 

nder the new treaties, Panama will 
eceiving greater earnings from the 
i. But the payments to Panama for 
ontribution to the canal enterprise 

be drawn from the canal's rev- 
:s. The treaties require no payments 
ix dollars from the U.S. Treasury 
anama, either now or in the future. 
:parate from the treaties, we have 
ed to seek certain loans, guaran- 

and credits to assist Panama's de- 
pment. All of these loans must be 
id. They are not grants. They will 
sed largely to finance U.S. trade 
U.S. investment in Panama. 



:ical Concerns 

me people have asked what hap- 
if a Communist government takes 
in Panama? What would happen to 
:anal? The fact is there is little 
munist influence in Panama. Con- 
d disagreement with Panama over 
:anal will only have the effect of 
asing that influence. Panama has a 
enterprise economy. Its closest 
ds are the democratic governments 
enezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico. Its ties to the United 
s are strong. And most important, 
ie canal becomes something that 
'anamanian people value as much 
'e do now, the advantages of 
)iting it for political purposes will 
ibstantially diminished, 
pally, it is asked whether these 
ies represent an American with- 
al from the world? Are they a sign 

S. retreat? Just the opposite is 
These treaties are entered into by 
merica that is looking to the fu- 

They are entered into by an 
rica that is confident of its strength 
prepared to act as a responsible 
i power. 

e treaties look to the future of 
rican trade. They promote the 
term interests of the United States 
sll as other maritime nations that 
it from an open and secure canal. 
e treaties reflect America's future 
iry requirements. They modernize 
protect our right to defend the 



canal and they enhance our ability to 
defend it if that is ever necessary. 

The treaties look to the future of our 
relations with our neighbors in this 
hemisphere. The other nations of Latin 
America share Panama's opposition to 
the old treaty. They share Panama's 
support for the new treaties. 

I believe most Americans want to es- 
tablish a more mature partnership with 
Latin America — one that is based on 
mutual respect and admiration. Strong 
common interests bind the people and 
nations of Latin America and the 
United States. Our economies need that 
relationship. Latin America is a major 
market for U.S. exports and an impor- 
tant supplier of valuable natural 
resources. 

By eliminating a major source of irri- 
tation that has existed between us, the 
new treaties enable us to strengthen our 
relationships throughout Latin America 
and reassert the most powerful source, 
our influence — our reputation for fair- 
ness and justice. 

Finally, the treaties look to the fu- 
ture of our relations with the rest of the 
world. 

• They say to all the world that we 
will define our national interests care- 
fully and we will protect those inter- 
ests. 

• They say to the world that 
disputes — even between large countries 
and small ones — can be resolved peace- 
fully. 

• And they say that we will act in 
the world in a way that is true to our 
values as a nation. 

The same resourcefulness and in- 
genuity that enabled us to build the 
Panama Canal now leads us to build a 



59 

new arrangement for the canal that re- 
flects present-day realities and provides 
for the future. 

We are a nation that has been able to 
change with changing times. We have 
never rested on our laurels. We have 
always seized the opportunity to make 
things better. 

The treaties serve America's inter- 
ests. It is vitally important that they be 
approved by the United States Senate. 
Every American has a stake in the fu- 
ture they secure. □ 



'Address in New Orleans on Jan. 12, 1978 
(press release 14 of Jan. 12). 

2 For text of treaties and related materials, see 
Bulletins of Oct. 17, 1977, p. 481 and Nov. 7, 
p. 615. 

3 For text of statement of understanding of 
Oct. 14, 1977, see Bulletin of Nov. 7, p. 631. 



Letters 
of Credence 



The following newly appointed 
Ambassadors recently presented their 
credentials to President Carter: 

November 22 1 

Grenada — Franklyn O'Brien Dolland 

January 18 2 

El Salvador — Roberto Quinonez Meza 

Guatemala — Jorge Lamport Rodil □ 

1 For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of State 
press release of Nov. 22, 1977. 

2 For texts of the Ambassadors' remarks and 
the President's replies, see Department of State 
press releases of Jan. 18, 1978. 



TREATIES: UJS. 9 Mexico 
Initial Aviation Agreement ' 



Delegations representing the United 
States and Mexico initialed a new air- 
line route agreement and understanding 
relating to reduced fares and charter 
services on December 19, 1977, in 
Washington. The U.S. delegation was 
chaired by Joel W. Biller, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Transpor- 
tation, Telecommunications, and 
Commercial Affairs. The Mexican 
delegation was chaired by Jorge Cen- 
dejas Quesada, Director General of 
Civil Aeronautics of Mexico. 

The proposed agreements will be 
implemented by an exchange of diplo- 



matic notes after appropriate internal 
clearance procedures are completed by 
the respective governments. 

The new route agreement expands 
airline service between the United 
States and Mexico. New or improved 
service by U.S. and Mexican airlines 
will be available for 33 U.S. cities and 
21 cities and resort points in Mexico. 
These U.S. cities are San Francisco, 
Oakland, San Jose, Los Angeles, Seat- 
tle, Albuquerque, El Paso, Houston, 
Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, Har- 
lingen, Chicago, Minneapolis, St. 
Paul, Kansas City, Denver, Boston, 



29 

i 

S3 

u 



:3 



60 

New York, Washington, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, At- 
lanta, New Orleans, Memphis, Tampa, 
San Juan, San Diego, Tucson, 
Phoenix, and St. Louis. 

The Mexican points to which new or 
improved services will be provided are 
existing and new resort points on the 
east and west coasts of Mexico (Man- 
zanillo, Zihauatenejo, Mazatlan, 
Puerto Vallarta, Acapulco, Loreto, La 
Paz, San Jose de Cabo, Cancun, 
Cozumel, and Guayamas); the major 
air traffic centers of Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, Monterrey, Tampico, and 
Merida; and other cities such as Oaxa- 
ca, Bahia Kino, Hermosillo, Mexicali, 
and Tijuana. 

The United States will also obtain 
expanded rights for its airlines to oper- 
ate beyond Mexico to Central and 
South America on flights from New 
York, Washington, Baltimore, Dallas, 
Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Los 
Angeles. 

The proposed agreement will also 



remove most of the existing restrictions 
on the operation of U.S. routes. 

Both governments agreed to encour- 
age and facilitate airlines to propose 
and implement innovative, reduced 
fares for scheduled services. 

A charter services understanding 
contains acceptance of the country-of- 
origin rules for charterworthiness of 
flights, designation of U.S. scheduled 
and supplemental airlines to operate 
charters, and a declaration of intent to 
accept charter flights liberally. A con- 
sultative mechanism is established to 
handle any outstanding issues. The 
agreement and the understandings will 
be in force until December 31, 1982. 

These agreements, resulted from 
negotiations which covered the past 7 
years. The most recent rounds of talks 
were held September 12-21 in Wash- 
ington, November 29-December 2 in 
Mexico City, and December 13-19 in 
Washington. d 



Press release 581 of Dec. 20, 1977. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of 
the principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty of December 1, 1959. TIAS 4780. 
Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975 at the Eighth 
Consultative Meeting. 1 

Notification of approval: Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, November 14, 1977. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 
16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 
1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, October 20, 

1977. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into 
force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accessions deposited: Cape Verde, October 

20, 1977; Lebanon, December 23, 1977. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers 
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva De- 
cember 2, 1972. Entered into force Septem- 
ber 6, 1977. 



Department of State Build 

for Agricultural Development. Done at R> 
June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nover: 
30, 1977. 

Signature: Costa Rica, December 20, 197 
Ratifications deposited: Senegal, Ded 
ber 13, 1977; Turkey, December 14, 1" 
Accessions deposited: Djibouti, Upper Vl 
December 14, 1977; Uruguay, Zambia. t 
cember 16, 1977; Haiti, December 
1977; Cyprus, December 20, 1977. 



Ratification deposited: United States, Janu- 
ary 3, 1978. 

Enters into force for the United States: 
January 3, 1979. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, 
scientific, and cultural materials, and pro- 
tocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 
1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952; for 
the United States November 2, 1966. TIAS 
6129. 

Accession deposited: Oman, December 19, 
1977. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into 
force April 24, 1964; for the United States 
December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 28, 
1977. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modifica- 
tion techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva 
May 18, 1977. ' 
Signature: India, December 10, 1977. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 



Health 

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
stitution of the World Health Organizatic 
July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4 
8086, 8534). Adopted at Geneva May 
1976. ' 

Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, Dei 
ber 16, 1977. 

Human Rights 

American convention on human rights. Do; 
San Jose November 22, 1969. ' 
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, Dei 
ber 28, 1977. 

Postal 

Second additional protocol to the constituti 
the Universal Postal Union of July 10, i| 
(TIAS 5881, 7150), general regulations 
final protocol and annex, and the unii 
postal convention with final protocol an: 
tailed regulations. Done at Lausanne h 
1974. Entered into force January 1, fl 
TIAS 8231. 

Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, Octobti 
1977; China, People's Republi' 
November 30, 1977; Greece, Septemb;, 
1977; Indonesia, August 31, 1977; 
Zealand, September 26, 1977; 2 Po 
February 4, 1977. 
Money orders and postal travellers' clj 
agreement, with detailed regulations. De 
Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into 
January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, Octobi, 
1977; Greece, September 26, 197: 
donesia, August 31, 1977; Poland, /> 
31, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Iraq, August 30, 1 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects law 
into outer space. Done at New York Ja 
14, 1975. Entered into force Septembe 
1976. TIAS 8480. 

Accession deposited: Seychelles, Dc 
ber 28, 1977. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977, wi: 
nexes. Done at Geneva October 7, 197 
tered into force provisionally, Janu; 
1978. 

Signatures: Cuba, Ecuador, Decemb. 
1977; Kenya, Nicaragua, Decembc 
1977; Barbados, Peru, December 16, ■ 
Haiti, South Africa, December 19,1 
Australia, Costa Rica, Hungary, Dec' 



ruary 1978 

20, 1977; United Kingdom, December 20, 
1977;' Swaziland. Trinidad and Tobago, 
December 21, 1977; New Zealand, De- 
:ember 22, 1977. 

\if nation deposited: Barbados, December 
16, 1977; Swaziland, December 21, 1977. 
zeptance deposited: Mauritius, Decem- 
»er 20, 1977. 

fifications of provisional application depos- 
ed: Nicaragua, December 15, 1977; Aus- 
ralia, Guatemala, Hungary, December 20, 
977; Costa Rica, December 22, 1977; 
Jnited States, December 28, 1977. 

ommunications 

lational telecommunication convention, 

h annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga- 

remolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into 

:e January 1, 1975; for the United States 

il 7, 1976. TIAS 8572. 

ession deposited: Djibouti, November 22, 

977. 



ith proces-verbal extending the declaration 
he provisional accession of Tunisia to the 
IT. Done at Geneva November 11, 1977. 
:rs into force between Tunisia and any par- 
king government as soon as it shall have 
a accepted by Tunisia and such govern- 
it. 

i proces-verbal extending the declaration 
le provisional accession of the Philippines 
ie GATT. Done at Geneva November 11, 
7. Enters into force between the Philip- 
!S and any participating government as 
) as it shall have been accepted by the 
ippines and such government. 
;ement regarding international trade in tex- 
i, with annexes. Done at Geneva De- 
ber 20, 1973. Entered into force January 
974, except for Article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, 

4 which entered into force April 1, 1974. 

5 7840. 

?ptance deposited: Peru, November 7 
177. 



iTERAL 



nent relating to equal access to ocean car- 
i of government-controlled cargoes. Ef- 
:d by. exchange of letters at Washington 
ember 17, 1977. Entered into force 
ember 17, 1977. 



■andum of understanding concerning re- 
)cal recognition of Great Lakes load lines, 
ed at Ottawa November 21 , 1977. Entered 
force November 21, 1977. 

grant agreement relating to human re- 
:es development, with annexes. Signed at 
lamena August 25, 1977. Entered into 

August 25, 1977. 



Republic of China 

Interim agreement relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
products, with annexes. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington December 16, 1977. 
Entered into force December 16, 1977. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat im- 
ports from the Dominican Republic during 
calendar year 1978. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington December 21 and 28, 
1977. Entered into force December 28, 1977. 

Egypt 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of June 7, 1974 
(TIAS 7855), with agreed minutes and related 
letter. Signed at Cairo December 7, 1977. En- 
tered into force December 7, 1977. 

Arrangement amending the arrangement of April 
13 and 25, 1974, as amended (TIAS 7859, 
8169), to make it applicable to hydrographic 
survey operations in environs of Port Said and 
Gulf of Suez and contiguous waters. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Cairo December 2 
and 17, 1977. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 17, 1977. 

Finland 

Agreement modifying the air transport agree- 
ment of March 29, 1949, to permit experimen- 
tal implementation of low-cost fares. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Helsinki December 5 
and 9, 1977. Entered into force December 9, 
1977. 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat im- 
ports from Guatemala during calendar year 
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington December 21 and 28, 1977. Entered 
into force December 28, 1977. 

Guinea 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of April 21, 1976, 
with memorandum of understanding. Signed 
at Conakry December 10, 1977. Entered into 
force December 10, 1977. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to limitation of meat imports 
from Haiti during calendar year 1978. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
December 21 and 30, 1977. Entered into force 
December 30, 1977. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat im- 
ports from Honduras during calendar year 
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington December 21 and 30, 1977. Entered 
into force December 30, 1977. 

India 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products, 
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington December 30, 1977. Entered 
into force December 30, 1977; effective 
January 1, 1978. 



61 

Israel 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of December 16, 
1974. Signed at Washington December 21, 
1977. Entered into force December 21, 1977. 

Jamaica 

Agreement relating to trade in textiles, with an- 
nex. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington November 22 and December 20, 1977. 
Entered into force December 20, 1977. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 8, 1977. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston De- 
cember 2 and 21, 1977. Entered into force 
December 21, 1977. 

Republic of Korea 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products, 
with annexes and related letter. Effected by 
exchanges of notes at Washington Decem- 
ber 23, 1977. Entered into force December 
23, 1977; effective January 1, 1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of 
the United States. Signed at Washington Au- 
gust 26, 1977. 
Entered into force: December 29, 1977. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat im- 
ports from Nicaragua during calendar year 
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington December 21 and 26, 1977. Entered 
into force December 26, 1977. 

Pakistan 

Agreement modifying the air services agreement 
of November 14, 1946 (TIAS 1586), to permit 
experimental implementation of low-cost 
fares. Effected by exchange of notes at Is- 
lamabad October 16 and November 15, 1977. 
Entered into force November 15, 1977. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of November 23, 
1974 (TIAS 7971), with minutes. Signed at Is- 
lamabad December 22, 1977. Entered into 
force December 22, 1977. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, 
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington January 4 and 9, 1978. Entered 
into force January 9, 1978; effective Janu- 
ary 1, 1978. 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the agreement of October 
15, 1975, as amended and extended (TIAS 
8179), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Manila 
December 27, 1977. Entered into force 
December 27, 1977. □ 



• * 

3 



and 



1 Not in force. 

2 Applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, 
Tokelau. 

3 In respect to Belize and Saint 
Christopher-Nevis- Anguilla. 



62 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



January 6-February 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*6 1/6 U.S., Jamaica sign textile 

agreement, Nov. 22, Dec. 
20. 
7 1/7 Vance: statement at ceremony 

to return the Crown of St. 
Stephen, Budapest, Jan. 5. 
*8 1/7 U.S., India sign textile 

agreement, Dec. 30. 
*9 1/7 Vance: dinner toast, 

Budapest, Jan. 6. 
*10 1/9 Young Hispanic Leadership 

Seminar, Washington, Jan. 
16-17. 
*H 1/9 Conference on U.S., Carib- 

bean trade, investment, and 
development, Miami, Jan. 
19-20. 
*12 1/11 Vance: address at Morris Har- 

vey College, Charleston, 
W. Va. 
*13 1/12 Vance: address in Louisville. 

*13A 1/13 Vance: question-and-answer 
session following address in 
Louisville, Jan. 12. 
14 1/12 Vance: address in New Or- 

leans. 
*15 1/12 U.S., Thailand amend textile 

agreement, Apr. 4, May 20. 
*16 1/12 U.S., Macau amend textile 

agreement, Aug. 4 and 17, 
Oct. 20 and 29. 
*17 1/12 U.S., Pakistan sign cotton tex- 

tile agreement, Jan. 4 
and 9. 
18 1/13 Vance: address before Los 

Angeles World Affairs 
Council. 
*18A 1/16 Vance: question-and-answer 
session following address in 
Los Angeles, Jan. 13. 
*19 i/)3 U.S., Canadian negotiations 

on the Atikokan generating 
station. 
*20 1/13 Advisory Committee on the 
Law of the Sea; closed ses- 
sion Mar. 2, open and 
closed sessions Mar. 3. 
♦ 21 1/13 U.S., Philippines amend tex- 

tile agreement, Dec. 27. 
*22 1/16 New U.S.-U.S.S.R. hotline 
activated. 



*23 



*24 



*25 

*26 

*27 

28 
29 



1/14 



1/15 



*34 

*35 
*36 

*37 

*38 
39 
40 



1/16 

1/17 
1/17 

1/17 
1/18 



*30 


1/18 


*31 


1/19 


*32 


1/19 


*33 


1/19 



1/19 

1/20 
1/20 

1/20 

1/20 
1/20 
1/21 



Vance: telephone interview to 
town hall meeting, 
Springfield, Mass. 
Dr. Vincent E. McKelvey 
named Senior Scientific 
Advisor to U.S. delegation 
to the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference and Deputy U.S. 
Representative (biographic 
data). 
U.S., Singapore amend textile 
agreement, Mar. 29, June 
17, Nov. 10 and 23. 
Vance: arrival remarks, 

Jerusalem, Jan. 16. 
Study Group 6 of the U.S. Or- 
ganization for the Interna- 
tional Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), Feb. 
14-15. 
Vance: statement at opening 
session of the Political 
Committee, Jerusalem. 
Vance, Begin, Kamel: ex- 
change of toasts, Jerusalem, 
Jan. 17. 
Vance: remarks to the press, 

Jerusalem. 
Vance: remarks to the press, 

Jerusalem, Jan. 18. 
Vance: remarks to the press, 

Jerusalem, Jan. 18. 
Study Group 7 of the U.S. Or- 
ganization for the Interna- 
tional Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), Feb. 
22. 
U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, Feb. 
27. 
Vance, Dayan: departure re- 
marks, Tel Aviv. 
Advisory Committee on Pri- 
vate International Law, 
study group on maritime 
law matters, Feb. 15. 
Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee, Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea, work- 
ing group on radiocom- 
munications, Feb. 16. 
Vice President signs air trans- 
port agreement between the 
U.S. and Mexico. 
Vance, Begin: remarks to the 
press following their meet- 
ing, Jerusalem, Jan. 19. 
Vance, Sadat: joint news coa- 



41 


1/21 


42 


1/21 


43 


1/21 


'44 


1/23 


45 


1/22 


"46 


1/25 


47 


1/23 


t48 


1/23 



'49 

50 
*51 

*52 
*53 

*54 

*55 
*56 
*57 

*58 

*59 

*60 
*61 

*62 



Department of State Built i 



ference, the Barraj* 
Egypt, Jan. 20. 
Vance, Okcun. arriv 

marks, Ankara, Jan. 20 
Vance, Ecevit: remarks be 
working dinner, Ank'i 
Jan. 20. 
Vance: departure staterri 

Ankara. 
Vance, Papaligouras: arf 
remarks, Athens, Jan. 7 
Vance, Caramanlis: reir| 

to the press, Athens. 
Vance, Papaligouras: d<j 
ture statement, Athens, i 
22. 
Vance: arrival remarks, I 
drews Air Force Base, 
22. 
Vance: statement befon 
Senate Governmenta 1 
fairs Committee. 
Vance: remarks to the .! 
following his statemerl 
fore the Senate Govern 
tal Affairs Committee.. 
Vance: statement befor 
House Committee on 1 
national Relations. 
Vance: remarks to the' 
following his stateme; 
fore the House Comii 
on International Relat. 
U.S., Philippines amen; 
tile agreement, Jan. 43 
Acting Secretary reques. 
retary of the Inter) 
withdraw from sale c 
oil and gas leases in C 
Maine. 
Advisory Committee o 
vate International Law 
22. 
U.S., Egypt sign tj 
agreement, Dec. 7 am 
U.S., Poland sign t. 
agreement, Jan. 9 anc 
Vance, Dinitz: remarks 
press following their 
ing, Jan. 27. 
James R. Atwood swor 
Deputy Assistant Se 
for Transportation J 
(biographic data). 
Ocean Affairs Ad 
Committee, marine 
section, Mar. 16. 
U.S., Romania sign 

agreement, Jan. 6. 
Program for official 
Egyptian President I 
Feb. 3-8. 
Department of State Bl- 
overhauled. 



1/23 

1/24 
1/24 

1/24 
1/27 

1/30 

1/30 
1/30 
1/30 

1/30 

1/31 

2/1 
2/2 

2/6 



Not printed. 

Held for a later edition of the Boli 



INDEX 



BRUARY 1978 
>L. 78, NO. 2011 

ica 

essment of 32d U.N. General Assembly 

foung) 52 

:ign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) ... 23 
sident Carter's News Conference of January 

2 (excerpts) 21 

is Control 

essment of 32d U.N. General Assembly 

foung) 52 

ign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) ... 23 

e of the Union (excerpts) 20 

ation. U.S., Mexico Initial Aviation 

greements 59 

!ium. President Carter's Visit to Europe, 
juth Asia, and the Middle East (Carter, 
ierek, Khalid, Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland 

immunique, Delhi Declaration) 1 

lbodia. Human Rights in Cambodia (Chris- 

pher) 32 

gress 

•etary 's Report on the Bureau of Human 

ights and Humanitarian Affairs 32 

retary Vance Visits Israel and Egypt, 
nuary 16-22 (Begin, Sadat, Vance) . . 33 
h Report on Cyprus (message from Presi- 

nt Carter) 31 

: of the Union (excerpts) 20 

Powers Bill (statement by President Car- 

22 

rus 

'etary Vance Visits Turkey and Greece 

'aramanlis, Okcun, Vance) 30 

n Report on Cyprus (message from Presi- 

nt Carter) 31 

artment and Foreign Service. Secretary's 
:port on the Bureau of Human Rights and 

Jmanitarian Affairs 32 

eloping Countries 

ign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) ... 23 

Id Population Trends (Green) 45 

lomics 

:ssment of 32d U.N. General Assembly 

ou ng) 52 

ign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) 23 
ident Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 
d the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, Khalid, 
hlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland communique, 

:lhi Declaration) 1 

■ of the Union (excerpts) 20 

idem Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 
d the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, Khalid, 
hlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland communique, 

:lhi Declaration) 1 

etary Vance Visits Israel and Egypt, 
nuary 16-22 (Begin, Sadat, Vance) . . 33 
ialvador. Letter of Credence (Quinonez 
eza ) 59 

ussion Paper on Energy 28 



President Carter's News Conference of January 

1 2 (excerpts) 21 

President Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 
and the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, Khalid, 
Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland communique, 

Delhi Declaration) 1 

Prospects for the Next Decade (Cooper) . . 26 
State of the Union (excerpts) 20 

Fisheries. Foreign Fishery Allocations ... 44 

France. President Carter's Visit to Europe, 
South Asia, and the Middle East (Carter, 
Gierek, Khalid, Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland 
communique, Delhi Declaration) 1 

Greece. Secretary Vance Visits Turkey and 
Greece (Caramanlis, Okcun, Vance) ... 30 

Grenada. Letter of Credence (Dolland) . . 59 

Guatemala. Letter of Credence (Lamport 
Rodil) 59 

Human Rights 

Assessment of 32d U.N. General Assembly 
(Young) 52 

Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) ... 23 

Human Rights in Cambodia (Christopher) .... 32 

President Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 
and the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, Khalid, 
Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland communique, 
Delhi Declaration) 1 

Secretary's Report on the Bureau of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 32 

State of the Union (excerpts) 20 

Hungary. Crown of St. Stephen (Vance) .... 29 

India. President Carter's Visit to Europe, 
South Asia, and the Middle East (Carter, 
Gierek, Khalid, Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland 
communique, Delhi Declaration) 1 

Iran. President Carter's Visit to Europe, South 
Asia, and the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, 
Khalid, Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland com- 
munique, Delhi Declaration) 1 

Israel. Secretary Vance Visits Israel and 
Egypt, January 16-22 (Begin, Sadat, 
Vance) 33 

Italy. Italy (Department statement) 32 

Japan. U.S., Japan Trade Agreement (White 
House statement) 25 

Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea Conference 
(Richardson) 39 

Mexico. U.S., Mexico Initial Aviation Agree- 
ments 59 

Middle Fast 

Assessment of 32d U.N. General Assembly 
(Young) 52 

Chronology of Recent Events 37 

Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) 23 

President Carter's News Conference of January 
1 2 (excerpts) 21 

State of the Union (excerpts) 20 

Military Affairs. War Powers Bill (statement 
by President Carter) 22 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Presi- 
dent Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 
and the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, Khalid, 
Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland communique, 
Delhi Declaration) 1 

Nuclear Policy 

President Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 
and the Middle East (Carter, Gierek, Khalid, 
Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland communique, 
Delhi Declaration) 1 

State of the Union (excerpts) 20 



Oceans 

Law of the Sea Conference (Richardson) ... 39 

Visions of the Future (Mink) 42 

Panama 

Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) 23 

Panama Canal Treaties (Richardson, 

Vance) 56 

State of the Union (excerpts) 20 

Poland. President Carter's Visit to Europe, 
South Asia, and the Middle East (Carter, 
Gierek, Khalid, Pahlavi, Sadat, U.S. -Poland 

communique, Delhi Declaration) 1 

Population 

Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) 23 

World Trends (Green) 45 

Presidential Documents 

President Carter's News Conference of January 

1 2 (excerpts) , . 21 

President Carter's Visit to Europe, South Asia, 

and the Middle East 1 

Sixth Report on Cyprus 31 

State of the Union (excerpts) 20 

War Powers Bill 22 

Publications. Discussion Paper on Energy 28 
Saudi Arabia. President Carter's Visit to 
Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East 
(Carter, Gierek, Khalid, Pahlavi, Sadat, 
U.S. -Poland communique, Delhi Declara- 
tion) l 

Trade. U.S., Japan Trade Agreement (White 

House statement) 25 

Treaties 

Current Actions 60 

U.S., Mexico Initial Aviation Agreements ... 59 
Turkey. Secretary Vance Visits Turkey and 
Greece (Caramanlis, Okcun, Vance) ... 30 
U.S.S.R. 

Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978 (Vance) ... 23 
President Carter's News Conference of January 

12 (excerpts) 21 

United Nations 

Assessment of 32d U.N. General Assembly 

(Young) 52 

Benefits From the U.N. Agencies 

(Maynes) 48 

Summary of U.S. Statements at the United 
Nations 55 



Name Index 

Begin, Menahem 33 

Caramanlis, Constantine 30 

Carter, President 1 , 20, 21 , 22, 31 

Christopher, Warren 32 

Cooper, Richard N 26 

Dolland, Franklyn O'Brien 59 

Gierek, Edward 1 

Green, Marshall 45 

King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz 1 

Lamport Rodil, Jorge 59 

Maynes, Charles William 48 

Mink, Patsy T 42 

Okcun, Gunduz 30 

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 1 

Quinonez Meza, Roberto 59 

Richardson, Elliot L 39, 56 

Sadat, Anwar al- 1,33 

Vance, Secretary 23, 29, 30, 33, 56 

Young, Andrew 52 



. 



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March 1»7U 



Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2012 







Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2012 / March 1978 



Cover Photos: 

Julius L. Katz 
Warren Christopher 
Lucy Wilson Benson 
Secretary Vance 
President Carter 



The Department of State Bul- 
letin, published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to 
provide the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign rela- 
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The Bulletin's contents include 
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State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
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States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public A: 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



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COIVTEIVTS 



INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY POLICY (Julius L. Katz) 



APR 



?19?8 



THE PRESIDENT 

7 News Conference, January 30 

8 Foreign Intelligence Activities 

THE VICE PRESIDENT 

9 Visit to Canada and Mexico 

THE SECRETARY 

13 News Conference, February 10 

18 General Overview of 1977 Activities 

AFRICA 

20 Namibia 

21 Southern Rhodesia (Department Statement) 

ECONOMICS 

22 U.S. Embargo Policy (Julius L. Katz) 

24 International Aviation Policy (Richard N . Cooper) 

25 Debts Owed to the U.S. (Robert D. Hormats) 

EUROPE 

27 Summary of U.S. -European Relations (George S. Vest) 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

30 The Diplomacy of the First Year ( Warren Christopher) 
33 Indochinese Refugees (Patricia M. Derian) 

MIDDLE EAST 

35 Visit of Egyptian President Sadat (White House Statements) 
37 Middle East Aircraft Sales (Secretary Vance) 

37 Israeli Settlements 

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 

38 Technology Transfer Policies (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.) 

41 U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (Foreign Rela- 

tions Outline) 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

42 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (Lucy Wilson Benson) 

45 Administration Officials Testify on Arms Transfer Policy (Lucy Wilson Benson, 

Barry M. Blechman, Lt. Gen. H.M. Fish, Leslie H. Gelb) 
47 President Carter's Statement on Arms Transfer Policy 

TERRORISM 

53 Scope of the Threat and Need for Effective Legislation (Secretary Vance) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

55 Panama Canal Treaties (President Carter) 

TREATIES 

58 Current Actions 

61 PUBLICATIONS 

62 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



****** 



5 9 

eg 



■■'■■■': 




Petroleum 



U.S. COMMODITY IMPORT DEPENDENCE AND SOURCES (1977 est.) 

Asbestos Manganese Ore 



Cobalt 



( 42% J f 97% j 

Arab OPEC 48% Zaire 47% 

Non-Arab OPEC 34% Belgium and Luxembourg 24% 
(incl. Iran 7.8%) 

Antimony 




Metal— P.R.C. 18% 

Mexico 16% 
Ore— South Africa 44% 

Bolivia 20% 
Oxide— South Africa 41% 

U.K. 22% 
Bauxite (exc. alumina) 

( 99% j 

Jamaica 48% 
Surinam 18% 



Natural Rubber 




^ / 



Diamonds (Industrial stones) 
(1976) 





Indonesia 45% 
Malaysia 30% 



South Africa 53% 
Zaire 11% 



NOTE: Percentages following country names represent 
percentages of U.S. imports, not consumption. 



Abaca 



Philippines 70% 
Ecuador 30% 



Zinc 




Canada 57% 




Malaysia 50% 
Thailand 14% 
Bolivia 14% 



Nickel 




Canada 60% 



Chromium 




CHROMITE 
South Africa 39% 
U.S.S.R. 24% 
FERROCHROMIUM 
South Africa 34% 
Southern Rhodesia 24 



1978 



INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY POLICY 



ius L. Katz 

i pleased to have this opportunity 
ify before your subcommittee in 
rl of H.R. 9486, a bill to au- 
; a contribution of up to 5,000 

tons of tin metal to the buffer 
Dperated by the International Tin 
nent. To set this question in its 

context, I would like to outline 
Iministration's general interna- 
commodity policy and the status 
rent international discussions on 
I other key commodities. 

United States is a major con- 

and producer of many critical 
laterials — both mineral and ag- 
ral. We have a stake in the effi- 
functioning of the international 
s for such commodities. Our ob- 
es are two-fold and address 
erm and long-term problems of 
e between market supply and 
d. 

le short term we recognize that 
le and erratic fluctuations in 
odity prices can damage our 
ts and those of developing coun- 
'hich depend on the export of a 
ajor commodities. This problem 
ade clear during the great com- 
( boom-bust cycle of 1973-75 
paralleled the onset of the petro- 
risis. Sharp boosts in commodity 
can add impetus to domestic in- 
n in our economy through 
re on manufacturing costs and 

The rise in costs becomes em- 
I in the economic structure and 
s long after commodity prices 
downward. The sharp declines in 
aterial prices, which usually fol- 
:aks in the commodity price cy- 
Iso injure producers and cause 

drops in the foreign exchange 
igs of developing country 
ers. 

ie longer term we have an inter- 
issuring needed supplies of basic 
aterials at reasonable prices. This 
:s adequate flows of new invest- 
o insure that new supplies can be 
it into the market to keep pace 
sing demand. Excessive price in- 
y works against this interest by 
g uncertainty on the part of in- 
s about expected returns from 
ts. 

s long-term global supply 
ige — in agricultural and nonag- 
ral commodities — is being met 
through domestic investment but 



also through a variety of international 
mechanisms, including bilateral aid, 
investment insurance, international fi- 
nancial institutions, and private foreign 
investment. 

Sources of Financing 

Private multinational corporations 
will undoubtedly remain essential to 
achieving adequate supplies of raw ma- 
terials for the global economy in the 
foreseeable future. Recognizing that 
prospect, and the fact that developing 
countries are likely to provide a grow- 
ing share of global reserves of key raw 
materials, investment insurance pro- 
grams, such as those of the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), help create conditions condu- 
cive to sound investments. By 
ameliorating political risk factors, 
OPIC enables prospective investors to 
make decisions based mainly on eco- 
nomic criteria and in this way contrib- 
utes to a more efficient allocation of 
capital resources. 

Despite the continued importance of 
foreign investment, national resource 
exploitation in developing countries 



has, in recent years, been marked by a 
growing role for national governments. 
The traditional long-term concession 
agreement between the host country 
and foreign investor has given way to a 
variety of complex contractual ar- 
rangements which have resulted in 
more active government participation, 
if not control. Furthermore, in the face 
of rapidly escalating costs, the major 
source of financing has shifted from in- 
ternally generated capital of private 
corporations to debt. 

Under these changing circumstances, 
international financial institutions, such 
as the World Bank, with our support 
are providing new sources of invest- 
ment capital. World Bank participation 
can also act as a catalyst to private in- 
vestment in some cases by providing a 
buffer between the host government 
and prospective private operators or 
commercial creditors. 

The Integrated Program 

The United States is now engaged in- 
ternationally in a comprehensive effort 
to deal with these problems of com- 
modity trade in the so-called Integrated 



Julius L. Katz was born in New York City 
on March 9, 1925. He received his B.A. de- 
gree from the George Washington University 
and served with U.S. Army in Europe from 
1943-45. 

Mr. Katz began his career with the De- 
partment of State in 1950, holding several 
positions dealing with U.S. economic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Po- 
land, and other countries of Eastern Europe. 

He was designated Deputy Director of the 
Office of International Trade in 1963 and 
promoted to Director in 1965. In this capac- 
ity he was primarily concerned with the Ken- 
nedy Round of trade negotiations under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and attended a number of meetings 
and working parties of the GATT. His re- 
sponsibilities also involved bilateral negotia- 
tions and legislative activities in the trade 
field. In 1967 Mr. Katz was named Director 
of the Office of International Commodities. 

Mr. Katz was appointed the senior Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Busi- 
ness in April 1974. From July 1968 until 
April 1976 he was Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for International Resources and Food 
Policy — serving in a dual capacity from 1974 




to 1976. Mr. Katz was sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs 
in September 1976. Mr. Katz is the recipient 
of the Department's Superior Service Award 
(1965) and the Distinguished Honor Award 
(1976), the Department's highest award. 



9 

.< 

:1 

:3 



Department of State Bui t 



Program for Commodities. This pro- 
gram was first put forward in 1975 in 
the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) by 
the UNCTAD Secretariat with the 
strong support of the developing coun- 
tries. Implementation of the program 
was called for at UNCTAD IV in 
Nairobi in May 1976. 

The program involves technical dis- 
cussions in UNCTAD of market condi- 
tions for 18 major commodities. These 
technical discussions are to be followed 
where appropriate by efforts to 
negotiate international price stabiliza- 
tion agreements and other measures to 
improve the functioning of the market. 
We have been participating actively in 
these discussions since 1976, and they 
will continue throughout 1978. 

The Administration believes that in- 
ternational price stabilization arrange- 
ments should be considered for specific 
commodities where such arrangements 
are feasible and appropriate. Where 
markets do not permit smooth adjust- 
ments to shifts in supply and demand, 
there may be a case for international 
agreements to improve the way in 
which a particular commodity market 
operates. We prefer to use instruments 
which enhance, rather than replace, 
market mechanisms. The technical ob- 
jective in any given case would be to 
stabilize the market price of the com- 
modity around its long-term trend, as 
determined by the forces of supply and 
demand. We are opposed to arrange- 
ments which introduce artificially rigid 
mechanisms to replace fully operative 
markets or which try to peg prices at 
artificially high levels. 

Ideally, we would prefer to stabilize 
commodity prices through the opera- 
tion of internationally constituted and 
financed buffer stocks. Such buffer 
stocks would seek to reduce price fluc- 
tuations around long-term market 
trends. A buffer stock would buy the 
commodity to defend the minimum 
price objectives and would release 
stocks to the market to protect the 
maximum price objectives. This tech- 
nique permits market forces to operate 
within the agreed price objectives. Dis- 
tortions of the market can thus be 
minimized so that producers and inves- 
tors can respond to market signals in 
making decisions on investment and re- 
source allocations. 

But the establishment of buffer 
stocks is not a simple matter, given the 
complexities of the particular market 
and the international negotiation proc- 
ess. It is often difficult, in practice, to 
formulate a stabilization system based 
on a pure buffer stock model. Long- 
term market trends are frequently dif- 
ficult to determine. The width of the 



price band and the calculation of the 
size of the buffer stock required to de- 
fend the band can be difficult technical 
problems. These problems are com- 
pounded when one tries to decide on 
such details in negotiations with other 
governments which often have differ- 
ing views on these issues. 

Objective conditions prevailing in 
particular markets may also require the 
use of other mechanisms. "Pure" buf- 
fer stocks are not always appropriate. 
Not all commodities can be easily 
stored, and costs may sometimes make 
an international stocking arrangement 
infeasible. In such instances, as in the 
case of the new International Sugar 
Agreement, it may be necessary to 
adopt market-sharing arrangements, 
with export quotas for producers 
backed by nationally held and interna- 
tionally coordinated reserve stocks. 
Such a system provides for stocks to 
absorb a portion of surplus production 
which is then available to protect the 
ceiling price in the agreement. Arbi- 
trary and rigid controls on production 
can thus be avoided. Such controls, as 
I will later mention with respect to the 
tin agreement, are generally destabiliz- 
ing. By holding down production and 
investment, they prevent the buildup of 
stocks which respond to excessive price 
increases. 

I might point out here that, in the 
debate over the relative merits of buffer 
stocking as opposed to supply man- 
agement, the issue of the cost of buffer 
stocking is often overstated. The capi- 
tal costs of a buffer stock (e.g., cop- 
per) are often thrown up as a major 
argument against such devices. A bal- 
anced argument, however, must take 
into account the economic benefits 
which might flow from such a stock as 
well as the costs. Stabilization through 
such a mechanism may give rise to net 
benefits through reduced inflation; 
greater assurance of adequate supply at 
reasonable prices; and, over the long 
run, more stable export earnings for 
producers. 

Price stabilization measures, how- 
ever, are not necessary or appropriate 
for all commodities. For example, 
there are some commodities, such as 
jute, which suffer from a long-term de- 
cline in demand. In such cases, other 
measures may be called for, such as 
market promotion and research and de- 
velopment for new products or new 
uses. In the case of commodities, 
which are in chronic oversupply, di- 
versification programs to promote pro- 
duction of other commodities may be 
needed. 

The choice among these approaches 
will depend on a rigorous analysis of 
each commodity market to determine 



what imperfections exist and u 
techniques might be most suitab 
correct them. There is no single i 
mula that can be applied in every | 
Whatever the approach, our con 
ment is to work seriously with | 
governments to develop workt; 
beneficial means of handling com 
ity trade problems. 

Compensatory Finance 

Aside from the commodity-spe 
framework of UNCTAD, we have 
been addressing the more gei 
balance-of-payments problems v 
developing countries often confro 
unstable raw material markets. Sii 
was liberalized in 1975, the Int 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) Con 
satory Finance Facility has provide 
fective relief in the form of loan 
to countries experiencing short, 
export earnings shortfalls. In 
example, a country's overall e': 
earnings decline for a particular y^ 
a result of a cyclical slump in I 
prices or demand for raw mate: 
that country can receive IMF fina; 
to help compensate for the shoi 
This mechanism thus alleviates th, 
pact of commodity market fluctu; 
on foreign exchange earnings an<j 
mits governments to plan their o\\ 
velopment programs with greate: 
tainty about the resources that w 
available. 

Specific Commodity Issues 

I want to turn now to some exai 
of specific commodity agreement 
negotiations in which we are inv 
to illustrate the problems that ar 
moving from general principles l 
practical problems of commodity 
kets. 

Tin. The United States joine 
Fifth International Tin Agree 
(ITA) in 1976, and we have p; 
pated actively since then in the In 
tional Tin Council (ITC), the 
executive body. We entered the I 
ment because we judged that U.S 
ticipation would help to further c 
ternational economic and pol 
interests. On the economic sid< 
United States is the leading con 
of tin. We acquire more than 81 
our current tin consumption 
abroad, with the remainder C( 
from domestic secondary produ 
The metal is an important basic 
for key industrial uses, especia 
the steel and solder industries. 

The tin trade is even more imp 
for the exporting countries i 
ITA— particularly Malaysia, B< 
and Thailand— where it is a 



h 1978 



e of domestic employment, gov- 
ern revenue, and export earnings, 
lining the tin council, the United 
; put itself in a better position to 
nee the council's policies affect- 
le long-term supply of tin, thus 
Ming both American industry and 
mere. Our decision clearly dem- 
ited our commitment to the idea 
nt producer-consumer cooperation 
ernational raw materials problems 
lso reaffirmed our willingness to 
nd forthrightly to the legitimate 
of the developing world. 
: intent of the ITA is to balance 
ational supply and demand of tin, 
izing the price within an agreed 
at levels deemed to be both re- 
rative for producers and fair to 
mers. To the extent that the ITA 
2 effective in achieving those ob- 
:s, it can contribute to the eco- 
c health of the participating 
ries and also demonstrate the 
ility of international cooperation 
aling with major trade and de- 
nental problems, 
purpose of the bill now before 
mmittee is to help rectify several 
problems which have hampered 
'A historically. The most impor- 
f these is that the buffer stock op- 
by the agreement has been too 
to stabilize the world tin price ef- 
;ly. In periods of slack demand 
ailing prices, the buffer stock 
not absorb enough metal from the 
t to defend the floor price. This 
d the tin council to rely exces- 
on export controls, the other 
component of the ITA's stabili- 
machinery, to keep the price 
the floor level. Conversely, 
shortages have appeared and 
have hit the price ceiling, the 
stock has had insufficient metal 
;ase into the market to dampen 
ice rise. 

>lication of these controls has 
I to inhibit production and dis- 
;e new investment in the tin in- 
'. Over the short term, export 
Is are inherently more cumber- 
and slower to take effect in the 
t than are buffer stock purchases 
les. There are long lags between 
"position and subsequent relaxa- 
f such controls and any actual 
t on market supplies and prices, 
suit has been the development of 
c tin shortages and a tripling of 
price over the past 5 years. This 
ion has been made worse, of 
, by the exhaustion of the ITA's 
stock in the face of such price 
ses. 

ther important factor which in- 

:s with price stabilization and 

growth is the imposition of ex- 



cessively high production taxes and re- 
strictive licensing practices by some 
producing country governments. 

The combination of export controls 
and production limitations, together 
with restrictive domestic tax and in- 
vestment policies, has produced a per- 
sistent deficit between tin metal pro- 
duction and consumption. Production 
of tin concentrates has dropped from a 
peak of 196,000 metric tons in 1972 to 
185,000 tons in 1977. In 1977 the gap 
between current world tin metal pro- 
duction and consumption was approxi- 
mately 20,000 metric tons, a figure 
which is not expected to decline ap- 
preciably in 1978. 

This deficit will persist at least until 
1980 and will generate continued pres- 
sure on tin prices, in the absence of in- 
fusions of metal into the market from 
the General Services Administration 
(GSA) stockpile and other sources. 
While the average New York price in 
1972 was $1.77 per pound, the latest 
price is around $5.30 a pound. This is 
above the $4.60 ceiling price of the 
ITA's price band, a situation which has 
prevailed for the last 14 months in spite 
of several upward shifts in the band 
during that period. The obvious failure 
of supply to respond to these price in- 
creases clearly shows the effects of the 
export control policies followed by the 
ITA and the major producers. In sum, 
the world tin market is not functioning 
efficiently. 

The contribution to the tin buffer 
stock which H.R. 9486 would au- 
thorize is intended to help alleviate this 
situation and to make the ITA a more 
effective stabilization instrument. It 
should also support the efforts of im- 
porting countries to persuade the major 
producers that a modification of their 
tax and investment policies is essential 
to our joint efforts to insure stable 
long-run growth in the tin market. 

The ITA provides for a buffer stock 
with a nominal level of 40,000 metric 
tons. Half of this is to be in the form of 
mandatory contributions from produc- 
ers with the rest made up of voluntary 
contributions of metal or the cash 
equivalent from consuming countries. 
Six other consuming countries have 
thus far contributed or pledged the 
equivalent of about 4,000 metric tons. 
Our contribution would, we believe, 
encourage other consumers to contrib- 
ute. It would also demonstrate, in con- 
crete fashion, the seriousness of our 
commitment to participate in workable 
international commodity arrangements. 
Since we consider that the ITA has 
economic benefits for us, both with re- 
spect to short-term stabilization and 
long-term assurance of reasonably 
priced supplies, we should share the 



cost of making it work. We have stated 
that the same principle of mutual 
producer-consumer responsibility 
applies as well to other commodity 
agreements which we have recently 
joined or may join. 

An increase in the buffer stock will 
also strengthen our arguments within 
the tin council against the excessive 
and prolonged use of export controls. 
A larger buffer stock should permit the 
ITA to moderate the price volatility 
which has plagued the tin industry dur- 
ing the 1970's. Over the longer run, 
such enhanced price stability, along 
with appropriate tax and investment 
policies in producing countries, should 
help bring about the new investment 
necessary to assure adequate supplies 
of tin in the 1980's and beyond. 

The provisions of H.R. 9486 would 
assist us to carry out our objectives 
with regard to the ITA. The bill would 
authorize the President to direct the 
Administrator of the General Services 
Administration to transfer up to 5,000 
metric tons of tin metal to the Interna- 
tional Tin Council. The contribution 
would be made from metal which is 
surplus to our needs under the Strategic 
and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. 
At the moment, GSA holds some 
168,000 tons of surplus tin out of a 
total stockpile of 201,000 tons, so that 
the bill would have no impact on our 
strategic needs for the metal. 

Based on the number of votes we 
have in the tin council (26% of total 
consumer votes) our pro rata share of 
the 20,000 tons of consumer contribu- 
tions provided for in the agreement is 
5,220 tons. This quantity at the current 
ITC floor price would have a value of 
$43.5 million which is the valuation 
given to our contribution for purposes 
of liquidation and repayment to the 
United States upon termination of the 
agreement. At current market prices, 
however, $43.5 million would equate 
to approximately 3,500 tons of tin 
metal. It is this quantity, therefore, that 
the United States would contribute in 
the present circumstances. Should 
either the market or ITC floor price 
change prior to the contribution, how- 
ever, the amount of the contribution 
would be adjusted accordingly. We an- 
ticipate that the tin will remain physi- 
cally in the United States and will be 
sold here. 

This contribution will not disrupt the 
tin market. As I noted earlier, the mar- 
ket price is substantially above the 
ITA's present price ban. The release of 
additional tin metal through our contri- 
bution will help to dampen these high 
market prices. Some producer countries 
themselves, realizing that excessively 
high prices will cause a long-term shift 



J' 



Department of State Bult 



in consumption away from tin, wel- 
come our proposed addition to the tin 
buffer stock. 

I would note here that while we have 
used the term "contribution," we are 
in effect making an investment in the 
tin buffer stock. This investment will 
be returned to us at the termination of 
the agreement in 1981, along with our 
pro rata share of any profits resulting 
from buffer stock operations. While a 
profit is not guaranteed, contributions 
have earned an average return of 8% 
per annum in past agreements. 

Wheat. As you know, a negotiating 
conference convened in Geneva last 
week to begin negotiations on a new In- 
ternational Wheat Agreement that 
would replace the 1971 International 
Wheat Agreement, which lapses this 
June. The conference will consider 
both a new wheat trade convention and 
a new agreement of food aid to food- 
deficit developing countries. Our prin- 



cipal objective in these talks is to ob- 
tain an agreement that will help to 
stabilize world wheat prices, expand 
trade in wheat, and enhance world food 
security. 

We are the largest wheat-exporting 
country. Our share in total world wheat 
exports for the current crop year will be 
around 40% — down from 47% in 
1972-75 but still crucial for our overall 
trade position and the well-being of our 
domestic producers. Our dominant po- 
sition in wheat trade, however, has car- 
ried with it certain costs. Because some 
countries insulate their domestic mar- 
kets from world trade, we have borne a 
disproportionate share of the burden of 
adjusting world supplies to shifts in 
demand. We have held the world's 
wheat reserve stock, and it is our farm- 
ers who have had to adjust production 
to meet major variations in world de- 
mand for wheat. 

I cannot now describe in detail the 



provisions which will emerge fron,: 
negotiations. The text under consiti 
tion. however, includes all the ni 
elements we proposed in the Intu 
tional Wheat Council last year.j 
system, in our view, should be tj 
upon nationally held, internatioii 
coordinated wheat reserve stocks uj 
would be used to stabilize the v] 
wheat price within a wide price bj 
We are opposed to setting rl 
maximum and minimum trading p: 
since experience shows that such 
limits could not work without eq 
rigid market-sharing provisions, i 
an agreement would not be accep: 
to any of the major participants ii| 
negotiations. 

Any wheat agreement needs tj 
accompanied by provisions! 
liberalizing the world grain trade i 
should insure that efficient prodi; 
have an incentive to maintain pre. 
tive capacity. One or two couni 



' 



DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEPENDENCE ON PRIMARY PRODUCTS FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS 



LHTin AfTlERKfl p 

BOLIVIA 

CHILE 

COLOMBIA 

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 

ECUADOR 

PANAMA 

URUGUAY 
VENEZUELA 

REAR EA/T 

IRAN 

IRAQ 

KUWAIT 

SAUDI ARABIA 

/OUTH A/IA 

SRI LANKA 
BANGLADESH 

EA/T A/IA 

INDONESIA 
MALAYSIA 



75 100 

I 

petroleum 




meat 



petroleum 



petroleum 



petroleum 



tea 
jute/products 



petroleum 



petroleum 



rubber 



rubber 



troleuml products 

Tj wood, tin 



wood 



AFRICA 

ALGERIA 

BURUNDI 

CENT. AFRICAN EMP. 

ETHIOPIA 

GAMBIA 

GHANA 

LIBERIA 

LIBYA 

MAURITANIA 

MAURITIUS 

RWANDA 

SENEGAL 

SIERRA LEONE 

SOMALIA 

SUDAN 

UGANDA 

ZAIRE 

ZAMBIA 




peanuts 
products 



diamonds 

lives tockl products 

cotton 



ground ni 




Source: International Financial Statistics, 1976. 



i 1978 



i not be forced to carry the major 

:n of adjustment to market 

es. 

fee. Coffee is a commodity for 

we already have an agreement, 
t, the United States has partici- 

in three International Coffee 
ments since 1962. The charac- 
;s of the coffee economy and its 
t conditions dictated a market- 
g approach in this case rather 
l buffer stock approach. Coffee 
nents have relied primarily on 

quotas to insure orderly market- 
surplus production and stocks 
prevailed for most of the 1960's. 
962 and 1968 agreements suc- 
I in their objectives of preventing 
ipse of coffee prices to disaster 

and of encouraging exporters 
ve into other products offering 

returns. In retrospect it seems 
le disincentives to new invest- 
were excessive as was the de- 
n stocks during this period. Thus 
rid was ill-prepared for the sharp 
ction losses in Brazil and 
ere in 1975, resulting in record 
rices. 

1976 International Coffee 
ment is essentially a standby 
lent, intended to encourage a re- 

of production from the tight 
situation brought on by the 1975 
an frost and temporary declines 
luction in other producing coun- 
Tie export quotas provided for in 
eement are in suspense and will 
me into effect until the market 
escends to the trigger levels set 
igreement. 

formula employed currently 
place the trigger levels between 
and 77.5^2 per pound, although 
m be adjusted by mutual agree- 
of producing and consuming 
es. Export quotas would be dis- 
ci among producers largely on 
;is of their historical export per- 
ice in the postfrost period and 
xording to their proportion of 
orld stocks. 

arrangement is meant to en- 
e producers to market available 
:s in the short run and in the 

term to follow more rational 
ig policies. The latter point is 
illy important because a buildup 
yover stocks will moderate fu- 
"ice escalation. The agreement 
eludes a provision for the sus- 
n of export quotas when the 
| price has risen 15% above 
he average for the previous year 
igreed price range. This provi- 
ould permit accumulated stocks 
r the market and moderate the 
ise. The existence of adequate 

in producer countries will be 



crucial to the success of this 
mechanism. 

The members of the agreement have 
also begun a study of the feasibility of 
putting national stocks under some 
form of international control. This 
study is provided for by one of the pro- 
visions of the agreement. We partici- 
pated fully in the first meeting of the 
study group. There are many problems 
that need to be explored in detail. Still, 
we welcome a thorough examination of 
all the possibilities for pursuing the 
goals of the agreement through interna- 
tional stocking arrangements. 

While prices reached extraordinarily 
high levels during 1977 as a result of 
catastrophic frost in Brazil and produc- 
tion disturbances in other countries, 
coffee production is now recovering 
from the low levels of 1975, 1976, and 
1977, especially in Brazil. As a result, 
prices have begun to decline. 

Rubber. International discussions on 
the stabilization of the world market 
for natural rubber have been going on 
since early 1977 under the sponsorship 
of UNCTAD. Technical work on the 
operation of the market and possible 
elements of a workable stabilization 
agreement are well advanced, and at 
their next meeting beginning February 
27, producing and consuming countries 
are expected to decide to convene 
negotiations on an agreement later this 
year. 

Our interest in such an agreement 
would be to seek to stabilize the price 
of natural rubber and to encourage the 
investment we believe will be needed 
to increase production in the mid- 
1980's when shortages of natural rub- 
ber are forecast. Higher synthetic rub- 
ber prices and greater use of radial tires 
have increased demand for natural rub- 
ber, and we have an interest in helping 
to assure a growing supply of natural 
rubber at stable prices. 

There is still no consensus among 
producers and consumers, however, 
about the details of an acceptable rub- 
ber agreement. On the basis of the 
studies done within the executive 
branch, as well as the international 
consultations which have been held, we 
have concluded that it could be feasible 
to establish an international buffer 
stock for natural rubber which could 
stabilize prices within a reasonable 
range. We are, therefore, prepared to 
participate actively in the negotiations 
for a natural rubber agreement and to 
recommend U.S. participation if a 
satisfactory agreement is concluded. 

Copper. International discussions on 
the need for stabilization of the world 
copper market have been going on for 
more than a year under UNCTAD 
sponsorship. Copper is one of the 



major commodities in international 
trade, with more than $5 billion traded 
in 1976. We are the world's largest 
producer and consumer of copper. Al- 
though we are not heavily dependent on 
foreign sources of supply, excessive 
instability in the world copper market 
does have a serious effect on our pro- 
ducers and consumers of copper. 

Prices worldwide are currently de- 
pressed as a result of slow economic 
growth in major consuming countries 
and continued high levels of produc- 
tion, particularly by developing coun- 
try producers. The large overhang of 
supply has pushed prices below aver- 
age U.S. production costs and has led 
to a recent upswing in imports. Our net 
imports of copper amounted to about 
20% of our consumption in 1976-77, 
up from about 12% over the previous 
several years. This situation is a phase 
of a typical copper cycle; the copper 
market has tended to be closely tied to 
the general business cycle and has long 
been marked by wide swings in prices. 
We are now engaged within the gov- 
ernment and in the UNCTAD talks in 
the analysis of the underlying problems 
of the copper market and the feasibility 
of international measures to correct 
them. The feasibility of an interna- 
tional buffer stock to moderate price 
fluctuations will depend largely on 
technical factors — including competi- 
tion from substitutes and the identifica- 
tion of an acceptable price indicator. 
We would particularly want to assure 
ourselves that any international stabili- 
zation measures on copper take full ac- 
count of the interests of our domestic 
industry and do not encourage uneco- 
nomic shifts of consumption from cop- 
per to other products. 

Earlier this month, the third UNC- 
TAD preparatory meeting on copper 
agreed to establish a producer- 
consumer forum to continue this inter- 
national study of the copper situation. 
The producer-consumer forum will 
carry out additional technical analyses of 
the copper market and study alternative 
stabilization schemes. It will also serve 
to improve the quality and flow of in- 
formation concerning conditions in the 
market. This latter step alone could 
contribute to improved functioning of 
the market. If the producer-consumer 
forum later determines that additional 
international action may be feasible, it 
could recommend the convening of 
negotiations for an international 
stabilization agreement. 

Sugar. With respect to sugar, the 
President sent the new International 
Sugar Agreement to the Senate last 
month [January 25, 1978] for advice 
and consent to ratification. We intend 
to submit implementing legislation to 



I 



m*. 



<m *' 

Si 

; 



Department of State Bult 



the Congress shortly. The agreement 
was concluded last October, after very 
difficult negotiations, and entered into 
force provisionally on January 1. It is 
intended to stabilize the world market 
price of sugar. 

In contrast to the situation in coffee, 
the sugar agreement must initiate ac- 
tion that will cause the depressed mar- 
ket price to rise up into the agreed 
range of 11-210 per pound. Later, it 
will function to prevent the sort of ex- 
treme price peak experienced in 1974 
when prices rose above 600. The 
agreement depends on a system of na- 
tionally held, internationally coordi- 
nated stocks combined with export con- 
trols. A special stock of 2.5 million 
tons — built up over a 3-year period 
when prices are low — would be placed 
on the market when the world price rose 
above 190, thus helping to protect con- 
sumers against excessive price increases. 
Of particular interest is an innovative 
scheme for financing sugar stocks. 
Each time sugar is traded on the free 
market by a member country of the 
agreement, a nominal fee will be col- 
lected for the stock financing fund. 
This fee — about x h of a cent per 
pound — amounts to only 1/100 of the 
retail price of sugar in the United 
States. Collection of these fees will 
build a fund amounting to $400-500 
million over a 5-year period. Interest- 
free loans from this fund will be made 
to exporters for the cost of carrying 
special sugar stocks. The exporters will 
receive 1.50 each year for each pound 
of sugar held in the special stock. The 
loans will be repayable when the stocks 
are released at a time of high sugar 
prices. 

The stock-financing plan demon- 
strates that financing need not be a 
problem in international commodity 
agreements. The sugar plan involves no 
cost to the U.S. Government and only 
an insignificant cost to the U.S. con- 
sumer. In return it provides strong pro- 
tection against high sugar prices. 

We expect the agreement to bring 
supply into balance with demand in 
1978 and the world price to rise from 
the 70 a pound level which prevailed 
late last year to the 1 10 minimum. The 
U.S. import price should thereby rise 
to a level that would permit both U.S. 
and foreign producers to earn a reason- 
able return on their investment. When 
this level is reached, the President will 
be able to lift at least part of the 5.50 
per pound import charges which he re- 
cently imposed as part of our domestic 
price support program. 

The International Sugar Agreement 
is superior to a domestic program in 
several respects. The agreement can 
provide the same price stabilization 



benefits to producers as a domestic 
program without significant budgetary 
expenditures or without the high tariffs 
that lead to problems in our foreign re- 
lations. Further, the agreement can 
provide protection for consumers 
against high sugar prices. Domestic 
programs do not have the ability to 
limit sugar price increases. 

The Common Fund 

In addition to the discussions on in- 
dividual commodities, the UNCTAD 
Integrated Program for Commodities 
includes a proposal to set up a common 
fund to support international com- 
modity agreements. The Adminis- 
tration supports a fund that would 
facilitate the efficient financing of in- 
ternational buffer stock agreements. 

With that objective in mind, the 
United States and other industrialized 
countries agreed at last year's eco- 
nomic summit conference in London 
that there should be a common fund. 1 
This conclusion was underscored at the 
Paris Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation [May 30-June 2, 
1977], at which we approved a final 
communique affirming that a common 
fund should be established, with its 
"purposes, objectives and other con- 
stituent elements" to be negotiated in 
UNCTAD. 2 

In preparation for these negotiations, 
the industrialized countries developed a 
proposal in the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development 
for a financially viable common fund 
that would consolidate the financial ac- 
tivities of participating international 
commodity agreements by pooling their 
cash resources and borrowing against 
callable capital or guarantees pledged 
to the fund through the individual 
agreements. The latter would retain 
basic responsibility for raising the 
necessary finance for buffer stocking 
and would also be autonomous in their 
policy and operational decisions. 

There are two ways in which this 
scheme would lighten the burden of 
buffer stocking operations for all con- 
cerned. 

• First, it would realize financial 
economies as a result of the offsetting 
price movements of different com- 
modities associated with the fund. 
These economies derive from the fact 
under normal circumstances, price 
cycles do not coincide for all com- 
modities, so that an international 
commodity agreement in a buying 
phase and needing cash could — 
through the fund — borrow from 
another commodity agreement in a 
selling phase and accumulating cash. 



• Second, by consolidating the ; 
rowing operations of participr 
agreements, the fund would reali2 
nancial savings in borrowing on ca 
markets. 

With regard to measures other 
price-stabilizing buffer stocks, thj 
dustrialized countries have strtfi 
their importance — particularly! 
commodities facing decli: 
demand — but have argued that i 
measures can be effectively harj 
through producer-consumer comml 
organizations, existing internation 
nancial institutions such as the \> 
Bank, U.N. agencies, and bilater; 
sistance programs. We do not ex 
the possibility that some improver: 
in current activities in this area m 
desirable, nor do we exclude 
role — such as coordination of th 
tivities of .producer-const! 
bodies — for a common fund. 

The developing countries are sel 
a common fund financed primari 
direct capital subscriptions from- 
ernments, as distinct from a poolii 
rangement based on internat 
commodity agreements. The 
would finance not only comm, 
stocks but also a wide range of i- 
nonbuffer stocking measures, so. 
which are of a development type.; 
The negotiations are currently! 
impasse. The second session t 
negotiating conference in Genev 
November was suspended at the « 
of the developing countries one d; 
fore its scheduled conclusion. W 
pressed regret at the suspension ai 
currently exploring with other g( 
ments and the UNCTAD Seci 
General whether a satisfactory 
can be found for resumption c 
negotiations later this year. We b 
a satisfactory outcome to any 
negotiations, however, will deper 
large extent on whether the devel 
countries are prepared to give s 
consideration to the proposal the 
trialized countries have on the tal 



Based on a statement before the Subco 
on International Economic Policy and 7 
the House Committee on International R 
on Feb. 21, 1978. The complete transcrij 
hearings will be published by the commi, 
will be available from the Superinten 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 1 
Washington, DC. 20402. Mr. KatzisA 
Secretary for Economic and Business Af 

1 For material relating to the econoir 
mit meeting, see Bulletin of June f 
p. 581. 

2 For text of final communique ana 1 
material, see Bulletin of June 20 
p. 645. 



i 1978 



THE PRESIDENT: Mews Conference, 
January 30 (Excerpts) 



\ other thing I would like to do 
)riefly is to outline the history of 
>viet satellite, the Cosmos 954. 
s satellite, which had a nuclear 
■ source on it, was launched on 
!th of September, last year. It was 
lis to us later on that the Soviets 
having trouble controlling the 
te. On the 19th of December, we 
i a small task force in the White 
:. On the 6th of January, we felt 
ontrol had been lost, and I de- 
personally to notify the Soviets 
: 12th of January that we were 

of their problems, to offer our 
i monitoring the path of the satel- 
,nd to begin preparing jointly to 
t where it would fall and also to 
e for handling it if it should con- 
e Earth. 

Soviets replied that it was de- 
I so that it would be destroyed as 
e back into Earth, and it was de- 
I also so there was no possibility 
atomic explosion. 
the 17th and 18th of January, we 
d the key congressional leaders, 
of our allies around the world 
vere capable of joining us in a 
lg effort. And the Soviets a day 
on the 19th, repeated their com- 
t will not explode, 
the 22d of January, we went back 
Soviets to ask them to give us an 
: to confirm the information we 
om monitoring sources. And on 
d of January, the Soviets notified 
t it would probably enter the at- 
ere the following day, which is 
th. 

y on the morning of the 24th, I 
otified that the satellite would 
the atmosphere quite early. We 
>t know whether it would hit be- 
Hawaii on a very high curve up 

northern part of Canada or the 
n coast of Africa, because some- 
the satellites can skip from one 
to another as they enter the at- 
ere. It, as you know, entered the 
)here in Canada. 

imediately called Prime Minister 
Trudeau, informed him about the 
ximate location, which later 

out to be accurate. And on the 
as you know, just recently, the 
ns of the satellite have been 
red. 

last satellite we put into Earth 
vith an atomic power source was 



in 1965. This satellite, at the conclu- 
sion of its useful life, was raised into a 
higher orbit that has a lifespan of at 
least 4,000 years. 

I think we need to have more rigid 
safety precautions assured among all 
nations in Earth-orbiting satellites. In 
fact, we would be glad to forgo the de- 
ployment of any such satellite al- 
together and will pursue that option 
along with the Soviet Union. 

The only time a satellite needs a 
longlasting power source that's free of 
the use of solar energy, which can be 
derived from the Sun, is when you go 
into deep outer space; for instance, if 
we send a probe to the outer planets, 
there would not be adequate source of 
energy from the Sun to trigger our solar 
cells. And we might need power from 
atomic sources then. 

But I see no reason for us to continue 
with the option of nations to have 
Earth-orbiting satellites unless much 
more advanced safety precautions can 
be initiated. 

Q. Since I assume the subject will 
come up when you meet with Presi- 
dent Sadat, could you give us a gen- 
eral outline of your view toward our 
helping Egypt acquire arms? 

A. We have been, of course, facing 
the continuing prospect for a number of 
years of providing some weapons into 
the Mideast, heavily to Israel, also to 
Saudi Arabia, to Iran, and to some de- 
gree, the nonattack weapons to Egypt. 

All these nations have requests to us 
for weapons. They've been committed 
to those nations to some degree by my 
two predecessors and reconfirmed in 
some instances by me. 

The National Security Council will 
make a report to me early this week 
recommending from the State Depart- 
ment, from the Defense Department, 
from the national security adviser, 
what weapons to recommend to the 
Congress. After that point, the Con- 
gress will have a 30-day plus a 21 -day 
period to respond affirmatively or not. 
I will decide later on this week what to 
recommend to the Congress. 

The Egyptians have, in the past, re- 
quested F-5E fighter planes, one that is 
used extensively around the world for 
export purposes primarily, and Israel 
and Saudi Arabia have requested other 
weapons. They have some F-5's. 



Q. Do you have a clear idea now 
from Prime Minister Begin as to 
whether or not he will authorize new 
settlements in the West Bank and in 
the Sinai, and do you believe that Is- 
rael, over a period of time, ought to 
phase out those settlements in return 
for real peace? 

A. I've covered this many times. 
Our position on settlements in the oc- 
cupied territory has been that they are 
illegal, that they are an obstacle to 
peace. When Prime Minister Begin was 
over here and when Foreign Minister 
Dayan was here, this question arose. 
And my understanding of their com- 
mitment was that no new settlements 
would be authorized by the govern- 
ment, that any increase in settlers 
would be an expansion of existing set- 
tlements as much as possible within the 
aegis of the military. 

The Geneva conference agreement is 
that civilians should not go in to settle 
permanently in occupied territories. I 
think the Israeli Government has not 
authorized the Shiloh settlement other 
than as an archeological exploration 
project. And I've not yet heard from 
Prime Minister Begin directly, but I 
have had information that this is a pol- 
icy of the Israeli Government, that this 
is not an authorized settlement. 



Q. Do you have an overall view of 
the final borders you would like to 
see for Israel? Do you expect Israel 
to return to the 1967 borders in all 
aspects, especially in east Jerusalem? 

A. No. I don't have a map or a plan 
that ought to be the final border deline- 
ation between Israel and her neighbors. 
I have always operated and made my 
statements under the framework and 
within the constraints of U.N. Resolu- 
tion 242, which calls for Israel to with- 
draw from occupied territories. 

Israel interprets this language differ- 
ently, of course, from the Arab 
neighbors. The Arab neighbors say that 
Israel ought to withdraw from all oc- 
cupied territories. Israel says that 
there's some flexibility there and that 
the thrust of U.N. Resolution 242 is an 
exchange, in effect, for portions of the 
occupied territory for guaranteed 
peace. 

The three elements that I've pursued 
are, one, a delineation of final borders; 
secondly, a feeling or conviction on the 






j 



1 

- 

I 



8 



part of the Israelis that their security 
was preserved, which would involve 
both their own military strength, the 
delineation of the borders, and the at- 
titude now and in the future of their 
neighbors. 

The second question, of course, is 
the definition of real peace. What does 
peace mean? Does it simply mean a 
cessation of hostility or belligerency, 
or does it mean open borders, trade, 
tourism, diplomatic exchange, the loca- 
tion of ambassadors, and so forth? 

I've taken the more definitive defini- 
tion as my own preference. And the 
other thing, of course, is to deal in all 
its aspects with the Palestinian 
question. 

But I have never tried to put forward 
in my own mind or to any of the 
Mideastern leaders a map in saying this 
is where the lines should be drawn. 



remains of the satellite or whether or 
not they are now retrieving it from the 
riverbed where it's located, I do not 
know. 

Q. Last August in your immigra- 
tion message, you said you were not 
considering reintroduction of a 
bracero-type program for the tem- 
porary importation of farm work- 
ers. 1 

Last week, Secretary [of Agricul- 
ture] Bergland down in Mexico City 
had an airport press conference at 
which he apparently gave some Mex- 
ican newspapers the idea that we 
were considering such a program 
and were considering importing 3 
million braceros, and they've been 
writing a lot of stories about it. He 
has tried to deny it. Could you state 
your position on it? 

A. We have no plans whatsoever to 



Department of State Bull i 

reinitiate a bracer o program. Our cj 
proposal to deal with the i 
documented workers or illegal a 
question has already been submitted 
the public, and that encompasses v'j 
we proposed. It does not comprh 
bracer o -type program. 

Q. There are reports that 
Soviets have or soon will have 
capability to disrupt our sending 
military orders by satellites. Can 
tell us whether they are accurati 
not? 

A. My information is that that ret 
is not accurate. 



For full text, see Weekly Compilation of h 
dential Documents of Feb. 6, 1978, p. 243 
1 For text of President Carter's message t 
Congress of Aug. 4, 1977, see Bulleti' 
Sept. 5, p. 316. 



Q. Regarding your concern about 
satellites and the safety precautions, 
in taking this up with the Russians, 
will you try to dissuade them from 
their practice of putting nuclear 
reactors into space in the future? 

A. Yes, certainly in Earth orbit. I 
think that this is something that we 
should explore. There are two factors 
though. One is to try to evolve a sure- 
fire safety requirement that would pre- 
vent a recurrence of any atomic active 
material reaching the Earth or the at- 
mosphere where human beings might 
breathe it. If we cannot evolve those 
fail-safe methods, then I think there 
ought to be a total prohibition against 
Earth-orbiting satellites. 

I would favor at this moment an 
agreement with the Soviets to prohibit 
Earth-orbiting satellites with atomic 
radiation material in them. 

Q. Do you have any idea what the 
deal is on that satellite up there? We 
get all these reports. One day it's not 
radioactive; the next day it is. Do you 
have any late information about just 
what the status of that thing is? Or 
whether there is any danger? 

A. No, I know nothing at this point 
that hasn't already been put into the 
press. One, I do know that they've lo- 
cated a crater, about a 9-foot dimen- 
sion, that it is radioactive and that a 
search group from one of our own heli- 
copters working with the Canadians is 
at the site. But the configuration of the 



Foreign Intelligence Activities 



On January 24, 1978, President Car- 
ter issued Executive Order 12036 con- 
cerning the organization and control of 
U.S. foreign intelligence activities. 
The most important features of this 
Executive order are: 

1 . The National Security Council and 
its two standing committees — the Spe- 
cial Coordination Committee (SCC) 
and the Policy Review Committee 
(PRC) — will, short of the President, 
provide the highest level review of and 
guidance for the policies and practices 
of the intelligence community. 

2. The authorities and respon- 
sibilities of all departments, agencies, 
and senior officials engaged in foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence ac- 
tivities are being made public. Those 
implementing directives which must 
remain classified for security reasons 
will be made available to the 
appropriate congressional oversight 
committees. 

3. Our intelligence agencies have a 
critical role to play in collecting and 
analyzing information important to our 
national security interests and, on oc- 
casion, acting in direct support of 



major foreign policy objectives, 
equally important, however, that; 
methods employed by these agerj 
meet constitutional standards protec 
the privacy and civil liberties of \ 
persons and are in full compliance 
the law. To accomplish this objecti 
major section of the Executive ord 
devoted entirely to setting forth 
tailed restrictions on intelligence 
lection, covert activities in suppoi 
foreign policy objectives, experimt 
tion, contracting, assistance to law 
forcement authorities, persoi 
assigned to other agencies, indirect 
ticipation in prohibited activities, 
semination and storage of informal 
and a prohibition on assassinations 
4. As an added protection ag; 
abuses and to help insure effective 
formance, the intelligence overs 
process is strengthened. 



The full text of Executive Order 12036, a 
as President Carter's statement on this s 
issued by the White House on Jan. 24, 19 
printed in the Weekly Compilation of Pre 
tial Documents of Jan. 30. 



i 1978 



THE VICE PRESIDENT: 

Visit to Canada and Mexico 



President Mondale visited Canada (January 17-18) and Mexico (January 
i to consult with Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau and President Jose 
Portillo and other officials of their governments. Following are the texts of 
dresses he made during those trips. 



lDA 1 

)ughout my public life, I've tried 
phasize the vital importance of 
osest possible consultation be- 

the United States and Canada, 
ve been proud to be a member of 

Administration in Washington 
has joined with your leaders to 
our friendship to a level of bal- 
inparalleled in our common his- 

ost a year ago today, President 
• stood before the American 
for the first time as their highest 
1. He called for a "new spirit" 

relationship between nations, 
not on power politics but on a 
•espect and deference for the 
ignty and independence of every 
on Earth, 
clearest example of that policy 

U.S. longstanding friendship 
ts neighbors to the north and 
The first two heads of govern- 
nvited to Washington — only a 

after President Carter took 
-were Prime Minister Trudeau 
resident Lopez Portillo of 
). These meetings were not the 
formalities of statecraft; they 
n unmistakable symbol of a new 
n the friendship between our na- 
They brought forth a new com- 
nt to work together as equal 
s to solve the problems which 
ige a shared future on this conti- 

2 short months we have accom- 
I more together than we imag- 
ossible. Old irritants and petty 
ns have been replaced by the 
)f compromise and accommoda- 
resident Carter and Prime Minis- 
deau have established a continu- 
ilogue. Half a dozen American 
;t members have traveled to 
i — and an even greater number 
r Ministers have come to the 
-to pursue the task of managing 
ghborhood together. 
' have already made good prog- 
"i safeguarding the environment 
)ur borders and revising the toll 
re of the St. Lawrence Seaway, 
loping the concept of joint man- 
it of some of our fishing stocks 



and determining our four seaward 
boundaries to maintain fishing patterns 
without disrupting operations on either 
side, and, in record time, we are mak- 
ing the first steps in a great new joint 
enterprise — the overland gas pipeline. 

At every level of our societies — in 
business and government, commerce 
and culture — Americans and Canadians 
are talking and learning and working 
together with a new feeling of confi- 
dence. And now, I have come to 
Canada at the start of our second year 
to leave no doubt that the course which 
we have begun so successfully, we 
shall follow in the years ahead. 

We share a common history which is 
also a blueprint for the future. It is the 
history of an experiment in freedom on 
this continent and of a mutual commit- 
ment to respect diversity and differ- 
ence. Ours are among the few nations 
on Earth which are nations not because 
of a common culture but because of a 
common commitment to a single 
ideal — the supremacy of the human 
spirit. 

More than anything else, that fun- 
damental commitment is the source of 
our closeness as peoples. It is the foun- 
dation for a level of interchange unique 
in history. We share by far the largest 
tide of trade between any two nations 
on Earth. We share what External Af- 
fairs Minister Don Jamieson has called 
"a network of contacts and communi- 
cations which exceeds that of any 
(other countries)." We share an inti- 
mate daily association at every level of 
society. 

Canadians cross our common border 
35 million times a year, and equivalent 
numbers of Americans make the jour- 
ney north. They come to do business, 
to visit friends and families, to see the 
matchless beauty of the northern coun- 
tryside, and to taste a foreign culture as 
different and exciting as it is friendly. 

• Together we built one of the 
world's great transportation systems — 
the St. Lawrence Seaway. 

• We have pioneered international 
efforts to preserve the environment, by 
conceiving and maintaining one of the 
world's oldest bilateral tribunals — the 
International Joint Commission. 



• We stand together not only in the 
defense of the continent that is our 
home but with 13 other nations in the 
defense of Europe — the home of many 
of our ancestors. 

• We have brought a new level of 
industrial growth and stability to both 
nations through the auto pact of 1965. 

• And as Prime Minister Trudeau 
told our Congress last year in his excel- 
lent message, we have worked together 
to create original techniques of en- 
vironmental management; of emer- 
gency and disaster assistance; of air 
and sea traffic control; and of transport- 
ing people, goods, and services. 

These programs are symbolic of the 
vital truth. Our common progress de- 
pends upon the preservation of our 
separate identities as nations. In shared 
interests and interdependence there is 
strength and promise. Dependence is 
only stagnation. We will never permit 
the abrogation of sovereignty on either 
side of the border. 

We have learned the art of being 
good neighbors. First, this means ad- 
vance consultation and accommoda- 
tion. Second, it means speaking our 
minds forthrightly. Third, it means re- 
sponding to the views of our citizens as 
befits representative democracies, and 
we each want to be heard in the world 
in our own voice. 

And as nations built on federal prin- 
ciples, our progress depends upon the 
harmony and unity of our countrymen. 
Working together means participation 
by all our peoples and regions within 
our respective federal frameworks. In 
this way different interests can be rec- 
onciled while we shape our separate na- 
tional destinies. 

Economic Challenges 

It is our destiny to face common 
challenges. 

We face an energy crisis which has 
brought to Canada the first oil trade 
deficit in almost a decade and which is 
bleeding the United States of $45 bil- 
lion a year for foreign oil. We both 
need to keep that money at home, to 
build schools and housing and transpor- 
tation facilities. And here, as in so 
many other areas, my nation can profit 
by Canada's example. 

When my countrymen saw the 
energy crisis on charts and 
blackboards, your leaders were taking 



or. •' 

■1 

.-J 



10 

action. You've already inaugurated a 
home insulation program, a forward- 
looking internal price policy on oil and 
gas, and a comprehensive strategy for 
conserving existing resources and de- 
veloping new ones. 

In the United States, President Carter 
has taken action, too. He is pledged to 
reduce American reliance on all exter- 
nal sources of energy. But still the 
shape of our program awaits the out- 
come of legislative bargaining — and 
still we grow more dependent on 
foreign sources half a world away. 

I am sure we will succeed in getting 
an effective and fair energy bill from 
Congress, one that will enable us to 
play our part in the global effort to 
meet the energy challenge. 

There's an old saying that a good 
neighbor doubles the value of a house, 
and the same is true of our countries as 
we face the energy problem. 

• We can both profit from reciprocal 
electricity arrangements, from oil 
swaps to compensate for regional dis- 
locations. 

• Our gas pipeline agreement is 
striking evidence of the power and po- 
tential of such cooperation. It promises 
to save both countries billions of dol- 
lars in comparison with independent al- 
ternatives. And the same friendship and 
good faith which produced that agree- 
ment will govern its execution — 
assuring each nation a fair and just re- 
turn in jobs and industrial orders on its 
part of the pipeline. 

• We both need oil storage facilities 
to guard against emergencies, and there 
may be advantages in building them to- 
gether. Prime Minister Trudeau and I 
discussed that option yesterday, and 
we've agreed to undertake an expedi- 
tious joint study of common facilities 
in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. 

• Our nations can also profit from 
joint arrangements concerning the pro- 
duction and distribution of existing re- 
sources. In the next few years Alberta 
may enjoy supplies of natural gas 
which are surplus to provincial and 
Canadian needs. 

Both nations can profit from cooper- 
ation in the production and consump- 
tion of existing resources. Prime Minis- 
ter Trudeau and I agreed yesterday that 
we should encourage new gas con- 
tracts, with a swap-back option, with a 
view toward facilitating the early build- 
ing of the lower sections of the gas 
pipeline. Over the short-term — and this 
could only be determined by the appro- 
priate regulatory bodies — Alberta may 
enjoy further supplies of natural gas 
which are surplus to provincial and 
Canadian needs. 



The United States could use that gas, 
if it were available, to give time for our 
measures to cut gas consumption and to 
increase gas production to take effect. 
We have a common interest in seeing 
that the pipeline is financed and built 
on schedule, and the swap-back provi- 
sion would protect the Canadian energy 
position as needed. This afternoon I 
hope to discuss this question with Pre- 
mier Lougheed [Peter Lougheed, Pre- 
mier of Alberta]. 

We can also join forces in a general 
effort to insure the growth and prosper- 
ity of our economies. Full employment 
here would create thousands of new 
jobs in the United States, and full 
employment in the States would create 
thousands of new jobs here. Because 
our prosperity is so linked, Prime 
Minister Trudeau and I have agreed 
that our senior economic officials will 
meet in March to begin a process of in- 
tensified consultations on economic 
problems facing both countries. 

We can work together for growth 
and progress. We sell each other $55 
billion worth of goods and services 
every year. Thus, consumers in both 
countries will benefit from lower 
prices. We understand that far more 
than internal domestic progress, it is in- 
ternational trade which has fueled the 
world's economy in the last 30 years. 
We understand that tariff barriers can 
only foster more deficits and more in- 
flation and more unemployment. And 
we are pledged to resist, with all our 
powers, retrenchment to protectionism. 
That is the spirit which our nations 
must take to the latest round of mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. 
Canada and the United States are lead- 
ers in both the nontariff and tariff- 
cutting sessions, and we should stand 
together in pursuit of freer trade 
throughout the world. We can set the 
standard for that effort with serious 
bilateral discussions about our own 
trading relationship. 

When offers are placed on the table 
in Geneva this week, the United States 
will propose substantial cuts on prod- 
ucts of interest to Canada. We hope 
that Canada and other countries will re- 
ciprocate by offering formula cuts, so 
we can maintain our proposal during 
the course of negotiations and reduce 
tariffs on the dutiable items which 
cross our border every day. 

We can do that in the context of mul- 
tilateral discussions in which we both 
have vital interests; for example, ef- 
forts to develop an international prod- 
ucts standards code and an equitable 
and universal system for responding to 
the unfair practices of export subsidy 
and favoritism in government procure- 
ment. We stand together on those 



Department of State Bulli 

issues — in opposition to any pc; 
which gives any business or natioj 
unfair trading advantage. 

The United States also stands 
Canada — not only at Geneva but al 
the International Wheat Counci 
London — in support of greater aci? 
to world grain markets. This Prov 
has a special interest in those eff i 
As the world's foremost grain exp 
ters, our two countries are workir 
London to achieve trade liberalizai 
price stability, and food security, ji 
will bring more certainty and grow 
our markets while better assuring 
able grain supplies to importe 
especially the developing coun 
which need that grain the most. 

Even as we work to liberalize i 
vailing trading practices in industry 
agriculture, we must continue to aVi 
other means for insuring the int< 
economic strength of our tra« 
partners. In all of these endeavors;;: 
key to our success is not only the': 
work of our leaders or the rightne. 
their positions; it is just as mud 
spirit of friendship and commonii 
pose which motivates our effjj 
Every time we reach agreement, k 
time we effect a solution, we are; 
claiming the strength and success ( 
dustrial democracy. And we are ra 
the foundations of a stable and sjj 
world order — a system of intellige; 
teraction between nations which ; 
best hope we have for a truly lal 
peace. 

In economic cooperation amonj 
tions, and in our life together on 
continent, we are friends and part 
We look to the problems we face a 
common agenda for the months 
years ahead. We've made good ] 
ress in preserving the beauty of om 
vironment. Now we must complet 
Great Lakes cleanup and mate! 
concern for rivers and lakes with 
grams that deal with air polk' 
across our common border. 

Both countries want to resolve 
ferences in the administration o 
auto pact, even as both recogni; 
over-all success. Our trade in auto 
parts rose from $1 billion in 19i; 
$17 billion in 1976. 

And because we value greatly 1 
vigorous two-way trade in agricu 
products, it is important that w< 
dress promptly and directly pro!' 
which may arise in this trade, su< 
we have seen in beef and cattle. 

The Prime Minister and I 1" 
therefore, agreed that Secretary o> 
riculture Bob Bergland should' 
very soon with his Canadian colic 
to consult on the steps require 
mutually satisfactory answers. 
These are all important probr 



i 1978 

demand our careful attention, and 
vill receive it. But if these prob- 
constitute the most pressing dif- 
es between us, then we are doing 
veil indeed. 

in Rights 

■ cooperation makes us better able 
ve the cause of human rights and 
ess throughout the world. The 
ims we are blessed with compel 
raise our voices against tyranny 
ppression wherever we see them, 
re blessed also with matchless 
n and material resources; that 
ts and demands of us that we join 
truggle against poverty and 
ssness wherever they exist, 
are joined in a new dedication to 
ig our southern neighbors im- 
the quality of their lives. Cana- 
sfforts to assist in Caribbean 
pment have been a model of hu- 
irian commitment for every na- 
They are matched by broader 
ian participation in multilateral 
: — not only in the Caribbean but 
;hout Latin America — to provide 
chnical and material assistance 
can advance hope and progress, 
country's recent participation in 
msultative group for the Carib- 
vas an important contribution to 
iter-American effort, and it sig- 
new era of productive participa- 
i Latin America. 

have also worked together to de- 
freedom and pursue peace 
hout the world. We have cooper- 
1 efforts to diminish tensions be- 
nations and to reduce transfers of 
which may deepen tension and 
ct. We have worked for inde- 
ice and free elections in Namibia 
o promote peaceful change 
hout southern Africa. We have 
d to keep alive the North-South 
?ue begun in Paris — so ably 
A for the North by Deputy Prime 
ter Allan MacEachen — and the 
to bridge the gap between rich 
s and poor. 

dl of these endeavors, we are 
f by a common and overriding 
itment to the human rights and 
i dignity of the people of every 
• We have come to view our rela- 
ip with other countries — in trade 
"ms negotiations and in interna- 
forums — not only in our own 
terest but also in response to the 
n of those countries for the needs 
ghts of their own people, 
both countries, that posture is 
tural legacy of common tradition 
suit of human rights that is liter- 
nparalleled in human history. 
» the American people, that leg- 



acy is the root of our close bonds to 
Canadians. 

President Carter pointed out the 
striking results of a recent Gallup poll 
which asked Americans to list the na- 
tions for which they had the greatest af- 
fection and respect. As might be ex- 
pected, 95% named their own country 
first. But 91% named Canada next, and 
that overwhelming sentiment is the 
product of more than geographic prox- 
imity or economic interdependence. 

The American people see in Canada 
one of the great successes in constitu- 
tional democracy. They have seen a na- 
tion which, for 30 years, has refused to 
use its wealth and technology for build- 
ing nuclear weapons but instead has 
participated in every U.N. peacekeep- 
ing operation since World War II. They 
have seen your nation devote a great 
percentage of its gross national product 
to aiding Third World countries. And 
they have seen your borders opened to 
the homeless and the dissident from 
every corner of the globe, most re- 
cently to refugees from the tragic war 
in Vietnam. 

The American people have been 
touched by the willingness of your 
country to export precious natural gas 
during our severest winter shortages. 
Thousands have been deeply touched 
by your Bicentennial gift to our 
nation — the pictorial representation of 
our peoples and our common land, 
"Between Friends/Entre Amis." And 
we have felt the closest bonds of 
friendship in watching a proud and free 
nation striving to maintain its pledge to 
honor cultural and individual 
diversity — in the face of disagreements 
which diversity necessarily entails. 

Prime Minister Trudeau has said that 
Canada stands today on the threshold 
of greatness. By the measure of what 
the American people have felt and seen 
in their neighbor, that is a modest ap- 
praisal. By the measures of wisdom 
and humanity and love of freedom, 
there is no greater nation on Earth. We 
are proud to be your friend and partner. 



MEXICO 2 

For the United States and Mexico, 
the principle of mutual respect is the 
basis of our relations. We have learned 
that power and wealth do not confer a 
monopoly on wisdom. And we have 
learned that our common hopes and 
plans as neighbors are far stronger than 
our differences. 

Our countries share a peaceful bor- 
der of nearly 2,000 miles. Trade across 
that border is of enormous economic 
importance to both countries. There is 
a daily stream of tourists and travelers 



11 



both ways. Students and researchers 
share the resources of our great univer- 
sities. We share common roots as the 
children of revolution and because 16 
million Spanish-speaking citizens live 
in the United States. Most of all, we 
share a common commitment to the in- 
dividual freedom and dignity of all our 
citizens. 

For the first time in a quarter of a 
century, the peoples of Mexico and the 
United States have elected new Presi- 
dents at the same moment in their his- 
tory. That event is symbolic of a fresh 
start in our relationship. 

The meeting between our two Presi- 
dents [February 1977] signaled far 
more than the courtesies of acquaint- 
ance. It reflected just as much the high 
priority which President Carter attaches 
to America's relationship with its 
southern neighbor and his deep respect 
and admiration for the extraordinary 
public servant whom the people of 
Mexico have chosen as their leader. 

I was privileged a year ago to intro- 
duce President Lopez Portillo to ad- 
dress the Congress of the United 
States. He said then that his mission to 
my country was to "seek understand- 
ing, balance, and respect" in the rela- 
tionship between the United States and 
Mexico. This has been the basis for a 
year of unparalleled accomplishment 
between our two countries — a year in 
which equal partnership became the 
guiding spirit of our future growth and 
progress. 

We pursue such a course because it 
is right. But we also believe, with 
equal conviction, that the best hope we 
have for progress and peace is not the 
domination of one country by another 
but rather sovereign nations pursuing 
common goals. 



Tangible Accomplishments 

My journey to Mexico City seems 
very short in comparison with the dis- 
tance we have traveled together in only 
12 months. 

When President Lopez Portillo re- 
turned from Washington after his visit 
last year, he took with him the respect 
and affection of an American Presi- 
dent. The closeness which has quickly 
grown between our President's family 
and yours is a symbol of the deeper, 
more balanced and mature relationship 
that has developed between Mexico and 
the United States. 

This new spirit by itself would have 
been an important achievement. But we 
have put it to work. We have taken a 
number of concrete bilateral steps to 
improve our relations further. 

• President Carter and President 



9 

IB •' 

A 

.J 



12 

Lopez Portillo at their meeting a year 
ago set up a consultative mechanism to 
consider our common problems in 
trade, investment, energy and miner- 
als, tourism, and social problems. It is 
a vital functioning instrument. 

• In 1977 we signed a tropical prod- 
ucts agreement, an important precedent 
for the world trading system. It com- 
bines for the first time in practice the 
twin objectives of trade reciprocity 
with the need for special consideration 
for developing countries. By this 
agreement, we will cut tariffs on items 
of special interest to Mexico — like 
fruits, fiber, and vegetables — which 
represent $63 million in Mexican ex- 
ports to the United States and $36 mil- 
lion in your imports from the United 
States. That action signals our mutual 
dedication to freer trade throughout the 
world. It will serve as a model for both 
industrialized and developing countries 
as we pursue the multilateral trade 
negotiations in Geneva. 

• In 1977 we also ratified and im- 
plemented an exchange of sanctions 
treaty — a unique humanitarian agree- 
ment for permitting Americans impris- 
oned in Mexico and Mexicans impris- 
oned in the United States to serve the 
remainder of their sentences in their 
own countries. The first transfer during 
Christmas was a poignant moment 
which both our people will long re- 
member. Like our trade agreements, it 
has served as a model for agreements 
with other nations. 

• In 1977 we concluded a civil avia- 
tion agreement to enable the airlines of 
both countries to expand their services 
and thereby increase and enhance the 
interchange between our peoples. It 
represents the greatest expansion of air 
services ever undertaken by two na- 
tions. The agreement is symbolic of the 
larger effort to expand the interaction 
and deepen the friendship between us. I 
was proud to sign it today on behalf of 
the United States. 

• Tourism helps bring our nations 
together. And we appreciate its eco- 
nomic importance to Mexico. We are 
raising the ceiling of duty-free entry of 
goods that an American may bring 
from other nations to the United States 
from $100 to $250 per month. Addi- 
tionally, President Carter's tax reform 
proposals will contain provisions that 
should ease Mexican concerns over our 
foreign convention tax regulations. 

• In 1977 we enacted a new 
fisheries agreement, creating clear 
rules for managing our fishing 
resources. 

• And in 1977, we increased and 
improved our cooperative efforts to at- 
tack the illicit flow of narcotics across 
our border. We share a great interest in 



the swift and complete eradication of 
this poison. The American people are 
grateful for the massive commitment of 
human and material resources to that 
effort by the Mexican Government. 
Our senior officials continue to discuss 
new programs to use new and promis- 
ing technologies for eliminating this 
source of so much misery. 

In only one year, together we have 
built a remarkable record of accom- 
plishment. My purpose in coming to 
Mexico, as we enter the second year of 
our two Administrations, is to em- 
phasize the importance of our continu- 
ing together the course which we have 
taken so productively. 



Future Agenda 

We still have before us a full 
agenda — one which will challenge our 
wisdom, talents, and determination. 
We must each find ways to create more 
jobs. Smuggling of narcotics and other 
goods must be stopped. Obstacles to 
mutually beneficial trade and invest- 
ment must be reduced. Improved coop- 
eration is the only path to achieve these 
goals. 

Not only cooperation but candor and 
understanding must be brought to all 
our tasks. In this spirit, I want to dis- 
cuss the problem of undocumented 
workers — people who enter the United 
States to seek employment without 
visas or proper documentation. 

Undocumented Workers. Every 
government has a responsibility to its 
citizens to regulate the entrance of 
people as well as goods. That is what 
we are trying to do. The citizens of my 
country want our laws on entry en- 
forced; this is the responsibility of any 
American Government. But we want to 
do this without creating problems for 
Mexico. 

We recognize the many dimensions 
of the problem, and we are prepared to 
work with you to address them. For our 
part, the President has proposed a 
comprehensive program regarding un- 
documented workers presently living in 
the United States and the flow of new 
workers. 

The program begins by recognizing 
that the human rights of the un- 
documented workers already in the 
United States must be protected. There- 
fore, the proposal would grant legal 
status to all who arrived before January 
1 5 1977 — permitting them to work and 
live without fear of arrest. Those who 
have been in the United States since 
before 1970 will be able to apply for 
permanent resident status and eventual 
citizenship. Those who arrived between 
1970 and January 1 , 1977, will be enti- 



Department of State Bu 

tied to a 5-year temporary resi: 
status. There will be no massive d« 
tations or roundups. 

In addition, the Carter Adman) 
tion is supporting legislation w; 
would increase the immigration <jl 
between Mexico and Canada to 50 
per year. Since Canada has so few 
migrants to the United States, thj 
feet of this legislation would be at 
stantial increase in Mexico's arj 
legal immigration to the United St; 
The proposal also recognizes I 
employers in our country who emj 
age undocumented workers are a si 
of the problem. The President's 
gram imposes civil sanctions ag) 
such employers and also increase 
number of personnel who patro 
border. 

At the same time, we understan 
reasons for the flow of undocum 
workers to the United States. W ; 
willing to help Mexico as it desij 
obtaining support for its efforts tl 
velop its economy. The stoi 
Mexico's postwar economic progr 
very impressive. In the three de' 
since Franklin Roosevelt visited i 
terey, you've made great strid' 
producing goods and services and 
ing per capita income. That pre! 
took place within a democ; 
framework, creating a model fc; 
veloping nations in every corner j 
globe. 

On behalf of President Carter, 1 
informed President Lopez Portilh 
the United States is ready and ea; 
do all it can, including support f< 
panded efforts by the World Ban 
the Inter-American Development 
to increase rural development eff( 
Mexico. These institutions hav 
sured us that they are prepared i 
pand significantly their efforts ii 
with Mexico's commitment to 
these problems as a matter of the 
est priority. 

The challenges of economi 
velopment, social justice, and 1 
rights that we face in our two coi 
also confront the other nations < 
hemisphere and the international 
munity. The United States and N 
must work together and with oth 
meet these challenges. 

North American Community 
opportunity to visit America's i 
neighbors this week has shown rr 
idly how much we have in con 
and how much our countries a 
coming increasingly interdepei 
We occupy a continent rich in i 
and human resources. We share 
tic and Pacific interests, as w 
interests in the Caribbean. We s 
common belief in human rign 
political democracy. 



ti 1978 

tile this interdependence offers 
benefits, it also imposes great re- 
ibilities. The economies and the 
ies of Mexico, Canada, and the 
:d States have become so in- 
ned that developments in one part 
e continent have direct and im- 
ite repercussions in others. This 
if life compels us to carefully as- 
the consequences of our actions 

> search continually for new forms 
operation. We can do that by con- 
g closely with each other. 

)bal Problems. We must not 
that our common problems have 
spect for national or even conti- 
1 boundaries. They confront us 
ly as members of the world com- 
y. As the citizens of representa- 
lemocracies, our nations have a 
d responsibility to the life and 
>f this planet. We can fulfill that 
nsibility by the power of our 
)le here at home and by the wis- 
and determination of our mutual 

> in the world of nations. 

er the Cuban missile crisis in 
Mexico took the initiative in 
ating a treaty at Tlatelolco to ban 
ir weapons from Latin America, 
[ay 26, in the presence of your 
;n Minister Santiago Roel, Presi- 
Zarter signed Protocol I of that 
, pledging the United States not 
ploy nuclear weapons in Latin 
ica. We hope to work closely 
ou next year to insure the speedy 
:mentation of the treaty of 
olco and to make Latin America 
rst nuclear weapons-free zone in 
)rld. 

are also strongly committed to 
g the proliferation of nuclear 
>ns capabilities and to restraining 
ternational sale of conventional 
The U.N. Special Session on 
nament will offer us an opportu- 

> pursue that objective together, 
support the dialogue between the 
rialized and the developing coun- 
nd the effort to make the interna- 
economic system more equitable 
st. We welcome the leadership of 
:o as we work toward specific 
res which build upon the respon- 
y we all share for the effective 
;ement of the world economy. 

t December, our two countries 
with 28 others and 15 interna- 
institutions in a multilateral ef- 
' help develop the nations of the 
>ean and to increase cooperation 
en the island nations of the 
>ean and their neighbors. This is 
r area in which we are eager to 
with you. 

Presidents have committed 
o and the United States to pursue 
use of human rights wherever we 



encounter tyranny and oppression. For 
too many people, the promise of human 
destiny is dwarfed by the reality of sub- 
jugation. Our nations have worked to- 
gether to proclaim their unyielding op- 
position to any governmental policy 
which would suppress or enslave the 
human spirit. The important resolutions 
passed by the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States and 
the strengthening of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights bear 
concrete testimony to that cooperation. 
We must continue to work together to 
insure that 1978 will be not only the 
year that Tlatelolco is implemented but 
also the year when the American Con- 
vention on Human Rights becomes a 
working reality. 

We must also continue to define our 
relationship with other countries — in 
trade, in arms negotiations, and in the 
world community in general — not only 
in terms of self-interest but in response 



13 



to the concern of those countries for the 
needs and rights of their own people. 

We have taken great strides in the 
past year. We have coupled new re- 
spect for our individual sovereignty 
with concrete progress in solving 
mutual problems. In the process, we 
have strengthened the fabric of a work- 
ing, cooperative partnership. We wel- 
come that partnership, the respon- 
sibilities it imposes, and the benefits it 
offers for our separate destinies as na- 
tions and for our common future as 
friends and neighbors. Together, we 
will make that future more prosperous 
and more hopeful for the peoples of 
both our lands. □ 



1 Address at a luncheon at the Edmonton 
Plaza Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta, on Jan. 18, 
1978 (opening paragraphs omitted). 

2 Address at a luncheon at the Hotel Pres- 
idente Chapultepec in Mexico City on Jan. 20, 
1978 (opening paragraphs omitted). 



THE SECRETARY: 

News Conference, February 10 



Q. Prime Minister Begin said in 
Geneva the other day that the United 
States' supplying arms to Egypt 
would be a negative development. 
Would you agree with that? 

A. I think that the question of arms 
sales in the area is a very complicated 
one. As you know from the outset, we 
have applied certain criteria with re- 
spect to the approval of arms sales. 
Those criteria I have outlined to you 
many times, and we will continue to 
apply those criteria in connection with 
the requests for arms sales which have 
been made to us at this time by the var- 
ious parties. We have not yet reached a 
final decision on what we are going to 
do. We will be doing so shortly, and 
this will be announced by the President 
when those decisions are made. 

Insofar as the specific question you 
asked is concerned, I think that if the 
criteria which we have been applying 
all along are applied, then it is possible 
to make arms sales which are not dis- 
ruptive. 

Q. As President Sadat left, the 
United States put out a statement 
reaffirming its commitment to Is- 
rael's security, also reading [U.N. 
Resolution] 242 as requiring with- 
drawal of Israeli military forces from 
what some people refer to as oc- 
cupied Arab lands. I wondered if 
such a withdrawal does, indeed, 
tamper with or decrease Israel's se- 



curity, and I also wonder if arms 
sales to Egypt would square with the 
American commitment to Israel's se- 
curity? 

A. With respect to the question of 
withdrawals from occupied territories, 
242 is the basic document under which 
all of the parties have agreed that the 
negotiations for a Middle East settle- 
ment should be conducted. [Re- 
solution] 242 refers to, specifically, 
withdrawal from occupied territories, 
and "occupied territories" includes all 
fronts involved in the 1967 conflict. 

Insofar as security matters are con- 
cerned, I believe that they can be taken 
care of within the framework of 242 
and within the framework of with- 
drawal from occupied territories. . 

As to your second question, as I in- 
dicated a moment ago, I believe that 
arms sales to the various parties have to 
be taken a look at in the overall balance 
in the region and that, therefore, the 
decision whether or not to make a par- 
ticular arms sale, including that to 
Egypt, has to be looked at from the 
overall standpoint. 

Q. Are there any conditions under 
which the United States would con- 
sider supplying arms to Somalia — for 
example, if there were to be a major 
counteroffensive not solely against 
the Ogaden but against Somalia it- 
self? 

A. Let me respond by giving you a 



»-; 

4 



14 



broader answer to your question. 

We are concerned with the increas- 
ing conflict in the Ogaden. It continues 
toaccelerate in pace and in the number 
of arms which are moving into the 
area. We believe that there should be a 
negotiated settlement of this problem; 
we believe that there should be a 
cease-fire; we believe that there should 
be a withdrawal of the Somali forces 
from the Ogaden; and in return, we be- 
lieve that there should be a withdrawal 
of Soviet and Cuban forces from 
Ethiopia. We believe it is fundamental 
that there be a recognition and a respect 
by all parties for the internationally 
recognized borders, and we also be- 
lieve that there should be agreement in 
principle and negotiations looking to 
the solution in the future of the prob- 
lem of the Ogaden. 

We will continue our present course 



of action with respect to not supplying 
arms to either side. Let me say, if there 
were a crossing of borders, that would 
present a new and different situation, 
and we would have to consider it at that 
time. 

Q. There is a wire report today 
that the Western allies have agreed 
that if there is a crossing of the bor- 
der, that there will be Western arms 
supplied, including American arms, 
to Somalia. Is there any such agree- 
ment? 

A. What I would say on that is — and 
I think that is what was said in the arti- 
cle as I glanced at it before I came 
down here — that this would present a 
different situation, and it would have to 
be considered under the circumstances 
that existed at that time. 

Q. The Administration has said 
frequently that it is committed to the 



Department of State Bull* 

territorial integrity of Lebanon j 
supports the building of the Leban 
army. What is the present Ameri 
role right now in the Lebanese c 
flict between the Syrian troops 
the Lebanese troops? 

A. The American role in Lebano 
that we continue to support the G 
ernment of Lebanon. We support 
territorial integrity. We support its 
dependence. We are continuing to 
sist in the supplying of arms for 
building of a Lebanese army. That ] 
gram continues as it was outlined 
discussed with the Lebanese authori 
at that time, and the plans are to c 
tinue along those same guidelines. 

Q. The Syrians entered Leban 
The United States accepted the i 
ians as a peacekeeping force 
Lebanon, and right now they h 
violated that truce. 



TELEVISION INTERVIEW 

Secretary Vance added the following 
comments on the Middle East when he was 
interviewed on television by news corre- 
spondents Robert MacNeil and James 
LehrerofPBS on February 14, 1978. 



Q. The Carter Administration today 
appeared to bow a little to the personal 
diplomacy of President Sadat and agreed 
to sell Egypt some of the jet fighters he 
wants, but the United States refused to 
supply Sadat with the most advanced 
fighters that it sells to Israel. 

In his recent visit to Washington, the 
Egyptian leader argued strongly that 
sophisticated U.S. arms supplies made Is- 
rael inflexible in the current peace negotia- 
tions. Egypt needed the same weapons to 
create a better balance. Specifically, Sadat 
asked for F-5's, a fighter supplied to some 
25 foreign countries but not used by the 
U.S. Air Force. 

The State Department said today that 
we would sell Egypt the F-5's but not the 
more advanced planes Sadat also wanted, 
the F-15 and F-16, both of which we 
agreed to supply to Israel. 

However, the aircraft decision marks a 
significant change of American policy to 
Egypt just when relations with Israel have 
soured somewhat. Why was the decision 
made to sell planes to Egypt? 

A. We had outstanding for a long while 
requests for sales of aircraft from Israel, 
Egypt, and from Saudi Arabia. Some of these 
went back as far as a year or two in the past. 



We determined that we should deal with 
these issues, make a decision, and, move 
forward in this particular area. In doing so 
we took a look at three basic factors. 

• First, would these be conducive to the 
continuation of and progress in the peace 
negotiations? 

• Secondly, would they be consistent with 
the security requirements of the various 
countries? 

• Thirdly, would they be consistent with 
the basic military balance within the Middle 
East or would they change that balance? 

After a very careful examination of all 
these factors we came up with a package 
today which was approved by the President 
which we think meets all of these various re- 
quirements. Indeed, we believe that rather 
than hindering the negotiations, the decisions 
which have been made today will foster and 
be supportive of them. 

Q. Was Israel informed of the Egypt 
decision before it was announced publicly? 

A. Yes, it was. 

Q. At a high level of communication? 

A. We informed each of the governments 
last night. 

Q. What was the reaction from Israel to 
the Egypt decision? 

A. As one might expect, the Israelis were 
unhappy about that decision. They have, as 
far as I know, made no public statement on 
that, but they have made no bones in advance 

when there was rumor that this decision 

might be forthcoming— that they did not like 

it. 

Q. I notice that an Israeli official 
testified this morning in Congress after the 



decision was known and said that: 
sale to Egypt would be a radical and a; 
significant destabilizing factor to the 
die East military situation." 

A. 1 completely disagree wtih that cq 
sion. I don't think it is a radically dest^ 
ing element. 

One has to take a look at the situation 
the standpoint of the Egyptians. The 
tians made a decision 2 years or more 1 
which they decided that they were goi 
take a certain course of action with resp 
the Middle East and negotiations in the 
die East and as a result of that they losi 
principal arms supplier, which was the ! 
Union. Since then they have had to re 
the West for their requirements. 

Q. In these preliminary commu 
tions, as you say, Israel was toll 
forehand that these planes were goi 
be sold to Egypt. Were you told— w: 
United States told then that, hey, loo 
don't like it and there are going to b« 
lie statements made? In other word 
they going to make a big deal about i 
A. We were told that they were un 
about this and would not like it and w 
told by the Egyptians that they were ve 
happy that they wouldn't be getting 
thing that they were asking for. So, 1 
there is a little bit of unhappiness ot 
side, but we think the decisions are 
decisions. 

Q. Why is Egypt not getting th 
vanced fighters that are going to 
Arabia and Israel? What is the lo 
that difference? 

A. We believe that they do not r 
these for their defense requirements. \ 



:h 1978 



15 



The situation in Lebanon is, in- 
, a very difficult and troublesome 
at this point. Fighting has broken 
again in the north as well as 
idic fighting in the south. It is a 
;r which we are watching with the 
est of care and caution. We are in 
: touch with the parties involved 
ire continuing to provide the kind 
rvices that we have in the past — 
ing with the various parties trying 
Ip in damping down the conflict. 

Could you tell us, please, how 
y Cuban and Soviet military ad- 
s are now in Ethiopia, the extent 
eir involvement actually in com- 

and what effect would this 
•ening Soviet and Cuban in- 
intent have upon the develop- 

of America's relationship with 
of those countries? 

You've asked me three questions. 



Let me go one-by-one on the various 
questions. 

I guess your first question was, how 
many Cuban and Soviet military per- 
sonnel or advisers are there in 
Ethiopia? The best estimates which we 
have at the present time are that there 
are approximately 800-1,000 Soviet 
military adviser-types in the area. 
There are approximately 3,000 Cubans, 
of which approximately 2,000 are ac- 
tually involved in combat at this time, 
and we believe that there are further 
Cubans on their way to Ethiopia. 

Q. How deep are they involved in 
combat, what kind of combat roles 
are they performing? 

A. It is our best information that the 
Cubans have been flying aircraft and, 
indeed, have been involved in other 
ground activities as well as the flying 
of planes. 



Q. What effect does all of this 
have — the apparently deeper Soviet 
and Cuban involvement have — on the 
relationship the United States seeks 
with both of these countries? 

A. This, obviously, cannot help but 
have an effect upon the relationship be- 
tween our countries. It affects the polit- 
ical atmosphere between the United 
States and those two countries. It is a 
matter which we will, obviously, keep 
in mind as we proceed with the talks on 
the Indian Ocean, because what seems 
to be happening there is inconsistent 
with a limitation of forces in the area, 
which is what we are seeking insofar as 
the Indian Ocean talks are concerned. 
We will continue with those talks, but 
obviously it affects the political atmos- 
phere in which those talks are carried 
forward. 

Q. When the United States express- 



ihat the F-5's will meet their defense 
;ments and will not upset the military 
e in the area. 

Could you describe that military 
ce in a little more detail? I mean how 
: not upset the balance to have Egypt 
a rather obsolete air force and 
ied with a plane that President Sadat 
If described as a tenth-rate plane, 
■5E, when he was here in an inter- 
Why would it not upset the balance 
ve its neighbors with much more 
sticated planes? 

Well, insofar as Egypt is concerned, it 
las a number of the more advanced 
ircraft. It has been short of spare parts, 
is making some steps now to develop 
n capability, providing substitute spare 
for those which it does not have, 
ddition to that, the F-5 is really a very 
aircraft. It is really not a tenth-rate air- 
It is one of the best short-range light 
rs that exists, and I think that it will fill 
ovide what is needed for the Egyptian 
fense capability. 

If it is such a good aircraft, why 
't our Air Force use it? 

Our Air Force has different require- 
There are many, many other nations 
i the world who do use it and think 
very highly of it. 

Why are we giving the Saudis 60 
i which is regarded, I think, as the 
»dvanced fighter in the world? 

About 3 years ago a study was made of 
defense requirements, including their 
uirements, and it was concluded at that 
that because of the fact that their 



Lightning aircraft which they had gotten 
from Great Britain were becoming outmoded, 
that they would require an advanced intercep- 
tor in the future. 

Subsequently, they came to the United States 
and examined the various possibilities. In 
addition to that a team was sent, I think in 
1976, to Saudi Arabia to take a look at the 
situation there and then they were offered 
their choice among the various interceptor - 
type fighter aircraft. They at that time indi- 
cated they wanted the F-15's, and since then 
they have stuck to that conclusion. 

Sixty aircraft is not a great number of air- 
craft for that country and the threat which it 
potentially faces. It is a large country in 
terms of area. It has very important resources 
within its country. It has a small army. And 
yet it faces from certain of its radical 
neighbors a potential threat. 

Q. As I said at the beginning of the pro- 
gram, Mr. Sadat made the argument when 
he was here both in Congress and re- 
portedly also in his talks with you and the 
President that because Israel got such 
sophisticated weapons it helped Israel to 
be inflexible in these negotiations, and he 
needed to balance that out with some more 
sophisticated arms. Do you buy that 
argument? 

A. No. I really do not buy that argument 
because I believe that providing it with the 
arms which are necessary to give it the capa- 
bility to protect its own security gives it 
self-confidence rather than giving it an over- 
confidence which prohibits progress in 
negotiation. 

Q. Should we regard this decision to sell 
the F-5's to Egypt as a symbolic decision to 



show our support for Mr. Sadat's diplo- 
matic initiatives? 

A. I think it is more than that. I think it 
also does meet a genuine requriement which 
the Egyptians have in terms of their military 
requirement. 

O- Now, all this comes, as you know, at 
a time when Israel is already accusing you 
and the Administration of taking sides on 
the Israeli settlements and the Sinai issue 
and was triggered — I don't have to tell you 
this, of course — it was triggered by your 
statement Friday where you said: "... 
these settlements are contrary to interna- 
tional law and that, therefore, they should 
not exist." That is your position; is that 
correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. AH right. Why are they contrary to 
international law? How are they, I should 
say? 

A. The Geneva Convention, the so-called 
Fourth Geneva Convention, considered this 
question and concluded that the creation of 
settlements in occupied territory was contrary 
to international law because it was occupied 
territory and that is generally recognized in- 
ternational law. 

Q. And there is no question about that? 

A. There is no question about that. 

Q. All right, when you say "should not 
exist," what do you mean by that? 

A. What I mean is if something is illegal, 
then it follows that they should not exist. But 
I went on to point out what was going to be 
done about this was a matter for the parties to 
work out. 



Press release 76 of Feb. 14, 1978. 



m 



•si 

I 



16 

es concern, as it did the other day in 
the communique from the White 
House over Israeli settlement activ- 
ity, does this mean literally that you 
want to see the bulldozers halted in 
the Sinai settlements and the 
amateur archeologists sent home 
from Shiloh? 

A. We believe that the settlement ac- 
tivity, including the construction and 
the new activities that are concerned, 
does create an obstacle to peace, and 
we believe that peace will be fostered if 
this is stopped. 

Q. And likewise, should the ar- 
cheologists be sent home from 
Shiloh, in your view? 

A. If, indeed, this is merely ar- 
cheological, that would be one thing. It 
is not clear that that is the case. 

Q. After your talks with Mr. 
Sadat, are you now in a position, as 
the mediator in the Middle East dis- 
pute, to tell the Israelis that further 
settlement activity could cause a 
breakdown in the peace talks? 

A. I don't want to characterize it in 
the terms which you have set forth. Let 
me say again, however, that I do be- 
lieve it creates an obstacle to peace and 
that this must be faced up to and dealt 
with in order to make progress in the 
talks. 

Q. On the Ogaden, in your discus- 
sions with the Soviets, have you re- 
ceived any assurances that they do 
not have any intention of supporting 
an Ethiopian drive beyond the bor- 
ders of Ethiopia? 

And secondly, do you limit the 
area in which you think Soviet- 
American relationships might be af- 
fected, by their conduct in Africa, to 
the Indian Ocean talks? 

A. We have received assurances that 
the Ethiopians would not cross beyond 
the border of Ethiopia into Somalia, 
and I hope and expect that that will be 
carried out. 

Secondly, with respect to the impact 
of what is happening there on the over- 
all relationship between the Soviet 
Union and ourselves, I am not suggest- 
ing any direct linkage, but I do suggest 
it affects the political atmosphere in 
which these discussions take place. 

Q. For most of this week the Ad- 
ministration has been giving brief- 
ings to members of the American 
Jewish community, to Members of 
Congress who are known to be sym- 
pathetic to Israel's cause. 

What is it you would like these 
people to say to Mr. Begin? Or what 
will you be saying to Mr. Begin in 
coming weeks? What is it that Israel 
could do particularly to contribute to 
the peace efforts? 



On the Sinai, for instance, would 
you like Israel to agree that the set- 
tlements would be disbanded over a 
period of time? On the West Bank, 
what is it that the Administration is 
looking for? 

A. We have been talking to various 
Members of Congress and various indi- 
viduals here in the United States to 
bring them up to date on what has 
taken place during the talks with Presi- 
dent Sadat so that they can understand 
the actual condition of the negotiations 
at this point and the obstacles and prob- 
lems that remain, in order to make con- 
tinuing progress in the talks. 

We are pleased that as a result of the 
talks which we had with President 
Sadat when he was here, he has said 
that he will persevere in the talks and 
that he remains committed to peace and 
that the door to peace remains open. 

In our discussions with the 
Israelis— and I shall be meeting with 
Foreign Minister Dayan on the 16th 
when he will be here in 
Washington— we will be talking about 
the discussions which we have had with 
President Sadat and what we believe, 
in light of those discussions, are the 
key points that have to be dealt with. 
They, clearly, are two in number: One 
is the question of settlements, and the 
other is the question of West Bank- 
Gaza and the intertwined Palestinian 
question. 

What we will try and do is see if 
we cannot, in our discussions between 
them and ourselves, find ways of bridg- 
ing the differences, because these two 
problems must be overcome if we are 
going to make any real progress in the 
negotiations. I think it is possible to 
make progress in these areas and that is 
the reason why we are sending Roy 
Atherton [Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., As- 
sistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs] back to the Mid- 
dle East, following Mr. Dayan 's visit 
here, so that he can pick up our mediat- 
ing role in an active way, moving be- 
tween the various capitals. 

Q. After you have discussed this, 
as you said, with people who aren't 
normally having classified clear- 
ances, could you share it a bit 
broadly with more people? 

And specifically, would the United 
States like Israel to agree on the 
Sinai settlements, to agree to closing 
them down over a period of time? 

And on the West Bank, where do 
you stand, particularly on the 
American formula for a temporary 
internationalization of the area — I 
gather over 5 years — and do you still 
propose some kind of referendum of 
that at the ending of that period? 



Department of State Bull 

A. First, with respect to the S, 
settlements, we have said that we 
lieve that all of these settlements 
contrary to international law and t 
therefore, they should not exist. I tl 
our position, therefore, is quite c 
with respect to that. This, howevei 
a problem that has to be resolved by 
parties. They are going to hav( 
negotiate it themselves. 

Secondly, with respect to the \ 
Bank, we have indicated previo 
that we believe that there should 1 
homeland for the Palestinians and 
it should be linked with Jordan. 

We have suggested to the parties 
their consideration the possibility o 
interim arrangement covering a pe 
of years in which the parties w< 
have a chance to work out all of 
very complicated and intricate de 
which would be involved in a \ 
Bank-Gaza-Palestinian settlement, 
we still believe that a formula of 
type is one which should receive 1 
most careful and serious consider^ 
by the parties. 

Q. Just about a year ago, j 
Ambassador to the United Nat 
referred to Cuban troops in AfriC 
being a stabilizing influence. I \ 
der if you could explain to us wb 
is that has happened over the 
few months that has caused 
United States now to so drasti* 
change its attitude? 

A. When we first started talkir 
the Cubans last year, we indicate 
them that we hoped that it migh 
possible to move forward in a meas 
way toward an improvement of 
tions between our two countries, 
indicated, however, that there ' 
certain problem areas that existed 
tween us that had to be discussed, 
of those problem areas was the ] 
ence, and the increasing presence 
Cuban forces in Africa. 

We expressed the hope at that 
that this would change because w< 
that this was not conducive to brir 
about peaceful conditions in the ai 
Since that time we have been d 
pointed in what we have seen. R 
than a decrease of forces, whicl 
think would have been helpful 
leading toward peace in the area, 
has been an increase in forces, 
consequence of this, we think tha 
situation has been further complic 
We are not suggesting this be< 
we want to see the Cubans make 
concession to us. What we are se< 
is an action which will be helpf 
leading to peace in the area rathet 
fueling the conflagration. 

Q. Former Secretary Kissi 
opposed the U.S. troop withdr 



h 1978 



17 



orea on the ground that it would 
estabilizing, and it could be mis- 
;rstood by the North Koreans, 
was reported quite recently by 
NHK [Nippon TV Network 
).l interview with Dr. Kissinger. 
Id you give us what is the benefit 
e United States, do you think, by 
ng out U.S. troops in Korea? 
I am not sure that you have accu- 
\ slated Secretary Kissinger's posi- 
but I will, therefore, put that 
and speak to the specific question 
ti you have put to me: What do I 
is the benefit of a phased with- 
al of U.S. troops from South 
a'? 

; believe that if these troops are 
Jrawn over a period of time, a 
d of years — 5 years, say — and that 
s done on a phased basis while at 
ame time making sure that the 
i Korean forces are able to build 
leir own troops, that this will 
: a stronger and more self-reliant 
i Korea. We believe that this can 
ne without any danger to the secu- 
f South Korea. 

: indicated further that we would 
aintaining strong and substantial 
air units in the area and naval 
and as a result of that, I think 
here should be no fear about the 
;th of America's commitment to 
epublic of South Korea under the 
al defense agreement which we 
signed many years ago. Nobody 
d have any doubts about that, and 
ild be very unwise if anybody, in- 
ng the North Koreans, should 
any doubt about the strength of 
evictions there. 

Do you detect an increased pat- 
of Communist espionage, with 
ietnamese spy case here and the 
Ision of the Soviet diplomats 
Canada? And, if so, is there a 
concern in the United States 
these events? 

I would separate the two. The 
hat we are dealing with here is a 
ihat dealt specifically with the 
amese, and I do not, therefore, 
with anything which Canada has 
■vith respect to the Soviet Union, 
had a very specific case to deal 
here, a case under which an in- 
:nt had been handed down with 
t to espionage activities in which 
:ad of the U.N. delegation for 
im was named as an unindicted 
spirator. Under those circum- 
s we felt that it was clear that the 
-ges which the various people 
re at the United Nations serving 
I missions have, had been vio- 
and, therefore, it was clear that 
'"Id be asked to leave the coun- 



try, as we have done in other cases. 
That was done, and his government has 
indicated they will withdraw him. 

Q. Could I follow up on that spe- 
cific question, because intelligence 
activities are rather common, but the 
expulsion of such a high-ranking dip- 
lomat is not. Could you give us more 
of your thinking as to why you did 
order it, and also what impact you 
might think it would have on future 
relations with Vietnam? 

A. Yes. In this case, this particular 
individual was named by a grand jury 
as an unindicted coconspirator. That 
means that he had an active part in 
what was going on. Therefore, it is a 
different situation from other situations 
that have occurred in the past. 

Insofar as what will happen in the fu- 
ture, obviously this cannot be helpful 
in our bilateral relationships, but we 
hope that it would not impede them in 
such a way as to preclude in the future 
at some point moving forward with our 
discussions which we have started. 

Q. Can you clarify whether the 
new Panama Canal treaty, in com- 
parison to the existing situation, will 
cost the U.S. Treasury anything in 
expenditures or in lost revenue? 
And, if so, how much, in approxi- 
mate terms? 

A. As to the Panama Canal, let me 
try and divide this down into the vari- 
ous pieces so that we can all under- 
stand it clearly. 

The treaties require no appropria- 
tions of taxpayers' dollars for payments 
to Panama. Payments to Panama will 
be drawn from the canal's revenues and 
only from the canal's revenues. 

We have agreed, secondly, outside 
of the treaties to seek certain loans and 
credits for Panama. These loans and 
credits, which I believe total approxi- 
mately $345 million, must be paid 
back; they are not grants. They will be 
used primarily to finance U.S. trade 
and investment in Panama. 

There will be, in addition to that, 
certain expenses which will be incurred 
for consolidation of military facilities 
and early retirement programs for our 
employees, should they desire to exer- 
cise that option. 

None of the money expended for 
these purposes would go to Panama, 
and the United States is free to deter- 
mine the nature of these expenditures. 
These programs will be determined by 
the Congress and the executive in the 
implementing legislation which will 
follow ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties. 

Q. I seem to recall the Carter Ad- 
ministration repeatedly announcing 
that ratification of the treaties will 



not cost the American taxpayers any 
money, but the recent testimony of 
the Comptroller General, the Gover- 
nor of the Canal Zone, as well as 
Senate Majority Leader Byrd, seems 
to indicate that ratification will, in- 
deed, cost the taxpayers money. And 
I was wondering, do you believe 
these men are all wrong, or will the 
Carter Administration retract or re- 
vise — 

A. No, I don't. I think, if you will 
take a look at the testimony — and I 
know what I have said in my own 
speeches — I have referred specifically 
to payments to Panama, and I have 
never said that there would be no cost 
to the American taxpayer with respect 
to such things as the consolidations that 
have to be taken care of in respect of 
the military facilities and in connection 
with the early retirement provisions. I 
think Senator Byrd made this very clear 
when he summarized these matters in 
his speech on the floor yesterday. 

Q. In his speech at the National 
Press Club on Monday, President 
Sadat approached the subject of a 
nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. 
Was this discussed with Mr. Sadat 
when he was here? 

And, secondly, is it your opinion 
now that the Middle East is a 
nuclear-free zone except for those 
nuclear or atomic weapons which 
may be in the area and under the 
control of a known nuclear power, 
such as the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain, France, 
China, and India? 

A. No, I did not discuss this matter 
with President Sadat. This he raised 
himself in connection with his discus- 
sions at the meeting to which you refer. 
Insofar as what is in the area at this 
time, we have nothing that I can add to 
what has already been said on this 
previously. 

Q. What is the American view of 
Israel's reported attempts to move 
closer economically to South Africa? 
And what influence, if any, will that 
have on our future relations with 
that country? 

A. I think that is a question that I 
really should not speak to and that 
should be answered by Israel itself. I 
would not necessarily accept the state- 
ment which you made as being an ac- 
curate one, but I think you ought to put 
that question to the Israelis and not to 
me. 

Q. Is the United States trying to 
set up a three-way summit involving 
Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat, as was re- 
ported today in the Jerusalem Post? 
A. We have not yet suggested that. 
On the other hand, as we move on 



:''" i 






la «| 

IK "' 
%•> 

4 



i: 



down the road, we remain totally flexi- 
ble, and anything that is going to move 
the peace process forward, we would 
certainly consider. At this particular 
moment, it doesn't seem necessary to 
do this. 

Q. Could I follow up on one detail 
on Somalia? These Cubans that you 
number there, are they being drawn 
down from Angola or are they com- 
ing in fresh? In other words, is the 
total amount of Cubans in Africa 
going up? 

A. It would appear that they are 
coming from both sources. 

Q, In connection with the Cubans, 
you mentioned that the U.S. relations 
with the Soviet Union might be af- 
fected in terms of negotiations on the 



Indian Ocean. Are there any specific 
areas in which U.S. relations with 
Cuba might be affected? 

A. All I can say is that President 
Sadat kindly, as a courtesy, offered to 
let me read his speech before he made 
it at the press club. I did read it. I did 
make some suggestions to him. He then 
made his own decisions with respect to 
what his speech was going to be, as he 
quite properly should. 

Q. Your assurances on the cross- 
ing of the border, do they come from 
the Soviets, the Cubans, the Ethio- 
pians, or specifically whom? 

A. From the Soviets. Q 



Press release 71 of Feb. 10, 1977. 



General Overview 
of 1977 Activities 



by Secretary Vance 

I am delighted to appear before you 
as you consider the fiscal year 1979 
budget for the Department of State. 1 

I want to spend most of the time we 
have this morning answering your 
questions. But I would like to take a 
few minutes at the outset to give you a 
general overview, as we see it, of the 
year that has just passed and the year to 
come. 

In many respects, the past year has 
been one of continuity in foreign pol- 
icy. 

• We built upon the record of 13 
years of painstaking and difficult 
negotiations to conclude an agreement 
with Panama for the future of the 
Panama Canal. 

• We have pursued, with great care 
and attention, the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks (SALT) with the Soviets, 
and we have made substantial progress 
toward an agreement. 

• We have strongly reaffirmed 
America's commitment to our tradi- 
tional alliances and the importance of 
working to modernize and strengthen 
those relationships. 

• We have continued to play an ac- 
tive role in the efforts to achieve peace 
in the Middle East and southern Africa. 

New emphasis has been given to 
other aspects of America's foreign pol- 
icy over the past year. As we look 
ahead to the 1 980 's— and beyond— we 
are, as a nation, beginning to address 
the problems that will affect the re- 



mainder of our lives and the next gen- 
eration. 

Arms Control 

We want a world that is not con- 
stantly threatened by the possession— 
by dozens of countries — of the capabil- 
ity of starting a nuclear war. The risks 
of such a prospect, in a world filled 
with regional disputes of great emotion 
and volatility, are grave. 

The President has brought into sharp 
focus the urgency of taking steps now 
to stop further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons technology. In our domestic 
nuclear programs, and in our consulta- 
tions with other supplier and recipient 
nations, we have begun to investigate 
new technologies and examine new in- 
stitutional arrangements that will en- 
able the nations of the world to harness 
nuclear energy without spreading the 
most deadly instruments of war. 

We recognize the drain on scarce re- 
sources created by the global traffic in 
conventional arms. We see also the 
constant danger that local arms races 
can fuel regional disputes, which all 
too easily can flare into regional wars. 
As the world's largest supplier of 
conventional weapons, we have recog- 
nized our responsibility to review more 
rigorously requests for such arms. We 
will continue, of course, to utilize arms 
transfers to advance our own security 
and that of close friends. But in the fu- 
ture, the burden of persuasion will be 
on those who favor a particular arms 
sale rather than those who oppose it. 
To be effective in the long run, the ef- 



Department of State Bu 

fort to restrain regional arms 
must involve other nations. We 
been meeting with other 
suppliers, including the Soviet I 
to discuss possible measures for 
tilateral action. And we have ei 
aged the purchaser nations to adc 
gional agreements that limit arm 
ports. 

World Economy 

We recognize that the ecor 
well-being of the American peop 
creasingly is influenced by a 
web of decisions. The vitality i 
economy is attuned to the health 
world economy. Economic dec 
by the advanced industrial nation 
increasingly be made with close 
tion to the interests and concerns 
developing nations. The condit 
the world economy makes it es 
that nations work together H 
mutually beneficial solutions to' 
economic problems. 

Last year at the London sumrf 
gave renewed emphasis to closei 
dination among our traditiona 
nomic partners to build a more 
and durable recovery. Our talk 
the Japanese have been parti<j 
useful in strengthening their c<; 
ment to bring their current aj 
surplus into equilibrium, to it 
their real growth rate, and to opt 
markets. The multilateral trade n ; 
tions in Geneva have been res 
and offers have been tabled. A f 
balanced agreement will, we he 
completed this year. One of out 
ity objectives in international ec< 
policy during the latter months c 
was an oil price freeze by the Or 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Coi 
this was accomplished. 

At the Conference on Intern 
Economic Cooperation in Par 
pledged special attention to the 
ing needs of the developing r 
especially in our trade and finan 
sistance policies. And we be 
fashion longer term policies— fc 
World energy development, for 
sion of International Monetary F 
sources, and for establishment ( 
tional commodity stabilization 
ments. We also began negotiati 
a common fund to finance buffe: 
and will soon begin discussion: 
international wheat agreement. 

Human Rights 

Finally, we have, over the pa 
focused greater attention in our i 
liberations and in those of other 
on the conditions of human 
around the world. 



ch 1978 

'e have come to recognize that 
srica is strongest in the world when 
true to the values of its people. Re- 
t for the individual, abhorrence of 
;rnment torture or arbitrary denials 
eedom, the rejection of racism, the 
t to the economic necessities of 
and the opportunity to participate 
le's government — these are convic- 
s which are widely shared by 
■deans. 

e are finding the most constructive 
i to advance these goals. Our own 
sions — on aid, on votes for loans 
he international development 
s, on military assistance and even 
; — are reviewed for their potential 
ict on human rights conditions, 
e are working to improve the 
an rights machinery of the United 
ons and the Organization of 
rican States and, with the help and 
cipation of Chairman Fascell [Rep- 
itative Dante B. Fascell, chairman 
e joint congressional Commission 
;curity and Cooperation in Europe] 
others in the Congress, to review 
secure better implementation of the 
in rights provisions of the Confer- 
on Security and Cooperation in 
pe. 

ir interest is in results, and thus we 
ot be rigid or doctrinaire. Ulti- 
ly, our policy will be measured by 
lpact on people's lives. 
e decisions which the Administra- 
Congress, and the American 
le face in 1978 will be made, in 
measure, within the context of the 
we set for ourselves during 1977. 
vill persist in our efforts to pro- 
human rights, to check nuclear 
ons proliferation, and to restrain 
;rowth in conventional arms traf- 
n addition, our nation faces par- 
irly important decisions in several 
in the coming year. 

da for 1978 

nama Canal Treaties. The 

es demonstrably promote our na- 

I interests, and for this reason I 

it they will be approved by the 

e. They protect and enhance our 

to defend the canal, by use of 

•can troops if necessary. They 

that defense on more solid foot- 

ince we would be acting on the 

of agreements supported by the 

e of Panama and by world opin- 

bringing Panama into full 
:rship with us in the canal enter- 
. the treaties insure that the canal 
•ways remain open and efficient. 
>y eliminating those arrangements 
,iave been considered vestiges of 
lahsm throughout Latin America, 



we create a new atmosphere in our rela- 
tions that will enable us to strengthen 
our ties to our neighbors in this hemi- 
sphere. 

In short, the treaties secure the fu- 
ture of the canal, and that serves our 
military needs, our commercial inter- 
ests, and our international objectives. 

Strategic Arms Control. We will 
continue during the coming months to 
pursue an agreement with the Soviets 
that will strengthen our security, as 
well as that of our allies. 

Faced with a continuing competition 
in strategic forces with the Soviet 
Union, we have two choices: We can 
match those forces — and there can be 
no question we would do so — or we 
can pursue a new SALT agreement 
which will establish the principle of 
equality in strategic weapons and 
strengthen the strategic balance be- 
tween our two countries. Such an 
agreement would not only place limits 
on Soviet forces but would force actual 
reductions from their current levels. 

We also seek to impose constraints 
on the development of newer, more 
deadly systems. In addition, we will 
continue to press for a comprehensive 
ban on nuclear testing. 

We will pursue these agreements 
with the Soviets because we seek to 
stabilize the military competition. At 
the same time we recognize that there 
will continue to be elements of both 
competition and cooperation in our 
overall relations with the Soviets. 

Middle East and Southern Africa. 
Our diplomatic efforts toward peaceful 
and just resolutions to the conflicts in 
the Middle East and southern Africa 
will continue and will require public 
understanding and support. We will 
work for solutions to these difficult 
problems that will find the support of 
those directly involved and that will 
endure. 

Domestic Energy Program. An ef- 
fective American energy program must 
be enacted in the coming weeks. The 
United States is the world's greatest 
user, greatest waster, and greatest im- 
porter of oil. Our unchecked appetite 
for foreign oil — on which we spend 
$44.6 billion per year, or 30% of our 
total import bill — undermines our own 
economy and threatens the welfare of 
others abroad. 

Trade Negotiations. In consultation 
with Congress and the public, we will 
be seeking in the multilateral trade 
negotiations to design a more open 
trading system, one that will bolster 
our economy and the well-being of 
both the industrialized and developing 
world. 

Foreign Aid. Through a more effec- 
tive foreign aid program, we will en- 



19 

courage the growth and well-being of 
the developing societies. Their eco- 
nomic progress will advance our own. 

The agenda for 1978 is a heavy one, 
reflecting the diverse challenges we 
face as a nation. But we face these 
challenges from a position of unparal- 
leled strength, with extraordinary 
human and physical resources. 

The decisions of 1978 provide us 
with the opportunity to demonstrate 
that a strong America has recaptured its 
confidence, the confidence to play a 
positive role of world leadership. It is a 
role we must play if the world is to 
come to grips with the complex prob- 
lems that otherwise could engulf us. 

All of the challenges we face will 
demand the full measure of our skill 
and resources. In that connection, let 
me briefly address two other matters 
which concern me and in which this 
subcommittee has demonstrated par- 
ticular interest — maintaining the qual- 
ity of the Foreign Service and 
strengthening our consular services 
abroad. 



Foreign Service 

The United States has the finest 
Foreign Service in the world. Those 
who serve our nation in its Foreign 
Service do so with great dedication and 
competence, often under the most se- 
vere and dangerous conditions. They 
serve not just the Department of State 
but the American people, conducting 
their official business, protecting their 
interests — and sometimes their lives — 
overseas. Maintaining the highest 
standard for our diplomatic personnel 
is essential to the successful conduct of 
American foreign policy and to the 
well-being of every American. 

In the past, the Foreign Service has 
been able to attract and retain unusu- 
ally high caliber people by offering the 
prospect of steady advancement to jobs 
of increasing challenge and responsibil- 
ity. We have recently been faced, how- 
ever, with a series of developments 
which have had a significant impact on 
the personnel structure of the Foreign 
Service. The executive pay raise of last 
February has resulted in a substantial 
decline in voluntary retirements. The 
recent court decision striking down the 
mandatory retirement-at-60 provision 
of the Foreign Service Act has aggra- 
vated the problem, and the Solicitor 
General, at our request, is appealing 
the decision. 

I want this subcommittee to know — 
and we seek your support and 
counsel — that we will do all that we 
can to ameliorate the impact of these 
developments. We will take those steps 
that are available to us to provide 






5*' 
1 

* 



20 

broader career opportunities and to 
strengthen the skills that have been the 
hallmark of our American diplomacy. 

At the same time, we will continue 
to pursue a vigorous affirmative action 
prosram to bring about a more repre- 
sentative diplomatic corps. Early last 
year. I established a task force to 
examine equal employment opportuni- 
ties in the Department of State and to 
make recommendations for a specific 
prosram for affirmative action. I have 
accepted the report of that committee, 
and we are working actively to imple- 
ment its recommendations. They in- 
clude increasing the hiring goals for 
existing affirmative action programs; 
centralizing Department recruiting and 
hiring; appointing more women and 
minorities to executive-level positions, 
to Foreign Service Selection Boards, 
and to Civil Service promotion panels; 
and establishing affirmative action as a 
factor in performance evaluations and 
promotions. 



Department of State Bulk 



AFRICA: Namibia 



Consular Services 

As we work to strengthen the 
Foreign Service, we must also address 
the need to improve and modernize our 
consular services abroad. In this con- 
nection, I want to express again my ap- 
preciation for the strong leadership and 
support this subcommittee has demon- 
strated in this area. 

The continuing growth of travel 
abroad, and this Administration's 
commitment to facilitate the ability of 
all peoples to move freely in the world, 
give renewed importance to the quality 
of our consular resources. 

As part of our efforts to improve 
these services, on which the American 
people have come to rely more heavily, 
we are working to improve the man- 
agement and use of our existing re- 
sources. 

• Since 1973 the personnel re- 
sources devoted to the consular func- 
tion have increased by approximately 
1 y/c . The commitment of additional re- 
sources will continue, particularly to 
posts where the problems are most se- 
vere. 

• We are improving the quality ot 
the consular work force. We have ex- 
panded the training courses available 
for consular officers, and in 1977 the 
Department opened a new consular 
training facility as part of the Foreign 
Service Institute. 

• We are working to provide better 
promotion opportunities and other in- 
centives for our consular officers. 

• We are expanding and reorganiz- 
ing the office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Consular Affairs to enable us to al- 



Secretary Vance visited New York 
February 11-12, 1978, to meet with 
representatives of the contact group on 
Namibia (Canada, France, West Ger- 
many, United Kingdom, and United 
States), the South West Africa People's 
Organization (SWAPO), the South Af- 
rican Government, and other African 
states to discuss an internationally ac- 
ceptable transition to independence for 
Namibia. Following are remarks to the 
press by Secretary Vance and the 
Foreign' Ministers of Canada (Donald 
Jamieson), France (Louis de Guirin- 
eaud), West Germany (Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher), and the United Kingdom 
(David Owen) on February 12. 

Secretary Vance: I think that this 
has been a useful 2 days that we have 
had with the parties and a chance to 
discuss the proposals we have made in 
respect to Namibia. We have had a 
number of suggestions made by both 
sides with respect to the proposals we 
have made. The discussions which we 
have had on those issues have now 
clarified the problems as they appear to 
both sides. We will be working on 
clarification of the issues which have 
been raised and will be in touch with 
both the South Africans and the South 
West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO) in the very near future. 

I would say on the whole that I think 
we have made some progress; there are 
some difficult issues yet to be resolved, 
but I am pleased that we have had what 



I think has been a very useful mee, 
during these last 2 days. 

Foreign Secretary Owen: I tl 

the only thing I can say is that it 
very serious issue — the chance of 
ting Namibia to independence wit! 
ternational acceptance is a major r 
which would have profound co 
quences for southern Africa. I thin! 
fact that we've seen together five v 
ern Foreign Ministers, Foreign M 
ters from many of the front-line c 
tries, other African states, the S 
African Foreign Minister [R.F. Bo 
and everybody coming to discuss 
creation of a new independent < 
within the framework of U.N. re, 
tions is of itself a really remart 
fact of life. 

In my judgment, the differe' 
that exist between the parties art 
such that it's not possible to close 
gap, and the prize in my judgme 
too great to allow an unwillingne 
make the necessary compromisj 
stand in its way. So I leave he, 
think this business of being optir; 
or pessimistic is almost impossit 
■assess. There is a chance that Na 
could go to independence under i 
ternationally acceptable framewor 
with the involvement of the Unite 
tions. That's a very big prize, 
worth that effort. 

State Secretary Jamieson: I 
think there is anything I can 
fully add other than to real 
the fact that this has been foi 



locate better available consular re- 
sources. 

• We are expanding the automation 
capabilities for issuing passports and 
visas. 

But the difficult problems remain. 
The strains on available consular re- 
sources continue to build, deriving 
from several sources. These include: 

• New statutory demands on con- 
sular services, such as refugee reproc- 
essing, return of Americans imprisoned 
overseas, and emergency medical and 
dietary assistance to Americans abroad; 

• The ever-increasing numbers of 
Americans now traveling abroad and 
foreign citizens traveling in America, 
both of which should increase even fur- 
ther with lower cost airfares; and 

• The magnitude of the un- 
documented alien problem. 



The simple fact is, addition 
sources are needed for this vital 
tion, and, accordingly, we have i 
new funds for this activity i 
budget request. 

As you consider this request, 
with the entire budget, we stand 
to cooperate with you fully and 
sist you in any way that we can. 



Statement before the Subcommittee on 
tional Operations of the House Committt 
ternational Relations on Feb. 8, 1978 (t 
press release 66 of Feb. 8). The complt 
script of the hearings will be publishe, 
committee and will be available ft 
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Go\ 
Printing Office. Washington, DC. 2041 
1 This request refers to $1.3 billion 
partment of State operating expen: 
$56.3 million for migration and refuge 
ance. 



irch 1978 

d I'm sure for my colleagues, a wel- 
me opportunity. I think if one had to 
:ntify what the real advantage has 
in, it has certainly been to focus the 
ue very clearly, to give us — as the 
)resentatives of our countries — a 
nprehensive overview of just exactly 
at is involved, to identify the areas 
problems that still exist and that are 
be resolved. But on balance, I think 

have moved significantly over these 
t 2 or 3 days. As Mr. Owen has 
d, it may not be appropriate to de- 
ibe it as optimistic or pessimistic, 

certainly I believe that we have the 
mentum going here that can produce 

desired results within a very quick 
e frame. 

Foreign Minister Genscher: [Unof- 
ial translation] When I left Ger- 
ny, I was asked whether I thought 
t there would be a breakthrough at 
• meeting, and I replied by saying I 

not think there would be a break - 
ough but that there would be prog- 
s. Now, shortly before I will be 
ving New York, I can rightly say 
t there has been progress made in 

talks which we have had. I consider 
t it was a very important event 
ich made five Foreign Ministers, 
ose countries are members of the 
urity Council, meet here for a seri- 

effort to bring about a solution in a 
icult international question. 
t was likewise of great importance 
t for the same reason, African 
eign Ministers and politicians also 
ie here to meet with us. There is 
) the presence of the president of 
'APO [Sam Njoma] and of the 
ith African Foreign Minister, which 
ins that all these personalities see a 
nee which they all would like to 
e made the best possible use of. Our 

is to set an example for a solution 
^rding to which in a country elec- 
is can be organized with security 

while maintaining order, so that 

country can come to independence. 
s event will show that all patience 

all endeavors made were worth- 
le and that this country is indeed 
ig led toward independence and 
dom. 

oreign Minister De Guiringaud: I 

k there is little I can add to what 
already been said. With respect to 
progress of the meeting, I think it 

worth meeting, the five of us, here 
•ther with the Foreign Minister of 
th Africa and together with several 
pgn Ministers of important African 
lines. We did not expect to achieve 
I'Plete agreement when we came 
j^here; no one of us expected it. But 
-xpected ihat we would make prog- 

and that more comprehension of 



the problem would be reached on both 
parts — by all parties. 

I think this has been achieved; the 
last conversation we had with the pres- 
ident of SWAPO is a very good exam- 
ple of that. We were in a position a few 
months ago where nobody knew what 
would happen in Namibia, that a proc- 
ess could have started whereby some 
kind of political solution in Namibia 
would have developed which would 
have been to the detriment of the 
people and would have put [inaudible] 
in a rather difficult position. I'm con- 
vinced tonight that the effort which has 
been deployed by the contract group of 
the five has been extremely useful and 
that the effort which we have deployed 
in the last 2 days has added to this. 
Now there is a fair chance that Namibia 
will accede to independence within the 
framework of U.N. resolutions. 

Q. We have heard here last week 
and this week that all the parties 
have made significant modifications 
in their positions. We have also 
heard that SWAPO has made some 
concessions. We have heard that 
South Africa pretty much accepted 
the same position and is going [back] 
to South Africa to consult. What I 
would like to know is if there aren't 
further concessions from South Africa, 
how likely are sanctions against South 
Africa in the Security Council? 

Secretary Vance: Let me first an- 
swer by saying that as far as South Af- 
rica is concerned, there have been con- 
cessions on the part of South Africa as 
there have been concessions or flexibil- 
ity on the part of SWAPO as well. So I 
think on both sides there have been — 
there has been demonstrated a willing- 
ness to try and move in a fashion which 
is necessary if there is going to be the 
kind of compromise which is necessary 
in any set of negotiations. 

Insofar as the question of sanctions 
is concerned, I think we ought to wait 
and see what happens as we proceed 
forward during the next weeks to see 
whether we cannot make progress in 
this particular area. I think it is much 
too early to draw conclusions about 
what the future holds, and, therefore, I 
would think it is too early to respond to 
the question you asked. 

Perhaps some of my colleagues 
would like to speak. 

State Secretary Jamieson: We can 
agree. 

Q. [Inaudible — concerns when 
South Africans might move toward 
an internal settlement] 

Secretary Vance: I really can't an- 
swer that with precision — I wish I 
could. The South Africans have talked 
about an internal solution or settle- 



21 



ment. On the other hand, I think it is 
important to note that when the South 
Africans went back for further consul- 
tations they did not indicate that they 
were going back to discuss the ques- 
tion of an internal settlement or solu- 
tion. They went back to consult with 
respect to what might be done in terms 
of the propositions which have been 
made and how they could be handled in 
the future. So, therefore, I would not 
like to try and guess or predict at this 
point how much time there is. 

Q. Is the end of the year an actual 
deadline for the independence of 
Namibia, or could you move that up? 
Why did you choose that deadline? 

State Secretary Jamieson: To the 
best of my knowledge, I don't think 
anybody from our side has ever put a 
deadline or has said the end of the 
year. I think there has been a general 
observation that 1978 was, in fact, the 
year in which independence should be 
achieved. But, I don't recall — certainly 
not in these last days — anybody speak- 
ing about a very specific date. Ob- 
viously, the faster, the better. 



Southern 
Rhodesia 



Department Statement 

In consultation with all the parties 
concerned, the British and American 
Governments developed a plan de- 
signed to avoid the problems that frus- 
trated previous settlement efforts in 
Rhodesia. We believe this plan offers 
an opportunity for the people of Zim- 
babwe to choose their own leadership 
fairly and openly. It sets the standard 
against which any settlement proposals 
should be measured. 

To the extent that last week's Salis- 
bury announcement offers the possibil- 
ity of an early end to the white minori- 
ty's domination of the political 
process, it is a significant step. We 
lack information, however, on impor- 
tant details of the agreement, and there 
are complex and significant aspects 
that remain to be worked out among the 
parties. 

We remain dedicated to working 
with all of the parties, both those in 
Salisbury and outside of the country, to 
promote a peaceful settlement with 
majority rule. □ 



ii 

'4 »* 

H 



Read to news correspondents on Feb. 22, 1978, 
by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III . 



22 

Q. In the proposal there is a 
date— December 31, 197&— for inde- 
pendence. Is that date no longer 
valid? 

Secretary Vance: I would say that 
that is a target date. Everybody, as the 
Foreign Minister said, would like to 
see it happen as soon as possible, but 
that is a target date rather than a final 
date. 

Q. Ambassador [Donald F.] 
McHenry [U.S. Deputy Representa- 
tive on the U.N. Security Council] 
told us earlier that you are now in 
the process of constantly revising 
some of the proposals. If so, it ap- 
pears that [inaudible]. 

Secretary Vance: I would describe 
it as clarifications that are being made 
with respect to the proposals which the 
five have put forward. I think that what 
he is doing is taking back the issues 
which exist as a result of the discussion 
and the reports which we have made to 
him with respect to the positions of the 
other side. We have indicated that we 
will send to him our suggestions with 
respect to clarifications, as we will to 
SWAPO, and we will then receive the 
views of both of them and determine 
what changes, if any, might be made 
with respect to our proposals. But, I 
would really call them clarifications 
more than revisions. 

Q. Could you give us some indica- 
tion as to what the range of options 
are in terms of what is unacceptable 
from either party? 

Foreign Minister Genscher: The 
negotiations are upstairs. [Laughter] 

Foreign Secretary Owen: I hate to 
get too formally committed here. This 
is best done privately. If we firm up 
our positions then we will firm up the 
opposition and firm up the inability of 
people to move into the center. We are 
trying to keep everybody from getting 
into too rigid positions. One of the 
things in any negotiation is that people 
often find it easier to make that com- 
promise when they see the package as a 
whole emerge. If you start isolating in- 
dividual claims and making sticking 
points you gradually build up a situa- 
tion where you haven't got any flexibil- 
ity in the negotiations. Everybody 
knows the main central problems as 
always in these issues — and we have 
had it in Rhodesia and elsewhere— and 
you get down to law and order issues. 
This is the problem. The question of 
the armies — the way and the control — 
these are the things that are the central 
core of the problem. 

Q. How would a settlement in 
Namibia affect the prospects for a 
settlement in Rhodesia? 



Foreign Secretary Owen: I think 
that if we could show in Namibia that 
you could bring a country to 
independence — internationally agreed 
and with a major role of the United 
Nations — this will all do very well for 
an internationally acceptable solution 
in Rhodesia. I think that if the South 
Africans can accept one man, one vote 
without qualifications, and they have 



Department of State Bulki 

expressed a readiness to accept a r< 
of the United Nations, then there ij 
real reason why the Rhodesians, bl| 
and white, should not accept the sat; 
But, as for the timing, these iss : 
have moved across in time over the 5 
few months quite often, and no den 
they will again. 



Press release 73 of Feb. 14, 1978. 



ECONOMICS: 

I/JS. Embargo Policy 



by Julius L. Katz 

I welcome the opportunity to appear 
before you to consider questions relat- 
ing to proposals for an economic em- 
bargo against Uganda in the context of 
U.S. experience with embargoes 
against other countries. 

I would like to emphasize that there 
can be no question about the concern of 
this Administration with the violation 
of human rights in Uganda. We have 
made clear, and will continue to make 
clear, our opposition to an abhorrence 
of the flagrant disregard of fundamen- 
tal human rights and denial of specific 
human dignity in that country. 

Both the executive and legislative 
branches of the U.S. Government have 
made clear in numerous ways the im- 
portance of minimizing restrictions on 
international trade. Such a policy has 
contributed significantly to the growth 
of the economic, political, and military 
strength of our country. This basic phi- 
losophy has served us well. Therefore, 
we believe trade restrictions of any 
kind are not to be entered into lightly. 
An economic sanction is generally 
regarded as an action toward another 
nation intended to force it into a de- 
sired course. It might take the form of 
a trade embargo, lesser forms of re- 
strictions on trade, or withholding 
loans. Prospects of effectiveness are 
increased through multilateral action. 
But it is often difficult to reach interna- 
tional agreement on the application of 
sanctions. And even internationally 
agreed sanctions may not change the 
policies of the targeted country. A 
broad embargo is the most restrictive 
form of economic sanction and, there- 
fore, most harmful to trade interests. 
Economic sanctions, especially a uni- 
lateral embargo, should be imposed 
only where there are extraordinarily 
serious reasons for doing so. 

The United States has, of course, be- 
lieved that embargoes have been jus- 



tified in certain exceptional di- 
stances in the past. Chief among rj 
are armed hostilities. 

Most past U.S. embargoes, inclui 
several still in effect, have been f 
tuted for this reason. During the' 
rean conflict we imposed an emtai 
against North Korea. Similarly, dii! 
the Vietnam war we embargoed ii 
with Communist-controlled portioi 
that country. This embargo was: 
tended to all of Vietnam, and C 
bodia, when the Communists took/ 
complete control in 1975. The emi 
against Cuba came at a time \1 
Cuban actions presented a set) 
threat in the Western Hemisphere. 

In other situations we have imp- 
embargoes as a result of U.N. Sec 
Council findings under Chapter V 
the U.N. Charter. Thus, the U| 
States is participating in multila' 
Rhodesian sanctions and in a ' 
agreed mandatory prohibition o 
sale of munitions to South Africa. 
For many years we have restr 
the export of strategic goods and 
nologies to countries threatening 
security. Together with other N 
countries and Japan, we have pri 
ited the export of items which \| 
make a significant contribution ti 
military potential of the U.S. 51 
other Warsaw Pact countries, an. 
People's Republic of China v, 
would prove detrimental to our 
rity. 

Effects of an Embargo 

The economic effects of emba; 
prohibiting virtually all U.S. trade' 
Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and J 
Korea have been limited. This has> 
in part because other countries ha> 
joined us in restricting trade. The I 
on Cuba was relatively greater thi 
the East Asian countries because 
proximity of Cuba to the United I 
and the extent of economic ties V 






:h 1978 



23 



revolutionary government came to 
er. Cuba lost a major market for its 
r, but the U.S.S.R. took up most 
ie slack. Cuba and Vietnam have 
i deprived of spare parts for equip- 
t previously imported from the 
ed States. U.S. trade with Cam- 
a and with North Korea was not 
ificant even before the embargoes. 

the case of Rhodesia, the embargo 
been accompanied by sanctions 
ion by South Africa and earlier by 

ugal's African colonies. The 
lesians have also concentrated on 
levelopment of indigenous industry 
: the imposition of sanctions. Con- 
on exports to South Africa and to 
J.S.S.R., other Warsaw Pact coun- 
, and the P.R.C. are not designed 
ive an economic impact, 
ie political effects of these embar- 

have also been limited. In some 
s a targeted country changed its 
rnal or foreign policies in the 
lg direction. For instance, Cuba 

Vietnam moved closer to the 
S.R. following imposition of the 

embargoes, although they proba- 
vould have done so even in the ab- 
B of our trade restrictions. The em- 
o of Cuba may have helped to con- 
the spread of Communist influence 
ie Western Hemisphere, but this 
osition cannot be proven nor dis- 
en. 

the case of Rhodesia, however, 
: is strong evidence to suggest that 
adherence to U.N. sanctions by 

nations, coupled with the strains 
ised by an ongoing guerrilla war, 

seriously damaged the Rhodesian 
omy and significantly influenced 
lopments there. Restrictions on 
)rts of strategic items to the 
S.R., its allies, and the P.R.C. 

had only the modest impact of 
what slowing the transfer to them 
lvanced Western technology. 



rent Rationale 

ie committee has asked for a 
ment on the current rationale for 
:mbargoes still in effect. I shall at- 



CONOMIC REPORT 
»F THE PRESIDENT 

On January 29, 1978, President Carter 
:nt a message to the Congress outlining 
is fundamental domestic and interna- 
onal economic goals and his strategy for 
laining them. The full text of this mes- 
ige is printed in the Weekly Compilation 
' Presidential Documents of January 23, 
"8, p. 129. 



tempt to respond by describing condi- 
tions under which it might be wise to 
remove existing embargoes. The cir- 
cumstances which prompted imposition 
of some of them have changed some- 
what over the years. However, it would 
be irresponsible to discard them on that 
basis alone. Ending an embargo is a 
dramatic action with significant policy 
ramifications. 

• In the case of Cuba, full normali- 
zation of trade and diplomatic relations 
hinges in our view upon Cuba's will- 
ingness to address, among other issues, 
compensation for American citizens 
whose property was expropriated by 
the Cuban Government and restraint in 
Africa. 

• In the case of Vietnam, we are 
prepared to end the embargo at such 
time as normal diplomatic relations are 
established and ambassadors are in 
place. 

• Cambodia does not seem to be in- 
terested in considering whether a simi- 
lar arrangement might be possible 
there. 

• Continuing North Korean intransi- 
gence makes any accommodation un- 
likely in the near future. 

In all four of these cases controls on 
the export of strategic items would be 
continued for national security pur- 
poses even if other controls were re- 
moved. Whether or not to remove these 
other controls inevitably becomes a 
question of foreign policy, which 
should take the totality of our relations 
with the targeted country into account. 

With respect to Rhodesia and South 
Africa, the United States is complying 
with U.N. Security Council resolutions 
on sanctions. Unilateral U.S. controls 
against South Africa going beyond 
U.N. resolutions consist of restrictions 
on exports to the police and the mili- 
tary aimed at dissociating ourselves 
from their apartheid-motivated repres- 
sive measures. 

There has been no development 
which would warrant discontinuing the 
strategic embargo against the 
U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and the 
P.R.C. 



Relevance to Uganda 

What is the relevance of all this to 
Uganda? As I said at the outset, it is 
our view that sweeping economic sanc- 
tions, particularly embargoes, should 
be entered into only under extraordi- 
nary circumstances. As was stated by 
the Department's witness at the Feb- 
ruary 2 session of these hearings, it is 
the Administration's view that the tak- 
ing of such a step with respect to 
Uganda at this time is not likely to be 



effective, particularly given the improb- 
ability of endorsement of or participa- 
tion in such a move by the international 
community as a whole. The United 
States is neither a unique nor an essen- 
tial source for Uganda's imports. Cof- 
fee is Uganda's principal export, and 
Uganda would have little or no trouble 
finding other customers for the coffee 
it now sells to American firms. 

Does this mean that we should do 
nothing in the trade field to show our 
displeasure with human rights viola- 
tions in Uganda? No. It is quite proper 
for us to prohibit the export to Uganda 
of items which could reasonably be 
used to repress the people of that coun- 
try. This we are doing. It is also quite 
proper for us to encourage increased in- 
ternational attention to the human 
rights situation in Uganda, including 
international pressure on the Ugandan 
Government to improve its human 
rights performance, as we are also do- 
ing. But we do not believe that it would 
be wise to impose a unilateral embargo 
on Uganda. □ 






Statement before the House Committee on In- 
ternational Relations on Feb. 9, 1978. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. Mr. Katz is Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. 



CONGRESSIONAL 
DOCUMENTS 



Temporary Suspension of the Duty on Certain 
Latex Sheets, and Other Matters. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Finance to accom- 
pany H.R. 2850. S. Rept. 95-419. Sept. 9, 
1977. 5 pp. 

Duty-Free Treatment for Imports of Copying 
Lathes Used for Making Shoe Lasts, and 
Other Matters. Report of the Senate Commit- 
tee on Finance to accompany H.R. 3093. S. 
Rept. 95-421. Sept. 9, 1977. 7 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of the Import Duty on 
Certain Horses, and Other Matters. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Finance to accom- 
pany H.R. 3259. S. Rept. 95-422. Sept. 9, 
1977. 6 pp. 

Suspension of the Import Duty on Intravenous 
Fat Emulsion, and Other Matters. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Finance to accom- 
pany H.R. 1904. S. Rept. 95-432. Sept. 15, 
1977. 6 pp. 

Extension of Suspension of Duties on Certain 
Classifications of Silk Yarns, and Other Mat- 
ters. Report of the Senate Committee on Fi- 
nance to accompany H.R. 3373. S. Rept. 
95-434. Sept. 15, 1977. 7 pp. 



©» 






388 



5» 

1 • 



24 



international Aviation Policy 



by Richard N. Cooper 



These are lively times for interna- 
tional aviation — times of change for the 
industry and the government. But be- 
fore addressing these changes, I would 
like to say a word about what is un- 
changed in U.S. international aviation 
policy. 

The enduring objective of the United 
States in international aviation is to 
serve the national interest in efficient, 
reliable air service; in a viable U.S. 
carrier industry; and in a regime of fair 
rules and expanding competitive oppor- 
tunity for both U.S. and foreign car- 
riers. These objectives parallel our 
goals in foreign commerce generally: 
We seek to remove unnecessary restric- 
tions; to enlarge the possibilities of 
competition; and to maximize the bene- 
fits of competition for the consuming 
public, industry, and labor. 

These generalities have, in recent 
months, taken on a new and specific 
form. New entry and price competition 
among carriers in the North Atlantic 
has resulted in substantial fare reduc- 
tions and in extraordinary range of op- 
portunities for travelers of ordinary 
means. Decisions by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board and the President 
have encouraged innovations and low 
fares in scheduled service and 
liberalized the rules for charters. In 
aviation agreements with Mexico, Bel- 
gium, Singapore, four African coun- 
tries, Yugoslavia, and Paraguay we 
have secured expanded rights for both 
charter and scheduled service. 

Political scientists dispute whether it 
is events that create policy or policy 
that controls and shapes events. Fre- 
quently both propositions are true; 
these changes in the marketplace and in 
government regulation are a case in 
point. 

Forces Behind Recent Changes 

In recent years, the main economic 
problems of international aviation have 
been too many empty seats and, on 
many routes, unduly high rates. The 
problems have reinforced each other: 
High rates have reduced the growth of 
travel, while empty seats have pro- 
duced losses and the impetus to raise 
rates even higher. In the world of 
theoretical economics, this circle 
would be broken by competitive fare 
reductions. But the real world of inter- 



national aviation is not the theorist's 
model of perfect competition. In some 
areas of the world, low load factors 
have led, at times, to rebating rather 
than to lower authorized fares. In other 
areas, fare reduction and innovation 
have not been seen as in the interests of 
governments or carriers. And some 
countries have not permitted the liberal 
charter operations which act as a spur 
to competition among scheduled car- 
riers. 

On North Atlantic routes, these bar- 
riers to competition have been partially 
overcome by market forces. The de- 
mand for low-cost travel is enormous. 
Millions of travelers have shown them- 
selves willing to accept some 
inconvenience — fixed return dates, ad- 
vance purchases, or the uncertainties of 
standby status — in return for dis- 
counted fares. This demand for nonbusi- 
ness travel created the charter indus- 
try, led to scheduled fare innovations, 
and in recent months has made possible 
active price competition on the North 
Atlantic. 

While the marketplace has been 
changing so have public and official 
views about the proper role of regula- 
tion in the aviation industry. For 
domestic aviation, there has been in- 
creasing agreement that regulation 
should be modified to allow substan- 
tially greater freedom for new entry 
and price competition. The problems of 
international aviation, though in ways 
more complex, are broadly similar. 

In the past, nations have avowed two 
basic reasons for restricting entry, 
operating rights, and price competition 
in international aviation. They have 
viewed the entire international aviation 
system as what economists call an "in- 
fant industry," needing the nurturance 
of government for its survival and 
growth. And in particular, they have 
promoted national flag carriers, and 
protected them from competition, as a 
means of serving broad political as well 
as economic goals. 

Whatever the merits of these restric- 
tive policies in the past, they are in- 
creasingly inappropriate to the interna- 
tional aviation industry of today. The 
industry has reached maturity. Its 
growth has been spectacular. In the last 
decade, international passenger traffic 
has doubled, and cargo has nearly tre- 
bled. Over two dozen flag carriers op- 
erate over intercontinental route net- 
works. In this new context, govern- 



Department of State Bullei 

ments can take a step back and let f 
key decisions be made by compett 
airlines rather than by administrate 
dictate. 

The basic case for reduced restrict i 
can be made from a comparison!, 
fares over similar routes. The one-v; 
economy fare from Los Angeles to 5ji 
Francisco is $28. 10; the distance is I 
miles. California allowed free compn 
tion and entry until the mid-1960's ;< 
still has a less restrictive framew 1 
than the interstate system. On an 
terstate route of 334 miles — Chicago 
Minneapolis — the fare is $52. 

In Europe fares for comparable <jl 
tances are similar or higher: Londi 
Glasgow, a 326-mile route, has a f," 
of $58, and the slightly shor 
Lisbon-Madrid route is $56. Or if 
look at a longer route — for exam 
Paris-Rome — we can calculate the j: 
rated cost of 337 miles to be about $.' 
To be sure, traffic density on the | 
Angeles-San Francisco route is exc: 
tionally high. But careful and repes 
study has shown that the basic expl?: 
tion for the low fare is competitive:! 
ficiency rather than good weather 
high market potential. 

The task, then, for the United St,: 
is to work with other countries 
achieve the benefits of competition': 
to remove needless restrictions, i 
cause international aviation rights;: 
defined by bilateral agreements, " 
expansion of competitive opportuni* 
necessarily a process rather tha ; 
single decision. In economic terms, 
aviation market between two counti 
is a bilateral monopoly. Both sil 
must agree to the terms and condit i 
of airline operation. Since agreem 
are a result of bargaining, at any gjl 
time the aviation agreements apply 
to different markets will not be 
fectly parallel or consistent. But 
withstanding this obvious point, tl: 
is one overriding economic force w| 
will aid our attempt to achieve lib 
aviation rules — geographic comp: 
tion. As the international aviation 
work has expanded, the choice of r;: 
ing available to passengers has vt 
increased. Winter tourists from the i 
coast can choose among dozen; 
sunny destinations. The travele 
Europe has a broad choice of I 
gateways and European intermedi 
points. Restrictive rules in one ma 
will lead to relative decline for i 
market and increased prosperity fo: 
competitors. 

Negotiating Policy 

The Administration is committed 
forceful and vigorous program of ii 
national aviation negotiations desij 



h 1978 



25 



aend and formalize the scope of 
jetition. Four principles charac- 
; our negotiating policy. 

We are committed to expanding 
fare opportunities for the traveling 
ic. In my own view, the market for 
cost travel has barely been tapped 
ide the North Atlantic. Within 
ent arrangements there is great 
i for low-fare innovation and com- 
ive pricing, which we will encour- 

In negotiating new and revised 
;ments, the United States has reaf- 
:d this permissive policy and ob- 
d clear commitments to low-cost 
innovative rates. By the terms of 

agreements, approval of low fares 
not depend on whether these rates 

been set by intercarrier agree- 
. We encourage U.S. flag carriers 
ce advantage of the new opportuni- 

Liberal charter rules should be 
inteed as an integral part of bilat- 
aviation agreements. In the past, 
agreements have often dealt with 
ers and scheduled services sepa- 
i or have covered only scheduled 
ces. But we have come to recog- 
that charter service is not an inci- 
il appendage to the international 
ion system but one of its central 
res. The opportunity for charter 
•etition under liberal rules must be 
guaranteed, not merely to serve 
leeds of charter customers but to 
rve competitive conditions among 
luled carriers. Removing unneces- 
restrictions on charter service is 
a prime objective of U.S. policy. 
iVe must insure that the system of 
:s, rights, and designation for 
luled carriers permits full scope 
ompetition. Airline routes should 
panded to meet potential demand 
should be free of limitations on 
■ity or frequency and arbitrary re- 
ions on operating rights. The an- 
to empty airline seats lies not with 
*nment restrictions on capacity but 
lower fares through competition 
vith reduced restrictions on routes 
operating rights. 

maximize the possibility for 
'etition, we will press for multiple 
nation of U.S. carriers in all suit- 
markets, as well as multiple 
top gateways for international 
l. Again, we believe that vigorous 
ce and price competition among 
ers, rather than the award of 
>Poly rights, is the best way of 
mg the needs of shippers and 
lers. 

["he United States is committed in 
x>n negotiations to be forthcoming 
tering foreign countries new op- 
mties in exchange for new oppor- 



tunities for our own travelers, shippers, 
and carriers. We want to join our 
negotiating partners in enhancing the 
aviation market rather than restric- 
ting that market through mutual 
protectionism. 

These are ambitious objectives, but I 
believe that they are reasonable and 
that they can be attained. Their 
achievement will require hard and 
coordinated work by U.S. agencies. I 
am told that we are in a period of un- 
usual accord among agencies on our 
objectives in international aviation. 
The number of meetings per agreed 
word is at a record low. Yet inter- 
agency harmony is high. We are, 
perhaps, in a new era when agencies 
agree and airlines compete, rather than 
the other way around. 



For our part, the State Department 
will continue to work closely with 
other agencies in preparing our 
negotiating position and in the negotia- 
tions themselves. We will continue to 
seek the assistance of the aviation in- 
dustry and of the consuming public. 
Together, I believe we have an historic 
opportunity to make the technological 
marvel of international air travel a real- 
ity for the average American. It is in 
this sense — of making the world acces- 
sible to tens of millions — that a free 
and competitive international aviation 
system is most profoundly a part of 
American foreign policy. □ 



Address before the International Aviation Club 
in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 18, 1978: Mr. 
Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Af- 
fairs. 



Debts Owed to the U.S. 



by Robert D. Hormats 

As of September 30, 1977, outstand- 
ing indebtedness on U.S. Government 
credits (exclusive of indebtedness aris- 
ing from World War I) totaled approx- 
imately $42.1 billion, of which $41.6 
billion related to long-term debt with 
an original maturity of over 1 year. 
This debt includes many loan 
categories, with the terms of lending 
reflecting the purpose of the program 
under which the loan was extended. 
Humanitarian or development loans, 
representing almost 60% of our debt, 
are, for example, highly concessional. 

On the other hand, loans by the 
Export-Import Bank, which account for 
roughly 28% of our outstanding debt, 
are at market-related rates consistent 
with the Bank's legislative mandate to 
provide official financing for U.S. ex- 
ports comparable to that of our major 
competitors. 

Approximately 54% of our long-term 
debt is attributable to the non-OPEC 
developing countries. OPEC countries 
account for 8%, industrialized coun- 
tries (including Israel) for 34%, and the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for 
4%. Aside from Ecuador, Indonesia, 
and Nigeria the bulk of the debt owed 
by OPEC countries is related to 
Export-Import Bank lending. This is 
also the case for lending to other indus- 
trialized countries. 1 

The objective of U.S. foreign policy 
is to protect the interests of the United 
States — among which are the assets 



represented by foreign debts. Indi- 
vidual lending or creditor agencies 
have the primary responsibility for in- 
suring debtor-country compliance with 
agreed repayment schedules. In situa- 
tions where these agencies encounter 
collection difficulties and request as- 
sistance, the Department of State and 
U.S. embassies overseas have the re- 
sponsibility for pursuing collection. 

We take these responsibilities very 
seriously and pursue such delinquen- 
cies vigorously. Among the areas of 
progress over the last 18 months were 
collections of overdue payments from 
Hungary ($4.3 million), the Dominican 
Republic ($1.4 million), and Uganda 
($500,000). 

In the vast majority of cases, debts 
owed to the United States since World 
War II have, in fact, been paid on time. 
Repayments, including interest, on 
long-term credits extended since 1940 
now exceed $45 billion. As of Sep- 
tember 30, 1977, principal and interest 
due and unpaid 90 days or more totaled 
$591 million. 

I note that in spite of the difficult fi- 
nancial situation faced by many debtor 
countries, the level of outstanding ar- 
rearages reflects an improvement over 
the $652 million figure discussed at 
this subcommittee's last hearing 2 
years ago. While this reflects primarily 
the seriousness foreign governments at- 
tach to honoring agreed obligations, it 
also reflects the importance and high 
priority given to debt-collection efforts 
by the U.S. Government. 



2s« 



33231 



m 



S3) 



•:■■•:•■.•; 



26 

While debtor countries worldwide 
have a generally good record in main- 
taining their debt servicing payments to 
the United States, I assure you that we 
will continue to press for improved 
results. 

Major Arrearages 

It is important to recognize, how- 
ever, that a large portion of current de- 
linquencies relate to a few unique situa- 
tions where circumstances currently 
impede our ability to collect. For 
example, approximately 70% of current 
arrearages relate to Korea conflict 
logistical support claims and debt 
owed by China, Cuba, the Khmer Re- 
public, and Vietnam. 

Arrearages relating to logistical sup- 
port provided by the United States to 
other nations during the Korean con- 
flict total $200 million. They arose be- 
cause, while we concluded formal 
agreements for repayment of such as- 
sistance with 14 countries, the validity 
of the claims of six countries (Colom- 
bia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Turkey) cannot be clearly es- 
tablished. The history of these claims 
is complex, and we are about to begin 
consultations with Congress regarding 
the initiation of legislation which 
would remove the claims from the cat- 
egory of outstanding debt. This course 
of action conforms fully to a 1976 rec- 
ommendation of the House Committee 
on Government Operations. 

The delinquencies attributable to the 
Republic of China total $108 million 
and are largely related to lend lease and 
other war accounts settlements. The 
debts involve a number of difficult is- 
sues including the proper allocation of 
claims between the Republic of China 
and the People's Republic of China, 
the correct evaluation of the claims, 
and the problems of government suc- 
cession. Cuba's arrearages total $74 
million, most of which is owed to the 
Export-Import Bank. As our relation- 
ships with the People's Republic of 
China and Cuba evolve, we will con- 
sider how we might handle the question 
of these and related debts. 

Political factors also hinder settle- 
ment of $25 million now owed by the 
Khmer Republic and Vietnam. In this 
context, it should be noted that our per- 
formance in assuring debt repayment is 
best in countries where we maintain 
good bilateral relations. And con- 
versely, situations where bilateral rela- 
tions bear the legacy of historic 
animosity or are clouded by serious 
friction often constitute serious debt- 
collection problems. 

Arrearages other than the five cases 
cited above total approximately $184 



million. The largest of these are at- 
tributable to Iran ($36 million) and 
Zaire ($25 million). In the case of Iran, 
the United States has made extensive 
efforts to collect arrearages owed on two 
surplus property agreements signed in 
1945 and 1948. Iran made payments to- 
taling $11 million on these debts during 
the late 1940's but halted them during 
the period of instability in the 1950's. 
As a result of recent negotiations, Iran 
made payments of $750,000 (March 
1973) and $1.8 million (October 1975). 
Iran has, however, mad